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Preface 
 
 
“Ask yourself what would happen to your own personality if you heard it said over and over again that you were 
lazy, a simple child of nature, expected to steal, and had inferior blood. Suppose this opinion were forced on you by 
the majority of your fellow citizens. And suppose nothing that you could do would change this opinion – because 
you happen to have black skin,” pioneering social psychologist Gordon Allport challenged his readers in 1954 to 
consider (Allport, 1979/1958/1954, p. 142). Today, fifty years later, people still suffer from stigma based on many 
different group memberships: African Americans and Latinos are negatively stereotyped in the intellectual domain, 
women are negatively stereotyped in the math domain, and those who are mentally ill suffer from more global 
devaluation.  
This book is a culmination of the efforts of a working group on stigma and group inequality. Our work on this 
topic began informally in 2002 and grew into the idea to organize more formal discussions and panel presentations 
at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology. Building on the success of these 
presentations, we decided to put together a full line-up of speakers and organize the Twenty-First Annual Claremont 
Symposium on Applied Social Psychology on the topic of stigma and group inequality. We held this one-day 
conference in the spring of 2004 in Claremont, California. All of the chapters in this volume were presented at the 
conference and discussed the next day at our final working group meeting. 
In each of the chapters, the authors provide a snapshot of the latest theoretical and empirical work on social 
psychological approaches to stigma and group inequality. Social psychology has a long tradition of research on 
stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination. For a large part of its history, this research focused on the views and 
responses of members of dominant groups to members of minority groups. In the past 15 years, however, a new line 
of research has emerged that focuses on the perspective of stereotyped or stigmatized groups. Many of the authors in 
this book were key pioneers in this field of research. Together with those whose more recent work has also led to a 
variety of theoretical and methodological innovations in the study of stigma, they have moved the field to a new 
depth of understanding of these processes. As a result, we have obtained much better knowledge of how stigma 
affects the stigmatized individual, his or her interaction partners, the stigmatized and non-stigmatized groups to 
which they belong, and relations between the groups.  
This wealth of ground-breaking theoretical and empirical work is captured in this book. As such, the volume is 
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an important addition to earlier scientific work on stigma and prejudice. The chapters of the book are written by 
experts in clear language that is accessible to a wide audience of teachers, administrators, managers, parents, 
community leaders, and concerned citizens who are trying to understand and improve the plight of stigmatized 
individuals in schools, at work, at home, in the community, and in society at large. With the cutting-edge research 
presented in each chapter, the book is also a valuable resource for undergraduate and graduate students and scholars 
in the fields of psychology, sociology, social work, anthropology, communication, public policy, and political 
science. 
The volume is organized around three major sections: responses to stigma, stigma in the social context, and 
stigma and the social basis of the self. The initial chapter by Colette van Laar and Shana Levin presents the overall 
structure of the volume and highlights three main themes covered in the chapters: the effects of stigma and the 
processes that account for these effects, the variables that moderate the effects of stigma on outcomes, and the 
lessons that can be learned from this work to mitigate the negative effects of stigma at the individual, interpersonal, 
and structural or institutional levels.  
The first section of the volume discusses the tradeoffs that stigmatized individuals must contend with as they 
weigh the benefits derived from a particular response to stigma against the costs associated with it. The chapters in 
this section focus particularly on the potential costs associated with confronting and not confronting discrimination. 
Carol Miller begins by providing an overview of a stress and coping perspective on reactions to stigma that has three 
major components: appraisals of stigma-related stressors, coping responses to these stressors, and the roles that 
identification to the self, to other people, and by other people that prejudice has occurred play in both appraisal and 
coping processes. The next two chapters address the ways in which confronting stigmatization can affect how group 
members are likely to be perceived and received by members of the dominant group. First, Cheryl Kaiser begins by 
reviewing theory and research on interpersonal responses to discrimination claimants, arguing that the stigmatized 
are reluctant to report discrimination because discrimination claimants often incur social rejection. She then 
proceeds to describe a dominant ideology threat model of reactions to discrimination claimants, explaining that this 
interpersonal rejection occurs because discrimination claims threaten meritocracy beliefs. In the next chapter, Nicole 
Shelton, Jennifer Richeson, Jessica Salvatore, and Diana Hill extend the work introduced by Kaiser to consider the 
intrapersonal costs of not confronting perpetrators of prejudice. The authors summarize two studies they conducted 
concerning the affective and cognitive consequences of not challenging prejudice, concluding that individuals 
should confront prejudice when they are firmly committed to challenging discrimination and they think they should 
confront in a particular situation – otherwise they will suffer serious intrapersonal costs of not confronting prejudice. 
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Next, Diane Quinn discusses the unique situation of individuals who have stigmatized identities that may be 
concealed from others, such as those who have a history of an eating disorder or mental illness. In addition to 
selecting an optimal coping strategy when their stigmatized identity is revealed to others, these individuals must also 
contend with difficulties deciding when and to whom to reveal the nature of their stigma in the first place. In the 
final chapter of this section, Janet Swim and Margaret Thomas suggest that in selecting the best coping response for 
a given situation, members of stigmatized groups will choose the strategy that  -ps them reach their core social 
goals – among them the need to belong, the need for self-enhancement, the need for understanding, the need to trust 
others, and the need to be in control. 
The second section of the volume discusses the ways in which environments can threaten one’s intellectual 
performance, sense of belonging, and self-concept. In the first chapter of this section, Michael Inzlicht and Catherine 
Good argue that situational cues such as the ratio of men to women in a testing room can have substantial effects on 
women’s performance and engagement in the testing domain. The authors propose various environmental 
modifications that may reduce the threat associated with these situational cues. In the next chapter, Rodolfo Mendoza-
Denton, Elizabeth Page-Gould, and Janina Pietrzak discuss the ways in which these environments can interact with 
personal characteristics, leading some individuals to perceive ethnic discrimination more readily and to react to it more 
intensely and negatively. For these individuals, the authors argue that having friends from other ethnic groups is 
especially beneficial for social and academic outcomes. However, Linda Tropp cautions in the next chapter that we 
must keep in mind that in threatening environments that foster perceptions of prejudice and discrimination, contact 
with members of other ethnic groups may generally be a less effective means for promoting positive intergroup 
outcomes among members of minority status groups. Brenda Major concludes this section with a synthesis of the new 
theoretical perspectives on stigma that have challenged traditional views, noting that there is considerable variability in 
responses to stigma across different stigmatized groups, across individuals within stigmatized groups, and even within the 
same individual across situations. 
In the last section of the volume, the authors argue that the experience of possessing a stigmatized identity is 
shaped by social interactions with others in the stigmatized ingroup as well as members of other outgroups. Tracy 
McLaughlin-Volpe begins by considering the positive consequences for members of stigmatized minority groups of 
forming social relationships with members of the majority outgroup. Specifically, she argues that when one develops a 
close relationship with members of an outgroup, that outgroup will, to some degree, become a part of a person’s self 
concept. Furthermore, this inclusion of the majority outgroup in the self will facilitate the adjustment of minority group 
members in institutions dominated by majority group members. However, Stacey Sinclair and Jeff Huntsinger 
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demonstrate in the next chapter that when members of stigmatized groups are interacting with individuals who are 
thought to believe the negative stereotypes about their group, they may apply these negative group stereotypes to 
themselves (i.e., engage in self-stereotyping), particularly when they are highly motivated to form a social relationship 
with these individuals. Furthermore, Toni Schmader and Brian Lickel argue in the following chapter that in addition to 
influencing the way we think about ourselves, stereotype-confirmation can influence the way we feel about ourselves as 
well: Specifically, members of ethnic or racial groups are likely to feel a sense of shame when another member of their 
ingroup engages in behaviors that confirm a negative stereotype about their group and, as a consequence, will seek to 
distance themselves from the event and the stigmatized identity. Finally, Jennifer Crocker and Julie Garcia conclude 
this section and the volume as a whole by arguing that in the context of interactions between stigmatized and non-
stigmatized individuals, potential threats to the self – either due to stigmatizing attributes or judgments that one is 
prejudiced – can lead to a destructive cycle that may only be broken when people focus outside themselves on learning 
goals, goals that include others, and goals that are larger than the self. 
We hope that this book will be a resource for students, a guide for future researchers, and a call to concerned 
citizens to use this wealth of information to guide their own efforts to mitigate the pernicious effects of stigma in their 
daily lives. 
 
Shana Levin and Colette van Laar 
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Social psychological research on stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination has typically focused on the views and 
responses of members of dominant groups to members of minority groups. Recent efforts to focus attention on the 
perspective of stereotyped or stigmatized groups have led to a variety of theoretical and methodological innovations in 
the study of stigma. The authors in this volume have been on the forefront of these efforts. As a result, we have 
obtained a much deeper understanding of how stigma affects the stigmatized individual, his or her interaction partners, 
the stigmatized and non-stigmatized groups to which they belong, and relations between the groups. The volume as a 
whole examines many different forms of stigma, including stigma based on ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, 
weight, eating disorders, and mental illness. In particular, the volume addresses three main themes of research on 
stigma: the effects of stigma and the processes that account for these effects, the variables that moderate the effects 
of stigma on outcomes, and the lessons that can be learned from this work to mitigate the negative effects of stigma 
at the individual, interpersonal, and structural or institutional levels.  
 
 
THEMES OF THE VOLUME 
 
Effects of Stigma 
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The research in this volume shows that stigma has profound effects across a wide range of outcomes, including well-
being and self-esteem, self-perception, group identification, motivation, task performance, and social interaction. As 
the research shows, members of stigmatized groups may be devalued, ignored, and excluded. They may have 
difficulty establishing an accurate, stable and clear self-concept, especially with regard to domains that are relevant 
to stereotypes about their group (Inzlicht & Good, this volume). As a result of interactions with others who are 
perceived to hold negative stereotypes about their group, members of stigmatized groups may perceive themselves 
in ways that are consistent with these stereotypes in an effort to socially tune and maintain relationships with them 
(Sinclair & Huntsinger, this volume). Repeated negative experiences with stigma can lead members of stigmatized 
groups to anxiously anticipate similar treatment in future situations, straining cognitive resources that would 
otherwise be devoted to other tasks (Mendoza-Denton, Page-Gould & Pietrzak, this volume). Such experiences with 
stigmatization also increase general anxiety and cardiovascular reactivity (Clark, Anderson, Clark, & Williams, 
1999; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey, & Leitten, 1993). Moreover, members of stigmatized groups are not only 
affected by their own experiences; the actions of their fellow group members may also reflect negatively on them, 
causing shame when these behaviors are perceived as confirming the negative stereotype that exists of their group 
(Schmader & Lickel, this volume).  
So what do members of stigmatized groups do in the face of these challenges? While research on the effects of 
stigma has shown broad and pervasive effects across a wide range of affective, cognitive and behavioral outcomes, 
current work on stigma clearly indicates that there is much variability in responses across individuals, within 
individuals across time, and across situations. Also, the work clearly indicates that stigmatized individuals do indeed 
actively cope with the negative effects of stigma. Moving away from an early focus on members of stigmatized 
groups as passive victims of stigma and its consequences, the research in this volume demonstrates the flexibility 
and tenacity of members of stigmatized groups in responding to stigma, and the diversity in their responses as a 
result of their different goals, environments, and individual characteristics. Contrary to earlier perspectives, 
contemporary views of stigma are focused more centrally on the role of construals and goals in stigma processes: 
According to these emerging perspectives, any attempt to understand whether and how individuals of stigmatized 
groups cope with stigma needs to take into consideration both the stigmatized individuals’ understanding of the 
situation and the goals that they have in that particular situation (Miller, this volume; Swim & Thomas, this volume). 
Whilst much of the early research focused on self-enhancement goals as the primary motives for members of 
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devalued groups, more recent research shows that other goals may also be primary, among these the need to 
understand and control what happens to oneself and the need for a sense of belonging, each of which may 
sometimes be at odds with self-enhancement goals. Members of stigmatized groups, like people in general, prioritize 
the goal that they most want to accomplish in a situation and, to the degree that the situation allows them, act in 
ways to achieve it.  
This focus on goal-directed behavior also emphasizes that there is not any one “optimal” coping response to 
stigma. The work by Kaiser (this volume) and by Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore and Hill (this volume) provides fine 
examples of the need to consider the goals that members of stigmatized groups have when considering their optimal 
coping strategies. Both chapters address one of the key decisions facing members of stigmatized groups: whether to 
confront the injustice they face or whether to remain silent. They show that the avenue chosen by members of 
stigmatized groups depends on the intra- and interpersonal costs associated with their responses and the goals that 
they have in the situation. Kaiser shows that confronting the prejudiced behaviors of others often leads to derogation 
of the complainant and increased conflict, especially when the person accused of prejudice endorses beliefs that the 
world is a just place and that anyone can succeed through hard work and individual merit. Thus, when interpersonal 
and intergroup harmony are the primary goals, confronting prejudice may thwart these goals and may result in 
reduced well-being. However, as Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore and Hill show in their chapter, self-enhancement 
goals may also be thwarted by not confronting prejudice, particularly when stigmatized individuals are highly 
committed to confronting prejudice and as a result experience uncomfortable discrepancies between their behavior 
and their self-views when they do not confront. Moreover, the choices that members of stigmatized groups make 
have consequences not only for themselves and the immediate interaction but also for their larger social group and 
their group’s relations with other groups. When members of stigmatized groups do not speak out against their unjust 
treatment, perpetrators of prejudice may not correct their biases and may continue to believe that the social structure 
is fair and permeable and feel no need to address group inequality. Failure to confront prejudice may also lead other 
members of the stigmatized group to underestimate the degree to which their sense of injustice is shared and 
undermine their sense of efficacy in responding more collectively to their shared injustice.  
 
Variability in the Effects of Stigma 
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This volume also describes the huge leap forward the field has made in deepening our understanding of the 
variability in responses to stigma and identifying environmental and personal factors that explain these individual 
differences in responses to stigma. Taken together, the chapters in this volume show that variability in responses to 
stigma is shaped by the characteristics of the stigma, the characteristics of the person, and the characteristics of the 
situation.  
Characteristics of the stigma. One characteristic on which stigmas differ is in terms of how globally they 
involve devaluation of the stigmatized person (e.g., see Quinn, this volume). Whilst some stigmas are restricted to 
particular aspects of the person, such as being overweight or homosexual, other stigmas, such as mental illness, 
involve devaluation of a broad range of the person’s characteristics. Individuals with more narrowly defined stigmas 
are likely to be able to escape the negative effects of stigma to a much greater extent than those with stigmas 
relevant to many characteristics. Quinn also shows how the stigma process depends on whether the stigma is 
concealable or not. Whilst minority ethnicity may be a chronically accessible stigma that is difficult to conceal, other 
stigmas, such as a history of eating disorders or mental illness, are easier to conceal. Compared to individuals with a 
chronically accessible stigma, individuals with a concealable stigma may be less likely to incorporate the 
stigmatized identity into their larger self-concept. Not incorporating a stigmatized identity into the self-concept may 
confer a disadvantage as such individuals are less able to make the ingroup comparisons and external attributions for 
prejudice that help protect the self from the negative effects of devaluation (Crocker & Major, 1989). Interpersonal 
interactions may also involve more decisions for individuals with concealable stigmas: Individuals with concealable 
stigmas have to choose to whom and when to reveal their stigma and may suffer from the potential guilt and loss of 
control associated with their stigma being exposed by others. Monitoring for signs of one's stigma being exposed 
and having to decide to whom and when to reveal the stigma can be anxiety-provoking and place an extra cognitive 
burden on individuals with concealable stigmas.  
Characteristics of the stigmatized individual. The effects of stigma also depend on the individual characteristics 
of the stigmatized individual. In the stress and coping model presented by Carol Miller (this volume), the coping 
process begins with appraisals of the threat and availability of coping responses. In this process, characteristics of 
the stigmatized individual may affect what is perceived as threatening and what resources the individual has and 
chooses to use in order to cope with the threat. Like Miller, Janet Swim and Margaret Thomas (this volume) argue 
that the goals of the stigmatized individual play a key role in determining the selection of coping responses and the 
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evaluation of their effects for the individual. Thus one individual may be motivated to have the interaction go as 
smoothly as possible (see Sinclair & Huntsinger, this volume), whilst others may want to protect the self from 
negative stereotypes or evaluations (see Kaiser, this volume). Yet others may be concerned about failing to confront 
perpetrators of prejudice (see Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore & Hill, this volume).  
Prior experiences with stigma also affect the stigma process. Stigmatized individuals not only experience 
prejudice and discrimination directly, they are exposed to representations of their stigma in the dominant culture as 
well. Based on these prior experiences with stigma, members of stigmatized groups develop “collective 
representations,” or shared feelings, beliefs, and expectations about their stigma and its potential effects (Major, this 
volume). Furthermore, individuals who have had much previous direct or vicarious experience with exclusion, 
prejudice and discrimination are likely to perceive and react more strongly to an instance of prejudice than are those 
who have had few such previous experiences. Some individuals may be chronically more sensitive to instances of 
prejudice and discrimination. Mendoza-Denton, Page-Gould and Pietrzak (this volume) show that individuals who 
are highly sensitive to status-based rejection are more likely to perceive discriminatory treatment and react more 
strongly and negatively when it occurs. Status-based sensitivity to rejection may also, however, have positive effects 
for the stigmatized group in that the higher salience of discrimination that results from status-based sensitivity to 
rejection may spur members of stigmatized groups to engage in collective action on behalf of their group.  
Similar to this, group identification may play a part in influencing the effects of stigma (see Ellemers, Spears, & 
Doosje, 2002). Compared to low identifiers, individuals who are strongly identified with their stigmatized group 
may be more likely to perceive events as relevant to their stigma, be more attuned to such events, and react more 
strongly when they occur. At the same time, because the ingroup can be an important source of both practical and 
emotional support and provide a framework for understanding and negotiating the social world (see Branscombe, 
Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999), a strong group identity may also protect stigmatized group members from some of the 
negative effects of devaluation. As such, other stigmatized group members may provide both assistance in 
appraising an event as related to stigma and in coping with the event. However, identifying strongly with a group 
can also make members of stigmatized groups vulnerable to the actions of other ingroup members. In essence, the 
self is extended such that one may experience not only shame and guilt over one’s own actions, but also over the 
actions of other ingroup members, especially to the extent that these actions are perceived to confirm existing 
negative stereotypes of the group (see Schmader & Lickel, this volume).  
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Characteristics of the situation. Other chapters in this volume address the importance of situational variables in 
moderating the negative effects of stigma. Generally, this work notes that environmental cues that influence the 
salience of the stigmatized identity determine whether stigma affects outcomes in a particular setting. Inzlicht and 
Good introduce the term ‘threatening environments’ to describe settings in which members of stigmatized groups 
come to suspect that they may be devalued, stigmatized or discriminated against because of their particular social 
identity. They note that such threatening environments compel individuals to think about their social identities and 
the stereotypes associated with these identities. Any environment that signals that the identity is not valued is likely 
to increase the negative effects of stigma. Heterogeneous settings that include people from many other groups may 
be particularly likely to form threatening environments for the stigmatized. Being outnumbered increases 
distinctiveness and self-consciousness, increases the salience of one’s social identity, primes stereotypes, and 
increases anxiety and arousal among members of stigmatized groups. Tropp (this volume) shows how the repeated 
experience with threatening environments may make members of stigmatized groups less likely to show positive 
effects of known prejudice-reducing-strategies. Specifically, concerns about group status and discrimination against 
one’s group may limit the potential for even positive intergroup contact to enhance positive attitudes towards 
outgroups among members of stigmatized groups. Interactions with outgroup members may also be damaging 
through self-stereotyping. The work by Sinclair and Huntsinger (this volume) shows that members of stigmatized 
groups may socially tune to the attitudes of members of the high-status group. Schmader and Lickel suggest, in 
addition, that not only are members of stigmatized groups anxious about the actions of outgroup members in 
heterogeneous settings, but the actions of ingroup members may equally be a cause for concern, especially to the 
degree that these actions are perceived as confirming negative stereotypes of the group. Combining the work by 
Schmader and Lickel with that of Sinclair and Huntsinger suggests that interactions with ingroup members who hold 
negative stereotypes about their own group may actually be more harmful than interactions with prejudiced outgroup 
members. As members of stigmatized groups may feel more close and safe with ingroup members and be more 
likely to socially tune with them, this may result in more negative self-stereotyping in interactions with ingroup 
members who hold negative group stereotypes than with outgroup members who hold them.  
While the research on the impact of threatening environments highlights the negative effects of interactions 
with outgroup members, McLaughlin-Volpe (this volume) provides complementary evidence for the benefits of 
contact with outgroup members. Extending the self-expansion model (Aron & Aron, 1997) to intergroup relations, 
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McLaughlin-Volpe argues that self-expansion through relations with higher status outgroup members is especially 
important for members of stigmatized groups as such relations provide access to the physical and social resources of 
the higher status group. Together, this work suggests that the consequences of interactions with ingroup and 
outgroup members are contingent on the degree to which the interactions are close and free of negative stereotypes 
and expectations. When environments are safe and non-threatening, both interactions with ingroup and outgroup 
members are likely to lead to positive self-expansion and social tuning, reduced prejudice and discrimination, and 
positive intergroup attitudes.  
 
Strategies to Reduce the Negative Effects of Stigma 
 
The contributions in this volume also provide suggestions regarding processes that may alleviate the negative effects 
of stigma on individuals, their groups and on relations between groups. At the intrapersonal level, the work in this 
volume emphasizes the importance of considering which goal is primary for the stigmatized individual. Both Kaiser 
(this volume) and Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore and Hill (this volume) note the importance of remaining true to the 
self and one’s goals in maintaining personal well-being, positive interpersonal relations or challenging injustice. 
Crocker (this volume) notes the benefits that may be gained by focusing on goals that are larger than the self, such 
as learning about the person with whom one is interacting or building a relationship with him or her.  
Group identifications can also offer a solution to the dilemmas posed by stigma, with the perception of a 
collective union being a source of comfort and social support for the stigmatized individual at the same time that it 
provides a potential vehicle to challenge the low-status position of the group as a whole. Mendoza-Denton, Page-
Gould and Pietrzak (this volume) show that ethnic identity may be a particularly important source of strength for 
individuals who are high in sensitivity to status-based rejection. Various other chapters also address the importance 
of supportive others in mitigating the negative effects of stigma. Inzlicht and Good (this volume) note that 
competent ingroup role models send the message that members of the ingroup are competent in a specific domain 
and signal that members of the group are respected. In addition to relations within the group being a source of 
support, McLaughlin-Volpe (this volume) shows how cross-group relations can be especially important for members 
of stigmatized groups in providing access to the social and physical resources of the high-status group and 
expanding the self to new levels. These cross-group friendships may be especially important for individuals high in 
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status-based sensitivity to rejection by providing disconfirming evidence with regard to negative intergroup 
expectations (Mendoza-Denton, Page-Gould & Pietrzak, this volume). For cross-group interactions to be effective, 
however, optimal contact conditions may not be sufficient; attention must also be devoted to concerns on the part of 
members of stigmatized groups about group status and discrimination (Tropp, this volume). Acknowledging and 
addressing these concerns will play an important role in dealing with stigma and group inequality in effective ways.  
The work by Sinclair and Huntsinger on the danger of social tuning to the attitudes of the outgroup among 
members of stigmatized groups also emphasizes the importance of active rejection of stereotypes by others in 
interactions. This is of course an especially difficult task as negative stereotypes and attitudes are often implicit 
(Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). Failing the ability to control the attitudes of the other, 
members of stigmatized groups need to be careful with whom they develop relationships and can reduce the 
likelihood of negative social tuning by remaining interpersonally distant from those with stereotypic views. 
Increasingly, research also indicates that members of stigmatized groups may have developed considerable skills at 
identifying such individuals (e.g., see Dovidio et al., 2002).  
The chapters in this volume also give several suggestions as to how stigma and its negative effects may be 
addressed at the institutional or structural level. First, many of the processes that have been identified at the 
interpersonal level as reducing the negative effects of stigma can also be structured more formally. For example, 
educational institutions can set up places where members of traditionally underrepresented groups can find a safe 
venue to interact and meet others. Such environments can already be seen in the formation of historically Black 
colleges and universities, Hispanic serving institutions, Latino and Black fraternities and sororities, and women’s 
colleges and organizations. In these environments, members of stigmatized groups expect to be valued and treated 
with respect. More generally, the chapters call for the formation of non-threatening environments in which important 
others clearly express counter-stereotypic beliefs. Similarly, these institutions can channel positive cross-group 
interactions in curricular and extra-curricular activities. Mentorship programs can provide the role models that 
research has shown to be so important for members of stigmatized groups who find themselves in the numerical 
minority. Lastly, educational programs can educate individuals as to the processes of stereotyping and stigmatization 
and help individuals to develop skills to address these issues. For example, individuals who are in positions in which 
they regularly give feedback can be taught the ‘wise’ feedback skills mentioned in the chapters by Inzlicht and Good 
(this volume) and Mendoza-Denton, Page-Gould and Pietrzak (this volume). In addition, knowing that Mendoza-
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Denton and his colleagues have also shown that individuals high in status-based rejection sensitivity are likely to 
avoid various resources that an institution may offer, the institution can organize procedures by which this avoidance 
is minimized.  
Reaching back to the importance of goals, a theme throughout the volume, Crocker and Garcia (this volume) 
provide a broad analysis of possible solutions to the dilemmas of stigma for members of stigmatized and non-
stigmatized groups, noting that a solution to many of the issues addressed in the volume may be reached by 
reframing how we manage stigma and social inequality. They maintain that many of the negative effects of stigma 
result from the fact that stigma affects the “corporate image” of both members of stigmatized and non-stigmatized 
groups and that the downward spiral that follows is a result of an attempt by these individuals to maintain or restore 
this corporate image. Crocker and Garcia suggest that this cycle can be broken by focusing on goals that are larger 
than the self, such as learning goals, inclusion goals, or superordinate goals. In their analysis, Crocker and Garcia 
move across the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and structural levels to suggest that individuals, interaction partners, 
and institutions should focus on what one can learn from the self and from the interaction partner, and should 
structure environments to be conducive to these learning and inclusion goals. 
 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUME 
 
The chapters in the volume are divided into three sections. The first section focuses on responses to stigma in terms 
of confronting, concealing and coping with stigma; the second section explores the impact of the social context on 
stigma; and the third section addresses stigma and the social basis of the self.  
 
Confronting, Concealing and Coping: Responses to Stigma 
 
The first section of the volume focuses on how members of stigmatized groups cope with and respond to stigma and 
discrimination. The chapters in this section discuss the potential costs and benefits associated with responding to 
stigma and discrimination, and how the goals and motives of the individual determine the responses that are chosen 
and their impact on the individual’s feelings, cognitions, and behaviors. In Chapter 2, Carol Miller begins with a 
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historical focus on the work on stigma, emphasizing the shift that has occurred as researchers moved from a focus 
on the harm that stigma can inflict to the ways in which people actively cope with stigma. After discussing changes 
in the nature of prejudice that have affected the ways in which people cope with it, she introduces a stress and 
coping perspective on stigmatized people’s reactions to prejudice, noting that coping is a dynamic process that 
involves tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of imperfect solutions. The coping process begins with appraisals 
of an event as threatening, appraisals of available resources to cope with the threat, and appraisals that the stressor is 
stigma-related. She emphasizes that identification to the self, to other people, and by other people that prejudice has 
occurred can play an important role in both the appraisal of stigma-related stressors and the ways in which people 
cope with them. Appraisal of an event as a stigma-related stressor is likely to lead to a wide variety of reactions. 
Miller makes a distinction between various forms of coping, paralleling the distinction between fight and flight 
responses in distinguishing coping responses that engage or approach the stressor from those that disengage or avoid 
the stressor.  
In Chapter 3, Cheryl Kaiser focuses on interpersonal reactions to discrimination claimants. Beginning with the 
finding that victims of unfair treatment often do not publicly acknowledge their discrimination, even when this 
discrimination is blatant, she shows that one reason for this is that victims of discrimination are derogated by others, 
even when others acknowledge that discrimination took place. Kaiser’s analyses show that public attributions to 
discrimination serve as a source of ideological threat to observers – threatening dominant ideology beliefs such as 
individualism and the Protestant work ethic that contend that any individual can get ahead through hard work and 
merit – and therefore lead the observers to derogate the discrimination claimant. Furthermore, because those who 
most strongly endorse the dominant ideology are most likely to be threatened by claims of discrimination, they are 
most likely to respond by derogating the victim. Kaiser shows that the final outcome of this interpersonal interaction 
is that members of stigmatized groups may avoid confronting the discrimination that they face in an effort to avoid 
negative evaluations and intergroup conflict. 
Whilst Kaiser focuses on the interpersonal costs of confronting discrimination, Nicole Shelton, Jennifer 
Richeson, Jessica Salvatore and Diana Hill emphasize the intrapersonal costs of not confronting discrimination. 
Specifically, in Chapter 4, Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore and Hill present a self-discrepancy model to account for the 
intrapersonal consequences of not confronting perpetrators of prejudice. While the interpersonal costs of confronting 
prejudice may be substantial, as Kaiser showed in the previous chapter, Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore and Hill show 
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that not confronting prejudice can leave members of stigmatized groups with an inconsistency between their 
behaviors and self-standards which can also have negative affective and cognitive consequences. Individuals of 
stigmatized groups may feel that they have transgressed a personal standard, that they have let down or “sold out” 
the group in order to make their lives easier, and may feel guilty and ruminate about their inaction, leading to 
cognitive distraction and decrements in performance, as well as intrusive and obsessive thoughts. Moreover, the 
authors show that these effects occur in particular for individuals who have a personal commitment to confront 
prejudice and discrimination; members of stigmatized groups who have no such personal commitment are protected 
from these adverse consequences. Together, the chapters by Kaiser and by Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore and Hill 
show that members of stigmatized groups appraise a prejudiced situation on the basis of their intrapersonal, 
interpersonal and intergroup goals, and consider their response options in light of the costs and benefits associated 
with each option. 
In Chapter 5, Diane Quinn discusses the role that characteristics of the stigma play in the stigma process. Whilst 
members of many stigmatized groups find themselves in situations in which their stigma is chronically accessible to 
themselves and others, members of groups that have a stigma that is concealable face an extra burden in that they 
need to decide if and when to reveal their stigma to others. Quinn distinguishes these concealable stigmas from non-
concealable stigmas in terms of their emotional and behavioral demands. Using two potentially concealable stigmas 
as illustrations – a history of a mental illness and eating disorder – she discusses some of the experiences unique to 
those with a concealable stigma, including deciding when and to whom to reveal, short- and long-term consequences 
of keeping an identity concealed, and concerns about the discovery of the stigma. Quinn shows how individuals with 
concealable stigmas are particularly affected by the salience of the stigma in different contexts and the resulting 
centrality of the stigma for the self. When the stigma is not salient, individuals with concealable stigmas are likely to 
have interactions that do not differ from those of the non-stigmatized. Those with concealable stigmas may be less 
competent, though, in situations in which their stigma is salient, having less experience than those with chronically 
visible stigmas in such interactions. Those with concealable stigmas also clearly face some other costs: the reactions 
of others who perceive them as dishonest or distrustful for not revealing their stigma and the danger that the stigma 
will reveal itself involuntarily at an inopportune moment. Quinn also highlights some of the benefits of 
concealability, noting that individuals with concealable stigmas can choose situations in which they feel comfortable 
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to reveal their stigma, giving them an extra sense of control and the ability to “pass” in situations in which they do 
not want to reveal their stigma (Goffman, 1963). 
Completing this first section of the volume, Janet Swim and Margaret Thomas bring a goal perspective to the 
study of responses to stigma. They note that an understanding of the goals that members of stigmatized groups have 
is essential to an understanding of how individuals cope with stigma. Specifically, they place the selection of coping 
responses in a framework of self-regulation processes directed at achieving core social motives, arguing that an 
understanding of these processes helps clarify what is threatening or challenging about stigma, what motivates 
responses on the part of members of stigmatized groups, why members of stigmatized groups select particular 
coping responses, and how they appraise the effectiveness of their coping responses. Using Fiske’s five core social 
goals (Fiske, 2003), Swim and Thomas argue that members of stigmatized groups have needs for self-enhancement, 
for trust, for understanding, for control and for belonging, and that the activation of these goals is situation-specific 
and varies across individuals. Swim and Thomas continue highlighting the theme prominent in this volume that 
coping involves tradeoffs and argue that goals determine not only what coping mechanisms are utilized but also the 
effects of these coping responses on individuals’ feelings, cognitions, and behaviors. An assessment of whether the 
coping response in a particular situation is beneficial or costly thus needs to take into consideration the goals and 
motives of the stigmatized person in that situation.  
 
Stigma in the Social Context: Coping with Threatening Environments 
 
The second section of the volume focuses on how the social context impacts the experience of stigma. The chapters 
in this section show that the effects of stigma are varied and depend on the characteristics of the stigmatized 
individual, the context surrounding the stigma, and the coping mechanisms marshaled in response to stigmatization. 
In Chapter 7, Michael Inzlicht and Catherine Good underscore the importance of situational and environmental 
factors for understanding the relationship between stigma and adjustment outcomes, and introduce the term 
“threatening environments” to discuss the role of context in the stigma process. Focusing on stereotype vulnerability 
in different contexts, Inzlicht and Good make the case that stereotype vulnerability threatens performance, the 
accuracy and stability of self-knowledge, and the sense of belonging that members of stigmatized groups feel in a 
domain. Using the case of women in the domain of math as an illustration, the authors argue that even small 
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situational cues—for example the ratio of men to women in a testing room—can have substantial effects on 
women’s performance and engagement in the math domain. In order to overcome the threats posed by these 
environments, Inzlicht and Good suggest creating environments in which people are encouraged to view intelligence 
as malleable rather than fixed, to view negative group stereotypes as irrelevant to their own performance, and to 
view tests as less diagnostic of their ability in domains in which their group is negatively stereotyped. 
In Chapter 8, Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton, Elizabeth Page-Gould and Janina Pietrzak focus on the other side of 
the person X situation interaction, examining how individuals differ in their responses to similar environmental 
circumstances. They argue that prior experiences with discrimination lead people to anxiously anticipate similar 
treatment in future situations and make them especially vulnerable to the negative consequences of threatening 
environments. Mendoza-Denton, Page-Gould, and Pietrzak first review the conditions surrounding the development 
of such status-based rejection expectations and the consequences of these expectations. They then discuss how 
individuals may cope with status-based rejection at the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels and how institutions 
can establish procedures to manage status-based rejection and its effects. 
In Chapter 9, Linda Tropp reviews theory and research concerning the impact of stigma and status inequality on 
processes of intergroup contact. She summarizes results from studies on the expectations that members of minority 
and majority status groups have for intergroup contact and the outcomes of this contact, showing that experiences 
with prejudice and stigmatization can inhibit the potentially positive effects of contact in members of stigmatized 
groups. Specifically, she shows that concerns about group status and discrimination against one’s group may play a 
more significant role in defining the intergroup interaction among members of minority status groups than among 
members of majority status groups. Tropp’s analysis is an important extension of recent work on intergroup contact 
that focuses on the different concerns that members of minority and majority status groups have in intergroup 
interactions (e.g., see Devine, Evett, & Vasquez Suson, 1996). In addition, it extends one of the main themes of the 
volume in terms of the importance of considering the goals that individuals have in understanding processes of 
stigma and social inequality.  
Concluding the section on stigma in the social context, Brenda Major summarizes the core themes of the “New 
Look” in stigma research that has challenged traditional understandings of the effects of stigma. In contrast to 
traditional perspectives on stigma that focused on the internalization of stigma into chronic feelings of inferiority, 
contemporary perspectives on stigma assert that the effects of stigma are not uniformly or inevitably negative. 
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Rather, these emerging perspectives emphasize the variability in responses to stigma across stigmatized groups, 
across individuals within stigmatized groups, and within individuals across different contexts, and seek to identity 
the factors that explain these sources of variability. Using a transactional model of responses to stigma, Major 
discusses the personal and situational factors that influence how stigmatized individuals cognitively appraise stigma-
related events and cope with them when they are appraised as stressful. 
 
Stigma and the Social Basis of the Self 
 
The final section of the volume focuses on stigma and the social basis of the self. Each of the chapters in this section 
identifies ways in which social relationships with others influence the impact that stigma has on the lives of those 
who bear the stigmatized identity. 
In Chapter 11, Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe explores the benefits of self-expansion through interactions with 
members of outgroups. Taking a self-expansion perspective (Aron & Aron, 1997), which focuses on the importance 
of close relationships for personal growth, McLaughlin-Volpe extends the concept of self-expansion to intergroup 
relations. The chapter describes the self-expansion model and supporting research, shows how it is relevant to 
understanding the experiences of members of stigmatized groups, and discusses the role that the hypothesized self-
expansion processes play in educational institutions. Consistent with the model, McLaughlin-Volpe provides 
evidence showing increased self-expansion when members of stigmatized groups have contacts with members of 
outgroups. This increased self-expansion is hypothesized to occur because members of outgroups are more different 
from the self than are ingroup members, having different knowledge, interests and skills as a result of their different 
experiences. McLaughlin-Volpe concludes that these cross-group interactions are especially important for members 
of stigmatized groups because they provide members of stigmatized groups with access to the material and social 
resources of the higher status group. 
Whilst McLaughlin-Volpe concentrates on the benefits to be gained from interacting with others who are likely 
to provide extra avenues for self-expansion, the next two chapters in this section focus on the dangers that may 
result from such inclusion of others in the self. In Chapter 12, Stacey Sinclair and Jeff Huntsinger focus on the 
consequences of including others in the self for self-stereotyping. They note that self-stereotyping will occur when 
members of stigmatized groups desire to form or maintain a relationship with a person who has negative views or 
The Experience of Stigma      15 
stereotypes of their group. They argue that, in order to maintain a relationship with this other individual, stigmatized 
individuals will ‘socially tune’ or adjust their social beliefs, including beliefs about the self, to those of their 
interaction partner. For members of stigmatized groups interacting with members of non-stigmatized groups, this 
can mean tuning to negative expectations and stereotypes held by the other person about their group, a process 
ultimately resulting in self-stereotyping. Sinclair and Huntsinger show that this phenomenon occurs even when this 
social tuning goes against other goals that the individual may have in the interaction, such as making a good 
impression or appearing competent. Together, the two chapters by McLaughlin-Volpe and by Sinclair and 
Huntsinger suggest that whether contacts with outgroup members are harmful or beneficial to the self will depend on 
the degree to which the interaction partner harbors negative stereotypes and expectations relevant to the stigma. 
In Chapter 13, Toni Schmader and Brian Lickel extend the discussion of the dangers of the inclusion of others 
in the self to contacts with ingroup members. They note that the inclusion of ingroup members in the self leads to a 
situation in which members of stigmatized groups are affected not only by their own actions but also by the actions 
of their ingroup members. Drawing on recent work on group-based emotion, Schmader and Lickel articulate why a 
person might feel threatened when someone other than the self confirms the negative stereotype about the group and 
present their work exploring these ideas. They focus in particular on feelings of shame that may arise in response to 
actions by ingroup members that confirm the negative stereotype about the group, and link these emotional reactions 
to distinct action tendencies. They argue that members of stigmatized groups will respond very strongly to 
stereotypic actions by ingroup members, especially to the degree that the stigmatized identity is perceived to be 
“essentialized.” Essentialized identities are those such as ethnicity and gender that are viewed by perceivers as being 
inalterable and deeply informative aspects of an individual (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). Members of such 
essentialized groups are likely to be especially affected when members of their group behave in stereotypic ways. 
While the chapter concentrates on feelings of shame, Schmader and Lickel also discuss other emotions that may 
result from stereotypic actions of ingroup members such as guilt, anger, sadness and anxiety.  
In the final chapter of this section and the volume as a whole, Jennifer Crocker and Julie Garcia take a broad 
perspective on the dilemmas posed by stigma for members of stigmatized and non-stigmatized groups to call for a 
focus on goals that are larger than the self. They argue that many of the dilemmas posed by stigma occur because 
stigma affects the “corporate image” of both the stigmatized group member and his or her non-stigmatized 
interaction partner. The stigmatized person faces potential devaluation because of his or her stigmatizing attribute, 
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whereas the non-stigmatized person faces the possibility of being judged as prejudiced or racist. In the context of 
social interactions, these potential self-threats can lead to mistrust, discomfort, anxiety, avoidance and withdrawal, 
and eventually reinforce the negative views that each person in the interaction holds of the other. Sustaining the 
belief that the self is worthy and valuable becomes fundamentally difficult in such interactions between the 
stigmatized and the non-stigmatized. Examining this downward spiral, Crocker and Garcia argue that many of these 
negative outcomes may be reduced by focusing on goals to create something larger than the self, goals that focus on 
learning rather than evaluation, and goals of inclusion and relationship-building rather than differentiation. In 
highlighting the dynamics and complexity of stigma effects, Crocker and Garcia present a thought-provoking 
analysis that suggests that a re-framing of goals in social interactions may provide a solution for the dilemmas faced 
by members of both stigmatized and non-stigmatized groups.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The theoretical and empirical work presented in this volume clearly indicates that individuals actively cope with 
stigma in ways that vary across stigmatized groups, across individuals within stigmatized groups, and within 
individuals across time and situations. As such, the chapters in the book demonstrate the resilience of members of 
stigmatized groups and the flexibility in their responses to stigma based on their different goals and other individual 
and contextual factors relevant to the stigmatizing situation. This work has helped to advance our understanding of 
how stigma affects the individual, his or her interaction partners, the stigmatized and non-stigmatized groups to 
which they belong, and relations between the groups. Together with the other contributors to the volume, we hope 
that these valuable findings will be used to inform future research, educate students, and move concerned citizens to 
apply them in their own life’s settings to improve the outcomes of stigmatized and non-stigmatized individuals alike.  
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OVERVIEW 
 
The defining characteristic of stigmatized people is that other people devalue them (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 
1998). Devaluation exposes stigmatized people to a variety of stigma-related stressors (Allison, 1998; Meyer, 2003; 
Miller and Kaiser, 2001;  Miller & Major, 2000).  A stressor is an event in which environmental or internal demands 
tax or exceed the adaptive resources of the individual (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Stigma can create stress because 
other people have stereotyped expectancies about what stigmatized people are like, harbor prejudiced attitudes 
toward stigmatized people, and behave in a discriminatory manner toward stigmatized people (Fiske, 1998; Miller & 
Kaiser, 2001). The triumvirate of stereotypes, prejudiced attitudes, and discrimination, which throughout this 
chapter I will refer to collectively simply as prejudice or stigma, can affect stigmatized people's access to 
educational and employment opportunities, the quantity and quality of health care they receive, and their acceptance 
by the communities in which they live (Allison, 1998; Clark, Anderson, Clark & Williams, 1999; Meyer, 2003). 
Stigmatization also results in psychological stress responses such as anger, anxiety, hopelessness, resentment, and 
fear (Clark et al., 1999) and physiological stress responses such as increases in cardiovascular activity (Clark et al., 
1999; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey, & Leitten, 1993).  Coping is a response to stress that draws on the individual’s 
resources in an effort to meet the demands posed by a stressor (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).   
This chapter outlines why interest in coping with stigma is a relatively new development in the study of 
prejudice.  It summarizes how modern incarnations of prejudice affect the types of stressors stigmatized people face 
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due to their stigmatized status, and the way in which they cope with these stressors.  It then describes three major 
components of a stress and coping perspective on reactions to prejudice, (1) appraisals of stigma-related stressors, 
(2) coping responses that are made to these stressors, and (3) related to both appraisals and coping,  the identification 
to the self, to other people, and by other people that prejudice has occurred..  The chapter concludes by emphasizing 
that coping with prejudice often involves making tradeoffs in which some goals may be sacrificed to achieve those 
that are most important to the stigmatized individual in a particular situation.  It also reminds us of the importance of 
maintaining the perspective of stigmatized people to avoid making assumptions about how they “should” cope with 
prejudice or what their goals in a prejudice-tainted situation must be. 
 
 
THE TARGET’S PERSPECTIVE AND COPING WITH PREJUDICE 
 
Perhaps the most important single thing that can be said about how stigmatized people cope with stigma is that they 
do indeed cope.  It took a surprisingly long time for the research community to recognize this simple fact.  Even 
Allport's (1954/1979), masterpiece, The Nature of Prejudice, which anticipated virtually every modern development 
in the study of prejudice assumed that, "Since no one can be indifferent to the abuse and expectations of others we 
must anticipate that ego defensiveness will frequently be found among members of groups that are set off for 
ridicule, disparagement, and discrimination.  It could not be otherwise.” (p. 139, emphasis in the original).  Among 
the ego defenses Allport described were obsessive vigilance and hypersensitivity to prejudice, withdrawal and 
passivity, clowning, slyness and cunning, identification with the dominant group, self-hate, and neuroticism. 
However, Allport's remarkable insights into the nature and consequences of prejudice also led him to point out 
that not all of these “persecution-based” traits are unpleasant. Stigmatized people also cope constructively, for 
example by showing enhanced striving in the face of prejudice.  Allport also suggested that many people are able to 
avoid developing these "marks of oppression" even in the face of extreme prejudice. 
Nonetheless, it is safe to say that research on stigmatized people has traditionally focused more on the harm that 
prejudice inflicts upon them than on the way stigmatized people cope with prejudice.  There are a least three reasons 
for this.  The first is that social scientists were intent on documenting the evils of prejudice.  The notion that 
stigmatized people could cope with it did not fit well with this objective.  Duckitt (1992) pointed out that in the 
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United States prior to the 1920's, prejudice was not widely considered to be a social problem, because most people, 
including researchers at that time assumed that prejudice was justified by the natural inferiority of certain groups.  
During the 1920‘s and 1930’s, researchers began to identify prejudice as a social problem that could not easily be 
explained by the inferiority of certain groups.  In the U.S., this recognition reflected broad societal changes resulting 
from the Great Depression, challenges to colonialism world-wide, the influx of scholars into the social sciences who  
had direct experience with being stigmatized (e.g., Jewish scholars immigrating from Europe), and the growing 
influence of civil rights movements (Duckitt, 1992).   
Casting prejudice as a social problem led to efforts to  document prejudice as the product of a variety of faulty 
cognitive processes and irrational personality dynamics (Duckitt, 1992).  Entertaining the hypothesis that 
stigmatized people might be able to mitigate the effects of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination on their lives 
risked dismissing prejudice as a minor irritation rather than the major social problem that social scientists assumed it 
to be.   
A second reason researchers have been a little slow to think about coping with prejudice is that a characteristic 
of human judgment is to assume that causes and their effects must be of roughly equal magnitude (Wegner & 
Wheatley, 1999; Nisbitt & Ross, 1980).  That is, dramatic effects must have equally dramatic causes and vice versa.  
A "big" problem such as prejudice is assumed to have "big" effects on its targets.  The possibility that prejudice 
could pose extreme hardship on its targets without damaging their outcomes or characters seems to fly in the face of 
our common-sense understanding of the relationship between causes and their effects.  As Allport (1954/1979) 
explained, “One’s reputation, whether false or true, cannot be hammered, hammered, hammered, into one’s head 
without doing something to one’s character” (p. 142). 
 Finally, research support for the assumption that prejudice damages its victims was has not been hard to find.  
To give just a few classic examples, social scientists in the U.S. marshaled an impressive array of evidence to help 
convince the Supreme Court that the “separate, but equal” doctrine that rationalized racial segregation in public 
schools was inherently unequal because segregation had adverse psychological, social, and academic effects on 
African-Americans (see Zirkel & Cantor, 2004 for a recent review).   
Several decades later, research on the self-fulfilling nature of teacher expectations about the educational 
promise of their students (Miller & Turnbull, 1986; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978) was widely assumed to imply that 
race-based expectations could depress the academic performance of African-Americans and other stigmatized 
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groups.  Contemporary research supports this view and indicates that even the suspicion of stereotyping can threaten 
the performance of stigmatized people (Inzlicht & Good, this volume, Steele, 1997).  There is also evidence that for 
many stigmatized people, encounters with prejudice are common experiences, sufficiently prevalent to constitute 
“daily hassles” (Swim, Cohen, & Hyers, 1998).   Such experiences have been implicated in cardiovascular and 
endocrine responses that may help explain the prevalence of health problems among members of stigmatized groups 
(Clark et al., 1999).   
Empirical documentation of the adverse effects of prejudice was matched by the development of theories that 
explained the mechanics of how prejudice could create conditions that harmed the well-being of stigmatized people 
(Crocker & Major, 1989).  Amidst this impressive documentation of the power of prejudice and the establishment of 
theories that explained these findings, it is easy to understand why the idea that stigmatized people cope with 
prejudice did not readily spring to mind.   
One set of findings that directly challenged the prevailing view of how prejudice affects stigmatized people was 
the finding that stigmatized people have levels of self-esteem that rival the levels of nonstigmatized people (Crocker 
& Major, 1989; Twenge & Crocker, 2000).  As Crocker and Major (1989) pointed out, all the major theories of 
prejudice predict that stigmatized people should have poor self-esteem.  Because the evidence that prejudice creates 
difficulties for stigmatized people is overwhelming, Crocker and Major concluded that something was happening 
that enabled stigmatized people to mitigate the effects of these prejudice-induced difficulties.  They proposed that 
the “something” was a set of coping strategies that took advantage of special properties that being stigmatized 
conferred on stigmatized people. These coping responses included blaming poor outcomes on prejudice rather than 
personal shortcomings, devaluing domains and activities in which the stigmatized group is stereotyped as inferior, 
and limiting comparison of outcomes to other stigmatized people, thereby avoiding “upward” comparisons that 
might threaten self-esteem. 
This landmark paper was published just as a number of researchers were beginning to emphasize the 
perspective of the targets of prejudice in their research rather than focusing on the perspective of the perpetrators 
(see Heatherton, Kleck, Hebl, & Hull, 2000; Swim & Stangor, 1998; Shelton, 2000, for reviews of much of this 
research).  Almost as soon as researchers began to conceptualize stigmatized people as active agents who seek to 
control and better their outcomes rather than as passive victims of a society that devalues them, researchers 
recognized that stigmatized people can act both proactively and reactively to the predicaments posed by prejudice.  
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This emphasis encouraged consideration of the ways in which stigmatized people may cope with prejudice. 
 
 
CHANGES IN PREJUDICE THAT AFFECT COPING WITH IT 
 
The nature of prejudice has altered in recent years as a result of changes in societal attitudes about the acceptability 
of prejudice (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Fiske, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986).  It is important to consider these 
changes because different types of prejudice may create different stressors for stigmatized people and may require 
different types of coping. 
A large volume of research indicates that “old-fashioned” blatant prejudice is no longer socially or personally 
acceptable in many quarters.  Theories about contemporary forms of prejudice generally assume that people are 
motivated to avoid being prejudiced either because of sincerely held egalitarian beliefs or because of social pressure 
(Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brian, 2002).  Consequently, prejudice now tends to be an ambivalent (Glick & Fiske, 
2001; Katz & Haas, 1988), subtle (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), and sometimes even unconscious or automatic 
(Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002) response to members of stigmatized groups.  The difficulty 
for stigmatized people is that even people who aspire to be non-prejudiced may still harbor ambivalent reactions to 
members of stigmatized groups, experience negative affect when interacting with them, have implicit stereotypes 
about them, make judgments about stigmatized people that are unconsciously affected by prejudice, and experience 
difficulty in acting normally when interacting with stigmatized people, especially with respect to nonverbal and 
other subtle behaviors that sometimes communicate more than a person intends (see  Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; 
Fiske, 1998, for reviews).   
Expressions of old-fashioned blatant prejudice may create different stressors and require different coping 
strategies than do modern or subtle forms of prejudice (Baretto & Ellemers, in press).  For example, blatant 
prejudice may lead to avoidance simply because the prospects of improving the situation are relatively poor.  
Stigmatized people may simply not care to expend their resources to deal with an out-and-out bigot, but may be 
more willing to work to establish a better situation with a less blatantly prejudiced person.  However, some 
stigmatized people have expressed the view that it is easier to cope with blatant prejudice than it is to cope with 
subtle prejudice (Feagin & Sikes, 1994).  At least they know where they stand with blatant prejudice, whereas it may 
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be very difficult to identify what is going on when a person is subtly prejudiced or ambivalent about the stigmatized 
person. This can leave the stigmatized person with considerable ambiguity about what precisely is happening in a 
situation (Crocker & Major, 1989, Major et al., 2002).   
 
 
A STRESS AND COPING PERSPECTIVE ON STIGMATIZED PEOPLE’S 
REACTIONS TO PREJUDICE 
 
There is a vast literature on coping with a wide variety of stressors (e.g., illness, bereavement, daily hassles) which 
has resulted in major theoretical, empirical, and methodological advances (Zeldner & Endler, 1996). Stigma 
researchers can profit greatly from the progress and problems that have occurred on the more general topic of how 
anybody copes with any kind of stressor (Allison, 1998; Major, this volume; Meyer, 2003; Miller & Kaiser, 2001, 
Miller & Major, 2000; Swim & Thomas, this volume).  As shown in Figure 1, there are three major components of 
coping with stigma each of which is depicted by a triangle: appraisals of stigma-related stressors, coping responses, 
and related to both appraisals and coping, the identification of prejudice.   
The coping process begins with a primary appraisal of an event as a personally relevant threat that may tax or 
exceed the person’s resources for coping with it (see also Major, this volume; Swim & Thomas, this volume).  This 
is accompanied by a secondary appraisal of whether sufficient resources can be called upon to cope with this threat 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  As the bottom left triangle in Figure 1 shows, a third important element that comes 
into play in the appraisal of stigma-related stressors is determining that the stressor is somehow related to or caused 
by the person’s stigmatized status (Meyer, 2003).  
Once an event as been appraised as a stigma-related stressor, stigmatized people are likely to have a variety of 
reactions to it.  The vast literature on coping with a wide variety of stressors (e.g., illness, bereavement, daily 
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FIG. 1 Stress and coping model.  
 
hassles) indicates that people have a myriad of physiological, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses to 
stress (Zeldner & Endler, 1996). In reviewing the diversity of ways in which stress responses and coping have been 
conceptualized and measured, Compas and his colleagues (Compas, Connor-Smith, Saltzman, Thompsen, & 
Wadsworth, 2001; Conner-Smith, Compas, Wadsworth, Thompsen, & Saltzman, 2000) recently proposed that the 
most fundamental distinction between different responses to stress is between voluntary coping responses and 
involuntary responses. This distinction emphasizes the fact that not everything a person does in response to stress 
constitutes coping. People may have involuntary emotional, behavioral, physiological, and cognitive responses to 
stress that do not serve to regulate or modify stressful experiences.  The term coping is reserved for conscious 
volitional efforts to regulate emotion, thought, behavior, physiology, and the environment in response to stressful 
events or circumstances.   
Compas and his colleagues (Compas et al., 2001; Conner-Smith et al., 2001) also suggest that coping responses 
can involve engagement or disengagement with the stressful even or problem.   This distinction parallels traditional 
distinctions between fight versus flight responses and between approach and avoidance responses (Swim & Thomas, 
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this volume).  Engagement coping involves self-regulation efforts that engage with or approach the stressor in some 
way, whereas disengagement coping involves regulatory efforts that disengage from or avoid the stressor. 
Engagement coping can be further distinguished by whether it is aimed at gaining primary or secondary control 
over the stressful event (Compas et al., 2001). Primary control coping includes efforts that are directed toward 
influencing objective events or conditions to enhance a sense of personal control over the environment and one’s 
reactions (Compas et al., 2001). Secondary control coping, by contrast, involves efforts to adapt to the situation. It 
includes efforts to change the way one feels or thinks about the fact the stressful event.  Primary and secondary 
control coping along with disengagement coping form the three sides of the coping triangle shown in Figure 1. 
 Figure 1 also includes a triangle that represents the identification of prejudice.  Prejudice identification refers to 
an inference that is made that prejudice is present or had an influence in a particular situation.   Prejudice 
identification is depicted as hovering above appraisals (bottom left triangle) and coping responses (bottom right 
triangle) because the identification of prejudice can be important in both the appraisal of stigma-related stressors and 
the coping responses that are made to them.  
In summary, this stress and coping perspective on reactions to stigma emphasizes the appraisal of stigma-related 
stressors, a hierarchically organized description of coping responses to these stressors, and consideration of the role 
of prejudice identification in both appraisals and coping. 
 
Prejudice Identification Defined 
 
Because nobody ever sees an act of prejudice directly. the identification of prejudice requires an inference that a 
threat is the result of prejudice.  Both stigmatized people and other people use a variety of cues to make inferences 
about prejudice, including, for example, the nonstigmatized person’s intentions with respect to the stigmatized 
person and the amount of harm the stigmatized person suffers (Swim, Scott, Sechrist, Campbell, & Stangor, 2003).  
There are three important ways in which prejudice can be identified. These are identification to the self that 
prejudice has occurred, identification to other people that prejudice has occurred, and identification by other people 
that prejudice has occurred.  Identification of prejudice to the self that prejudice has occurred refers to an attribution 
or inference that stigmatized individuals make that they have been targeted by prejudice.  Identification to other 
people that prejudice has occurred refers to instances in which stigmatized individuals communicate in words or 
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actions to another person that they believe that they have been targeted by prejudice.  Identification by other people 
that prejudice has occurred refers to instances in which other people draw their own inferences about whether 
stigmatized individuals have been targeted by prejudice.  Inferences by other people about the occurrence of 
prejudice may be based on information from a variety of sources, including, for example, direct observation of 
events involving stigmatized individuals, hearsay from other people who have information about the event, or 
communications from the stigmatized individuals themselves. 
 
Prejudice Identification and Appraisals of Stigma-related Stressors 
 
The appraisal of an event as a stigma-related stressor involves, at a minimum, the identification of prejudice to the 
self (Major et al., 2002).  Without this identification, prejudice would not be appraised as the cause of the 
threatening event and thus the event would not be experienced as a stigma-related stressor (although it could be 
experienced as some other type of stressor).  Some stressors that are a direct or indirect result of prejudice may not 
be recognized as such by stigmatized people.  This can happen because stigmatized people may attribute an outcome 
that was actually the result of prejudice to some other cause (Crocker et al., 1998).   
There are some situations in which virtually any stigmatized person will be highly aware of prejudice, for 
example when a stigmatized person is the only member of the stigmatized group present in a situation or when the 
situation emphasizes domains in which the stigmatized group is thought to perform poorly (Inzlicht & Good, this 
volume).  There also are chronic individual differences between stigmatized people in how sensitive they are to the 
possibility that they will be stereotyped by others, a characteristic known as stigma consciousness (Pinel, 1999).  
Compared to stigmatized people who are not stigma conscious, highly stigma-conscious stigmatized people can 
provide more examples of situations in which they have been the targets of prejudice in the past and anticipate more 
prejudice-based rejection (Pinel, 2002).  Sensitivity to rejection in general and sensitivity to stigma-based rejection 
in particular also can affect the likelihood that stigmatized people will appraise an event as stigma-related (thereby 
identifying to the self that prejudice has occurred) and the manner in which they will cope with rejection (Mendoza-
Denton, Downey, Purdie, Davis, & Pietrzak, 2002, Mendoza-Denton, Page-Gold, & Pietrzak, this volume).  
 
Prejudice Identification as a Cause of Stigma-related Stressors 
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Prejudice identification to the self, to other people, and by other people can create different types of stressors for 
stigmatized people.  For example, stigmatized people may consider themselves to be targeted by prejudice in a 
particular situation (identification to the self), but they may refrain from communicating this to others and thus may 
not be considered by others to have been targeted.  The type of stressor this is likely to create for stigmatized people 
is that they may be unfairly held accountable for events that resulted from prejudice.   
Stigmatized people may also believe that they have encountered prejudice in a situation and may identify 
themselves as a target to other people, but these people and others who are present or who are informed about events 
may not accept the stigmatized person’s construal of events.  A stressor this creates for stigmatized people is that 
they may be perceived as unfairly trying to blame prejudice for something for which they should be willing to take 
personal responsibility.   
Identification by other people that prejudice has occurred also can create stressors for the stigmatized person.  
For example, even if they acknowledge that prejudice was present in a situation, other people may underestimate the 
effects it has on stigmatized people or may even have a tendency to engage in victim-blaming (Lerner & Miller, 
1978; Miller & Krulewitz, 2003).  Moreover, a hallmark of modern forms of prejudice is that nonstigmatized people 
often feel conflicted, upset, and anxious when prejudice surfaces (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; 
Dovidio et al., 2002), even when they were not personally responsible for the event.  These negative feelings may be 
expressed in subtle ways that stigmatized people pick up on.  In such situations, stigmatized people can wind up in a 
stressful prejudice-tainted interaction that is permeated with confusing and conflicting emotional and behavioral 
responses, without fully understanding why nonstigmatized people are so uncomfortable. 
 
Prejudice Identification and Coping Responses 
 
Prejudice identification also is an essential component of many coping responses to a stigma-related stressor.  For 
example, the attribution of negative outcomes to prejudice, a method of coping that can protect the self-esteem of 
stigmatized people, requires identifying to oneself, that prejudice has occurred, but not necessarily identifying the 
occurrence of prejudice to other people.  Identification of the occurrence of  prejudice to other people is implicated 
in coping responses that involve confronting the perpetrator about his or her prejudice or communicating to other 
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people about the situation (Kaiser,this volume, Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Hill, this volume; Stangor, Swim, 
Sechrist, DeCoster, Van Allen & Ottenbreit, in press). Confronting prejudice obviously also requires that 
stigmatized people identify to the self  that prejudiced has occurred as well.  Identification by other people that 
prejudice has occurred can present stigmatized people with a different set of coping challenges. Coping responses 
that require identification of prejudice to the self will not be available when the stigmatized person is coping with 
stigma-related stressors that result from other people’s (but not their own) identification that prejudice has occurred. 
 
Consequences of Prejudice Identification 
 
Prejudice identification in any of its forms is risky for stigmatized people because acknowledging the existence of 
prejudice challenges core beliefs about the fairness and justness of the world and the systems in which we live (see 
Kaiser, this volume, for a review).  For example, self-identification as a target of prejudice can sometimes buffer 
self-esteem from the ravages of stigma because it provides the stigmatized person with an external reason for 
negative outcomes (see Major et al., 2002, for a review).  However, identification of oneself as the target of 
prejudice could also lead to the belief that prejudice is pervasive and that the world is a cold and unjust place, and 
stigmatized people may suffer reduced psychological well-being as a result (Branscombe, Schmitt & Harvey, 1999).   
Identifying oneself as the target of prejudice to the perpetrator of that prejudice is likely to make the perpetrator 
feel accused, maligned, and in the case of subtle or unconscious forms of prejudice, misunderstood (Crocker & 
Garcia, this volume, Kaiser, this volume, Shelton et al., volume).  Stigmatized people may hope that communicating 
to people other than the perpetrator that one has been targeted by prejudice may enlist them as allies who could take 
remedial action to address the injustice.  At the very least identifying the prejudice to others should help them to 
understand why the stigmatized person’s performance or outcomes were not as good as they could be.  
Unfortunately, this rosy scenario may not be typical.  For example,  Kaiser and Miller found that an African-
American who attributed a failing grade (Kaiser & Miller, 2001a) or failure to land a job (Kaiser & Miller, 2003) to 
discrimination was perceived negatively by other people (see Kaiser, this volume, for a review).  Even when it was 
virtually certain that the person who graded the test performance was prejudiced (because participants were told that 
100% of the test evaluators discriminated against African-Americans) or the job interviewer was prejudiced 
(because his written “interview notes” indicated that he had never hired a black person and never would), study 
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participants still formed relatively negative impressions of the African-American who identified himself as a target 
of prejudice.   
Prejudice identification to others can be problematic for the stigmatized person because he or she may stand in 
the role of accuser and/or excuse-maker.  What happens if instead other people reached their own conclusions about 
the presence of prejudice in a particular situation?   The rosy scenario is that when other people themselves have 
drawn the inference that prejudice played a role in a particular situation, there should be no suspicion that self-
interest or excuse-making on the part of the stigmatized person explains the identification of prejudice.  
Consequently, other people should be driven to rectify things, confront the perpetrator themselves, or at least have 
sympathy and understanding for the stigmatized person.  Unfortunately, being a “witness” to prejudice does not 
appear to prevent people from forming negative impressions of the targets of prejudice.   
We (Miller & Krulewitz, 2003) investigated the impressions people formed of women who experienced an act 
of gender discrimination (sexual harassment) during a simulated job interview in which they participated as part of 
another study (Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001).  We played audiotapes of the women’s answers to scripted, job-
appropriate questions (e.g., questions about qualifications and job-related experiences) that the interviewer had 
asked. People who listened to these responses without knowing the context in which the answers were given (i.e., 
whether or not the interviewer had sexually harassed the women) judged the harassed women as less competent and 
qualified for the job than non-harassed women.  This result replicates Woodzicka and LaFrance’s main finding – 
which was that sexual harassment has real and immediate negative effects on women’s performance during a job 
interview.  
Sadly, we also found that people who knew about the sexual harassment because they had seen a script of all of 
the questions that the interviewer had asked, including the sexually harassing questions, also rated the harassed 
women as less competent and qualified than non-harasssed women.  Even more sadly, people who were high in 
belief in a just world (Lerner & Miller, 1978) went one step further and evaluated harassed women more negatively 
when they knew that the women had been harassed – a striking example of victim derogation. 
This experiment suggests that at best other people ignore the disadvantages prejudice causes for stigmatized 
people.  This assumption of a “level playing field” puts stigmatized people at a severe disadvantage in any situation 
in which they are handicapped by the effects of prejudice, as, in fact, the harassed women in this experiment were.  
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At worst, some people (i.e., those high in belief in a just world) not only fail to properly consider the role that 
prejudice may play in the behavior of stigmatized people, but may also derogate the victims of prejudice.   
In sum, research on the identification of prejudice suggests that identifying prejudice may be threatening to 
stigmatized individuals and people to whom prejudice is identified, even if the stigmatized persons themselves had 
no hand in the identification of the prejudice.  Kaiser  this volume) develops the theme that the reason prejudice 
identification is so threatening is that it challenges cherished beliefs about system fairness.   
 
Effects of Prejudice on Resources Available to Stigmatized People 
 
In the stress and coping literature, the appraisal of an event as a stressor involves not only the individual’s appraisal 
of an event as a personally relevant threat, but it also involves an appraisal of whether he or she has sufficient 
resources to meet the demands of this threat (Meyer, 2003; Miller & Kaiser, 2001; Miller & Major, 2000).  
Resources include personal attributes such as optimism (Kaiser & Miller, in press), group identification 
(Branscombe et al., 1999), and interpersonal attributes such as social support, interpersonal skills, and prior 
experiences with coping with prejudice (Miller & Kaiser, 2001; Miller & Myers, 1998).  Resources also can include 
economic security, status, education, and mobility.  The stigmatized group itself may be a resource by providing safe 
avenues for affiliation, cohesiveness, and political and social influence (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998; Meyer, 
2003). 
There is a complex interplay between stressors, resources, and coping.   People with more resources generally 
face fewer stressors than those with fewer resources.  This is partly because they are subjected to fewer potentially 
threatening events in the first place.  For example, job-related stress is more prevalent among lower status workers, 
such as clerical staff, than higher status workers, such as executives, presumably because status affects how much 
control people have over events that occur in the workplace.  When threats do occur, people with more resources are 
less likely to appraise them as stressful (i.e., something that will tax or exceed their resources) because they have 
sufficient resources to cope with the threats. Finally, people with more resources are better equipped to cope with 
threats that they do appraise as stressors (Meyer, 2003).  
Prejudice affects the resources of stigmatized people in numerous ways.  It can deny stigmatized people many 
of the educational, social, and economic opportunities that would provide them with resources that are needed for 
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effective coping. Consequently, in many situations stigmatized people occupy low status roles and have little power 
(Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002).   
Prejudice may deny some stigmatized people the opportunity to develop interpersonal skills that could be used 
to cope with prejudice (Miller & Myers, 1998).  In experiments in which interaction partners rated the social skills 
and likability of stigmatized people with whom they conversed by telephone or intercom without being aware of 
their partner’s stigmatized status, physically unattractive people (Goldman & Lewis, 1977) and women with heavy 
body weights (Miller, Rothblum, Barbour, Brand, & Felicio, 1990) were perceived as unlikable and lacking in social 
skill.  These findings generally are interpreted as demonstrating that prejudice can affect the behavior of its targets 
via the operation of expectancy confirmation processes (Miller & Turnbull, 1986) and denial of opportunities in 
social interactions.   
Although stigma has a detrimental effect on many resources available to stigmatized people, the development of 
other resources actually depends on having experience with being stigmatized.  Coping with prejudice can be 
likened to a skill that requires practice to develop (Miller & Myers, 1998; Miller et al., 1995).  In the most widely 
cited studies of the way in which stereotypes can become self-fulfilling prophecies, the “stigmatized” people who 
participate are nonstigmatized people who have been assigned (without their knowledge) to be portrayed to other 
people as a member of a stigmatized group (Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977; Word, Zanna, and Cooper, 1974).  
When nonstigmatized people are led to believe that they have been portrayed as a stigmatized person, their behavior 
exhibits considerable ineptness (Farina, Allen, & Saul, 1968; Kleck & Strenta, 1980).  In contrast, studies of people 
who are actually stigmatized including women (Kaiser & Miller, 2001b), heavyweight women (Miller et al., 1995), 
and African Americans (Shelton, 2003), show that when stigmatized people know that others may be prejudiced 
against them, they tend to counteract stereotypes rather than confirm them and to behave in a more socially skillful 
manner.  In fact, the social skills “deficits” that are found when stigmatized people interact with someone who does 
not know about their stigmatized status (and the stigmatized people know this), disappear when stigmatized people 
think that other people do know about their stigmatized status (Miller et al., 1995).  This suggests that when 
stigmatized people believe that prejudice threatens the outcome of their interactions, they marshal their interaction 
skills to counteract the effects that prejudice would otherwise have (Miller & Kaiser, 2001). 
 
Coping Responses to Stigma-related Stressors 
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There have been several efforts to identify dimensions that can be used to describe different types of coping with 
stigma.  Some of these efforts have been developed specifically for stigma-related coping (Branscombe & Ellemers, 
1998; Jacobson, 1977; Swim et al., 1998; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam; 1990).  Many of these efforts are 
intuitively appealing, but lack empirical support and pay little heed to dimensions that have proved to be meaningful 
in the general stress and coping literature. Others have adapted dimensions of coping that have investigated in the 
general stress and coping literature (Major, this volume; Miller & Major, 2000; Miller & Myers, 1998). Miller and 
Kaiser (2001) adapted the Compas et al., model, described above, to integrate the existing research on coping with 
stigma (Compas, et al., 2001; Conner-Smith, et al., 2001).   
In their model they made the same distinction that Compas and his colleagues made  between engagement and 
disengagement coping responses (see also, Swim & Thomas, this volume).  Recall that engagement coping involves 
self-regulation efforts that engage with or approach the stressor in some way, whereas disengagement coping 
involves regulatory efforts that disengage from or avoid the stressor.  Recall also that engagement coping can 
involve seeking primary or secondary control over the stressful event.  Primary control coping includes efforts that 
are directed toward influencing objective events or conditions to enhance a sense of personal control over the 
environment and one’s reactions (Compas et al., 2001). Engagement control coping that is aimed at gaining primary 
control over the stressful event includes problem solving and efforts to directly regulate one’s emotions or the 
expression of emotion. Secondary control coping, by contrast, involves efforts to adapt to the situation. by changing 
the way one feels about or thinks about the stressful event. The major coping responses that fall into this coping 
domain are distraction, acceptance, positive thinking and cognitive restructuring.  Disengagement coping includes 
attempting to control thoughts and situations to avoid thinking about or encountering the stressor, denial that the 
stressor has occurred, and wishful thinking.  
A growing body of research on how people cope with stigma has documented that stigmatized people do use 
primary and secondary control engagement coping and disengagement coping to protect themselves from the 
stressors that result from stigma (see Major et al., 2002; Miller & Kaiser, 2001 for reviews).  Crocker & Major’s 
(1989) pioneering article on the self-protective properties of stigma is largely a description of secondary control 
engagement coping strategies.  They argued, for example, that stigmatized people protect self-esteem from the 
negative consequences of prejudice and discrimination by blaming poor outcomes on prejudice (Crocker & Major, 
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1989), a form of secondary control coping involving cognitive restructuring.  Another type of secondary control 
engagement coping featured in Crocker and Major’s analysis is the devaluation of domains on which the stigmatized 
group is stereotyped as performing poorly.  For example, African-Americans devalue academic achievement and 
women devalue the pursuit of mathematics and science – domains in which these groups are stereotyped as being 
inferior (Crocker et al., 1998).  Devaluation can be conceptualized as a way of making stigmatized people (in this 
case African-Americans and women) feel better about the fact that their group has or is believed to have poor 
outcomes in a given domain, without changing the fact that these poor outcomes are associated with the stigmatized 
group. 
Primary control coping has recently emerged as a focus of research. As was mentioned above, results of several 
experiments indicate when stigmatized people know that prejudice could affect their interactions with others, 
stigmatized people use problem solving behavioral strategies that involve behaving in a more competent or socially 
skilled manner (Miller et al., 1995; Steckler & Rosenthal, 1985).   
Another form of primary control coping is that stigmatized people may strategically present themselves to 
others in ways that confirm stereotypes about their group.  This is especially likely to occur when the other people 
do indeed have stereotyped expectations and have power over the stigmatized individuals.  For example, women job 
applicants dressed in a more traditionally feminine way and gave more stereotype consistent answers to interview 
questions when they thought the interviewer had traditional views about women’s role than when they thought he 
had liberal views (von Baeyer, Sherk, & Zanna, 1981).  Sinclair and Huntsinger (this volume) suggest that self-
stereotyping, a process in which stigmatized people actually perceive themselves to be consistent with stereotypes 
about them, may be used as a tool to help stigmatized people focus on those aspects of themselves that fit with other 
people’s expectations about them.  By sincerely believing (at least for the moment) that one is what the stereotype 
says one should be, stigmatized people may be better able to present themselves in ways that people who stereotype 
them expect, and consequently may enjoy more harmonious relationships with them. 
Of course, sometimes stigmatized people have goals that encourage disconfirmation of stereotypes.  In doing so 
they may sacrifice the goal of harmony with others, but achieve other goals that take precedence (Snyder & Haugen, 
1995).  For example, Kaiser & Miller (2001b) found that women who expected their performance on a measure of 
future career success to be evaluated by prejudiced evaluators wrote essays in response to test questions that were 
judged by people who read them as being counter to stereotypes about women compared to the essays written by 
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women who were not expecting prejudiced evaluators. In the context of a test of career success, disconfirmation of 
gender stereotypes could be an asset, whereas a situation in which it is more important for people to get along could 
promote confirmation of gender stereotypes (Snyder & Haugen, 1995).   
Primary control coping also may involve seeking out nonstigmatized people as mentors, friends, or other 
sources of social support.  McLaughlin-Volpe (this volume) suggests that cross-group friendships can benefit 
stigmatized people by providing them access to resources (e.g., information about the situation) that might otherwise 
be denied them.   
Much of the recent research on primary control coping has examined when and how stigmatized people 
confront prejudice (e.g., Kaiser, this volume, Shelton, this volume; Swim & Hyers, 1999).  Confrontation is a 
general term that refers to behaviors or verbalizations that challenge the existence or expression of prejudice.  
Confronting prejudice can be a form of primary control coping because the hoped for outcome is remedying the 
unjust situation either for the individual target of prejudice or for the stigmatized group as a whole.  
There also is considerable evidence that stigmatized people use disengagement coping in response to stigma-
related stressors.  Disengagement often involves avoidance of social interactions with prejudiced people.  For 
example, women avoid interacting with men who have reputations for being sexual harassers or sexists (Swim, 
Cohen & Hyers, 1998); women who expect that they will be stereotyped avoid interacting in situations in which 
gender stereotypes are applicable (Pinel, 1999); and college students who expect others to be prejudiced or to 
stereotype them avoid cross-group interactions (Mendoza-Denton et al., this volume).   Avoidance coping may not 
be feasible in situations in which stigmatized people typically are in the minority (Inzlicht & Good, this volume).  
For example, African-American college students on a campus in which European-Americans are the overwhelming 
majority may find it virtually impossible to use avoidance of interracial contact as a way of coping.   
However, stigmatized people can also psychologically disengage from threatening situations even if they cannot 
actually avoid those situations.  For example, there is abundant evidence that African-Americans cope with 
stereotypes about their intellectual inferiority by disengaging from academic domains (Crocker et al., 1998; Major, 
Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998).  Although physically present in academic settings, their self-esteem 
may be invested elsewhere.  Of course, psychological disengagement can often result in leaving the stigma-
threatened situation, as if the case, for example, when an African-American drops out of school. 
One common way in which some stigmatized people can avoid the consequences of their stigmatized status is 
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to conceal their stigma from others (Crocker & Garcia, this volume; Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Meyer, 2003; 
Quinn, this volume).  Hiding one’s stigmatized status avoids many  of the stressors that result from stigma. If 
nobody knows about the stigmatized person’s stigma, the stigmatized person will not have to deal with problems 
created by prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination.  Concealing a stigma or “passing” as a nonstigmatized person 
is a coping response that obviously is available only for certain kinds of stigmas.  Stigmatizing conditions that are 
highly visible (e.g., ethnic group membership, gender, weight) cannot be concealed in any situation in which the 
stigmatized person is visible to others.  Some behaviorally-based stigmas (e.g., severe alcoholism) also are virtually 
impossible to conceal successfully because the stigmatized person is unlikely to be able to control behaviors that 
signal the stigmatized state.  Many other stigmas are potentially concealable even though it may take considerable 
effort to do so. 
It is important to realize that a particular coping response may serve different goals depending on the goals the 
stigmatized person is seeking to achieve in a particular situation.  For example, seeking social support can function 
as secondary control coping when it is aimed at helping the stigmatized person deal with the emotional and 
cognitive responses they have to being the target of prejudice.  Social support also can be used as a primary control 
coping response when, for example, stigmatized people band together to demand better treatment or seek out 
mentors and other advocates who will prevent others from acting on their prejudice.  Similarly, emotional regulation 
is often the goal of secondary control coping.  Stigmatized people may use distraction, wishful thinking, and 
cognitive reframing to help them feel good about themselves and avoid negative emotional states even though a 
prejudiced event has occurred.  Emotional regulation also can help stigmatized people use primary control coping.  
Confronting prejudice, for example, may require either controlling or stoking the fires of one’s anger at injustice 
depending on the probable success of a cool-headed approach or a aggressive approach.  Performing in a skillful 
manner that will overwhelm the other person’s prejudice may require that stigmatized people be able to control their 
anxiety about the possibility that they may fall short and confirm the other person’s stereotypes about them. 
 
 
COPING WITH STIGMA INVOLVES TRADEOFFS 
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Coping is not a panacea.  Although people often believe that they find meaning and gain strength through adversity, 
coping responses require a commitment of personal resources that could otherwise be used for other endeavors.  
This is true of coping with any type of stressor, and it is true of coping with stigma-related stressors as well.  
Consequently, it is not surprising as soon as stigma researchers turned their attention to how people cope with 
stigma, they quickly discovered that coping with stigma often involves hard choices between imperfect options.  
Coping responses typically involve weighing the benefits of the response against the costs that will be incurred in 
making it (Kaiser & Miller, in press; Swim & Thomas, this volume).   
For example, the negative reactions others have to a stigmatized person who makes a claim of discrimination 
(Kaiser, this volume; Kaiser & Miller, 2002; 2003, Shelton, et al., this volume) may be offset by the possibility that 
challenging prejudice will help reduce it.  Shelton and Stewart (in press) pointed out that although identification to 
others as a target of prejudice may be personally costly, the group as a whole may benefit when prejudice is 
challenged.  They found that although a woman who confronted a male confederate about sexist behavior that was 
part of a script he was instructed to follow was evaluated negatively by him, his overall level of sexism declined 
after the confrontation.  Thus, confrontation, although personally costly, may have considerable benefit for the 
stigmatized group as a whole.   
There also is growing evidence that many nonstigmatized people are motivated not to be prejudiced and try not 
to let prejudice affect how they treat stigmatized people (Devine, 1989; Shelton, 2003).  When they fail, they 
experience negative affect and try to compensate for this failure by bending over backwards not to be prejudiced in 
subsequent interactions (Devine, et al., 1991).  These findings suggest that at least some nonstigmatized people 
might ultimately appreciate having their prejudice pointed out to them, although in the short term they may have a 
tendency to “shoot the messenger” by having a negative reaction to the bearer of the bad news. 
The primary control coping responses of self-stereotyping and stereotype-consistent self-presentation can 
promote interpersonal harmony (von Baeyer et al., 1981; Sinclair & Huntsinger, this volume, Snyder & Haugen, 
1995), but they also may justify continued prejudice against stigmatized people.  Stereotype confirmation can also 
depress the self-esteem of stigmatized people, particularly because stereotypes typically characterize stigmatized 
people in negative terms (Fiske, 1998; Steele, 1997).  Even the suspicion that one might confirm a negative group 
stereotype can impair the performance of stigmatized people (Inzlicht & Good, this volume; Mendoza-Denton et al., 
this volume, Steele, 1997).   In addition, stereotype confirmation may be so threatening to stigmatized people that 
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confirmation of a stereotype by other members of the stigmatized group causes stigmatized people to feel personally 
ashamed  (Schmader & Lickel, this volume). Other forms of primary control coping also can exact costs on 
stigmatized people.  Drawing on behavioral skills to compensate for prejudice (Miller & Myers, 1998) uses 
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral resources that stigmatized people may need to achieve other goals.  Other 
forms of problem solving such as taking collective action to reduce or outlaw discrimination (Branscombe & 
Ellemers, 1998) can be personally costly and are often dangerous. 
The chief drawback of secondary control coping responses is that they make stigmatized individuals feel better 
about the fact that their outcomes are poor because of prejudice, but do nothing to prevent those outcomes from 
occurring.  Some forms of secondary control coping can even exacerbate the situation.  For example, when ethnic 
minority students cope with negative stereotypes about their academic promise by devaluing the pursuit of academic 
excellence, they cut themselves off from achievement in a domain that is critical in today’s world (Crocker et al., 
1998; Major et al., 1998; Mendoza; Mendoza-Denton et al., this volume). 
Disengagement coping also can have a number of pitfalls.  In fact, research on coping with many types of 
stressors indicates that avoidance coping generally has a poor track record (Zeldner & Endler, 1996).  The tendency 
to avoid interactions with nonstigmatized people may be counterproductive because an enormous volume of 
research indicates that prejudice against minority groups is reduced by intergroup contact (Tropp, this volume). 
There also are some major drawbacks to avoiding stressors by stigma concealment. Concealing the stigma often 
deprives the stigmatized person of social support from similarly stigmatized individuals (Major, Richards, Cooper, 
Cozzarelli, & Zubek, 1998).  Concealment can result in suppression of thoughts about the stigma. Thought 
suppression is notorious for producing rebound effects in which the person experiences intrusive thoughts about the 
thought being suppressed (Wegner, 1994), and people who conceal their stigmas often do experience intrusive 
thoughts about the stigmatizing condition (Major et al., 1998; Smart & Wegner, 1999). 
Consideration of the tradeoffs involved in coping with stigma suggests that there may be no easy or cost-free 
way to cope with it.  However, stigma-related stress may be no different in this respect than any other type of stress.  
These tradeoffs do suggest that stigmatized people have to weight the costs and benefits of a coping response.  This 
involves considering what they most want to accomplish in a particular situation.  This is likely to vary for different 
stigmatized individuals, in different situations, at different points in time.  Thus, there is not likely to be any one 
“adaptive” coping response. 
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MAINTAINING THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE STIGMATIZED PERSON 
 
Stigma researchers have been in the forefront of appreciating the stigmatized person’s perspective in understanding 
the consequences of prejudice.  This appreciation is what gave rise to research on coping with stigma and has led to 
important advances in our understanding of when and why stigmatized people are resilient or vulnerable to the 
effects of prejudice.   
Keeping the perspective of stigmatized people in mind is critical in any discussion of the outcomes of coping 
with prejudice.  Otherwise, it is tempting to try to identify what constitutes “good” or “effective” coping with stigma 
without considering the goals of the stigmatized person.  For example, Pinel (2002) found that women high in 
stigma consciousness virtually sabotaged an interaction with a man whom they believed was a sexist, but who 
actually an innocuous fellow participant selected because he was not particularly sexist, by negatively evaluating his 
contributions to an experimental task before he had a chance to evaluate their own contributions. This effect was 
mediated by the women’s expectations that the man would evaluate them negatively.  When finally given a chance 
to evaluate the women’s contributions to the task, the men responded in kind to the women’s evaluations of their 
work, and the entire interaction entered a vicious cycle in which neither party ended up thinking highly of the other.  
This unfortunate turn of events could be considered an example of spectacularly bad coping, because the stigma 
conscious women’s behavior left little room for the men to disconfirm the women’s expectations. A better 
interpretation may be to consider this as an example of a stigmatized person deciding that she would rather not waste 
her time or energy earning the respect of someone whose regard she did not value anyway.   
Like anyone else, stigmatized people have limited resources at their disposal.  They face the same stressors that 
anyone faces, plus they have the additional stressors created by prejudice.  Trying to cope with everything may leave 
stigmatized people unable to cope with anything. Consequently, they may have to set priorities that sacrifice some 
potentially important outcomes in order to achieve the goals that are most important to them.   
Researchers are just beginning to give serious attention to the goals stigmatized people may be attempting to 
achieve when they cope with prejudice.  One important insight that is emerging from these efforts is a reminder that 
stigmatized people have the same basic motivations as anyone else does.  Swim and Thomas (this volume) suggests 
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that five core social motives (belonging, self-enhancement, control, trust, and understanding) that have been used to 
describe human social motivation in general can be usefully applied to stigmatized people.  Other stigma theorists 
have placed more emphasis on a particular motive.  For example, McLaughlin-Volpe (this volume) focuses on 
control over resources whereas Crocker emphasizes the self-enhancement goal (Crocker, this volume; Crocker & 
Major, 1989). 
This emphasis on goals that stigmatized people share with everyone else reminds us that stigmatized people are 
people who have been stigmatized by others.  Conceptualizing people who are stigmatized primarily as stigmatized 
people risks thinking too narrowly about what their goals are in coping with prejudice.  This can lead to the 
assumption stigmatized people are always or primarily concerned with goals that are directly related to their status 
as a stigmatized people (such as whether they are confirming or disconfirming stereotypes) and that the only goal of 
primary control coping is reducing or eliminating prejudice.   
Crocker and Garcia (this volume) argue that stigmatized and nonstigmatized  people too often approach 
interactions with each other in an ego-defensive manner.  Stigmatized people define the situation as one in which 
they can accept their devalued status (and suffer a loss of self-esteem) or one in which they can maintain their self-
worth by castigating the other person as prejudiced.   Being suspected of prejudice makes nonstigmatized people 
anxious, uncomfortable and perhaps even angry. This causes them to behave in ways that confirm the stigmatized 
person’s fears about the interaction.   According to Crocker & Garcia, this cycle of mistrust and suspicion can be 
broken if both stigmatized and nonstigmatized people focus on goals other than defending their egos, for example by 
focusing on what can be learned in the situation, how both parties can be included in each other’s goals, and striving 
for goals that are larger than the individual.  Consideration of the variety of ways in which stigmatized people cope 
with stigma-related stressors and the way in which they tailor their responses to the situation at hand to achieve the 
goals that are most important to them suggests that many stigmatized people need no introduction to these ideas.  
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Though psychologists have studied prejudice for nearly a century, it has been only recently that attention has turned 
towards understanding the consequences of prejudice for its targets, those who are stigmatized (see Crocker, Major, 
& Steele, 1998; Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002 for reviews). Stigmatized individuals possess or are perceived to 
possess an attribute conveying a devalued social identity within a social context (Crocker et al., 1998). Examples of 
groups that are stigmatized in North America include racial and ethnic minorities, women, gay men and lesbians, 
people with heavy body weights, and individuals belonging to nontraditional religious groups. The stigmatized 
encounter discrimination in many domains including restricted access to resources such as employment, income, 
housing, and education (see Clark, Anderson, Clark, & Williams, 1999 for a review). Additionally, the stigmatized 
experience many forms of social threat, including being ignored, rejected, disrespected, and patronized (Hebl, 
Foster, Mannix, & Dovidio, 2002; Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001). Thus, one important goal of research 
on stigma involves understanding how members of stigmatized groups cope with the predicaments posed by being 
the target of prejudice and discrimination (Miller, in this volume; Swim & Thomas, in this volume).  
Attributing events to discrimination is a coping strategy that has received considerable attention in recent years 
(see Crocker & Major, 2003; Major et al., 2002; Major, McCoy, Kaiser, & Quinton, 2003; Schmitt & Branscombe, 
2002a for reviews). Attributions to discrimination are judgments of unfair treatment stemming from one’s social 
identity (Major et al., 2002). In their seminal analysis of discrimination and self-esteem, Crocker and Major (1989) 
drew upon Kelley’s (1973) discounting principle to argue that the awareness of being the target of discrimination 
offers members of stigmatized groups the opportunity to discount stable, internal, controllable attributes of the self 
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as a cause of negative outcomes and can thus serve a self-esteem protective function. Crocker and Major’s (1989) 
theoretical analysis has proven to be extremely generative and has provided the ground work for many important 
theoretical and empirical advances on this topic (see Crocker & Major, 2003; Major et al., 2002; Major, McCoy et 
al., 2003; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a for reviews of this work).  
However, despite the recent theoretical and empirical advances made in research on the consequences of 
attributions to discrimination, this work has remained almost exclusively focused on the intrapersonal consequences 
of these judgments. Though we now know quite a bit about the self-esteem and affective consequences of 
attributions to discrimination, we still know very little about other types of consequences these judgments might 
pose. In this chapter, I examine a less studied consequence of attributions to discrimination: the consequences of 
these judgments for interpersonal relationships. 
The case of Bassem Youssef, a high-ranking Arab American FBI agent, who filed a discrimination lawsuit 
against the agency in 2002, illustrates these interpersonal consequences. Youssef, an American citizen who was born 
in Egypt, had worked with the agency for 15 years and had an excellent grasp of Arabic languages and Middle 
Eastern culture. Prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Youssef had worked 
extensively in counterterrorism, receiving consistently exceptional performance evaluations, commendation from 
both American and Arabic leaders, and a highly coveted Director of Central Intelligence Award. Youssef’s 
discrimination claim states that after 9-11, he hit a glass ceiling and was blocked from counterterrorism assignments 
for which he was uniquely qualified, and that this negative treatment was due to his national origin. After Youssef 
discussed his perceived discriminatory treatment with his supervisor, he reported experiencing retaliation from the 
bureau. For example, Youssef learned at a public meeting that another agent would be taking over his job. Youssef 
also claimed that his responsibilities continued to be stripped from him, and that he was treated disrespectfully and 
was told that his actions disparaged the agency. This poor interpersonal treatment led Youssef to later add a charge 
of retaliation to his claim.  
As this case illustrates, publicly claiming to be a target of prejudice can have negative interpersonal 
ramifications. Youssef’s retaliatory experience is not uncommon. In 2002, retaliation charges represented over one-
quarter of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission discrimination-related charges (Nielson & Nelson, in 
press). In this chapter, I will explore the interpersonal consequences of public attributions to discrimination. I will 
first describe research demonstrating that attributions to discrimination are interpersonally costly. I will then 
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integrate these findings within a dominant ideology threat model of reactions to discrimination claims (see Figure 1). 
This model argues that discrimination claims threaten core North American ideological beliefs, such as those 
contending that America is a fair place where any individual or any group can get ahead through hard work and 
effort. Furthermore, individuals who strongly endorse this belief system or who are in situations where these beliefs 
are salient will feel threatened and will be particularly likely to derogate the discrimination claimant. I will present 
research investigating these hypotheses and will discuss the theoretical and applied implications of this research.  
 
 
ATTRIBUTIONS TO DISCRIMINATION ARE INTERPERSONALLY COSTLY 
 
Several studies demonstrate that individuals who publicly attribute events to discrimination incur negative 
interpersonal ramifications. Kaiser and Miller (2001) provided the first empirical test of the hypothesis that 
attributions to discrimination are interpersonally costly. They had predominately White participants read a 
description of a Black man who had received a failing test grade. In addition, participants learned that the test 
administrator had informed the target person that either that there was no chance, a 50% chance, or a 100% chance 
that a racist White evaluator graded the target's test.  Participants then examined a survey ostensibly completed by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIG. 1. Dominant ideology threat model of reactions to discrimination claimants.  
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FIG. 2. Derogation of an African American target as a function of the target’s attributions for failure and the chance of prejudice 
(data from Kaiser & Miller. 2001). 
 
the target in which he indicated that his grade was due primarily to either discrimination, his inadequate test answers 
(an internal attribution), or to the difficulty of the test (an external attribution). We included both internal and 
external attribution control groups because discrimination attributions have two loci of causality. They are internal 
because they implicate a part of the self (one’s social identity) as the cause of negative feedback and external 
because they implicate external factors (another person) as the cause of negative feedback (Major, Kaiser, & 
McCoy, 2003; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002b). All participants then completed a measure of derogation of the target 
(e.g., ratings of the extent to which he was hypersensitive, irritating, a troublemaker). The target who attributed his 
failing grade to discrimination was derogated to a greater extent than the target who attributed his failure to his test 
answers or the difficulty of the test. Remarkably, this effect occurred regardless of the objective probability that a 
racist evaluator graded the target's test. In other words, the target who blamed a failure on discrimination 
experienced damage to his reputation even when prejudice was clearly responsible for the event (see Figure 2).  
Though the Kaiser and Miller (2001) experiment is consistent with the hypothesis that individuals who blame 
events on discrimination rather than other causes are derogated, participants in that experiment never saw direct 
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evidence that the test grader was racist (i.e., participants received base rate information delivered by the test 
administer to the target person).  Even though this second-hand base rate manipulation of prejudice was successful 
in establishing different levels of perceived prejudice in the experimental situation, it is possible that the 
participants’ insensitivity to the amount of prejudice facing the target person occurred because this information 
lacked emotional saliency or credibility that might otherwise arise from seeing this information directly from the 
perpetrator of discrimination (e.g., Fazio & Zanna, 1978).  Relative to information obtained indirectly, direct 
information is more confidently held, more cognitively accessible, and more likely to influence subsequent behavior 
(Fazio & Zanna, 1978; 1981).   
In a subsequent experiment, Kaiser and Miller (2003) addressed this limitation by directly exposing participants 
to the source of prejudice. In this experiment, predominately White college students participated in a study on the 
job application process. Participants reviewed the material of an African American job candidate (his race was 
conveyed by including a picture of a professionally dressed African American man) who failed to receive a job he 
desired. Participants then read comments purportedly made by the White interviewer in charge of the hiring decision 
that expressed either no animosity toward Blacks, moderate levels of racism, or blatant old-fashioned racism (i.e., he 
made statements such as “Black people are just not as smart as White people” and “I have never hired a black person 
and I never will”).  Participants then viewed a survey ostensibly completed by the job candidate in which he 
attributed his job rejection to discrimination, his poor interviewing skills, or the strong competition for the job. 
Consistent with Kaiser and Miller (2001), the applicant who blamed his rejection on discrimination still was 
derogated more than the applicant who blamed his rejection on other causes; even when he faced blatant old-
fashioned racism. 
These negative interpersonal reactions to discrimination claimants are not limited to Whites reactions to Blacks. 
Shelton and Stewart (2004) demonstrated that women also incur negative interpersonal costs when they publicly 
acknowledge sexism. In this experiment, male participants were instructed to conduct job interviews with female 
participants. The men received a list of interview questions and were trained to behave consistently during the 
interviews. Half of the men were assigned to read a set of interview questions (which were adapted from Woodzicka 
and LaFrance, 2001) that contained several sexist questions (“Do you have a boyfriend?”, “Do people find you 
desirable?”, and “Do you think it is important for women to wear bras to work?”) and the other half were assigned to 
read a set of questions that were rated as equally offensive as the former questions but irrelevant to sexism.  The 
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interviews were videotaped, and after the interview was completed, the men completed dependent measures 
including the extent to which the women were complainers (i.e., argumentative, troublemaker, complainer). Raters 
then watched the videotaped interviews and indicated the extent to which the women job applicants confronted the 
men’s sexist or offensive comments. When the women were asked sexist questions, the more they confronted the 
sexist remarks, the more the men who interviewed them saw them as complainers and perceived them less 
favorably. These relationships did not appear when women were subjected to offensive but nonsexist interview 
questions. 
Likewise, Dodd, Giuliano, Boutell, and Moran (2001) examined participants’ reactions to women who 
confronted or failed to confront a man who made sexist comments. In this study, participants read a scenario about a 
woman who was subjected to sexist comments and who either confronted or ignored the comments. Men who read 
about a woman who confronted sexist comments liked her less than when they read that she did not confront the 
comments. Though this study lacks a control group in which a woman makes a confrontation that is irrelevant to 
sexism, it does converge with studies showing that people who publicly acknowledge prejudice are disliked. 
These laboratory experiments showing that people who publicly attribute events to prejudice are disliked are 
consistent with retrospective survey research. Survey research indicates that targets of prejudice believe that publicly 
claiming discrimination is socially costly and frequently anticipate being perceived as a troublemaker and targeted 
by retaliation when they do make such claims (Feagin & Sikes, 1994; Fitzgerald, Swan, & Fischer, 1995; Haslett & 
Lipman, 1997; Kaiser & Miller, 2004; Near & Jensen, 1983). For example, in a study of female attorneys’ responses 
to sexism in the workplace, none of the women reported that confronting a peer’s sexist behavior improved the 
relationship (Haslett & Lipman).  At best the relationship remained the same and at worst the relationship 
deteriorated.  In another study, 40% of women who brought sexual harassment allegations against their employers 
reported that the company responded by retaliating against them (Near & Jensen). Likewise, interviews with African 
Americans reveal that they anticipate social backlash from publicly attributing events to discrimination (Feagin & 
Sikes).   
Having established that public attributions to prejudice are interpersonally costly, I next turn toward integrating 
this work within a dominant ideology threat theoretical framework (see Figure 1). I will begin by discussing North 
America’s dominant ideology and then explore the consequences of threats to this belief system. I will then discuss 
research examining attributions to discrimination as a source of dominant ideology threat.  
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THE DOMINANT IDEOLOGY 
 
Independence, the Protestant Ethic, and the American Dream are three pervasive values in North American culture 
(de Tocqueville, 1840/1945; Plaut, Markus, & Lachman, 2002; Weber, 1904/1958). Independence involves the need 
for autonomy and the belief that success depends upon self-reliance and stamina (Triandis, 1995). The Protestant 
Ethic is a moral imperative emphasizing the superiority of hard work, commitment, and industriousness (Weber). 
The American Dream combines notions about individualism, self-interest, and the Protestant Ethic and argues that 
the greatest good is to be individually successful and that almost anyone, regardless of his or her life circumstances 
can get to the top through dedication, perseverance, and hard work (Hochschild, 1995; Spindler & Spindler, 1990).  
The collective endorsement of these values, norms, and beliefs in North America has led this cultural belief system 
to be dubbed “the dominant ideology” (see Kluegel & Smith, 1986). 
The dominant ideology has been theoretically conceptualized and empirically assessed with a number of related 
constructs, including individualism, the Protestant Ethic, the belief in a just world, meritocracy beliefs, hierarchy 
enhancing beliefs, and individual mobility beliefs (e.g., Davey, Bobocel, Son Hing, & Zanna, 1999; Katz & Hass, 
1988; Lerner, 1980; Major, 1994; Major, Kaiser, McCoy, & O’Brien, 2004; Quinn & Crocker, 1999; Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999).  The dominant ideology can also be manipulated with primes serving to activate these constructs 
(Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996; Major et al., 2004; Quinn & Crocker). These beliefs share a common feature---
they locate the causes of events internally within attributes of individuals and groups and hold individuals and 
groups responsible for their position in life. Thus, the dominant ideology creates the perception that individuals and 
groups who succeed in life are responsible for their success because they have worked hard and individuals and 
groups who experience failure are responsible for their outcomes because they simply have not worked hard enough.  
Though the dominant ideology is part of a largely shared North American cultural value system, individuals do 
differ in the extent to which they endorse the ideology. Relative to weak endorsers of the dominant ideology, strong 
endorsers tend to perceive the government as more fair, place a high value on obedience, accept inequalities in 
society as fair, posses an internal locus of control, a conservative political orientation, and are less tolerant of 
members of stigmatized groups (see Furnham & Procter, 1989; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Lerner 
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& Miller, 1978 for reviews). Among members of stigmatized groups, endorsing the dominant ideology is associated 
with lower self-esteem when faced with evidence of prejudice against their group (Major et al., 2004). 
The dominant ideology serves several important functions for those who endorse it. First, it provides individuals 
with the perception that their social world is orderly, controllable, and predictable (Erickson, 1950; Greenberg, 
Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Lerner, 1980), and these perceptions have a number of 
important benefits including enhanced motivation, performance, well-being, and mental health (Greenberg et al.; 
Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Tomaka & Blascovich, 1994).  Second, the dominant ideology provides individuals with the 
ability to make sense of negative events in their social world (Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Lerner & Miller, 1978). 
People and groups who experience negative outcomes have not worked hard enough and hence deserve their fate 
and are morally flawed.  This explanatory style is adaptive because it provides individuals with a sense of hope 
about their future outcomes and protects them from feeling vulnerable to failure. As long as they work hard, they 
can achieve anything. Indeed, the more individuals endorse the dominant ideology, the more ambitious their life 
aspirations and goals (Mirels & Darland, 1990) and the less vulnerable they feel about experiencing a variety of 
negative events (Lambert, Burroughs, & Nguyen, 1999).   
 
 
THREATS TO THE DOMINANT IDEOLOGY 
 
What happens, however, when individuals encounter evidence that challenges the dominant ideology? A number of 
theoretical perspectives posit that individuals who have their worldviews challenged experience a heightened sense 
of fear, uncertainty, discomfort, and threat; and that one way to alleviate this discomfort is by punishing the source 
of the threat (Crocker & Garcia, in this volume; Greenberg et al., 1997; Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Jost & Hunyady, 
2002; Lerner, 1980). For instance, terror management theory argues that our cultural worldviews serve as the 
foundation for our self-esteem, and when these worldviews are threatened, we will experience discomfort and 
engage in behaviors to defend our worldview, such as punishing those who challenge our views and rewarding those 
who affirm our views (Greenberg et al.). Likewise, Lerner’s just world hypothesis is predicated on the belief that 
innocent victims are so threatening to benevolent beliefs about the world, that the more innocent they are, the more 
we convince ourselves that they deserve their fate so that we can protect ourselves from the distressing possibility 
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that the world is not just and fair after all. Finally, system justification theory argues that individuals are motivated 
to justify existing beliefs and ideologies and will sometimes do so even when these beliefs contribute to the 
derogation and disadvantaged state of one’s personal self and social groups (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady).  
These perspectives provide converging evidence that threats to one’s worldview are indeed unsettling and motivate 
individuals to restore or reaffirm their belief systems. 
A study by Kaiser, Vick, and Major (2004) demonstrates these psychological responses to threats against the 
worldview within the context of the 9-11 terrorist attacks against the United States of America. Kaiser and 
colleagues examined individuals’ endorsement of Just World Beliefs prior to the 9-11 terrorist attacks, an event 
which represented a severe challenge to this belief system, and then two months after the terrorist attacks examined 
threat stemming from the attacks as well as the desire for revenge against the terrorists.  Results revealed that the 
more individuals endorsed Just World Beliefs prior to September 11, 2001, the more threat they experienced after 
the terrorist attacks and the more they desired revenge against the terrorists. Furthermore, the relationship between 
Just World Beliefs and the desire for revenge was mediated by threat. Thus, this study was consistent with 
theoretical perspectives arguing that worldview threat is distressing and can lead to restoration efforts through means 
such as punishing the source of the threat.  
 
 
ATTRIBUTIONS TO DISCRIMINATION AS A SOURCE OF DOMINANT IDEOLOGY 
THREAT 
 
Central to my argument is the notion that stigmatized group members’ attributions to discrimination threaten the 
dominant ideology. These judgments call into question the basic assumptions upon which the dominant ideology is 
based, and thus serve as a source of ideology threat. Attributions to discrimination challenge the dominant ideology 
in a number of ways. These judgments threaten beliefs about autonomy, self-reliance, and personal control. That is, 
they communicate that effort and persistence are not sufficient to produce success and that even if we work hard, we 
will not always succeed. Attributions to discrimination also challenge prescriptive norms of the dominant ideology, 
which argue that individuals should take personal responsibility for their outcomes and should locate the causes of 
events internally, within personal attributes. Finally, attributions to discrimination convey that some groups in 
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society are unable to obtain the American Dream. In short, when individuals encounter stigmatized individuals who 
publicly blame events on discrimination, these accusations can undermine basic assumptions about the world, which 
can result in threat and distress. 
 
This dominant ideology threat posed by discrimination claims is expressed by Shelby Steele (1990) in his 
essays, The Content of Our Character: 
 
 “The race-holder whines, or complains indiscriminately, not because he seeks redress, but because he seeks the 
status of a victim, a status that excuses him from what he fears. A victim is not responsible for his position, and by 
claiming a victim’s status, the race-holder gives up a sense of personal responsibility he needs to better his 
condition.” (S. Steele, 1990, pp. 33). 
 
Likewise, in his book A Nation of Victims, Charles Sykes argues: 
 
“Unfortunately, that [perceived victimization] is a formula for social gridlock: the irresistible search for someone or 
something to blame colliding with unmovable unwillingness to accept responsibility” (Sykes, 1992, pp.15). 
 
As these quotations illustrate, individuals who claim to be victims of discrimination threaten the dominant 
ideological premise that personal responsibility is the primary determinant of and proper route to success.  
Furthermore, because discrimination claims pose a threat to important beliefs upon which North American culture 
rests, they by extension threaten the orderliness of the social world. 
According to the dominant ideology threat model of reactions to discrimination claimants, challenges to the 
dominant ideology should be threatening and should motivate individuals to restore their faith in the worldview by 
finding fault in the character of those who threaten their belief system. This argument lends itself to the prediction 
that individuals who strongly endorse the dominant ideology or who are in situations where these beliefs are salient 
will feel particularly threatened in the presence of stigmatized individuals who blame events on discrimination and 
will be especially likely to derogate those individuals (see Figure 1).  I next turn to reviewing empirical research that 
addresses these predictions. 
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THE MODERATING ROLE OF DOMINANT IDEOLOGY ENDORSEMENT 
 
Perceived Threat  
 
The model presented in Figure 1 argues that attributions to discrimination will be threatening to individuals who 
strongly endorse the dominant ideology or who are in situations where this belief system is salient. That is, 
discrimination claims should cause strong endorsers of the dominant ideology to feel anxious, uneasy, and on edge. 
Though few studies have directly tested this hypothesis, initial evidence appears to support the model. For instance, 
Kaiser, Dyrenforth, & Hagiwara (2004, Experiment 2) primed undergraduate students with either the dominant 
ideology or neutral content and then examined how threatened they felt in the presence of a discrimination claimant. 
In this experiment, participants in the dominant ideology prime condition read a story in which a political leader 
selected an individual for a desirable promotion because that individual had worked hard and pulled himself up from 
poverty, and was the best qualified person for the job. In the control condition, participants read a neutral article 
about a tortoise species. After reading their respective article, participants read about an African American man who 
blamed a poor test grade given by a racist White evaluator on either discrimination, his test answers, or the difficulty 
of the test. Participants then completed a measure of threat (e.g., feeling nervous, anxious, distressed). Consistent 
with the dominant ideology threat hypothesis, relative to participants primed with neutral content, those primed with 
the dominant ideology experienced more threat in the presence of the African American man who blamed his failure 
on discrimination. The prime manipulation had no effect on self-reported threat when the African American target 
blamed his failure on either his test answers or the difficulty of the test.  
Kaiser et al. (2004, Experiment 3) replicated this threat effect in a study examining individual differences in 
chronic endorsement of the dominant ideology. In this study, participants who had previously completed a dominant 
ideology measure (Belief in a Just World; e.g., “I feel that the world treats people fairly”, “I feel that people get what 
they deserve”) and a threat measure witnessed an African American receive a failing test grade from a White 
evaluator who made a blatant racist comment. Participants then saw that the African American man attributed his 
grade to either discrimination, his test answers, or the difficulty of the test. Finally, participants completed the same 
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measure of threat again.  Consistent with the priming study, the more participants endorsed the Belief in a Just 
World, the more threat they experienced (controlling for initial threat) in the presence of the target who blamed his 
failure on discrimination. Endorsement of the Belief in a Just World was not positively related to threat in the 
answer attribution and test difficulty attribution conditions. Thus, this study demonstrates that individual differences 
in dominant ideology endorsement are associated with increased threat reactions when faced with individuals who 
make attributions to discrimination. 
 
Interpersonal Outcomes 
 
According to the dominant ideology threat model of reactions to discrimination claimants, individuals who 
chronically endorse the dominant ideology and those in situations where this ideology is salient will not only feel 
more threatened in the presence of individuals who blame events on discrimination, they will be particularly likely 
to react negatively towards discrimination claimants as well. Several studies provide evidence consistent with this 
argument. 
For example, Maass, Cadinu, Gaurnieri, and Grasselli (2003) had male participants complete the Social 
Dominance Orientation Scale (e.g., "It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are 
at the bottom;” Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), a measure found to be related to dominant ideology 
endorsement (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), and then interact via computer with a male and female confederate (the 
confederates were actually computer scripts). The female confederate’s gender-related attitudes were manipulated so 
that half the time she was portrayed as a feminist who worked with a union that defends women’s rights and half the 
time she was portrayed as traditionally feminine. In the former condition, one could readily infer that the woman 
attributes her group’s disadvantage in society to sexism and she should thus pose a strong challenge to the dominant 
ideology. Under the guise that the study concerned visual memory, the men were instructed to send computer 
images to the women. Some of these images were hardcore pornographic in nature and others were not. During the 
interaction, the male confederate sent several hardcore pornographic images to the female confederate (who objected 
each time) and encouraged the male participant to do the same thing. The dependent variable of interest was sexual 
harassment of the female confederate by the male participant (assessed by the number and intensity of pornographic 
images he sent to the woman). Consistent with a dominant ideology threat perspective, the female confederate was 
Dominant Ideology Threat 13 
harassed to a greater extent when she was portrayed as defending women’s rights than when she was portrayed as 
feminine. Furthermore, across both the feminist and traditional woman conditions, the more participants endorsed 
social dominance orientation, the more they sexually harassed her. However, this relationship was particularly 
strong when the female confederate was portrayed as a feminist. This study provides important behavioral evidence 
that men treat women who publicly blame their gender group’s outcomes on prejudice negatively, particularly if 
those men endorse the dominant ideology. 
A study by Jost and Burgess (2000) also is consistent with the dominant ideology threat model of reactions to 
discrimination claimants. In this study, men and women read a newspaper story about a woman named Ann who 
was denied entry into her university’s honors program (her qualifications were ambiguous). After learning that men 
were accepted into the program at a higher rate than women, Ann approached a school administrator who told her 
that this disparity reflected actual differences in qualification. Unsatisfied with this explanation, Ann brought a 
sexism lawsuit against the university. Participants then completed a number of measures including their attitudes 
towards Ann (e.g., “I feel proud of Ann”; “I feel that Ann has been unfair to the university” (reverse)). Additionally, 
participants completed the Belief in a Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975), which assessed individual 
differences in the endorsement of the dominant ideology. Consistent with the dominant ideology threat approach, the 
more men endorsed the belief in a just world, the less favorably they evaluated Ann. The same relationship was 
observed for women, but it was not significant (though the relationship was not significantly different than the one 
observed for men).  
Similarly, a study by Kaiser et al. (2004, Experiment 2) is consistent with the dominant ideology threat model. 
Participants in this study completed a Protestant Work Ethic measure (e.g., “If people work hard they almost always 
get what they want;” “Even if people work hard, they don’t always get ahead” (reverse)) prior to reading about an 
African American man who blamed a poor test grade given by a racist White evaluator on either discrimination, his 
test answers, or the difficulty of the test. The target of prejudice who blamed his failure on discrimination was 
derogated to a greater extent than the target who blamed his failure on other internal and external causes. Of 
importance, however, and consistent with the dominant ideology threat model, in the discrimination condition, the 
more participants endorsed the Protestant Work Ethic, the more they derogated the African American man.  This 
relationship was not observed when the target blamed his failure on his test answers or the difficulty of the test. This 
study provides important evidence that individuals who endorse the dominant ideology react negatively to African 
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Americans who blame negative outcomes on discrimination.  
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
According to the dominant ideology threat model presented in this paper, public attributions to discrimination serve 
as a source of dominant ideology threat. The model argues that strong endorsement of the dominant ideology leaves 
people feeling particularly threatened in the presence of discrimination claimants and likely to respond to this threat 
by derogating the discrimination claimant. The research reviewed in this chapter is consistent with this model. A 
number of studies utilizing a variety of research designs and stigmatized target groups demonstrate that individuals 
who blame negative outcomes on discrimination rather than other causes are derogated and treated negatively (e.g., 
Fitzgerald et al., 1995; Kaiser et al., 2004; Kaiser & Miller, 2001; 2003; Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Stangor et al., 
2003). Of importance, individuals who chronically endorsed the dominant ideology or who were primed with this 
value system were particularly likely to experience threat in the presence of discrimination claimants and were more 
likely to respond negatively to individuals who blamed their failure on discrimination (Jost & Burgess, 2000; Kaiser 
et al., 2004; Maass et al., 2003). This research points to the importance of conceptualizing attributions to 
discrimination within a dominant ideology threat perspective. A next step in testing this model should involve 
examining whether threat mediates the relationship between dominant ideology endorsement and the derogation of 
discrimination claimants. This question is currently being addressed in my laboratory.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the implications of this research for targets of prejudice and 
intergroup relations. This discussion will focus on how the interpersonal costs of claiming discrimination affect 
members of stigmatized groups’ decisions about whether to publicly report prejudice as well as the personal, 
collective, and societal costs associated with these decisions. 
 
 
THE TARGET’S DILEMMA 
 
The research reviewed in this chapter highlights the interpersonal difficulties faced by individuals who claim to be 
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targets of discrimination. Because claiming discrimination can be a negative experience for the claimant, individuals 
who experience discrimination face a difficult decision: should they report it?  The few studies to examine this 
decision show that even when faced with blatant discrimination, members of stigmatized groups often do not 
publicly acknowledge discrimination (Kaiser & Miller, 2004; Stangor et al., 2003; Stangor, Swim, VanAllen, & 
Sechrist, 2002; Swim & Hyers, 1999; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001). For example, Swim and Hyers had 
undergraduate women engage in a group discussion in which a male confederate made a series of sexist or nonsexist 
comments.  Although more than half (55%) of the women in the sexist comments condition did not respond to the 
discriminatory comments, private ratings made after the interaction revealed that 75% of these women who failed to 
respond rated the confederate as sexist and 91% had negative thoughts and feelings about him.  Similarly, 
Woodzicka and LaFrance found that only a minority of women confronted a man who asked them sexually 
harassing questions during a laboratory-based interview. Furthermore, survey research on sexual harassment and 
discrimination demonstrates that fewer than half of women who experience sexual harassment respond by telling the 
perpetrator to discontinue his behavior (Fitzgerald et al., 1995; US Merit System, 1995).  
Though deciding not to report discrimination can protect targets from experiencing retaliation for their claim, 
this decision can also have costs (Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Hill, in this volume; Swim & Thomas, in this 
volume). For example, it is well established that the suppression of emotionally charged experiences has a number 
of serious detrimental effects on individuals, such as increased rumination about the experience, decrements in 
cognitive functioning, increased negative emotions, less successful social interactions, and increased sympathetic 
and cardiovascular responding (Butler et al., 2003; Gross, 1998; Quinn, in this volume; Richards & Gross, 2000). 
When targets of prejudice do not disclose their perceptions of prejudice and related feelings, this could have harmful 
consequences for both their psychological and physical health. Indeed, African American women who reported 
accepting unfair treatment “as a fact of life” (Krieger & Sidney, 1996, p. 1373) had higher blood pressure than 
women who said they took some action.  In short, repeated efforts to publicly suppress perceived discrimination 
could serve as a constant source of stress, thereby compromising mental and physical health (Sapolsky, 1998).  
Deciding not to publicly acknowledge discrimination also can have harmful consequences for intergroup 
relations. When individuals remain silent in the face of prejudice, others may incorrectly assume that they do not 
perceive prejudice and are satisfied with how they are being treated and the outcomes they receive.  Thus, when 
discriminatory events go uncorrected, discrimination will continue to exist because the perpetrators of prejudice may 
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fail to recognize and correct their biases. In fact, recent research indicates that confronting prejudice is an effective 
means of reducing the perpetrator’s prejudice (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Czopp, Monteith, & Mark, 2004). Czopp 
and colleagues found that though individuals who were confronted about their prejudicial behavior did react 
negatively towards the person who confronted them, they simultaneously showed decreased stereotypic responding 
on a subsequent task. In other words, individuals who publicly acknowledge prejudice help to improve intergroup 
relations (unfortunately though, this occurs at a cost to the personal self). 
The decision about whether to acknowledge prejudice also has implications for social policies and societal 
justice. If claims of discrimination are less frequent then objective levels of societal discrimination, members of 
stigmatized and nonstigmatized groups will have very different perceptions of societal (in)justice. If members of 
nonstigmatized groups are not fully aware of the extent to which stigmatized groups perceive discrimination and 
injustice (because the costs prevent them from speaking up), they may underestimate the extent to which 
discrimination is still a problem in society. Furthermore, this overly optimistic perception of societal outcomes may 
cause the nonstigmatized to downplay the importance and necessity of social policies aimed at reducing injustice. 
For example, if members of nonstigmatized groups believe that racial discrimination is rare in society, this 
perception can be used for justifying the elimination of affirmative action programs. 
Infrequent claims of prejudice can also create a state of attributional ambiguity among the stigmatized. If 
objective encounters with prejudice are frequently masked because of the fear of retaliation, then the stigmatized 
may incorrectly come to assume that prejudice is decreasing and this perception can have negative consequences for 
self-esteem in some situations and can lead to the preservation of the status quo. For example, because speaking up 
about prejudice at work can have some severe costs (as the case of Bassem Youssef described at the beginning of 
the chapter can attest), many members of targeted groups are likely to remain quiet when they perceive injustice. 
This silence may create pluralistic ignorance whereby employees belonging to stigmatized groups fail to correctly 
attribute their disadvantaged treatment to prejudice and instead wonder if there is something wrong with them or 
their group. This uncertainty is cognitively taxing and emotionally unpleasant.  Furthermore, they may come to 
blame themselves and their group for outcomes for which they have little control and this could harm personal and 
collective self-esteem and prevent efforts aimed at changing a discriminatory culture (Crocker & Major, 1989; 
Major, Kaiser, et al., 2003). 
Similarly, diminished public attributions to prejudice have implications for societal level collective action. Once 
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discrimination is publicly acknowledged, other members of stigmatized groups (and their allies) have a forum for 
expressing their dissatisfaction.  When groups of disenfranchised individuals come together with a common goal, 
such as reducing prejudice, this can result in social movements that bring about changes that actually affect how the 
group is treated.  In short, publicly acknowledging discrimination can have tremendous societal benefits by exposing 
prejudice-based injustices and improving the group’s social status (Crosby, 1993; Swim et al., 2001).         
So how can the target’s dilemma be resolved? The research reviewed in this chapter suggests that members of 
nonstigmatized groups should consider how their cultural belief systems influence their reactions towards members 
of stigmatized groups who blame events on discrimination (even when such attributions to discrimination are clearly 
warranted).  By the same token, the research suggests that members of stigmatized groups should consider that 
attributions to discrimination may be especially costly interpersonally when they are identifying prejudice to those 
who endorse the dominant ideology.  However, because identifying prejudice to these individuals might also be 
especially beneficial in terms of improving intergroup relations, the optimal reaction to perceived discrimination will 
likely depend on the stigmatized individual’s goals in a particular situation (see also Miller, in this volume; Swim & 
Thomas, in this volume). 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
One of the defining features of stigmatization involves being the target of prejudice and discrimination. Though 
social psychologists have had a relatively long-standing interest in understanding the intrapersonal consequences of 
perceiving prejudice, we have just recently begun examining the interpersonal consequences of these perceptions. In 
this chapter, I adopted a dominant ideology threat theoretical framework that contends that individuals who publicly 
blame events on prejudice threaten North America’s core cultural values, such as the promise that any individual 
regardless of his or her life circumstances can get to the top through personal effort and self-reliance. When 
individuals experience a challenge to this belief systems they will experience threat and will derogate the source of 
the threat.  The research reviewed in this chapter in consistent with this model, and makes important theoretical 
contributions to understanding the interpersonal consequences of attributions to discrimination. Research on the 
interpersonal consequences of attributions to prejudice has important implications for coping with prejudice, 
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intergroup relationships, and social change. 
 
 
NOTES 
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When faced with prejudice and discrimination in interpersonal encounters, individuals must decide how to respond.  
They may decide to take one of the following two paths:  either they confront the perpetrator and express their 
dissatisfaction, or they ignore the situation, letting their dissatisfaction go unnoticed.  The decision is not likely to be 
an easy one (see Miller, in this volume; Swim & Thomas, in this volume, for goals and motives that may play a role 
in the decision).  Moreover, these two reactions are likely to lead to strikingly different inter- and intra-personal 
consequences.  Researchers have recently turned their attention to understanding the interpersonal costs targets of 
prejudice face when they make the decision to confront perpetrators of prejudice and discrimination (Dodd, 
Giuliano, Boutell, & Moran, 2001; Kaiser, in this volume; Kaiser & Miller, 2001; 2003).  
In this chapter, we examine the intrapersonal costs associated with not confronting perpetrators of 
prejudice and discrimination.  Based on Higgins’ (1987) self-discrepancy theory we present a model (see Figure 1) 
which suggests that targets of prejudice incur both affective and cognitive consequences as a result of not 
challenging prejudice, particularly when they think they should.  Before discussing our model, however, we first 
provide a brief summary of research that has documented the interpersonal consequences of acknowledging that one 
has been the target of prejudice and discrimination.  Next we briefly describe self-discrepancy theory in general and 
highlight how this theory has been applied to understand majority group members’ attempts to curb prejudiced 
responding. 
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FIG. 1.  Conceptual Model of Confronting Perpetrators of Prejudice 
 
We then discuss our model of the intrapersonal costs of not confronting prejudice, linking the consequences of 
failure to confront with perceived discrepancies between behavior and self-standards, and provide empirical support 
for this model from our laboratory.  We conclude by considering the dilemma targets of prejudice face as they 
decide between the interpersonal and intrapersonal costs of confronting and not confronting perpetrators of 
prejudice. 
 
 
INTERPERSONAL CONSEQUENCES OF CHALLENGING PREJUDICE 
 
A growing body of research suggests that it may be in the best interest of members of stigmatized groups to ignore 
perpetrators’ prejudiced remarks and behaviors in order to avoid a host of negative consequences. Research on 
attributions to discrimination suggests that it may be best for individuals even to deny that they have experienced 
discrimination, even when there is good evidence that they have (see Kaiser, in this volume).  Kaiser and Miller 
(2001) illustrated, for example, that perceivers evaluated an African American student who attributed his failure on a 
test to discrimination as a “complainer and troublemaker,” but not so for an African American student who 
attributed his failure to lack of effort.  Kaiser and Miller (2003) replicated this finding in a job interview setting by 
showing that perceivers evaluated an African American job candidate who attributed his rejection to discrimination 
more negatively than an African American who attributed his rejection to either his interviewing skills or to job 
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competition. Across both studies, the derogation of the African American target occurred regardless of how blatant 
or subtle the discrimination. These findings suggest that in order to avoid interpersonal costs, stigmatized individuals 
should publicly minimize the amount of discrimination they have encountered. 
In addition to the research on attributions to discrimination, recent work finds that perceivers evaluate 
individuals who confront perpetrators of prejudice quite negatively.  Confronting, in this context, is defined as 
verbally or nonverbally expressing one’s dissatisfaction with prejudicial and discriminatory treatment to the person 
who is responsible for the remark or behavior.   Dodd et al. (2001), for example, found that a woman reacting to a 
male’s sexist comments about appropriate work for women was liked less by male perceivers when she expressed 
her dissatisfaction compared to when she did not.  Similarly, Shelton and Stewart (2004) found that the more often 
women confronted a male interviewer who asked sexist questions, the more they were perceived as complainers.  
Taken together, this research suggests that stigmatized individuals can ill afford to claim, report, or confront the 
prejudice they face. 
 
 
INTRAPERSONAL CONSEQUENCES OF NOT CHALLENGING PREJUDICE 
 
Although the costs of confronting perpetrators of prejudice may be high, is not confronting really the best option for 
members of stigmatized groups?  When making the decision of whether or not to confront a prejudiced person or 
situation, individuals must consider both the costs of doing so, as well as the potential costs of not doing so. Clearly, 
there are consequences associated with not confronting perpetrators of prejudice.  For example, perpetrators who are 
not confronted are more likely to continue behaving in prejudiced ways if they are unaware of their wrongdoings 
and/or stigmatized individuals’ discontent.  In addition, targets of prejudice may experience negative affect about 
letting prejudiced statements and behaviors pass without comment.   For instance, they may feel that they have let 
down or “sold out” the group in order to make their lives easier.  Furthermore, targets of prejudice may ruminate 
about their inaction, which could lead to cognitive distraction and decrements in performance.   In other words, 
individuals may incur intrapersonal consequences when they do not express their dissatisfaction regarding an 
encounter that is tainted with prejudice.   
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A Self-Discrepancy Framework   
 
Why would failing to confront a perpetrator of prejudice lead to affective and cognitive consequences?  For many 
stigmatized groups, failing to confront a perpetrator’s prejudiced comments will mean transgressing a personal 
standard for behavior.  According to Higgins’ self-discrepancy theory, transgressing a personal standard for 
behavior leads to negative affective consequences (Higgins, 1987).  Higgins surmised that there are three basic 
domains of the self: the actual self (the self as it really is), the ideal self (the self as you would like it to be), and the 
ought self (the self as you believe it should be).  When there is a discrepancy between these selves, individuals 
experience distinctive affective reactions. Of most importance to our work on the intrapersonal costs of not 
confronting prejudice is the discrepancy between one’s actual self and one’s ought self.  Discrepancies between 
individuals’ “actual” and their “ought” selves lead to agitation-related emotions.  Specifically, individuals 
experience guilt, self-contempt, and uneasiness directed toward the self (Higgins, 1987).   
Self-discrepancy and prejudice.  Self-discrepancy theory has been applied to research within the prejudice 
domain when considering personal transgressions for members of dominant social groups.  This research indicates 
that dominant group members (e.g., Whites, men, and heterosexuals) experience a prejudice-related discrepancy 
when their actual behavior toward stigmatized groups is at odds with their personal standards.  Extensive research 
suggests that affective reactions to such perceived discrepancies can be quite aversive (e.g., Devine, Monteith, 
Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Voils, Ashburn-Nardo, & Monteith, 2002; Zuwerink, Devine, Monteith, & Cook, 1996).  
Specifically, large prejudice-related discrepancies are accompanied by feelings of anger, discomfort, guilt, and self-
criticism (Devine et al., 1991).   
In additional work, Monteith (1993) demonstrated that when low-prejudiced individuals discriminate or 
otherwise behave in ways dissonant with their personal standards regarding prejudice, they experience an aversive 
self-discrepancy that over time functions to lower their level of prejudiced responding.  Monteith (1993; 1996) has 
provided extensive evidence that this self-regulatory cycle is largely driven by increased negative feelings toward 
the self, primarily compunction and guilt.  Moreover, in some of her later work Monteith (1996) indicated that the 
salience of prejudice-related standards moderated these affective reactions, such that those who had their standards 
made salient after discrepant responding experienced reduced guilt.  In short, research on self-discrepancy and 
prejudice has demonstrated distinct affective consequences for those, primarily low-prejudiced individuals, who 
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experience a discrepancy between their prejudice-related standards and their actual behavior toward stigmatized 
group members.   
Although Higgins (1987) did not relate self-discrepancies to cognitive outcomes – only affective ones – some 
research on self-discrepancy and prejudice suggest that individuals who perceive a mismatch between their behavior 
and their self-standards will also incur cognitive costs.  Monteith (1993), for example, found that low-prejudiced 
participants – exactly those for whom prejudiced responding violates an important self-standard and leads to guilt – 
also experienced increased self- and discrepancy-focused thoughts, and devoted increased attention to relevant 
information.   
Self-discrepancy theory and not challenging prejudice.   Self-discrepancy theory has been successfully used in 
the past to examine individuals’ reactions to their own prejudiced behavior, as described above.  We now apply that 
same theory to the experiences of targets responding to others’ prejudiced behavior.  For some people, not 
confronting perpetrators of prejudice will lead to a discrepancy between their personal standards and actual 
behavior.  That is, for some targets of prejudice it will be a significant part of their “ought” self to challenge 
discrimination.  If these individuals do not challenge prejudice they encounter, then their “actual” self will be 
dissonant with their “ought” self, resulting in a self-discrepancy.  We propose that this discrepancy can have internal 
consequences for individuals: specifically, affective consequences (guilt) and cognitive consequences (obsessive 
thoughts).  Moreover, similar to the work on self-discrepant prejudiced behavior by dominant group members, we 
propose that the relationship between the discrepancy and affective as well as cognitive consequences may be 
moderated by important individual difference and situational factors.  In our work, we have been particularly 
interested in individual differences in the commitment to fight prejudice.   
We believe that targets of prejudice who are committed to challenging prejudice are likely to be particularly 
vulnerable to the aforementioned consequences of failing to confront perpetrators.  Research with women indicates 
that those who are committed to eliminating gender discrimination have internalized the importance of individual 
and collective action in fighting the mistreatment of women (Downing & Roush, 1985; O’Neil, Egan, Owen, & 
McBride-Murray, 1993).  Not only are they identified with their gender group and dissatisfied with gender 
stereotypes, these individuals feel responsible for improving the treatment of women.  At the societal level, this may 
involve behaviors such as filing a letter of complaint to a company about hiring practices or filing a gender 
discrimination lawsuit against a company.  At the interpersonal level, standing up against gender discrimination may 
 Confronting prejudice     6 
involve communicating, verbally or behaviorally, to other individuals in face-to-face interactions that their behavior 
is inappropriate. Research suggests that such an activist orientation is a better predictor of challenging perpetrators 
of prejudice than being identified with women or having positive attitudes towards women (Bargard & Hyde, 1991; 
Crosby, 1993; Swim & Hyers, 1998).  But even these highly committed individuals may chose not to confront 
perpetrators of prejudice under conditions in which the interpersonal costs of doing so are particularly high (Shelton 
& Stewart, 2004).   
Although the aforementioned research has focused on women, it is reasonable to consider that similar findings 
apply to other targets of prejudice, such as ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, and the disabled.  Similar to low-
prejudice individuals, therefore, failing to confront perpetrators of prejudice should induce negative self-directed 
affect in targets of prejudice who have made a personal commitment to stand up against discrimination.  Consistent 
with previous research examining prejudice with and without compunction, as well as self-discrepancy theory, we 
propose that targets of prejudice who are committed to challenging oppression and bias should experience negative 
self-directed affect when they violate personal standards by not confronting perpetrators of prejudice.  
As noted previously, although self-discrepancy theory does not address cognitive consequences, there is reason 
to believe that individuals who perceive a mismatch between their behavior and their self-standards will also incur 
cognitive costs.  These individuals are likely to be emotionally charged when they encounter discrimination, but 
must conceal their reactions from perpetrators.  Concealing dissatisfaction from a perpetrator often consists of 
suppressing negative emotions, facial expressions, and, sometimes, even one’s own thoughts.  Research finds that 
suppressing facial displays of emotion, as well as thought suppression more generally, may come with cognitive 
baggage (Gross, 1998; Pennebaker, 1995; Wegner, 1994).  For example, Richards and Gross (1999, 2000) 
demonstrated that emotion suppression is cognitively demanding and may impair individuals’ memory for details of 
the emotional event.  Additionally, Pennebaker (1995) and Wegner (1994) find that emotion and thought 
suppression often lead to intrusive and obsessive thoughts.  For example, individuals who tried to suppress thoughts 
about their stigmatized identity had more obsessive thoughts about the identity compared to those who did not 
suppress such thoughts (Smart & Wegner, 1999).  In sum, cognitive functioning may be impaired for individuals 
who violated their personal standards of not confronting perpetrators of prejudice. 
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EMPIRICAL SUPPORT 
 
In our empirical work to date, we have sought preliminary support for our application of self-discrepancy theory to 
challenging perpetrators of prejudice.  Specifically, we have tested the claim that there are negative self-directed 
affective consequences when individuals violate personal standards by not confronting perpetrators of sexism.  We 
were particularly interested in the experience of people with a personal commitment to confronting prejudice.  We 
predicted that this population would suffer the most intense consequences following a perceived discrepancy, since 
they are not living up to a personal value.  Moreover, we have tested the claim that there are cognitive costs of not 
confronting perpetrators of prejudice, especially when one is committed to challenging prejudice.  Based on the 
work reviewed above, we predicted that women who are committed to challenging sexism who recalled a situation 
in which they failed to do so would report having obsessive thoughts about their inaction. We present two studies to 
support our claims. The first study focuses on the affective consequences, and the second study focuses on affective 
and cognitive consequences. 
 
Study 1 
 
In our first study, in order to investigate the affective consequences of not confronting perpetrators of prejudice, we 
developed a discrepancy measure to assess the degree of inconsistency between women’s actual responses and their 
personal standards for how they should respond toward perpetrators of prejudice.  We adapted Devine’s et al. (1991) 
should-would discrepancy questionnaire, which is used to measure prejudiced responses toward Blacks, to fit our 
purposes.  Our should-would questionnaire consisted of three sections (i.e., should, would, and a measure of affect).  
Participants first reported their personal standards for how they should respond in six different situations involving 
gender discrimination.  Specifically, the instructions read, 
Often times we set up personal standards or guidelines for evaluating our own behavior or 
responses to various groups of people.  We usually phrase these guidelines in terms of how we 
believe we should respond or behave in various situations. Based on your own personal standards 
for how you should respond, consider the following situations.  For each situation, circle the 
number between 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree) that best reflects your personal 
standard for how you should respond in the situation. 
 
An example of a situation read as follows: 
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Imagine that you have been treated unfairly by a teacher or professor because of your gender.  You 
should confront your teacher or professor about this behavior. 
 
Two of the six items focused on being treated unfairly by higher status individuals because of one’s gender (i.e., 
being treated unfairly by professors and being denied a promotion or job by a supervisor).  Two items focused on 
being treated unfairly by peers because of one’s gender (i.e., being treated unfairly by fellow student or coworkers, 
and fellow students acting as if you need help on a challenging task).  One item focused on hearing people making 
sexist jokes. The final item focused on hearing someone make sexist comments about the types of jobs women 
should or should not do.  After completing how they should respond participants answered how they actually would 
respond in those same six situations.  Specifically, participants read, 
Although we set up personal standards for how we should respond, our actual responses may or 
may not be consistent with these standards or guidelines.  Consider the six situations you 
responded to previously. You will now be presented with these same situations.  But this time, 
report on the 1 to 7 scales below how you believe you would actually respond to the situations.  
Base these responses on your previous personal experiences.  It is important to keep in mind that 
there are no right or wrong answers.  Your responses may or may not be the same as the ones you 
gave earlier.  It is also important that you be as honest and open as possible. 
 
Participants answered in terms of how they would respond to the same six scenarios used for the should 
index.   
Next participants indicated the extent to which 18 affect items described their feelings about how well their 
actual (would) responses matched their personal (should) standards.  A principal components factor analysis with 
varimax rotation using the 18 items yielded four factors that accounted for 73% of the total variance.  The first 
factor, Negative Affect Toward the Self, included the following 8 items that measure how much negative affect 
individuals felt toward the self: angry at myself, annoyed at myself, disappointed with myself, shame, self-critical, 
guilty, regretful, and disgusted with myself.  The second factor, General Positive Affect, included: friendly, content, 
energetic, optimistic, happy, and good.  The third factor, Negative Affect Toward Others, included the following 
three items that indicate negative feelings directed toward others: angry at others, disgusted with others, and irritated 
with others. The single item Embarrassed loaded separately as its own factor. 
In addition to completing the should-would discrepancy and affect measures, our participants answered six 
questions to assess how responsible they felt for standing up against sexism.  Examples of the questions include: 
“How committed are you to trying to fight gender discrimination?” and “How obligated do you feel to confront 
someone or something that is sexist?”   The should-would measure and the commitment to fight sexism scale were 
embedded in a large questionnaire packet with other measures.  These two sets of items were separated by some of 
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the additional measures, and their presentation order was counterbalanced. The order of the sets of items did not 
influence the results. 
In order to get a general sense of our participants’ responses, first we conducted Pearson correlations to examine 
the relationships between the total should and total would ratings with the commitment to challenge discrimination 
scale. As expected, the more women felt committed to standing up against sexism, the more they thought they 
should (r = .52, p < .001) and would (r = .62, p < .001) confront the perpetrators in the scenarios. Additionally, the 
more women thought they should confront the perpetrators, the more they thought they would (r = .73, p < .001). 
We then created a discrepancy index by subtracting participants’ would rating from their should rating for each 
of the six situations and summing across the items.  The discrepancy scores ranged from -6 to 18.  Of our 
participants, 10% had a discrepancy score of 0, which indicates that their personal standards matched their actual 
responses.  Additionally, 83% had positive discrepancy scores, which indicates their actual responses were lower 
than their personal standards (i.e., they thought they should respond but actually would not respond).  Finally, 7% of 
the participants had negative discrepancy scores, which indicates they thought they should not respond but actually 
would respond.  Similar to Devine et al. (1991), we deleted these latter participants from all analyses because their 
type of discrepancy is not the focus of the present research. 
We conducted regression analyses to examine if individuals’ discrepancy scores, level of personal commitment 
to fight sexism, and their interaction predicted their affective responses.  In general, the results supported our 
prediction for negative self-directed affect associated with not confronting perpetrators of prejudice.  The more 
women felt they should respond but would not actually respond, the more they experienced self-directed negative 
affect (β = .19, p < .001).  Additionally, as predicted, the interaction between the discrepancy scores and 
commitment to challenge discrimination was significant for negative affect directed toward the self (β = .07, p = 
.01).  Additional results revealed that at high levels of commitment, larger discrepancy scores were associated with 
more negative affect directed toward the self (β= .18, p < .001).  Thus, for women who were committed to 
challenging discrimination, large discrepancies in how they would actually behave compared to how they felt they 
should behave when confronted with sexism resulted in negative feelings directed inward.  In contrast, at lower 
levels of commitment, discrepancy scores were unrelated to negative affect toward the self (β = .023, p = .63). Thus, 
for women who are less committed to fighting discrimination, not behaving in a manner that is discrepant from their 
should standards has no bearing on how much shame and guilt they experience. 
 Confronting prejudice     10 
In addition, we conducted regression analyses to examine if individuals’ discrepancy scores, level of personal 
commitment to fight sexism, and their interaction predicted individuals’ positive affective responses.  Results 
indicated that larger discrepancy scores were associated with feeling less positive affect (β = -.11, p = .002).   These 
data show that participants with larger should-would discrepancies reported feeling less positively than women with 
smaller should-would discrepancies.  Contrary to predictions, the main effect for commitment to fight discrimination 
and the interaction between commitment and should-would discrepancy were not statistically significant for positive 
affective responses.  Hence, failing to confront sexism when they think they should seems to come with fewer 
positive affective consequences for many women, not just those committed to fighting discrimination.   
We conducted similar regression analyses with negative affective toward others and embarrassment as the 
outcome variables.  Given that the should-would discrepancy scores are based on individuals’ internal standards for 
their lives, we did not expect for these scores to be related to how they felt about others.  Consistent with 
predictions, the discrepancy scores were unrelated to the amount of negative affect women felt toward others.  The 
only (marginally) significant finding with this outcome variable is that the more women were committed to 
challenging discrimination, the more negative affect they experienced toward others (β = .25, p = .09).    No effects 
(main effects nor interaction) emerged from the analysis of embarrassment. 
Hence, the results of Study 1 suggest that women who felt they should confront perpetrators of prejudice, but 
knew they would not do so, experienced negative affective consequences.  Specifically, women in the present study 
reported feeling less positively when they thought they would not confront perpetrators, but felt that they should.  
Furthermore, the adverse effect of not confronting perpetrators was particularly prominent for women who have 
made a personal commitment to take action against discrimination.  That is, when women who felt personally 
responsible for challenging discrimination failed to do so, they reported heightened negative self-directed affect 
(e.g., shame, guilt, self-criticism).  They reported feeling negatively about themselves for not following through with 
a value that is a central component of their identity.  In contrast, when women who were less committed to fighting 
discrimination failed to challenge a perpetrator of prejudice, even if they thought they should, they were protected 
from these adverse self-directed affective consequences.  
These findings offer initial support for the hypothesis that failing to confront perpetrators of sexism will have 
negative affective consequences for women who are committed to challenging sexism.  However, several 
methodological limitations of the aforementioned study suggest caution regarding the interpretation of the data.  
 Confronting prejudice     11 
First, participants were required to imagine how they would and should behave in hypothetical situations.  It is likely 
that participants had differential degrees of actual experience in some, if not all, of the scenarios.  Differential 
exposure would influence the ease and vividness with which participants could imagine the scenarios, and, 
furthermore, could influence their affective reactions to discrepancies between how they report they should and 
would actually behave.   
 
Study 2 
 
In Study 2 we sought to replicate the negative self-directed affect findings of Study 1 by having participants recall a 
situation in their actual lives involving sexism.  Specifically, participants either recalled a situation involving sexism 
in which they should have responded to the perpetrator, but did not; or they recalled a situation involving sexism in 
which they should have responded to the perpetrator and did.  Additionally, in order to make certain that not 
confronting sexism, rather than not confronting negative situations more generally, was the critical predictor of 
negative self-directed affect, we included a control condition in which participants recalled an offensive but non-
sexist event to which they felt that they should have responded, but did not.  In addition to these methodological 
changes, the primary goal of Study 2 was to extend the findings of Study 1 through an examination of potential 
cognitive costs of not confronting perpetrators of prejudice.  We predicted that women who are committed to 
challenging sexism who recalled a situation in which they failed to do so would report having obsessive thoughts 
about their inaction.  
We asked participants to describe a situation in their lives in which they had been treated in a negative manner 
because of their gender and they either did or did not confront the person who caused the event.  The instructions 
read as follows, 
We would like for you to recall a situation in which you were treated in a negative manner because 
of your gender. If you can not recall a situation in which you were personally involved, please 
recall a situation in which you witnessed another woman being treated negatively because of her 
gender.  Regardless of whether the situation involved you personally or one in which you were the 
witness, it should be a situation in which you should have responded to the situation, but did not. 
That is, you did not confront the perpetrator nor let the perpetrator know how you felt even though 
you wanted to do so.  
  
In the sexist situation in which women did confront the perpetrator, the instructions were the same except for the last 
two sentences, which we replaced with, 
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Regardless of whether the situation involved you personally or one in which you were the 
witness, it should be a situation in which you responded to the situation. That is, you either 
confronted the perpetrator or made it very clear how you felt.   
 
In the offensive situation in which participants did not respond but wanted to do so, we used the same instructions 
except we told participants to recall a situation “in which someone did something negative to you. If you cannot 
recall a situation in which you were personally involved, please recall a situation in which you witnessed someone 
else being treated negatively.” 
After describing the situation in the space provided, participants completed items related to their affect and 
thoughts during the interaction. We composed a negative affect toward the self index by taking the average of 
participants’ responses to 6 items, including “I was angry at myself,” “I was annoyed at myself,” and “I felt 
displeased with myself.”  Similarly, an obsessive thoughts scale was created in order to assess the extent to which 
women had obsessive thoughts about their behavior during the situation they recalled.  The scale consisted of 5 
items including, “I replayed the scene over and over in my mind,” and “I ruminated about my behavior during the 
situation.”  In a separate testing session as a part of another study, participants completed the personal commitment 
to challenge discrimination scale used in Study 1. 
Surprisingly, participants reported experiencing more negative affect toward the self after not responding to the 
offensive but non-sexist situation (M= 2.36, SD = .91) compared to not responding to the sexist situation (M = 1.64, 
SD = .64) [t (37) = -2.91, p = .01] as well as compared to the sexist situation they did respond to [M = 1.60, SD = 
1.00; t (31) = -2.29, p = .03].  There was no significant difference in the amount of negative affect toward the self 
individuals experienced after not responding to the sexist situation and after responding to the sexist situation, t(31) 
< 1.00, ns.  But more importantly, in addition to this main effect, the interaction between the commitment to 
challenge discrimination and the recalled situation approached conventional levels of statistical significance for 
negative self-directed affect (β = -.22, p = .06).  For participants who recalled a sexist situation to which they should 
have responded but did not, the more committed they were to challenging discrimination, the more negative self-
directed affect they experienced (β = .24, p = .05).  In contrast, for participants who recalled a sexist situation in 
which they responded to the perpetrator, commitment to challenging discrimination was unrelated to negative self-
directed affect (β = -.23, p = .122).  Similarly, for participants who recalled an offensive situation which they should 
have responded to but did not, commitment to challenging discrimination was not related to negative self-directed 
affect (β = -.19, p = .31).  These data are consistent with the findings from Study 1 that among women who violated 
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a personal standard by not confronting a perpetrator of prejudice, the more committed they were to challenging 
discrimination, the more they suffered the consequences of self-directed negative affect (e.g., shame, disappointment 
with the self). 
In addition, the results generally support our prediction regarding the cognitive costs of remaining silent in the 
face of prejudice.  Results revealed a significant interaction between the commitment to challenge discrimination 
and the recalled situation (β = -.23, p = .03).  More specifically, for participants who recalled a sexist situation that 
they should have responded to but did not, the more they felt committed to challenge discrimination, the more 
obsessive thoughts they had during the situation (β = .28, p = .07).  In contrast, for participants who recalled a sexist 
situation in which they responded, commitment to challenge discrimination was unrelated to obsessive thoughts (β = 
-.04, p = .76).  Similarly, for participants who recalled an offensive situation in which they should have responded 
but did not, commitment to challenge discrimination was unrelated to obsessive thoughts (β = -.17, p = .28).  Hence, 
these data suggest that women who are committed to challenging discrimination and recalled an instance in which 
they failed to do so, not only experienced negative affect but also ruminated and had obsessive thoughts about their 
behavior during the prejudiced encounter.   
 
SILENCE ISN’T ALWAYS GOLDEN 
 
A small, but rapidly growing, body of research is beginning to address the interpersonal costs of confronting 
perpetrators of prejudice (see Kaiser, in this volume).  In our research we have been examining the flip side of this 
issue– the intrapersonal costs of not confronting perpetrators of prejudice. Our findings show that women who are 
committed to challenging discrimination experience guilt, regret, and disappointment with the self as a result of not 
confronting perpetrators of prejudice in situations where they thought they should have.  Additionally, our results 
show that women suffer cognitively as a result of violating their personal standards by not confronting perpetrators 
of prejudice.  Specifically, women experience obsessive thoughts and ruminate about their lack of confronting 
behavior.  Taken together, these findings reveal that not confronting perpetrators of prejudice can be psychologically 
and cognitively costly for targets.  In addition, these findings suggest that as targets of prejudice appraise a 
prejudiced situation and consider their response options (e.g., confront vs. not confront), the perceived inter- and 
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intra-personal costs associated with each option are likely to be shaped, in party, by their goals and motives in the 
situation (see Miller, in this volume, Swim & Thomas, in this volume). 
Armed with this evidence, a number of future research directions become clear.  First, more rigorous 
experimental studies are needed to examine these issues and provide stronger evidence regarding the affective and 
cognitive consequences of not confronting sexism that emerged in the present research.  For instance, future 
research could manipulate individuals’ beliefs regarding how they think they should behave or, even, how they think 
they would behave by manipulating the norms of the context or immediate situation.  Moreover, future studies 
should constrain women’s actual behavior such that they would not be able to confront a perpetrator of prejudice, 
then, the effects of this constraint on aspects of cognition and affect could be investigated. 
Further, in our work to date we have focused exclusively on affective reactions and obsessive thoughts that 
occur as a result of remaining silent in the presence of prejudice.  Are there other intra-personal costs associated 
with not confronting perpetrators of prejudice? For instance, do individuals find it difficult to concentrate on or 
perform a task after they do not confront?  Imagine the female employee who listens to her colleagues make sexist 
jokes or comments about women during a board meeting. Will this woman have trouble concentrating on her 
assignments if she decides not to express her dissatisfaction to her colleagues?  The preliminary findings we have 
presented in this chapter suggest that this may indeed be the case.  This possibility has serious implications for the 
career success of targets of prejudice in the workplace, and should be pursued.  
Finally, although we suspect that our findings would replicate to other targets of prejudice besides women, 
future research should explicitly address this issue.  Do ethnic minorities who are committed to challenging 
discrimination experience self-directed negative affect and obsessive thoughts when they do not live up to their 
personal standards?  Similarly, do members of dominant groups also experience similar affect when they fail to 
confront perpetrators of prejudice, particularly if they are committed to challenging discrimination?  How might it 
differ for targets and non-targets?  For instance, perhaps non-targets feel guilty and ashamed, but do not suffer any 
cognitive consequences.  Future research is needed to isolate the extent to which these effects are exclusive to 
targets of prejudice and stereotyping.   
 
Is Negative Self-directed Affect Adaptive? 
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Although we acknowledge that the intrapersonal costs of not challenging discriminators are upsetting, we believe 
they may play a functional role in encouraging targets to confront perpetrators.  Many theorists have suggested that 
when people behave in ways that are discrepant from their personal standards, they become motivated to engage in 
discrepancy-reduction behaviors (Aronson, 1968; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Festinger, 1957; Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 1987).  The motivation arises because of the self-directed negative affect that accompanies the 
discrepancy.  People are driven to reduce this negative affect. One way in which individuals could reduce the 
discrepancy between their behavior and values is by changing their future behavior so as to be more consistent with 
their values.  Thus, individuals could decide to challenge discrimination in future situations in order to avoid feeling 
ashamed and guilty.   This is not unlike cognitive dissonance theory, which also finds that individuals are driven to 
reduce negative affect by means of an attitude or behavior change when confronted with inconsistency between their 
thoughts and behavior (Festinger, 1957).  In other words, one function of self-directed negative affect, therefore, is 
to motivate individuals to confront perpetrators more regularly.   Of course, it will be necessary for individuals to 
weigh the group benefits and personal costs associated with this decision (see Miller, in this volume).  As opposed to 
motivating individuals to confront perpetrators more regularly, self-directed negative affect that results from self-
discrepancies may motivate individuals to change their values so that the values are more in line with their behavior.  
For example, targets of prejudice who experience discrimination yet choose not to confront the perpetrator, could 
change their values to match their behavior and decide that challenging discrimination is not important and then feel 
comfortable not confronting a perpetrator.  According to the theoretical framework of our research, targets that 
engage in such a value change will not feel ashamed or guilty since their values and behaviors will be consistent.  
We hope, of course, that this (i.e., attitude change) is not the path that individuals decide to take.  
 
 
FINAL THOUGHTS 
 
We conclude with the question that probably plagues most targets of prejudice when they encounter interpersonal 
prejudice – to confront or not to confront?  Previous research suggests that targets face a number of both affective 
and material consequences when they do confront perpetrators (Kaiser, in this volume).  In fact, these costs dissuade 
targets from doing just that (Shelton & Stewart, 2004).  In the research presented in this chapter, we have shown that 
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targets also face a number of both affective and cognitive consequences when they do not confront perpetrators.  
The interpersonal costs associated with confronting perpetrators of prejudice, and the intra-personal costs associated 
with not confronting leave targets of prejudice in quite a dilemma.  If they confront someone who behaves in a 
prejudiced manner, that person will dislike them.  However, if they do not confront the person, they will dislike 
themselves at that moment.   
Given this dilemma, to echo Czopp and Monteith (2003) in the words of Eberhardt and Fiske (1996), “What is  a 
target to do?”  There is, of course, no easy answer to this question.  Situational and personality factors will 
determine which route (confront or not) targets will follow and the costs they will have to cope with.  For some 
targets coping with the interpersonal costs will be so great that they will be willing to suffer the intra-personal costs.  
For others, the opposite will be true– they will be willing to bear the interpersonal costs in order to feel good about 
themselves.  When considering our research and Kaiser’s (in this volume) research in tandem, perhaps the following 
strategy is wise:  Targets of prejudice should confront perpetrators when they are committed to fighting 
discrimination and they think they should confront in that particular situation.  Targets should not confront 
perpetrators (even when they think they should) when the perpetrator endorses ideologies such as individualism and 
the Protestant Ethic and the consequences of the perpetrators’ evaluations are serious. 
Thus, the decision to confront or not to confront will require a delicate balancing of both the interpersonal cost 
of confronting, as well as the intra-personal costs of not confronting.  The research presented in this chapter is 
offered as a first step toward identifying some of the intra-personal costs associated with not confronting 
perpetrators of prejudice and discrimination.  Coupled with research on the interpersonal costs of confronting 
perpetrators, we hope that this work will spark research aimed at understanding how targets of prejudice manage this 
balancing act in the face of discrimination in everyday life. 
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A social stigma is defined as a negative attribute or identity that devalues a person within a particular context or 
culture (Goffman, 1963; Jones et al., 1984).  In an attempt to define the different types, or dimensions, of stigma, 
Goffman discusses three main types – body disfigurements, blemishes of moral character, and “tribal” affiliations 
such as race or religion.  Crossing these three main types, Goffman distinguishes between people who are already 
“discredited” – that is their stigma is known to others either because it is immediately visible or because others have 
previous knowledge of the stigmatized status – or “discreditable” – those whose stigma is concealed.  In a review of 
the stigma literature, Jones et al. (1984) suggest six important dimensions of stigma:  visibility/concealability, 
origin/responsibility for stigmatized condition, aesthetics, peril (i.e., is the stigma perceived as dangerous to others), 
disruptiveness, and course of the mark (i.e., will it change over time).  This search for a way to categorize types of 
stigma signifies how the experience and consequences of stigma defy a universal explanation.  In order to 
understand the effects of a particular stigmatized status, more must be known about the type of stigma, how it affects 
the self, and its particular links to the social beliefs that make the mark stigmatizing.  Crocker, Major, and Steele 
(1998) give a very thorough overview of the current state of research on social stigma. Most of the research to date, 
however, has focused on the experience of people with a visible stigma.  Thus, I will limit this chapter to a 
consideration of some of the key differences between the experience of those with a concealed versus conspicuous 
stigma. For the purposes of this chapter, a concealed stigma is defined as a stigmatized identity that is not 
immediately knowable in a social interaction, such as a history of mental illness or incarceration.  In the first section 
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of the chapter, I will discuss some of the experiences unique to those with a concealed stigma, including deciding 
when and to whom to reveal, short and long term consequences of keeping an identity concealed, and concerns 
about discovery.  In order to highlight similarities and differences of concealed and conspicuous stigma, I will then 
compare stereotype threat research examining gender, a conspicuous stigma, with work on mental illness, a 
concealed stigma.  
 
 
SOME KEY QUESTIONS ABOUT CONCEALED STIGMA 
 
When to reveal? To whom? 
 
Unlike people with a conspicuous stigma, those with a concealed stigma usually have more control over when, or if, 
they reveal their status and to whom they reveal it.  This level of control has some benefits.  People with a concealed 
stigmatized identity can choose situations in which they feel comfortable and safe to reveal their identity.  This can 
help to maintain personal boundaries and gives them control over levels of intimacy with others (Derlega & 
Chaiken, 1977; Kelly & McKillop, 1996).  They can also choose to not reveal it in contexts in which they are 
concerned about negative repercussions (such as in an interview or employment situation), and thus do not have to 
be constantly on the alert for prejudice and discrimination like a person with a conspicuous stigma.  Jones and 
colleagues (1984) noted that people with a concealed stigma may have better initial interactions with others.  They 
can “pass” in day-to-day activities (Goffman, 1963). Concealment may allow the person to proceed with 
acquaintance level relationships and activities with fewer burdens than a person with a visible devalued identity.    
 Once relationships progress beyond the initial interaction, however, a number of difficult issues arise for people 
with concealable stigmas.  If a person has been maintaining their hidden identity but wants to reveal it, she or he 
must decide at what point in a relationship to reveal.  If revealed too soon, the stigmatized person may worry about 
losing the relationship, and be concerned that the other person will break the confidentiality around the stigma (i.e., 
tell others).   Research has shown that, overall, personal disclosure is related to greater liking, but there is some 
indication that people become uncomfortable when highly personal details are revealed too early in the relationship, 
perhaps because they feel they must reciprocate with intimate information of their own (Collins & Miller, 1994; 
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Cozby, 1973).  However, if the stigmatized person waits until a trusting relationship is formed before revealing, the 
relationship may be hurt because the stigmatized person is seen as not honest or trusting of the relationship enough 
to reveal earlier.  Complicating this decision is research showing that people who are known to have something to 
hide, but who do not disclose, are liked less than those who do disclose (Jones & Archer, 1976). Yet, whether a 
person is seen as responsible for a negative personal plight also affects whether others like a person who reveals 
early in a relationship versus later.  For example, Jones and Gordon (1972) found that a person who had been 
expelled from school due to cheating was liked more by participants if he revealed this information very early in an 
interaction – in a sense, he was seen as not trying to hide or misrepresent himself.  However, if the person was 
forced to leave school due to parental divorce proceedings, he was liked more if he waited until late in an interaction 
to reveal this information.  Perhaps if stigmatizing information is revealed too early in an interaction, the individual 
is perceived as trying to place blame on others for any misfortune and not take personal responsibility (something 
that goes against America’s dominant ideology, see Kaiser, this volume).   
 Moreover, some concealed stigmas reveal themselves.  For example, work on the stigma of epilepsy has shown 
that while many people with epilepsy keep their diagnosis a secret, they also worry about an unexpected epileptic 
seizure that might alert others to their condition—an involuntary disclosure of their stigma (see Jacoby, 2002, for 
review).  Likewise, other types of medical conditions can have uncontrollable side effects (e.g. shaking or vomiting) 
or concomitants that are difficult to hide (e.g. necessity of taking frequent medication).  These types of stigma cues 
make it more difficult to conceal stigma and lessen the degree of comfort and control people have over their 
stigmatized identities (Golin, Isasi, Bontempi, & Eng, 2002). If stigma is revealed involuntarily, it also takes away 
the ability to choose to whom the identity is revealed.   
 Most experimental research on disclosure has been conducted with strangers or confederates in the laboratory, 
making it more difficult to gauge how people make the decision about to whom to disclose stigmatized identity.  Not 
surprisingly, people report disclosing stigmatized identities primarily to close others, such as family or close friends.  
People with stigmatized identities who do reveal to others, however, risk negative or non-helpful responses and 
possible alienation (Kelly & McKillop, 1996).  Therefore, being aware of (and correct about) who will or will not be 
supportive can have important psychological consequences.  For example, research by Major and colleagues (Major, 
et al., 1990) on psychological distress after abortion found that women who told a source (friend, family, or partner) 
but did not get complete support from them were more depressed and had lower coping self-efficacy post-abortion 
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than either women who told a supportive source or did not disclose at all.   Thus, having a concealed versus 
conspicuous stigmatized identity gives a person more control over when to reveal, but this control comes with the 
cost of making difficult, and potentially costly, decisions about when and to whom to reveal.  
 
Keeping it Concealed: What are the Short and Long Term Consequences? 
 
Perhaps the issue most dissimilar for those with concealable versus conspicuous stigmas is that people with a 
concealed stigma must worry about discovery: Will others find out? Am I leaking any cues that would make them 
suspect my status? Have they heard anything about me? This is Goffman’s (1963) issue of being “discreditable.”  
One may pass as non-stigmatized, but he or she then has the potential of being unmasked, discredited.  The work 
required to keep a stigma concealed, and, thereby elude discovery, has been considered akin to an additional 
cognitive load.  For example, research has shown that after a five minute conversation with a stranger, people with a 
concealable deviance were more likely than those with a visible deviance to report taking their partner’s perspective 
(meta-perspectives), taking particular notice of the interaction flow, and paying close attention to their partner’s 
words (Frable, Blackstone, & Scherbaum, 1990).  Frable and colleagues conclude that people with a deviant “master 
status” are more mindful in their interactions with others in order to be on the alert for cues of discrimination and 
devaluation.  Likewise, research by Smart and Wegner (1999) examined the effect of keeping an eating disorder 
concealed.  Except in the extremely underweight stage of anorexia, most eating disorders are not visible to strangers. 
In the Smart and Wegner studies, participants with and without an eating disorder were asked to role-play a person 
with or without an eating disorder while being interviewed by a study confederate.  Participants who had an eating 
disorder but actively tried to conceal it during an interview that asked questions about eating and food, reported that 
they worked harder to suppress thoughts of their disorder and were more concerned with secrecy than those not 
trying to conceal an eating disorder.  They also reported increasing accessibility of eating disorder thoughts over 
time, signifying that the more they tried to conceal their stigma the more it was on their mind.  Interestingly, in these 
particular studies, ratings of the participants attempting to keep their stigma concealed revealed that they did not 
seem more uncomfortable or neurotic than those without a concealed stigma.  Thus, although maintaining a 
concealed stigma may add a cognitive and emotional burden, it did not seem to hinder an initial interaction, 
supporting Jones et al. (1984) contention that a concealed stigma leads to more positive social interactions than 
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conspicuous stigma.  Both the Frable et al. (1990) and the Smart and Wegner  research point to the idea that people 
with concealed stigmas are quite facile at maintaining positive social interactions despite the additional cognitive 
burden.  As Miller (this volume) notes, every stigma coping strategy has both costs and benefits—by concealing 
their stigma, people reap the benefits of being considered unmarked in a social interaction, but incur the cost of an 
extra cognitive burden. 
 The above studies seem to suggest that the costs of maintaining a concealed identity are minimal.  This may be 
true for initial, or short-term, interactions.  The long-term effects of maintaining a concealed identity are likely more 
burdensome.  Drawing on the work above showing that actively concealing an identity might lead to more intrusive 
thoughts, Major and Gramzow (1999) tested a model linking increased concealment of an abortion to distress in 
women two years post-abortion.  The results showed support for a model such that the more stigmatizing women felt 
abortion was, the more they attempted to keep their own abortion secret from others.  Keeping the abortion secret 
was related to greater attempts at thought suppression, which led to more intrusive thoughts about the abortion.  
Intrusive thoughts were related to greater psychological distress. It is important to note that while almost half of the 
women in the study agreed that they would be stigmatized for having an abortion and they did feel the need to keep 
the abortion a secret from some close others, only around six percent reported suppressing thoughts of the abortion 
“quite a bit” or a “great deal.”  Thus, coping with a concealed stigma, particularly through thought suppression, is 
likely quite variable (see Miller, this volume; and Swim & Thomas, this volume, for reviews of types of coping with 
stigma).    
 Research on the long-term health effects of concealing sexual identity for gay men has linked increased 
concealment (self-reporting being half or mostly “in the closet”) with higher rates of cancer and other infectious 
diseases (bronchitis, sinusitis; Cole, Kemeny, Taylor, & Visscher, 1996); and, for HIV-positive men, an accelerated 
progression of AIDS (Cole, Kemeny, Taylor, Visscher, & Fahey, 1996).  These processes may be linked both to 
general issues related to inhibiting emotional expression and to increased loneliness or isolation.  Members of visible 
stigmatized groups are able to easily seek each other out if they so choose. In contrast, people with a concealed 
stigma have a much more difficult time identifying similarly stigmatized others, and, therefore, may miss an avenue 
of strong social support and comfort. In an 11-day experience sampling study, Frable, Platt, and Hoey (1998) found 
that participants with concealable stigmas (sexual orientation, bulimia, or very low socio-economic status) reported 
lower self-esteem and more instances of negative affect than participants with visible stigmas (ethnicity and weight).  
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The participants reported an increase in mood when they were around similar others, but they were also the group 
least likely to spend time around similar others.  In addition, maintaining a concealed identity may lead to people 
refusing to seek optimal medical care or other support.  An HIV-positive individual who chooses not to disclose his 
or her status, may also skip doses of medication and/or not attend clinics or medical appointments in order to avoid 
inquiries from others that could lead to stigma revelation (Chesney & Smith, 1999).  
 
What is the Relationship between Concealed Stigma and Self-Concept? 
 
Crucial to research and understanding of conspicuous stigma is the extent to which the stigmatized identity becomes 
a central and integrated part of the self-concept. For example, scales exist to measure racial and ethnic identity (e.g. 
Cross, 1991; Phinney, 1992; Sellers, Rowley, Chavous, Shelton, & Smith, 1997) and gender identity (e.g. Gurin, 
1985), and research has explored the extent to which racial and other collective identities are related to self-esteem, 
perceptions of prejudice, and coping (for reviews see Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; and Sellers, 
Smith, Shelton, Rowley, & Chavous, 1998). People with a visible stigmatized identity, perhaps because they must 
contend with negative stereotypes about their group on a daily basis, are assumed to incorporate their stigmatized 
identity into their larger self-concept.  Incorporation of the stigmatized identity into the self-concept is considered 
positive and adaptive.  As Crocker and Major (1989) pointed out, members of stigmatized groups may even use their 
stigma to help protect the self from the negative consequences of societal devaluation.   
 The distinct nature of concealable stigmas raises questions about how it differs from visible stigma for self-
concept processes: To what extent does the concealed stigma become an essential part of one’s self-concept and 
identity? Does the concealable nature of the stigma lead to a relative distancing of the stigma from the self-concept? 
And, if so, is this likely to lead to positive consequences for self such that people are less likely to internalize 
stigmatized attributes and expectations? Or, does it lead to negative consequences for the self such as less protective 
attributions and more vulnerability to isolation and self-doubt? For concealed stigmas related to medical (or other 
variable) conditions, does the sense of stigmatized identity wax and wane with the activity or remission of the 
condition? Very little research has directly addressed these questions.  There is some exploration of the experience 
of receiving a stigma label, such as obtaining a diagnosis of mental illness, cancer, epilepsy, or HIV.  For example, 
Jacoby (2002), reported that at the time people received their initial diagnosis of epilepsy, approximately 25% 
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reported feeling stigmatized.  When followed up two years after diagnosis, the extent of feelings of stigma was 
strongly related to the severity of seizure experience.  Those who had few seizures reported feeling less stigmatized.  
Jacoby (1994) found that amongst people whose epilepsy was in remission for two or more years, self-identification 
as an “epileptic” dropped, and very few reported that they felt a stigmatized identity.  Research on a diagnosis of 
mental illness, on the contrary, has shown that receiving the label of “mentally ill” is a source of enduring stigma 
(Link, Struening, Rahav, Phelan, & Nuttbrock, 1997). Perhaps because the negative stereotypes of mental illness are 
much more encompassing than those of epilepsy, the label of mental illness is more difficult to discard.  Link, 
Cullen, Struening, Shrout, and Dohrenwend (1989) contend that one reason a label of mental illness is difficult for 
the self is because most people, prior to being labeled, know and, to some extent, endorse the stereotypes about the 
mentally ill. Once they, themselves, are diagnosed, they have the difficult set of beliefs that includes both that they 
are mentally ill and that others reject people with mental illness.  Maintaining this set of beliefs leads to lower self-
esteem and greater belief that one will be ostracized. In a sense, mental illness patients believe the stereotypes about 
the mentally ill before they become part of the devalued group.  Note this is different from racial and gender 
identities.  Members of racial and gender groups know the stereotypes about their groups, but they are never in the 
position to be a non-group member.   
 If people with concealed stigma do not integrate the stigmatized identity as part of their self-concept, they may 
be less able to use some of the coping mechanisms that people with visible stigmas utilize.  For example, the three 
strategies Crocker and Major (1989) proposed for protecting self-esteem--attributing negative outcomes to prejudice, 
comparing to in-group members, and selectively valuing domains at which one’s in-group succeeds--seem less 
available for those with a concealed stigma.  If others are not aware of one’s stigma, it is difficult to attribute 
negative life outcomes to prejudice.  It is also difficult to find similar others with which to compare (Frable et al., 
1998).  It may, however, still be possible to value and devalue particular domains (although support from one’s in-
group for doing so may not be available). These differences in identification with a stigmatized identity, as well as 
the breadth of stereotypes related to different types of stigma, and potential coping strategies available, will likely 
affect what types of situations will result in negative consequences for those with a concealed stigma.  I will return 
to this issue later in the chapter with a comparison of gender and mental illness stigma.  
 
What are the Consequences of Discovery? 
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Obviously, the reason people with a concealed stigma are concerned with keeping it concealed is due to the 
perceived and actual consequences of discovery.  People with concealed stigmas are concerned about others’ 
prejudice.  They experience anxiety and uncertainty about what the other person’s reaction will be if they do 
discover the stigma.  For example, in a study examining reasons why people with HIV decided to disclose or not 
disclose their status to others (Derlega, Winstead, Green, Serovich, & Elwood, 2002), participants’ fear of rejection 
was correlated with not disclosing their status to parents and friends. Interestingly, in this study the participants also 
reported that protecting the other person was a reason not to tell parents or friends, as if they did not want close 
others to carry the burden or worry of their status.  Moreover, the greater the amount of perceived HIV-related 
stigma, the less likely a participant was to disclose to his or her parents.  People with a concealed stigma are also in 
the unique, and very uncomfortable, position of knowing exactly what close others think about their stigmatized 
identity. Unlike people with conspicuous stigmas, around whom others are likely careful to appear sensitive and 
non-prejudiced, people with concealed stigmas are likely to be in situations where others blatantly state their 
stereotypes and prejudiced attitudes. For example, in a survey study of undergraduates with a variety of concealed 
stigmatized identities, we (Quinn, Chaudoir, & Kallen, 2004) found that just over half of the respondents reported 
they had been in a situation in which others who were not aware of their concealed identity were derogating people 
with that identity.    
 Once a person with a stigmatized identity believes that their interaction partner knows about the stigma, they are 
placed in a situation more similar to people with a conspicuous devalued identity.   Research has shown that when a 
person with a normally concealed stigma believes that an interaction partner knows about their stigma, they tend to 
act in less competent and more anxious ways.  For example, Farina, Gliha, Boudreau, Allen, and Sherman (1971) 
conducted a study in which all of the participants were former patients of a psychiatric hospital.  The participants 
interacted with a confederate whom they had been led to believe either knew about their patient status or believed 
they were medical patients.  When participants thought the confederate knew of their psychiatric history, they spoke 
less often and performed worse on a joint task.  They were also more visibly tense and anxious. As noted by Miller 
(this volume; Miller & Myers, 1998) coping strategies may evolve out of practice with stereotyping situations.  If 
this is the case, people with normally concealed stigma who do not have as much experience coping with visible 
stigma, may have an added disadvantage when they do reveal.    
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USING AN IDENTITY THREAT MODEL TO CAPTURE THE SITUATIONAL NATURE 
OF STIGMA 
 
As noted above, one of the negative consequences of keeping a stigma concealed is the extra cognitive burden of 
maintaining the secret. An important question, however, is what are the conditions or situations in which the stigma 
is more or less salient for the individual? Although much of the research and theorizing assumes that the person with 
a concealed stigma is constantly worried about revealing it, this seems unlikely.  If a stigma is well-concealed, and 
the situation is one in which it is unlikely to be revealed, it is reasonable to assume that in such situations, the person 
is unaffected by it.  On the other hand, if the situation is one in which the stigmatized identity is likely to be 
activated – either through the content of the situation or an increased potential for discovery – then negative 
consequences may result.  To date, because research has primarily focused on visible stigmas, the stigma is in the 
situation at all times.  In a sense, for a person with a visible stigmatized identity, whenever they are with non-
stigmatized others, they are alert to the possibility of stigmatization.  This is not the case for people with a concealed 
stigma, but very little research has examined the boundaries of when a stigmatized identity will have an effect. 
Research on concealed stigma usually puts participants in situations in which the stigma will be salient (e.g., 
participants with eating disorders are asked to talk about food and diet during the study) or assumes that the 
concealed identity will always affect behavior (e.g. Frable et al., 1990).  However, as noted above in the work on 
abortion by Major and Gramzow (1999), only a small percentage of women reported chronically suppressing 
thoughts of the abortion.  In our survey study, we (Quinn et al., 2004) found a great deal of variability, with 
approximately one third of the participants reporting they think about their concealed identity once a month or less, 
one third reporting they think about it once or a few times per week, and the final third thinking about it daily.  
 Recent theorizing on “stereotype threat” and a broader “identity threat” by Steele, Spencer, and Aronson (2002) 
may help to clarify some of the situational boundaries surrounding the saliency and consequences of concealed 
stigmas.  Stereotype threat research has shown that when people are in a situation in which a specific negative 
stereotype about their group performance is applicable, their behavior is affected. For example, Steele and Aronson 
(1995) reasoned that an intellectual testing situation is a context in which African-American students are aware of a 
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negative stereotype about their abilities.  Part of the “black” stereotype is less intelligence.  Thus, whenever African-
American students are in a situation in which their intelligence is going to be judged, they may worry about that 
judgment.  In a test of this hypothesis, Steele and Aronson found that African-American students performed worse 
than European-American students on a standardized test described as diagnostic of their intellectual abilities.  When 
the same test was described as non-diagnostic of ability, African-American and European-American students 
performed equally.  In an additional study, it was found that the African-American students in the diagnostic 
condition had more thoughts about the racial stereotypes and their own ability on their mind, and avoided describing 
themselves in ways that could be construed as stereotypical.  Thus, it was in a particular type of situation in which 
stigmatized identity had negative consequences. 
 In considering a broader definition of how stigmatized or stereotyped identities might affect behavior, Steele et 
al. (2002) speculated that people with a stigmatized identity will be alert to situational cues that signify they may be 
devalued on the basis of their identity.  Being on guard for such cues and trying to repudiate them if necessary is an 
extra burden that results for those who experience such “identity threat.”  Importantly, for both stereotype threat 
and identity threat, the threat is situationally bound. Particular situations raise particular threats. A person’s 
stigmatized identity will not impinge on the self or behavior if it is not somehow relevant to the situation and 
activated in the person’s mind.  Thinking about the effects of stigmatized status in this way leads to some new ways 
to conceptualize when and how a concealed identity may affect the self and behavior.   
 
Conspicuous versus Concealed: An example with Gender and Mental Illness  
 
As an example of how identity threat can be used to explore the ramifications of different types of stigmatized 
identities, I am going to use the research of my colleagues and I on the effects of threat on academic performance.  
In our research we have examined women as a stigmatized or stereotyped group, and, in separate research, we have 
examined people with a history of mental illness.  Thinking about women as a stigmatized group points to the 
stickiness, or, contextuality, of defining “stigma.”   Gender is always conspicuous, but it is not always stigmatized.  
Whether female gender is a devalued social identity is highly dependent on the context.  In terms of Goffman’s 
“character flaws,” women are stereotypically portrayed to possess flaws such as being more narcissistic about their 
appearance, less intelligent, and less ambitious than men.  Women in particular cultures and at particular times are 
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deeply stigmatized for simply having a woman’s body. Indeed, objectification theory (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997) 
suggests that by constantly being bombarded with images of women’s bodies as idealized sexual objects unrelated to 
the person, women learn to objectify themselves and experience distaste and revulsion for their own bodies 
(Fredrickson, Roberts, Noll, Quinn, & Twenge, 1998).   Clearly, whether a woman’s gender is linked to a devalued 
identity depends on situational cues indicating that she may be stereotyped or viewed through a stigmatizing mark or 
characteristic.   
My own research has focused on the effects of stereotypes about women’s math abilities on their math 
performance (Quinn & Spencer, 2001; Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999).  When women are taking a math test or are 
in a math class, they are in a situation in which a stereotype linked to their gender could be activated.  Notably, 
gender itself is a visible characteristic.  Thus, in this case, women’s devalued identity is known to all in the situation.  
In trying to understand when women will be affected by their gender identity, focus must turn to the content of the 
environment.  Research on stereotype threat has shown that when (a) there is a negative stereotype in the culture 
about a group’s intellectual performance (e.g. “Women are bad at math”), and (b) members of the stereotyped group 
are in a situation in which that stereotype could be used to evaluate them (e.g. performance on a diagnostic 
standardized test, such as the SAT), then (c) those group members tend to be negatively affected (e.g. through worse 
performance). However, when the situation is changed such that the stereotype is no longer relevant to judgment of 
the self or one’s outcomes, members of stereotyped groups perform equally with their non-stereotyped peers. For 
example, Spencer and colleagues (Davies, Spencer, Quinn, & Gerhardstein, 2002; Quinn & Spencer, 2001; Spencer 
et al., 1999) found that when equally prepared men and women took a difficult math test, women tended to under 
perform in comparison to men. However, the performance difference disappears when men and women are led to 
believe that the same test had shown no gender differences in the past, thereby making the stereotype (and the 
women’s identity) irrelevant to this situation. Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev (2000) showed that the gender make-up of the 
testing situation can make the stereotype more or less applicable.  Women who took a math test when they were the 
minority (two other test takers were men) performed worse than when the other test-takers were women.  Moreover, 
in recent work by my colleague and I (Quinn & Kallen, 2004), we found that even after receiving performance 
feedback (positive or negative) women reported feeling less comfortable and more concerned with bias in stereotype 
threat situations compared to those described as gender-fair. Considering how the situation can activate or de-
activate particular stigmatized identities helps to define when an identity is likely to affect behavior and levels of 
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comfort.  Thus, in considering when members of different stigmatized groups may experience a threat of 
devaluation, the most important determinant may be whether they are in a situation in which they believe others 
know about and can use their stigmatized status to devalue them. With that in mind, I consider how identity threat 
might help shed light on when a concealed stigmatized identity—mental illness--might affect behavior.   
 Although various forms of mental illness are common in the population, having a mental illness is considered a 
highly socially stigmatizing condition. The stereotypes associated with being mentally ill devalue almost all aspects 
of a person and include being less socially acceptable, less intelligent, more unpredictable, mentally disorganized, 
dangerous, and dirty (Farina, Fischer, Boudreau, & Belt, 1996; Fracchia, Canale, Cambria, Ruest, & Sheppard, 
1976; Link et al., 1997; Nunnally, 1961). Stereotypes about mental illness not only affect the way that others treat 
those with mental illness (e.g. distancing, discriminating, Corrigan & Penn, 1997; Link, 1987; Link et al., 1997), but 
may also affect the social expectations and beliefs about future social interactions of the mentally ill themselves 
(Farina & Ring, 1965). 
 The stigma of mental illness varies along a continuum of concealable to conspicuous. Whereas the large 
majority of people who get treated for such conditions as depression, anxiety, and phobias are not immediately 
identifiable as having a mental illness, people in the midst of a psychotic episode are easily recognized as having 
some mental problems. Even less conspicuous is the person who has undergone treatment for a mental illness in the 
past, but is no longer in the active stages of mental illness. In the research reported below, our participants were 
highly functioning university students who had been treated for a mental illness. For these students, the stigma of 
mental illness was concealable.  
 In comparing the stereotype threat research on gender, a conspicuous stigmatized identity, to history of mental 
illness, a concealed stigma, several differences become apparent.  Stereotype threat research has examined groups 
with visible stigmas that have very specific stereotypes about their academic abilities linked to their group identities.  
For those with a mental illness history, however, the situation is different on both of these points (visibility and 
specific academic stereotypes). For example, because women’s gender is conspicuous in the situation, the “control” 
or “baseline” condition for women taking a standardized math test should be to perform below their full potential.  
We have found that simply placing women in a standardized math testing situation leads to underperformance.  
There is no need to mention gender or gender differences (Quinn & Spencer, 2001; Spencer et al., 1999); the 
conspicuous identity combines with the stereotype relevant situation.   For people with a history of mental illness, a 
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testing situation should be different. We hypothesized that the baseline for them would be to perform at their full 
ability.  Their stigmatized identity is concealed and not likely to be known or applied within the testing situation.  If 
there is no chance of anybody knowing their identity, there is no threat.  If, however, their mental illness identity is 
revealed in a testing situation, they face a broader stigma than women in a math situation. The stigma of mental 
illness devalues at almost every level: those in need of treatment for mental illness are seen as inferior, incompetent, 
childlike, insecure, awkward, confused, and dangerous (e.g. Cohen & Struening, 1962; Sibicky & Dovidio, 1986). 
Thus, once a mental illness identity is revealed in a situation, that situation is likely to become threatening, in the 
sense that now a person must prove him or herself a competent, worthwhile human.  Being in a situation of identity 
threat during a testing situation is likely to lead to lowered performance for those with a mental illness stigma 
because the test performance is a means by which their competence and intelligence could be judged and found 
lacking.  
 We put this possibility to the test in several studies (see Quinn, Kahng, & Crocker, 2004), two of which will be 
described here. In each of the experiments we examined how revealing the normally concealed identity of a history 
of mental illness treatment affects test performance.   For example, in one study (Quinn, et al., 2004, Study 2), we 
brought college students into the lab to take a standardized test similar to the analytical section of the Graduate 
Record Exam.  Several weeks prior to the laboratory session, participants had taken part in a mass pre-screening 
session in which they completed questions about their mental health background.  For this study, we selected 
participants for our “mental illness history” group if they indicated that they had previously experienced 
psychological problems for which they had sought treatment (medication, counseling, or both), and that the type of 
psychological problem was related to depression.  For our “no mental illness history” group, we selected participants 
who had indicated that they had not had any major psychological problems and had never sought treatment of any 
kind.  In this study we chose depression both because it is a disorder that affects many people, thereby making our 
results generalizable to a larger population, and because it would be a stringent test of the hypothesis. Depression is 
arguably less stigmatizing than many other disorders (e.g. schizophrenia), and if a subtle manipulation such as ours 
initiates identity threat and affects performance then the effects may be much larger for other mental illness 
conditions (see Corrigan and Holtzman (2001) for a theoretical discussion of how stereotype threat could affect 
cognitive deficits found with schizophrenia).   
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 In order to manipulate whether the concealed identity is revealed or not during a testing situation, we had all 
participants complete a short background questionnaire before taking the standardized test.  For half of the 
participants, the background questionnaire contained the same questions about mental health history as in the 
prescreening.  This was our “reveal” condition.  For the other half of the participants, these questions were omitted.  
We hypothesized that when no mention of the stigmatized identity is made in a testing situation, participants with 
and without a history of mental illness will perform equally well.  Because there is nothing to activate the concealed 
stigmatized identity, there is no reason it should impinge on performance. Note that this is different from stereotype 
threat research on participants with conspicuous stigmatized identities such as gender and race.  In those studies the 
devalued identity is activated simply by the content of the testing situation.  That is, a math situation automatically 
activates the gender and math stereotype leading women to score lower on a difficult math test than men (Spencer et 
al., 1999).  In addition, unlike other research on concealed stigma, we are not assuming that people with concealed 
stigmas are perpetually aware of, and, harmed by, their concealed identity.   When participants do reveal their 
identity, we hypothesize that the situation becomes one of identity threat.  The devalued identity is activated by the 
questions, the participants are aware that the experimenter will know their status, and they must contend with being 
negatively judged.  We predicted that in this situation, participants with a history of mental illness would perform 
worse than in the no reveal condition. 
 In addition, the study examined whether the evaluative pressure of the testing situation affected performance.  
Previous work on stereotype threat with both race and gender has shown that when the test is made non-evaluative 
by informing participants that the test is not diagnostic of ability, participants with stereotyped identities perform just 
as well as their non-stereotyped counterparts (Aronson, Quinn, & Spencer, 1998).  That is, the stereotype threat 
effect disappears when group members can no longer be judged and found lacking on the dimension specifically 
relevant to the stereotype.  It is not clear that the process would be the same for people with a history of mental 
illness stigma.  As noted above, the stigma attached to mental illness is very broad, devaluing almost every aspect of 
the person.  Instead of one specific stereotype (e.g. “bad at math”), the stigma of mental illness questions the basic 
competence of the person.  If this is the case, even when a test is described as non-diagnostic of abilities, a person 
who has just revealed their mental illness identity may still worry that they will be judged.  To examine this 
possibility, all participants in the study completed two tests.  The first was described as non-diagnostic (being used 
to “develop questions for future use”), the second as diagnostic (an “accurate indicator of a person’s reasoning 
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ability”). In sum, the design of the study was a 2 (history: no mental illness history versus mental illness history) by 
2 (reveal or no reveal) by 2 (test description: non-diagnostic or diagnostic) with the test description a within-
participants factor and history and reveal as between-participants factors.   
 As can been seen in Figure 1, results showed that participants with a history of mental illness performed worse 
when they revealed that history than when they did not reveal.   This pattern was particularly strong on the 
diagnostic test, although it appears on both tests. For participants with no history of mental illness, there were no 
significant effects of being asked about their history, although in the diagnostic condition there was a trend for them 
to do better in the reveal condition.  In a recent meta-analysis of stereotype threat research, Walton and Cohen 
(2003) found a consistent pattern such that the non-stereotyped groups tend to get a performance lift when in the 
stereotype threat conditions, perhaps because they are reminded of their own superior status.   
 
FIG 1. Performance on reasoning test by depression treatment history and condition, from “Discreditable: Stigma effects of 
revealing a mental illness on test performance,” by Quinn, Kahng, & Crocker, 2004, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
30, p. 809. Copyright 2004 by Sage Publications. Reprinted with permission.  
 
 In comparing the experience of the participants in this study who had a normally concealed identity of mental 
illness with female participants in the stereotype threat and math studies, we see both similarities and differences.  
As soon as women enter a math testing situation, they are likely in an identity threat situation – their gender is 
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conspicuous and the math situation lends a devalued status to their gender.  They are concerned about being judged 
on the stereotype relevant performance and that concern translates to worse performance.  The threat can be 
alleviated by changing the situation such that they no longer think the stereotype is applicable (e.g. the test is 
described as gender-fair) or by taking away the possibility of evaluation (e.g. by describing the test as non-diagnostic 
of ability).  In contrast, for people with a mental illness history, their devalued identity is not automatically cued by a 
standardized testing situation.  Because the identity is normally concealed and there are no cues in the situation that 
would alert a person for identity threat, performance is not diminished.  However, once the identity is revealed--in 
this case through simply noting their history in a questionnaire--the situation becomes one of identity threat.  People 
with a mental illness history now must be alert and concerned for evaluative judgment.  Just as with the women 
taking a math test, this concern translates into lowered performance. But different from women, the performance 
decrement occurs in the non-diagnostic condition as well. The test is a clear way in which their competency can be 
judged, and they now have an extra burden of proving themselves worthy through their performance.   
 In the previous study, we hypothesized that mental illness stigma is disruptive because the stigma is broadly 
devaluing, calling into question the basic competency of the person.  An alternative explanation, however, is that 
revealing any concealed stigma is disruptive and would lead to similar effects. That is, it may be the discomfort (or 
novelty) of revealing what is normally kept concealed that is harming performance and not identity threat per se.  In 
order to examine this possibility, we conducted a follow-up study (Quinn et al., 2004, Study 3) in which we sought 
to include a group with a concealed identity whose stigma was much narrower than mental illness.  We chose to 
include a group of people with a diagnosed eating disorder.  Whereas mental illness is a broadly devaluing stigma, a 
review of the literature yielded few stereotypes associated with eating disorders beyond the belief that they are 
usually found amongst women with exaggerated appearance concerns (Chiodo, Stanley, & Harvey, 1984). Although 
it may be that revealing an eating disorder would lead to identity threat in certain social situations, we hypothesized 
that it would not lead to concerns about competency or intelligence, and therefore not affect test performance.   
 The design of this study was a 3 (type of history: history of mental illness treatment versus history of eating 
disorders versus no history) by 2 (reveal versus no reveal).  We predicted that for participants with no history of 
mental illness or eating disorders we would see a similar trend to the previous study, with slightly better 
performance in the reveal versus no reveal condition. For participants with a history of mental illness, we predicted a 
replication of the previous study, with participants showing decreased performance after revealing their identity. For 
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participants with a history of an eating disorder we predicted their performance would neither be hindered (as the 
mental illness participants) nor helped (as the no-history participants) by revealing their stigmatized identity.  We 
used the same method, with the reveal questions embedded in a questionnaire given directly before the test.  For all 
participants the test was described as diagnostic of reasoning ability.  Participants with a history of mental illness 
were selected for study if they reported treatment for any type of psychological problem (not just depression) during 
the mass pre-screening.  The eating disorder participants were selected if they reported having a diagnosed eating 
disorder.  
 The results of the study supported our predictions.  As can be seen in Figure 2, the mental illness history 
participants scored higher in the no reveal than the reveal condition; whereas a non-significant reversal occurred for 
those with no mental illness history. The performance of the participants with a history of eating disorders did not 
differ in reveal and no-reveal conditions. The pattern of results supports our hypothesis that revealing a mental 
illness identity is broadly devaluing and likely leads to concern over proving oneself competent and worthwhile in 
an evaluative situation such as taking a standardized test.  A history of eating disorders, also a concealable stigma, 
does not carry the same negative connotations about basic competency and ability.  Simply revealing this normally 
concealed identity did not lead to the same level of decrement in performance as revealing a history of mental 
illness.  
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FIG 2: Performance on reasoning test by treatment history and condition from “Discreditable: Stigma effects of revealing a 
mental illness on test performance,” by Quinn, Kahng, & Crocker, 2004, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, p. 812. 
Copyright 2004 by Sage Publications. Reprinted with permission.  
 
 Results of this study illustrate that in order to understand and predict the ramifications of different concealed 
stigmas, it is important to not only know if the concealed stigma is salient, but also whether the situation leads 
people to be concerned and wary of devaluation from others.      
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter began with a list of key questions—by no means exhaustive—about the concerns and consequences 
unique to concealed stigma.  How do people with a concealed stigma decide whom to tell and when to tell them? 
What are the consequences of concealing a stigma versus the consequences of revealing? Some research has started 
to answer these questions, but much more needs to be done.  Recent work on the ramifications of conspicuous 
stigma, including most of the chapters in this book, has shed considerable light on the incredible number of ways 
that stigma affects people’s lives and interactions.  Future research might focus on the applicability of these 
frameworks to concealable stigma, noting where they intersect and where they diverge.  Current work on the costs 
and benefits of different coping strategies (see Miller, this volume; and Swim & Thomas, this volume) will also give 
researchers many fruitful avenues to explore in the search for a better understanding of the challenges faced by 
people living with a concealed stigma.     
 Insights about concealed stigmas suggest a number of practical implications. With concealed stigmatized 
identities that are linked to medical or psychological conditions that are benefited by treatment, research can point to 
ways to help people find the treatment they need while minimizing stigma costs.  For example, previous research 
examining college students with a history of mental illness have noted that active pursuit of treatments (either 
medications or counseling) is critical in preventing their withdrawals from college (Illovsky, 1997; Heiligenstein, 
Guenther, Hsu, & Herman, 1996). The findings of our studies presented above, however, show that revealing a 
history of mental illness can lead to worse academic performance in certain situations.  Thus, the research suggests 
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that college students might fare best if they are strategic about to whom they reveal their history.  Sharing the history 
with close supportive others and with therapists may lesson the cognitive load and lead to helpful treatment options; 
whereas sharing the history with teachers or classmates should be undertaken with care.  The findings of these 
studies also provide implications for counselors and teachers who work with students with concealed identities, such 
as learning disorders, history of mental illness, or history of family abuse.  Teachers and counselors need to be 
particularly careful that they do not maximize stigma by pulling students out of class at odd times or otherwise 
highlighting the students’ differences and taking away the control the student has over when and how to disclose.   
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A dominant theme in the previous chapters is the interpersonal and intrapersonal cost-benefit trade off targets face 
when considering possible coping responses to actual or anticipated discrimination.  For instance, after identifying 
an incident as discriminatory to the self, one specific way of responding to discrimination is to identify the 
discrimination to others by way of confronting a perpetrator.  If this identification challenges an audience’s (e.g., a 
perpetrator’s or observer’s) ideology, the audience will feel distress and may cope by derogating the confronter 
(Kaiser, in this volume).  However, if the target of the discrimination feels committed to challenging discrimination 
but does not challenge the discrimination, perhaps to avoid derogation, the stigmatized individual will feel worse 
about her or himself than if they had confronted, and have intrusive thoughts due to discrepancies between her or his 
actual and ought self (Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Hill, in this volume).  Cost-benefit considerations also occur 
when considering the coping response of hiding a stigma.  Hiding a stigma to avoid discrimination can result in 
intrusive thoughts regarding the stigma and long term negative health effects, but revealing it can result in stereotype 
threat responses (Quinn, in this volume).  
Given these tradeoffs, how do targets of prejudice decide how to cope with actual or potential discrimination?  
The previous chapters point to some important issues to consider when answering this question.  First, targets are 
not simply faced with the decision to confront or not to confront discrimination or to reveal or not reveal a stigma.  
Decisions about how to cope with discrimination or potential discrimination are done within the context of selecting 
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among a number of different possible coping responses (Miller, in this volume; see also Miller & Kaiser, 2001, 
Swim, Johnston, & Pearson, 2004) 
Second, targets’ evaluations of their options and the consequences of their responses are likely to be goal driven 
(Miller, in this volume).  Goals will determine whether anticipated and actual consequences of coping responses are 
judged as desirable or problematic.  For example, those who have the goal of challenging discrimination suffer more 
negative consequences for not confronting than those who do not share this goal (Shelton, et al., in this volume.)  
Third, whether a response is interpersonally costly will depend upon the goals and response of the audience.  
For instance, confrontation will likely be interpersonally costly if a perpetrator has the goal of maintaining belief 
systems (Kaiser, in this volume).  But if the perpetrator or observers are more open to change, confronting may alter 
their behaviors or beliefs (e.g., Czopp & Monteith, 2003).  In the remainder of this chapter we elaborate on the role 
that goals likely play in targets’ evaluation and selection of coping responses and how these goals and others’ 
responses impact targets evaluation of the consequences of their coping responses. 
 
 
SCOPE AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 
 
In this chapter we examine pro-active and reactive coping responses within the context of everyday forms of 
discrimination--routine encounters with another’s prejudice and discriminatory behavior that pervade people’s daily 
social interactions.  We have found that these forms of discrimination are relatively common; people report about 
two to three of these incidents per week in diary studies (Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001; Swim, Hyers, 
Cohen, Fitzgerald, & Bylsma, 2003; Swim, et al, 2004).  Despite the emphasis in psychology on subtle and covert 
forms of discrimination, everyday discrimination runs the entire spectrum from subtle and covert discrimination to 
blatant discrimination, particularly from the target’s perspective.  Even considering this broad spectrum, however, 
we and others in this book are not addressing institutional or cultural forms of discrimination.  Plus, we only address 
a subset of coping responses because we focus on individual rather than collective action.   
We are particularly interested in the role that targets’ goals have on their evaluation and selection of coping 
responses.  As illustrated in the previous chapters, researchers studying coping with discrimination have argued that 
consideration of interpersonal and intrapersonal goals influence target’s selection of coping responses.  Moreover, 
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adopting a stress and coping framework can also aid in understanding processes involved in coping with 
discrimination (Miller, in this volume, Miller & Kaiser, 2001, Miller & Major, 2000).  Although we agree with this 
assessment, we believe it is useful to place these considerations within the framework of self-regulation processes 
and core social goals.  Understanding self-regulation processes and core goals can help clarify what is threatening or 
challenging about discrimination, what motivates targets’ responses, why targets select particular coping responses, 
and how targets’ evaluate the consequences of their coping responses. 
Carver and Scheier’s (1998) cybernetic, self-regulation model provides a useful starting point for our discussion 
of coping with discrimination.  This model, presented in Figure 1, indicates that self-regulation processes begin 
when people compare their perceptions (i.e., inputs) with their goals, standards, or references.  A comparison that 
reveals a discrepancy between inputs and desired goals, standards, or references creates motivation to reduce the 
discrepancy.  These comparison processes can also be framed in reference to anti-goals, or undesirable end states.  
Just as people are motivated to achieve goals, they are motivated to avoid anti-goals.  A comparison that indicates 
closeness to an anti-goal creates motivation to increase distance from the anti-goal.  These motivational states result 
in outputs which are selected to reduce the discrepancy from goals and increase distance from anti-goals.  These 
outputs, as well as external disturbances, influence one’s external environment.  The effect on the environment leads 
to a new input and comparison to determine whether one is successfully on the path to reaching a goal or avoiding 
an anti-goal.  
Goals,
Standards
Reference value
Comparison
Input function
Effect on
Environment
External 
disturbance
Output function
FIG 1. Carver & Scheier’s (1998; 2002) self-regulation model.  
Responding to everyday discrimination 4 
 
Figure 2 integrates this self-regulation model and elements from stress and coping models and applies the 
modified model to voluntary responses to discrimination.  The initial input in the self-regulation model becomes an 
individual’s self-identification of actual or potential discrimination (see Stangor, et al., 2003 for a discussion on 
identification of discrimination; also Miller, this volume) and this input is compared with individuals’ goals.  The 
goals in self-regulation models range from very situation specific goals to abstract goals.  Similarly, a variety of 
types of goals will also be relevant to appraising experiences with discrimination (Miller, in this volume).  In the 
present chapter, however, we will consider the role of abstract goals in terms of core social goals in self-regulation 
processes.  The comparison between the actual or potential discrimination and core goals can be thought of as an 
appraisal of the situation, similar to primary appraisals or threat appraisals as described in the Health Psychology 
literature.  Primary appraisals consist of an assessment of the damage that has already been done by an event and the 
threat of future damage (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  Similarly, threat appraisals consist of an assessment of one’s 
vulnerability or susceptibility to a threat and the perceived severity of the threat (Rogers, 1975; Rogers & Prentice-
Dunn, 1997).  A comparison that indicates that anticipated or actual discrimination blocks goals or matches anti-goal 
creates motivation to consider and select strategies that restore goals or avoid anti-goals. 
Core 
Social goals
Comparison 
and Motivation
Intrapersonal &
Interpersonal
Consequence
Input
Ability
appraisal
Coping 
Response
Reactions 
By others
  
FIG 2. Self-regulation processes in response to discrimination. 
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The Health Psychology literature points to another important type of appraisal to be considered, an appraisal of 
one’s ability to engage in responses that address the situation.  These appraisals have been termed secondary 
appraisals or coping appraisals.  They consist of assessments of one’s personal ability to engage in a behavior (i.e., 
self-efficacy), the ability of a behavior to result in the desired outcome (i.e., response efficacy), and constraints on 
response options (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Rogers, 1975; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997).  Together the 
comparison process (i.e., primary or threat appraisals) and resultant motivation and the perceived ability to respond 
(i.e., secondary or coping appraisals) will impact the selection of a coping response (Mallett, 2004).1   This response 
as well as possible responses made by others will then influence the social environment.  The effect on the social 
environment can be considered the interpersonal consequences of coping responses.  Many coping responses reflect 
efforts to change the self instead of changing the situation (Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982; Weisz, Rothbaum, & 
Blackburn, 1984).  Therefore, coping responses can potentially have intrapersonal consequences as well 
interpersonal consequences.  These consequences then consist of new input in the self-regulation process, replacing 
the initial perception of discrimination.  Depending upon the re-evaluated distance from goals and anti-goals, the 
person may consider additional coping responses or exit this particular feedback loop. 
As an example, an interaction between two people could look something like the following.  While at a party, a 
female athlete is leading a conversation about women’s sports with a few individuals. A male interjects in the 
conversation, “although you seem like you know a lot about women’s sports, I bet you don’t know anything about 
men’s sports, and that’s what counts” (discrimination). The athlete had been in control of the conversation, and feels 
as though this comment diminished her control (comparison).  This loss of control bothers her and she wants to 
regain control (motivation).  She considers possible responses she can make (ability appraisal) in light of her goal to 
regain control of the conversation.  The woman decides to respond by saying, “Actually, I’d be willing to match wits 
against you in a contest about sports trivia of all kind” (coping response).  She feels good about having stood her 
ground (intrapersonal consequences).  Others present also decide to make comments as well (reactions by others).  
As a result of her response and other’s responses, the male commentator falls silent (interpersonal consequence).  
She regained control of the situation and was able to leave this feedback loop.   
In the remainder of the chapter we will elaborate on the model presented in Figure 2 by discussing:  1) core 
social goals, 2) discrimination as a potential threat or challenge to core social goals at the comparison stage, 3) 
evaluation and selection of coping responses in light of core social goals and framing of goals, and 4) the 
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interpersonal and intrapersonal consequences of responses and whether the consequences helped targets reach core 
goals or avoid anti-goals. 
 
 
CORE SOCIAL GOALS 
 
In the present chapter we consider five core social motives outlined by Fiske (2004).  Her organization encompasses 
several other motivational frameworks and highlights a variety of goals that are likely to be important when 
considering experiences with discrimination.  Although it is possible to argue for other core goals, needs, or motives, 
it is likely that many of these could be interpreted within these five goals, which are overviewed below.  These five 
core social goals are the need for self-enhancement, the need to trust others, the need for understanding, the need for 
control, and the need to belong. 
Self-enhancement has been described as a universal human goal that appears in various forms cross-culturally 
(Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003).  The need for self-enhancement occurs in many frameworks of basic 
psychological goals, including self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Deci & Ryan, 2000) and is important 
to research on stigmatized individuals’ experiences with discrimination (see Crocker, in this volume).  According to 
Fiske (2004) the desire to maintain self-esteem and the desire to improve as an individual is encompassed in the 
need for self-enhancement.  Essentially, people like to feel good about themselves (Taylor & Brown, 1988), thus the 
characterization of self-enhancement as an affective goal.  Intrapersonally, self-enhancement involves self-esteem, 
personal growth, and self-efficacy; we are motivated to feel good about ourselves, maintain that good feeling, and 
find ways to improve our outlook of ourselves.  The need to improve underlies the need for achievement, a goal that 
has a long history of psychological research (e.g., McClelland, Atkinson, & Clark, 1949).  Although primarily self-
directed, self-enhancement has an interpersonal aspect as well.  Interpersonally, self-enhancement addresses the 
perception of the public’s interpretation and presentation of the self. 
A second affective goal is the need for trust, which is primarily an other-directed or interpersonal goal.  The 
need for trust involves seeing the world as a benevolent place.  We are motivated to believe that other people are 
basically good, that they will not purposely hurt us, and that we can depend on them.  This motivation is reflected in 
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the belief that the world is just (Lerner & Miller, 1978) and related justice based ideologies (Mallett, Huntsinger, & 
Swim, 2004). 
The five core goals also include cognitive goals, the first of which is the reflective goal of understanding.  
Intrapersonally, this goal includes seeking explanations for other’s behavior, a central part of early research on 
attribution (e.g., Kelly, 1967).  Interpersonally, we are driven to have shared meanings with others and to share other 
relevant individuals’ understanding of events or situations.  For instance, groups will share information with each 
other, which serves to reinforce world-views (Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Keys, 1994).  This motivation may be a 
reason why stigmatized individuals self-stereotype to increase shared reality (Sinclair & Huntsinger, in this volume).  
The drive for shared meaning suggests that the goal of understanding can be considered as a need to understand 
others and to be understood by others.   
The second cognitive goal, the need for control, reflects being active in the world.  Individuals are driven to be 
effective and have control over their actions.  We seek a link between our behaviors and what happens to us.  
Control is both intrapersonal/self-directed and interpersonal/other directed; we seek to control our own actions and 
the actions of others.  Intrapersonally, the need for control encompasses not only a need for competence, but also a 
need for autonomy, for instance, in terms of desiring the ability to make choices about one’s own behavior, as 
described in self determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985).  Interpersonally, our need for control is in play when 
we try to persuade our friends, family, or coworkers to do things our way or perceive the world as we see it.   
The final goal is the need to belong.  This goal includes the need for strong stable relationships with others and 
a need to have frequent, positive interactions with a few others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).  Fiske (2004) proposes 
that this goal underlies the other four social goals.  The need to belong is posited as a core goal in nearly all 
psychological research addressing psychological goals (e.g., Glasser, 1998; Deci & Ryan, 2000) and has been 
argued to be the most basic and fundamental psychological goal (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).  The need for 
affiliation (i.e., belonging) is one of the core motivators for social identification with others (Brewer, 1991) and has 
a long history in social psychology; for example, research on need for affiliation reaches back at least to the 1950’s 
(e.g., Shipley & Veroff, 1952).   
Tying these goals to self-regulation processes, we propose that these five core social goals can be framed as 
goals or anti-goals.  For instance, the need to belong could translate into seeking inclusion or avoiding exclusion.  
Reflecting a desire to be included, one gay male noted that he hid his stigma because “‘You had to put on the act at 
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the time…so people would accept you’” (Rivers & D’Augelli, 2001, p. 208).  Trying to prevent exclusion, another 
Gay individual commented, “I didn’t come out and tell my parents, certainly, because I was still living at home…. 
As long as your parents didn’t know that part of you, they wouldn’t reject you” (Weston, 1991, p. 63).  The other 
core social goals can also be framed in terms of goals and anti-goals.  The need for self-enhancement could translate 
into seeking self-enhancement or avoiding self-diminishment.  The need for trust could translate into desiring trust 
or avoiding mistrust. The need for understanding could translate into desiring to understand and be understood or 
avoiding confusion and misunderstanding.  Finally, the need for control could translate into desiring self-control or 
avoiding loss of control.   
 
 
DISCRIMINATION AS A THREAT OR CHALLENGE TO CORE SOCIAL MOTIVES 
 
We propose that comparisons between anticipated or actual discrimination and core social goals will motivate 
individuals to seek, evaluate, and engage in coping responses.  This comparison will indicate that core social goals 
are or will be blocked or that core social anti-goals are or will be met.  The appraised distance between one's current 
state and one's goals or anti-goals will predict the strength of the threat or challenge to one's goals and predict the 
resulting motivation to protect one's self from current or future harm (Mallet, 2004).  Because individuals likely 
have multiple goals, these appraisals could also determine which goals (including those not highlighted by 
experiences with discrimination) are perceived as most in need of being addressed. 
Precedence for predicting that discrimination threatens or challenges core social motives can be found in 
research on reactions to ostracism.  Ostracism can be defined as “any act or acts of ignoring and excluding of an 
individual or group by an individual or group” (p. iv, Williams, 2001).  Discrimination can take the form of 
ostracism when ostracism is based upon a person’s group membership or discrimination can feel like ostracism 
when it creates or reinforces social distance from others.  Research on ostracism demonstrates that being ignored or 
excluded threatens a need to belong, need for self-esteem, and need for control (Williams, Case, & Govan, 2003).   
Thus, discrimination, perhaps via ostracism, may directly threaten or challenge a core need to belong by 
activating a belief that one is not accepted or valued by a group or does not fit into a group.  For instance, when 
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discrimination comes in the form of patronizing behavior, low power targeted individuals feel marginalized (Vescio, 
Snyder, & Gervais 2004; see also Foschi, 2000).   
Also like ostracism, discrimination may threaten or challenge self-esteem, or more generally self-enhancement.  
Self-esteem maintenance has been central to research on stigmatized individual’s responses to prejudice and 
discrimination (Crocker & Garcia, in this volume).  Although being in a stigmatized group is not necessarily 
associated with lower personal self-esteem (Crocker & Major, 1989), particular stigmatized groups do have 
relatively low personal self-esteem (Twenge & Crocker, 2002) and experiences with discrimination for those not 
identified with a group can threaten personal self-esteem (Branscombe, Schmidt, & Harvey, 1999).  Moreover, 
discrimination can also threaten public self-esteem while leaving personal self-esteem in tact.  The impact on public 
and not personal self-esteem can be seen in one Black American’s description of his experiences with 
discrimination, “‘[t]he way things are done now is that everything that a black person does…they try to discount it, 
say it’s not as good, which is not true’” (Feagin & Sikes, 1994, p. 297).  Consistent with this comment, we have 
found that the more incidents of heterosexist hassles lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals report during a day, the 
more they perceive that others negatively evaluate their group; however, these experiences do not influence personal 
state self-esteem (Swim et al., 2004, see also Swim et al., 2001).  Discrimination could also potentially convey 
specific stereotypic beliefs about groups and, depending upon the particular group, this could result in believing that 
others think that they are incompetent or not likeable (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999).  
Again, like ostracism, discrimination can potentially threaten or challenge the goal of control.  Discrimination 
can be perceived as blocking one’s ability to obtain important intrapersonal or interpersonal outcomes (Sechrist, 
Swim, & Stangor, 2004).  For instance, the following recollection of experiences with racism on a school bus relays 
the sense of personal loss of control and inability to control a situation.  “The kids always teased and hit me as I sat 
on the bus totally helpless.  Many of the people who were against me didn’t even know me.  So I just sat there while 
everyone stared and laughed.” (retrieved June 7, 2004 from http://collections.ic.gc.ca/sharing/racism2_e.html).  
Experiencing prejudice can also threaten or challenge an individual’s goal to trust others.  Consistent with this, 
Janoff-Bulman (1992) found that seeing anti-gay campaign materials made many lesbian and gay individuals 
question their belief that the world was safe and that others were good.  Discrimination can decrease feelings of trust 
in others, particularly the perpetrator and those perceived to be associated with or similar to the perpetrator.  For 
instance, Blacks’ cultural mistrust (Terrell & Terrell, 1981) and a greater tendency to believe in conspiracies against 
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Blacks (Crocker, Luthanen, Broadnax, & Blaine, 1999) are attributable at least in part to their group’s past and 
present experiences with discrimination (Feldman & Swim, 1998).  Experiences with discrimination may also 
indicate or remind some stigmatized individuals that the world is not just (Mallett, et al, 2004).  Depending upon the 
type of discrimination experienced, discrimination can threaten one’s belief in distributive justice (outcomes were 
distributed fairly), procedural justice (the process of distributing outcomes was fair), or interaction justice (they were 
treated with dignity and respect and given appropriate information about procedures that influence them) (Mitchell 
& Daniels, 2003).   
Finally, experiences with discrimination can influence one’s need to understand.  If discrimination comes 
unexpectedly, it could prompt attributions to help targets explain and understand such events (Hastie, 1984).  
Moreover, discriminatory actions suggest that perpetrators do not understand targets and they do not share the same 
understanding of social reality.  A Black social worker described difficulties with sharing an understanding of 
discrimination with White individuals, “‘And what disturbed me and continues to disturb me is that Whites will try 
to tell you that they’re not being racist, when they can’t tell you what you perceive, or how you’ve experienced 
something’” (Feagin & Sikes, 1994, p. 282).  Mismatches in understanding may be a result of differences in access 
to or emphasis on information regarding the role of intent and harm on judgments of discrimination (Swim, Scott, 
Sechrist, Campbell, & Stangor, 2003).  Mismatches could also occur if stigmatized group members make 
attributions for their social status to individual, institutional, or cultural discrimination while nonstigmatized group 
members make attributions to stigmatized group members’ behaviors. 
Although discrimination can potentially threaten all five core social goals, all five goals may not be activated in 
the face of discrimination, nor will the same goals be activated for every person.  In general, goal activation can be 
situation specific, such as a need to self-enhance at one’s job, and can vary across individuals, such as individual 
differences in need for affiliation.  These goals may be supplanted, accentuated, or simultaneously considered by 
goals activated by discrimination.  People likely balance responses to the activation of multiple goals in terms of the 
strength of competing goals and their perception of their ability to address the goals.  For instance, some have noted 
that a reason they did not confront discrimination was that it would interrupt the task at hand (Hyers, 2004; 
Moritsugu, 1997) suggesting that goals driven by the task at hand were deemed more important than those activated 
by discrimination.  Interestingly, similar responses may be made to offensive but nondiscriminatory behaviors if the 
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behaviors threaten or challenge the same goals.  Similar responses may also occur, if different goals are activated 
but similar responses are perceived to be effective at addressing the different goals.   
 
 
EVALUATION AND SELECTION OF COPING RESPONSES 
 
Matching coping appraisals and goals 
 
Strength of activation and weighted importance of goals is likely insufficient to determine the selection of coping 
responses.  One must also consider the ability to generate possible responses and the appraisal of these responses.  
The possible set of responses to be appraised could be based upon the target’s own past experiences, observations of 
others, social skills, or creativity, as examples.  The ability to generate coping responses may be limited by factors 
such as a target’s mood state (Vickers, et al., 2003; Gasper & Clore, 1998), the goal to generate responses quickly 
(Kowalski, 1996), or cognitive load.  Additionally, the goal that is threatened may focus attention only on those 
responses that could possibly address the goal. 
Appraisal of one’s ability to engage in responses (self-efficacy) and the ability of a response to address goals 
(response efficacy) will likely be considered in reference to perceived situational constraints (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984; Rogers, 1975; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997).  Response efficacy involves anticipating the consequences of 
coping responses and is therefore the assessment that is tied most closely to goals.  Reflecting this goal based 
assessment, one Black hospital administrator said, “‘[w]hen [discrimination] does happen ….you have to formulate 
a plan of action to still accomplish your goal and let that be your number one priority’” (Feagin & Sikes, 1994, p. 
274).  Anticipated consequence that lead toward the satisfaction of a social goal or the avoidance of an anti-goal can 
be expected to be beneficial. Anticipated consequence that hinder the satisfaction of the social goal or avoidance of 
an anti-goal can be expected to be costly.  Individuals presumably prefer responses that are primarily beneficial.  
Thus, goals can potentially influence the selection of coping response either by guiding a search for possible 
responses or by representing standards for evaluating the potential costs and benefits of responses being considered.  
Below we consider how different coping responses might be appraised in light of the five core social goals, starting 
with confronting. 
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Much of the past discussions about the role of interpersonal goals on decisions about confronting may 
specifically be concerns about belonging and public self-enhancement.  Confronters could be seen as a deviant if 
others do not support them.  They could then be rejected or ostracized from a group because of this deviance 
(Schacter, et al., 1954; Williams, 2001).  Indeed, lab studies demonstrate that self-presentation concerns inhibit 
stigmatized individuals’ public labeling of incidents as discrimination (Stangor, Swim, VanAllen & Sechrist, 2002; 
Sechrist, et al., 2004).  Plus, stigmatized individuals are more likely to make public attributions to discrimination 
when in the presence of in group than out group members (Stangor, et al., 2001), perhaps due to fewer concerns 
about rejection from in group than out group members.   
Although fear of loss of more control could inhibit confronting, confronting can also reflect attempts to gain 
control over others in a situation.  For instance, women in a diary study on confronting reported that they selected 
responses that served the goal of changing perpetrators’ behaviors (e.g., “to leave me alone” or “I wanted to make 
him stop saying those things”; Hyers, 2004).  Confronting can also be a means of achieving a sense of control over 
the self and increasing personal self-enhancement.  When confronting allows one to be true to the self, confronting 
can reduce intrusive thoughts or rumination and avoid negative self evaluations that come from self-discrepancy 
with beliefs about how one ought to behave (Shelton, et al, in this volume).  Similarly, public attributions to 
discrimination can allow targets to regain the sense of loss of control over future outcomes by placing blame for 
negative outcomes on a transient cause and allowing one to remain confident in one’s own control over future 
outcomes (e.g., Sechrist, et al., 2004).   
Although confronting is often treated as if people either confront or not confront, people have multiple ways in 
which they can confront and these different manifestations of confronting may reflect different goals.  One of the 
most frequent means of confronting others is by asking others to explain their behavior (Swim & Hyers, 1999; 
Shelton & Stewart, 2004).  The perpetrator’s explanations or apologies that could follow this form of confrontation 
could allow the targeted individual to trust or better understand the perpetrator.  Other forms of confronting could 
also address the goal of understanding.  For instance, a desire to educate a perpetrator is one of the prime motivators 
women reported for confronting sexism, racism, anti-Semitism, and heterosexism (Hyers, 2004).  The resulting 
social influence attempts could be driven by a desire to be understood by others or a desire to have a shared 
understanding of situations.  Conversely, a common reason people give for not confronting discrimination is that 
they perceived that confronting would not change an actor’s opinions (Hyers, 2004).  In the latter situation, targets 
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appear to be appraising confronting in terms of their ability to socially influence the perpetrator not in terms of other 
goals such as regaining control or self-enhancement.   
Other coping responses can also be considered in terms of their relation to each of the core goals.  Much of the 
early research on coping with discrimination was framed in terms of responses to protect self-esteem (Crocker & 
Major, 1989).  Responses such as making attributions to discrimination (Major, Kaiser, & McCoy, 2003), making 
within group comparisons (Bylsma & Major, 1994), and devaluing domains and activities where one’s group is 
stereotyped as inferior (Schmader, Major, Eccleston, & McCoy, 2001), have been argued to be responses that 
protected self-esteem.   Additionally, many coping responses have been classified in the stress and coping literature 
in terms of attempts at control, both in terms of the goal of controlling situations to suit the self and controlling the 
self to suit situations (Rothbaum, et al, 1982; Weisz, et al., 1984.)  
The above responses reflect reactive coping.  Yet, pro-active coping responses aimed at preventing 
discrimination can also address different core social goals.  For instance, hiding one’s stigma could prevent stigma-
based ostracism and subsequent threats or challenges to the goals of belonging, self-enhancement, and control.  
Although hiding a stigma may protect these goals, hiding a stigma may also threaten or challenge goals.  If 
stigmatized individuals who hide their stigma believe that they are not being true to themselves, the lack of 
authenticity may threaten personal self-enhancement and threaten the goal of being understood by others.  
Additionally, hiding one’s stigma might highlight one’s lack of trust in others and threaten the belief that the world 
is benevolent.  Finally, hiding stigma can potentially result in thought intrusions due to monitoring whether other’s 
detect one’s stigma (Frable, Blackstone, & Scherbaum, 1990) or in feeling a loss of control due to the distraction of 
rebound effects while suppressing one's identity (Smart & Wegner, 2000).   
Thus, different coping responses and manifestations of coping responses (such as different ways to confront) 
may be expected to be more or less effective at addressing the goals and anti-goals that are activated by 
discrimination.  Accordingly, these goals will influence the appraisal of coping strategies.  The extent to which a 
response is appraised as effectively addressing a goal or avoiding an anti-goal likely will influence whether the 
response is given.   
 
Framing and affect 
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Targets framing of goals is another potentially important predictor of the selection of coping responses (see Table 
1).  One outcome of primary appraisals has been described as establishing whether one is threatened or challenged 
by a stressor (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  Threat and challenge may be related to prevention and promotion 
motivational principles (Higgens, 1998).  That is, feeling threatened is similar to being prevention focused because 
both represent a focus on avoiding losses.  On the other hand, feeling challenged is similar to being promotion 
focused because they both represent a focus on seeking gains.  Moreover, these foci can be tied to Carver and 
Scheier’s (1998) self-regulation model because avoiding losses is akin to avoiding anti-goals and approaching gains 
is akin to approaching goals.  For instance, responses to the possibility of being stereotyped can come in the form of 
stereotype threat or stereotype challenge (aka stereotype reactance, see Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001).  
Stereotype threat responses may be a result of a prevention orientation aimed at avoiding the anti-goal of self-
diminishment that can come from confirming the stereotypes.  In contrast, stereotype challenge responses may be a 
result of a promotion orientation aimed at attaining the goal of self-enhancement by illustrating one’s competence.  
Additionally, tying these terms to cost-benefit analyses that have been used to describe targets’ consideration of 
responses to discrimination, avoiding costs may be thought of as avoiding losses or anti-goals and seeking benefits 
may be thought of as seeking gains or approaching goals.   
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TABLE 1 
Comparison of Different Framing Orientations and Foci Toward Situations and Affective and Behavior Consequences of these 
Framing Orientations and Foci. 
Framing Threat Challenge 
 Prevention  Promotion 
Concern or focus Avoid loss Seek gain 
 Avoid anti-goal Seek goal 
 Avoid costs Seek benefits 
Affect Anxiety Anger 
 Behavioral inhibition system Behavioral approach system 
 
Coping responses Avoidance  Approach  
 Disengagement Engagement/Effort 
 Secondary Coping responses Primary coping responses 
 
 
These different types of framing and foci have implications for affective responses to incidents (Carver & 
Scheier, 1998; Carver, 2004).  Approaching anti-goals results in anxiety and avoiding anti-goals produces relief.  In 
contrast, approaching goals results in joy or happiness, whereas discrepancies from goals results in anger.2   
Affective reactions are important to consider when reflecting on experiences with discrimination; we have found 
that daily experiences with everyday discrimination are associated with increased anxiety and anger (Swim, et al., 
2001; Swim et al., 2003; Swim et al., 2004).  Increased anxiety would suggest that experiences with discrimination 
have activated concerns about approaching anti-goals.  Conversely, increased anger would suggest that experiences 
with discrimination have activated concerns about blockage of goals.  Thus, people may feel either anxious or angry 
when they experience discrimination, dependent upon their ffforng of the situation.   
It is also possible that they may feel both angry and anxious in any particular interaction.  The simultaneous 
occurrence of anger and anxiety responses may reflect concerns about more than one type of core social goal.  For 
example, individuals may be concerned about being excluded while simultaneously wanting to gain control.  
Alternatively, feeling both angry and anxious during an interaction could also be a result of fluxing between two 
different framing orientations.  For example, Carver and Scheier (1998) argue that anti-goals and goals can be 
linked.  That is, the same goal may be thought about in terms of how close one is to a goal (e.g., close to being 
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included) or how far away one is from the same goal (e.g., distance from exclusion).  Although avoidance responses 
to anti-goals are not limited by natural ending points, approach responses to goals are limited by reaching the goal 
itself.  Yet, in practice, goals may provide limits to anti-goals; one may stop avoiding an anti-goal when they have 
reached the goal.  For instance, one might stop worrying about exclusion after one feels assured that they are 
included.    
Different affective responses have implications for the selection of coping responses (see Table 1).  Anxiety is 
associated with the Behavioral Inhibition System and avoidance behaviors.  In contrast, anger is associated with 
Behavioral Approach System and approach behaviors (Harmon-Jones, & Allen, 1997; 1998; Harmon-Jones, & 
Sigelman, 2001).  Consistent with these associations between affect and behavior, Carver and Scheier (1998) argue 
that approaching anti-goals is associated with disengagement responses and moving away from goals is associated 
with effort.   
The inhibition and activation systems and resultant avoidant and approach behaviors parallel the classification 
of coping responses in the stress literature as either disengagement/avoidance or engagement/approach responses 
(Compas, Conner-Smith, Saltzman, Thomsen, & Wadsworth, 2001; Conner-Smith, Compas, Wadsworth, Thomsen, 
& Saltzman, 2000).  Plus, parallels between coping responses to discrimination and engagement and disengagement 
responses have been made (Miller, in this volume, Miller & Kaiser, 2001).  There are also other ways to classify 
coping responses which share similarities with inhibition responses and approach related behaviors.  For example, 
responses aimed at changing a situation to fit the self (primary control responses) could be considered approach 
related whereas responses made with the goal of changing the self to fit the situation could be considered inhibitory 
responses (Rothbaum, et al., 1982; Weisz, et al., 1984).3  Examples of approach responses to discrimination that 
could be related to attempts to achieve goals include attempts at social influence, expression of moral outrage or 
anger, revenge (e.g., Hyers, 2004), and compensatory behavior, (Miller & Myers, 1998).  Examples of inhibitory 
responses to discrimination that could be related to avoiding anti-goals include avoiding groups (e.g., Cohen & 
Swim, 1995), hiding stigma (Quinn, in this volume), self-silencing (Swim, Quinliven, Ferguson, & Eyssel, 2004), 
dis-identification with groups (Major & Schmader, 1998), or devaluing threatened attributes (Schmader, et al., 
2001).  Other coping responses to discrimination could be also be considered inhibitory responses because they do 
not directly address discrimination.  Yet, unlike the other inhibitory responses listed above, they could still be 
related to active attempts to reach goals rather than avoid anti-goals.  These responses include, preferring within 
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group comparison (Bylsma & Major, 1994), shifting one’s social identity to non-threatened group identities to 
increase belonging (Mussweiler, Gariel, & Bodenhausen, 2000), strengthening in group identification to increase 
feelings of belonging (Branscombe, et al, 1999; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001), or focusing on task 
completion to increase self-control (Hyers, 2004).  Research is needed to establish whether any of the above coping 
responses follow from focusing on goals versus anti-goals, affective reaction targets have toward discrimination, and 
behavioral inhibition or activation systems.  
 
 
CONSEQUENCES OF COPING RESPONSES 
 
As the previous chapters illustrate, coping responses can have intrapersonal consequences, for instance, in terms 
evaluations of the self based upon whether one is acting in line with one’s beliefs (Shelton, et al., in this volume) or 
stereotype threat responses if one’s stigma is revealed (Quinn, in this volume), as well as interpersonal 
consequences, for instance, in terms of other’s defensive reactions to confronting (Kaiser, in this volume) or 
rejection after a stigma is revealed (Quinn, in this volume).  Thus, it is important to remember that consequences of 
coping responses are partially out of targets’ control because interpersonal consequences depend upon how others 
respond to targets’ coping responses.  Targets’, perpetrators’, and observers’ behaviors are linked such that each 
other’s behavior can become inputs into others’ self-regulation processes (Carver & Scheier, 1998).  Thus, targets 
overt coping responses may influence perpetrators’ or observers’ social goals and subsequently their behaviors.    
Additionally, other people may respond independently of targets’ responses and these responses may influence the 
social environment.  Both the intrapersonal and interpersonal consequences of responses to discrimination become 
new input to be compared to core social goals.   
This new comparison and reappraisal will determine the target’s assessment of the overall success of a coping 
response in light of the target’s personal goals.  For instance, confronting may appear to be ineffective because it 
does not alter an actor’s opinions and, worse yet, may result in retaliatory behavior.  However, from the target’s 
point of view, if the goal of confronting was to self-validate then the response may be perceived as effective.  Even 
so, discrimination can threaten many goals and it is likely that many responses will satisfy certain goals while 
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simultaneously aggravating other goals.  The balance between the costs and benefits to goals will likely influence 
the subsequent comparison and reappraisal processes.   
The reappraisal of threatened or challenged goals can have multiple outcomes.  Reappraisal may indicate that 
discrepancies between an individual’s current state and goals no longer exist and individuals may exit from the 
cycle.  However, the reappraisal may also indicate that the discrepancies still exist or highlight new discrepancies 
that may have emerged, perhaps as unanticipated consequences of the coping responses.  Alternative coping 
responses or means of enacting the selected coping responses may be generated and appraised.  Targets may find 
that they are unable to engage in other coping responses; for instance, this would occur if the interaction has ended 
or timing within the interaction is critical.  They may find other ways to meet core social goals through other 
interactions such as increased belonging and enhancement through other groups.  Additionally, the consequences of 
a coping response may inform their self-efficacy and response-efficacy in future situations where they encounter 
discrimination.   
Finally, the consequences we consider here reflect immediate effects of coping responses.  Long term effects 
may differ from immediate effects (Quinn, in this volume).  For instance, individuals who reveal a hidden stigma 
may be appreciated for their honesty in the moment.  However, revealing the stigma may result in unanticipated 
long term consequences such as a person avoiding them in the future.  At this later time, the individual may need to 
engage in other means of self-regulation processes to deal with these later threats. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
We began this chapter by asking the question, how do targets of prejudice decide how to respond to discrimination?  
We have attempted to provide answers to this question by considering research and theory on self-regulation 
processes, core social goals, stress and coping, and everyday discrimination.  The combination of these different 
literatures leads us to the model presented in Figure 2.  To summarize, we propose that experiencing discrimination 
motivates the generation and selection of coping because it threatens or challenges core social goals in the form 
discrepancies from goals or matches with anti-goals.  Voluntary coping responses are selected after the generation of 
possible coping responses and ability appraisals, including appraising the ability of the response to approach a goal 
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or avoid an anti-goal.  Plus, framing of incidents in terms of goals and anti-goals may influence the type of affect 
one experiences which in turn may influence the types of coping responses considered and selected.  The 
classification of responses that follow anxiety and anger into inhibitory and approach responses is consistent with 
other classifications of coping responses from the stress and coping literature.  This classification suggests that the 
type of affect people often experience in response to discrimination may also play an important role in their 
selection of coping responses.  The responses selected will have intrapersonal and interpersonal consequences and 
these consequences then become reappraised in terms of comparisons with core social goals.   
Understanding how targets respond to discrimination in a particular situation is complex and multifaceted.  
Targets are not passive recipients of discrimination.  Their responses are likely influenced by the activation and 
prioritizing of goals and their appraisals of themselves, the situation, and response options in light of their goals.  
They have a large repertoire of response options, some of which help them avoid anti-goals and associated costs and 
others that help them approach goals and associated benefits.  Responding to discrimination is intrapersonally and 
interpersonally dynamic; it can be influenced by previous experiences with discrimination, the salience and 
prioritizing of goals within a situation, self-regulatory adjustments made during an interaction and the responses 
made by others.   
 
 
NOTES 
 
1 This model indicates that comparison processes precede ability appraisals which then influence engagement in 
coping responses selected.  However, both processes may independently influence engagement in coping responses. 
Plus ability appraisals as well as comparisons could affect motivation (Mallett, 2004).   
2 Sadness is another emotion that can emerge if behaviors do not increase an ability to reach goals.  Sadness or 
depression has been associated with more reported experiences with discrimination (Landrine & Klonoff, 1996; 
Russell & Richards, 2003).  Yet, in our diary studies we have found that experiences with discrimination affect 
anger and anxiety and not depression. Sadness may differ from anger because sadness may not reflect initial 
reactions to discrimination but may instead reflect repeated experiences with discrimination interfering with core 
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social goals.  Yet, if sadness does emerge, we would anticipate that it would be related to coping responses tied to 
behavioral inhibition systems.    
3 Responses have also been differentiated into voluntary coping responses (those discussed here) and involuntary 
responses.  Both may be a result of comparison processes and both may have an impact on one’s social environment.  
For instance, involuntary responses of rumination and intrusive thoughts may decrease task performance.  The 
difference between voluntary coping responses and involuntary responses may be that the latter are not influenced 
by coping appraisals. 
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“Like many other Blacks,” recounted African American tennis great Arthur Ashe, “when I find myself in a new 
public situation, I will count” (Ashe, 1993, p. 131).  Ashe—who played a sport that was and still is dominated by 
Whites—counted his “Blackness” frequently.  By “counting”, Ashe was referring to the difficulty he encountered as 
a member of a group that is outnumbered and devalued in American society; he counted the number of Black faces 
in a room to determine how well his social identity was valued and represented. It turns out that many of us engage 
in a similar, albeit less conscious, form of mental arithmetic.  We scan the environment and “count” those features 
about ourselves that stand out. When those features are related to a stigmatized social identity, we, like Ashe, may 
be distressed and burdened by negative stereotypes associated with our identity.  For the past few years, our research 
has focused on the burdens of being immersed in environments that compel us to count our social identity—borne 
not only by African Americans, but by anyone who is the target of stereotypes based on race, gender, sexual 
orientation, or religious affiliation.  Much of this research has focused on what we call threatening environments, 
which are environments that can activate social identities and the relevant negative stereotypes about them. The aim 
of this chapter is to describe this research, and in so doing, illustrate what it means to belong to a group with a 
“spoiled identity” (Goffman, 1963). 
Although individuals belonging to stigmatized groups now occupy positions in schools, employment settings, 
and legislative bodies that were once reserved for White men, research continues to paint a discouraging portrait of 
under-representation for them.  Women, for example, still comprise only 38% of faculty in American universities, 
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16% of the corporate officers in America’s largest companies, and 13% of senators in the 107 th US Congress 
(Business and Professional Women/USA, 2003).  Observations about people of color show a similar pattern of 
under-representation.  Clearly, these individuals are immersed in social milieus compelling them to “count” their 
social identities and the stereotypes associated with them (McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978).  Being 
outnumbered, though, is not the only way environments activate social identities and stereotypes.  Hearing about the 
latest reality TV show with 20 beautiful women chasing after a rich bachelor, watching a commercial showing a 
woman getting excited about a kitchen cleaner, or even taking a class with a White instructor are all ways the 
environment can conspire to make us think about our social identities. 
So what are the effects of being in environments that compel us to “count” our group? How does a salient social 
identity affect the way we behave, feel, and think?  These questions are important because our world is increasingly 
becoming a mosaic of different cultures, races, and religions, and so introduces environments that regularly make us 
think about our identities and their associated stereotypes.   
In this chapter we explore how social factors can create threatening environments and come to affect intellectual 
performance, academic self-concept, and feelings of belonging.  First, we review research showing how being in the 
numerical minority can impact intellectual performance.  We describe, for example, how being outnumbered by 
Whites can activate negative race stereotypes and undermine African-Americans’ standardized test performance 
through a psychological process known as stereotype threat.  Second, we explore how specific environments can 
make people apprehensive about being the targets of prejudice, which in turn can pose problems for their academic 
self-concepts.  That is, we will show how viewing the world through the lens of social identity—or being in 
environments that compel one to do so—can rob people of valuable self-relevant information and so foster 
inaccurate self-knowledge and an unstable self-concept.  Third, we examine how threatening environments convey 
exclusionary messages by signaling that certain groups have only marginal status in the setting and so are not as 
valued as other groups.  In so doing, these settings can hamper feelings of belonging, acceptance, and comfort, 
especially when they communicate that ability and intelligence are fixed qualities. Finally, we discuss what we can 
do to disarm these harmful environments so that people can succeed and prosper in them.  Specifically, we suggest 
that we can inure people against the threatening features of an environment by convincing them that ability and 
intelligence are malleable.  We begin by introducing the concept of threatening environments. 
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THREATENING ENVIRONMENTS 
 
Threatening environments can be thought of as settings where people come to suspect that they could be devalued, 
stigmatized, or discriminated against because of a particular social identity. These settings compel individuals to 
think about their particular social identities and, in addition, the stereotypes associated with them.  For individuals 
belonging to stigmatized groups, these stereotypes are negative, and any cues that signal that one’s group is treated 
with ill will, is not valued socially, or is marginalized in any way, should increase one’s vigilance for prejudice, 
foster mistrust, and create a threatening environment (Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). After watching the film 
White Men Can’t Jump, for example, a normal game of pick-up may become threatening to a White basketball 
player playing with his Black friends (e.g. Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, & Darley, 1999).  Similarly, the boardroom 
may become threatening for a woman executive who becomes aware that the corporation she works for values men 
more than women and hires them almost exclusively (e.g. Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001).  Once people 
belonging to stigmatized groups start thinking about their social identities in such threatening contexts, these 
thoughts can trigger a chain of events leading to underperformance, feelings of rejection, and feelings of doubt about 
why they receive the outcomes they do. 
Settings that include people from more than one social group—heterogeneous ones—may be particularly likely 
to form threatening environments among the stigmatized.  This may be especially true for settings where stigmatized 
groups are outnumbered by the more dominant group, as is the case, say, for an African-American med-student who 
finds herself outnumbered by her White classmates.  According to distinctiveness theory (McGuire et al., 1978), we 
are selective self-perceivers and attend to those aspects of ourselves that are distinct and peculiar in our immediate 
social context.  Thus, our med-student will tend to notice and think about her “Blackness” in her White classroom, 
but in a different setting, say a class full of men, her race loses salience and she will become more conscious of 
being a woman.  In one study, McGuire and his colleagues (McGuire, et al., 1978) found that high school students 
were more likely to spontaneously self-define as a member of their racial group when that group formed a minority 
rather than a majority in their classrooms.  Further, this feeling of distinctiveness increased as the proportion of their 
race decreased in the classroom (cf. McGuire, McGuire, & Winton, 1979).  And when people feel distinct, they may 
Threatening Environments     4 
 
feel self-conscious.  For example, when asked to imagine that they were taking an oral exam in front of a group that 
was of a different race, African-Americans responded that they would feel uncomfortable being seen as a 
representative of their group (as cited in Thompson and Sekaquaptewa, 2002).  Mixed-group settings, then, can 
compel people to “count” and become aware of the representation of their group, and this tendency becomes more 
marked when people need only a few fingers to do so. 
Environments can also become threatening by dint of stereotype activation.  When members of stigmatized 
groups are outnumbered, they tend to notice their social identity; and once this happens, they may start ruminating 
about the stereotypes about their group.  Inzlicht, Aronson, Good, and McKay (2004), for example, discovered that 
Black participants were more likely to think about stereotypes about their race when Whites outnumbered them.  In 
their study, Black participants took a test with two other people—two other Blacks, two Whites, or one Black and 
one White. Before taking the test, participants completed a measure of stereotype activation, which consisted of 36 
word fragments, twelve of which could be completed with, among other words, words associated with the African 
American stereotype (e.g., B R _ _ _ _ _ [BROTHER], or W E L _ _ _ _ [WELFARE]).  The premise behind this 
task is that participants for whom the Black stereotype is activated should be more likely to make stereotypic 
completions than participants for whom the stereotype is not activated (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Steele & Aronson, 
1995).  In accordance with distinctiveness theory (McGuire, et al., 1979), stereotypes should be more active for the 
Black participants the less their race was represented in the group (i.e. the more distinct they were).  Results 
confirmed predictions.  The more participants were outnumbered, the more stereotypic completions they made. Our 
point here is that being outnumbered can increase awareness of one’s group and of the stereotypes associated with 
one’s group, and, ultimately, create a threatening environment where people expect stereotypes to be used against 
them. 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTS CAN THREATEN INTELLECTUAL PERFORMANCE 
 
Stereotype Threat 
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Environments that activate stereotypes might threaten intellectual performance via a motivational phenomenon 
known as stereotype threat (Aronson, 2002; Aronson et al., 1999; Spencer, Steele & Quinn, 1999; Steele, 1997; 
Steele & Aronson, 1995).  Stereotype threat is the discomfort individuals feel when they are at risk of fulfilling a 
negative stereotype about their group. The possibility that they may confirm the stereotype—in their own and other 
people’s eyes (Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2003)—causes anxiety that is experienced as heightened physiological arousal 
(Ben-Zeev, Fein, & Inzlicht, in press; Blascovich, Spencer, Quinn, & Steele, 2001; O’Brien & Crandall, 2003). 
Ultimately this arousal may deplete working memory (Schmader & Johns, 2003) and result in sub-optimal 
performance, especially when individuals are highly identified with success and achievement in the stereotyped 
domain (Aronson et al., 1999).  For instance, when faced with the stereotype that their group is not proficient in 
academic tests, African-Americans may feel anxious about being judged along stereotypical lines, and behave in a 
way that ironically confirms the very stereotype they were trying to refute; they may underperform.  Interestingly, 
stereotype threat does not necessarily spring from actually being stereotyped and can occur even in the absence of 
stereotypical treatment. The key is holding a negative meta-stereotype about future treatment (Vorauer, Main, 
O’Connel, 1998), or put another way, expecting to be stereotyped. 
Women are also exposed to negative stereotypes about their group and are threatened by them accordingly.  In 
math and science, for example, women have to contend with stereotypes alleging inferiority to men (Davies, 
Spencer, Quinn, Gerhardstein, 2002; Quinn & Spencer, 2001; Schmader, 2002; Spencer et al., 1999).  Further, 
women often find themselves in the minority in math and science domains: Although they account for well over half 
of the student body, women form only a small minority of college students in the physical and computer sciences 
(NSF, 2000).  Given that minority environments1 can activate negative stereotypes, it follows that they should also 
trigger stereotype threat and lead to depressed intellectual performance for women in math.  Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev 
(2000) conducted a study to find out if this was indeed the case. 
 
Minority Environments 
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In one study (Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2000), women participated in a “focus-group study on test strategies.”  
Participants were seated with two other people—either two other women or two men—and told that they would take 
a math test, the results of which would be publicly discussed in the focus group.  For women taking the test with two 
men, the mere distinctiveness of being in the minority should focus their attention on their gender, and along with it, 
the negative stereotypes about women and math.  Conversely, women in the majority group should be less likely to 
spontaneously notice their gender and related stereotypes.  In other words, being in the presence of two men should 
be enough to cause stereotype threat and lead to lower performance among women in a minority environment 
compared to women in a same-sex one.  This is precisely what happened.  A second study revealed that women 
performed worse when they were in the presence of even one man. Because social identity and stereotypes become 
more salient with increases in the relative number of out-group members in the environment (Inzlicht et. al., 2004; 
McGuire et al., 1979), it follows that women’s math performance would drop in relation to the number of men in the 
room.  Figure 1 shows that when women took the math test in mixed-sex majority environments (with one other 
women and one man) they performed worse than women in a same-sex environment but better than women in a 
minority one.  Therefore a seemingly innocuous contextual cue—the number of men in a room—can create a 
threatening intellectual environment and affect women’s math test performance. Similar results have been found 
with other stigmatized groups (e.g. Sekaquaptewa and Thompson, 2002).  
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So how, then, do minority environments threaten intellectual performance?  One possibility is that being 
outnumbered can increase the distinctiveness of one’s social identity, activate negative stereotypes, and then 
increase arousal.  In other words, being outnumbered may increase feelings of apprehension, stoke the fires of 
arousal, and lead to underperformance as a result.  Using the classic misattribution paradigm (e.g. Zanna & Cooper, 
1974), Ben-Zeev and her colleagues (in press; Study 2) found that arousal—and an individual’s construal of 
arousal—was a key ingredient linking minority environments to underperformance.  In their study, women took a 
math test with either two men or two women.  Half of the participants were also given the opportunity to attribute 
the negative arousal presumably triggered by the threat to a benign source—in this case, a subliminal tone.  As 
expected, women in the minority environment performed worse on the math test than women in the same-sex 
environment.  These minority performance deficits, however, were attenuated when the participants were given an 
opportunity to misattribute their arousal to an external source.  When participants were told that a subliminal noise 
FIG 1. Women’s math performance as a function of the number of men in a 3-person group.  Error bars 
represent standard error. 
 
Threatening Environments     8 
 
might make them feel anxious, minority participants performed as well as same-sex ones.  Arousal, and the manner 
in which arousal is attributed, can therefore play an important role in mediating minority underperformance effects.   
Threatening environments can also lower performance via lower performance expectations.  In a study reported 
by Sekaquaptewa and Thompson (2003), women and men placed in virtual minority or same-sex groups were asked 
to estimate their performance before taking a math test. Results showed that women in the minority group had lower 
performance expectations than those in a same-sex group; men’s performance expectations, in contrast, did not 
differ.  Furthermore, the effect of minority environments on women’s math performance was partly mediated by 
these lower expectations.  Minority environments, therefore, may impugn intellectual performance by raising 
arousal and by lowering performance expectations.    
Importantly, the effects of threatening minority environments on intellectual performance may be limited to 
groups operating in stereotyped domains.  For example, even though a White man may be more likely to notice his 
race in a group of Black men and his gender in a group of White women, the stereotypes that these social identities 
are likely to activate may not be negative or threatening. Tokenism theory (Lord & Saenz, 1985; Saenz & Lord, 
1989), on the other hand, suggests that being in the minority can cause cognitive deficits in all domains and for all 
groups, presumably as an outgrowth of the self-consciousness it causes.  Performance deficits, in other words, are 
caused by feelings of general self-consciousness and not from stereotype activation.  Although research supports 
both models, there is now converging evidence that minority situations are most threatening to groups dealing with 
negative stereotypes.  Thus, although women and African-Americans do worse when outnumbered by White men, 
White men are unaffected when the situation is reversed (e.g. Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2000; Thompson & 
Sekaquaptewa, 2002).  Similarly, although businesswomen (Kanter, 1977) and policewomen (Ott, 1989) suffer as a 
result of being in the numerical inferiority, male nurses, librarians, and elementary school teachers, who are not 
stereotyped to be inferior, do not (Williams, 1992).   
 
Other Devaluing Environments 
 
Thus far we have focused on the environmental threats posed by the sex or race of fellow test-takers.  Equally 
threatening is the race or gender of classroom instructors (Marx & Roman, 2002).  For instance, upon noticing that 
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most of their high school’s math and science teachers are men, girls in a math class might wonder whether gender 
and science are intricately connected and ask if math and science are male-centered.  For these girls, this “male-
centeredness” may signal that their social identity has only marginal value and so may transform their class into a 
threatening environment (Steele, et al., 2002).  Marx and Roman tested this idea by examining whether a testing 
environment could become threatening by the mere presence of a male experimenter.  In their study, an 
experimenter, who was either a man or a woman, administered a difficult math test to individual male and female 
participants.  The presence of a competent male experimenter, it was hypothesized, would reinforce participants’ 
notion of math as falling under the dominion of men and lead to impaired performance for women.  On the other 
hand, the presence of a competent female experimenter would provide a counter-example to the stereotype about 
women’s alleged difficulties in math and protect women’s math performance.   Experimenter gender, then, can 
signal how much import is placed on women’s contributions and so can determine whether an environment is 
threatening and performance impugning.  Results confirmed predictions: Women did worse with a male 
experimenter than with a female one, whereas men were unaffected by experimenter gender.  A second study 
suggested that female experimenters were only effective in protecting women’s math performance to the extent that 
they were perceived as competent and intelligent in math.  It appears that a competent female experimenter—or 
instructor—sends the message that women can excel in domains in which they are negatively stereotyped, signals 
that women are clearly respected and esteemed in the setting, and disarms potentially threatening environments. 
One does not need to take a class with a male instructor or attend a mostly White college to find threatening 
environments.  One, in fact, need go no further than the living room for the pleasure of such an experience.  For 
those households that indulge in a heavy diet of television consumption, one’s own home can become threatening.  
A quick glance at the TV is all one needs to be inundated with images that reinforce racial, ethnic, and gender 
stereotypes.  It is no surprise, then, that compared to light viewers, heavy television viewers believe that women 
have less ability and interests, and fewer career options than men (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli, 1993).  
Watching TV—or reading magazines, listening to radio, surfing the Internet, etc.—can therefore foster threatening 
environments and impugn intellectual performance as a result.  Davies and his colleagues (2002) examined this idea 
in a study on the effects of television commercials on intellectual performance.  Men and women watched a set of 
either stereotypic commercials (e.g. a commercial portraying a woman “drooling” with anticipation to try a new 
brownie mix) or counter-stereotypic commercials (e.g. a women speaking intelligently about health care concerns) 
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and then took a difficult math test.  Before taking the test, but after watching the commercials, participants also 
completed a measure of stereotype activation.  Even though the stereotypic commercials made no reference to the 
alleged difference in math ability, results revealed that women who watched stereotypic commercials did worse on 
the math test than women who watched the counter-stereotypic commercials or than men more generally.  Men, in 
contrast, were unaffected by the type of commercial they had seen.  Furthermore, these test results were mediated by 
stereotype activation: The women who watched stereotypic commercials thought more about negative female 
stereotypes and did worse on the test as a consequence.  Threats to performance, therefore, can literally be broadcast 
in the air. 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTS CAN THREATEN ACADEMIC SELF-CONCEPT 
 
Watching a stereotypical TV commercial, being outnumbered, or being taught by a member of the dominant group 
are not the only ways that environments threaten stereotyped individuals; and decreased performance is not the only 
way threat can manifest itself.  Environments can also increase people’s suspicions that they are being evaluated on 
the social prejudices that others hold against their group (Crocker & Major, 1989), and in the long run, become 
detrimental to the development of accurate, realistic, and stable knowledge about one’s strengths and weaknesses 
(Aronson & Inzlicht, in press). 
 
Discounting Feedback 
 
Environments can increase people’s prejudice apprehension, which is the extent to which a person anxiously 
expects, readily perceives, and intensely reacts to rejection that may be due to discrimination (Mendoza-Denton, 
Downey, Purdie, Davis, & Pietrzak, 2002).  In a study by Inzlicht (2004), for instance, when Black participants were 
in three-person groups, they felt more apprehensive about being discriminated against the less their social group was 
represented in the group. In this study Black participants took a test as either one of one, two, or three Black 
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participants in a three-person group. After the test, they completed a measure of prejudice apprehension (see 
Mendoza-Denton, Page-Gould, Pietrzak, this volume). Results showed that participants were more likely to expect 
and be bothered by discrimination the more Whites there were in the room.  Thus, being outnumbered may enable 
suspicions of bias and discrimination, and lead people to be uncertain whether they are being devalued, 
marginalized, or discriminated against because of their social identity.   
In their landmark paper on stigma, Crocker and Major (1989) called this state of uncertainty “attributional 
ambiguity” and defined it as the doubt that people have about the causes of their performances and the feedback they 
receive.  For example, after failing a paper, a Black student may wonder whether she actually deserves the poor 
grade or discount it because she thinks her professor is racist.  Because there are multiple possible reasons as to why 
she got the grade she did, she can discount internal attributions and minimize self-blame (Kelley, 1973; Major, 
Quinton, & McKoy, 2002). 
Blaming one’s shortcomings on prejudice and discrimination can buffer people from many of the negative 
affective consequences of poor outcomes.  In one study, Crocker, Voekl, Testa, and Major (1991) had Black and 
White college students participate in a study on “friendship development” with a same-sex White partner.  
Participants completed a self-description that was ostensibly given to their partner and then received either positive 
or negative interpersonal feedback.  Half of the participants sat in a room with the blinds on a one-way mirror 
partially raised, whereas the blinds were down for the other half of the participants.  Being in a room with blinds 
raised, it was hypothesized, would increase the visibility of the participant, subtly communicate group membership, 
and so increase the possibility that Black participants would attribute their outcome to prejudice against their group.  
In contrast, being in a room with blinds down would make it impossible for the White partner to know the 
participant’s race and thus would minimize the possibility that Black participants would feel like they were targets 
of discrimination.  This is just what happened.  Among Black participants, attributions to discrimination were higher 
if they thought their partner could see them and know their race than if their race was unknown.    Furthermore, after 
getting negative feedback, they actually felt better about themselves—as reflected in self-esteem—if they could 
attribute the feedback to prejudice.  White participants, on the other hand, were not affected by their visibility.  
Environments that signal that people may be judged along the basis of their social identity—threatening 
environments—can increase prejudice apprehension and therefore lead people to discount feedback and so become 
unaffected by it. 
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Inaccurate and Unstable Self-Knowledge 
 
Although suspecting that the negative feedback one receives reflects prejudice and discrimination can protect self-
esteem, it may also have negative consequences for self-knowledge.  Specifically, it may also lead individuals to 
disregard potentially instructive feedback, which can rob them of opportunities to learn about themselves from 
valuable sources of information. The more frequently one discounts feedback or writes off test scores as invalid, the 
less one can learn about one’s underlying abilities. The uncertainty of attributionally ambiguous environments 
means that individuals belonging to stigmatized groups may have a difficult time developing a clear self-concept—
that is, a stable and accurate conception of one’s strengths and weaknesses (Major et al., 2002).   
Aronson and Inzlicht (in press) tested this idea in a series of correlational studies.  In their first study, Aronson 
and Inzlicht hypothesized that individuals who are high in prejudice apprehension would make assessments of their 
performances that are poorly “calibrated” with reality (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977).  That is, those individuals 
who anxiously expect and readily perceive discrimination should judge their abilities in a way that corresponds very 
little with their actual abilities; those who expect and perceive less bias should judge their abilities more accurately.  
Black participants who were high or low in prejudice apprehension and White participants took a test composed of 
ten verbal items and then indicated the probability that each of their answers was correct.  Results confirmed 
expectations.  Black participants who were prejudice apprehensive were overconfident and had estimates of their 
ability that were more miscalibrated with reality than either Blacks who did not expect prejudice or than Whites 
more generally.  Black students who have a history of discounting feedback, in other words, may not have the 
benefit of learning from feedback and thus remain overconfident and miscalibrated.  Being wary of discrimination, 
then, is associated with inaccurate academic self-knowledge. 
Another way to examine the self-knowledge hypothesis is to examine self-knowledge over time.  People who 
have unclear academic self-knowledge do not really know how good or bad their academic skills are and may 
experience temporally unstable self-knowledge as a result (Kernis, Cornell, Sun, Berry, & Harlow, 1993; Wright, 
2001).  Aronson and Inzlicht (in press) therefore conducted a second study where Black participants who were high 
or low in prejudice apprehension and White participants completed diary measures of academic self-efficacy twice 
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daily for two weeks.  Being apprehensive for prejudice, they suspected, would be related to impaired self-
knowledge, and along with it, unstable academic self-efficacy.  In other words, because they do not really know how 
skilled they are, prejudice apprehensive individuals should have highly variable feelings of self-efficacy, sometimes 
feeling confident and other times not.  In contrast, Black participants who are not prejudice apprehensive—or 
Whites more generally—should have feelings of self-efficacy that are more stable over time. 
This is exactly what happened: Black participants who were prejudice apprehensive experienced more ups and 
downs in their feelings of academic competence than any of the other participants.  Figure 2 shows, however, that 
apprehensive participants only experienced heightened instability in self-concepts related to stereotyped domains 
(i.e. academic performance).  They did not suffer instability in non-stereotyped domains, such as in athletic self-
efficacy.  
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FIG 2. Instability of self-efficacy as a function of group and domain. Higher values denote greater 
instability. Error bars represent standard error. 
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Combined, these two studies show that although sensitivity to discrimination can protect self-esteem, it can 
harm the development of accurate and stable self-knowledge, both of which may be vital components of intelligence 
and goal-setting (e.g., Gardner, 1999; Sternberg, 1996).  Further, given that minority environments can enable 
suspicions of bias and discrimination (Inzlicht, 2004), it follows that they may also allow people to discount 
negative feedback and so may threaten the accuracy and stability of self-knowledge as a result.  Future research will 
need to examine this possibility. 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTS CAN SEND EXCLUSIONARY MESSAGES 
 
Thus far, we have seen how threatening environments can affect people’s intellectual performance and, possibly, 
their academic self-knowledge.  They can also, however, increase people’s suspicions that they do not belong.  
Current research shows that environments that activate negative stereotypes can make people feel like outsiders and 
like their contributions do not matter.  This is especially so when these stereotypic messages are coupled with 
messages about the immutability and fixedness of intelligence (Good & Dweck, 2003a), which can spring forth from 
the individuals who hold positions of authority in the environments; for example, from teachers in classrooms (Good 
& Dweck, 2003b).  
 
Sense of Belonging 
 
Building on research by Dweck and her colleagues on implicit theories of intelligence (see Dweck, 1999 for a 
review), Good and Dweck (2003a) wondered whether academic environments that suggest that intelligence is fixed 
could constitute a double threat to individuals who must also contend with negative stereotypes about their abilities, 
and thus foster feelings of unease and rejection.  When a learning environment conveys the message of fixed 
intelligence, any failure within that environment is seen as a reflection of true ability, which makes stereotypes 
implying low ability more pejorative and more harmful to a feeling that one’s social identity is valued and respected.  
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Alternatively, contexts that portray skills as acquirable may create resiliency to the negative stereotype’s debilitating 
message and send inclusionary, as opposed to exclusionary, messages. If the environment portrays the view that 
skills can be acquired through effort over time, then the stereotype of lesser underlying ability may become less 
credible and, consequently, less threatening (cf. Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Linn, & Wan, 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 1998). 
Furthermore, academic contexts that focus on fixed ability could, like stereotypes, undermine students’ sense of 
belonging—their feelings that they are valued members of the academic community.  These environments may 
insinuate that only those with high ability will be seen as valued members whose presence and contributions matter. 
And any slip in achievement or performance may be taken to indicate that a student is in fact inherently lower in 
ability and consequently does not really belong to the academic community in which they are stereotyped.  On the 
other hand, environments that foster the belief that competencies can be developed over time through effort may 
create room for many more people to be valued members, perhaps because a secure sense of belonging may depend 
more upon one’s interest, commitment, and progress and less upon one’s perceived ability (c.f. Butler, 2000; Hong, 
et al, 1999). 
To test these hypotheses, Good and Dweck (2003a) conducted a longitudinal study of calculus students in 
which participants completed the Sense of Belonging to Math Scale at the beginning and end of the semester.  The 
questionnaires also included measures of students’ perceptions of whether their math classes sent messages of (a) 
fixed views of math ability and (b) gender stereotyping about math ability.  Results showed that at the beginning of 
the semester, the most important determinant of women’s sense of belonging to math was their prior math ability.  
Specifically, women with higher SAT scores reported a greater sense of belonging to math than did those with lower 
SAT scores.  Over time, however, prior ability played less of a role and the educational environment played a larger 
one.  By the end of the semester, women’s perceptions of both the amount of stereotyping in their environment and 
the extent to which the environment was focused on fixed ability each independently undermined their sense of 
belonging to math.  That is, female students with either of these perceptions felt less accepted, felt that others had 
lower expectations for them, felt a greater desire to fade into the woodwork, felt less trust of their learning 
environment, and had lower confidence in their abilities.  
Although perceptions of gender stereotyping and perceptions of a fixed-ability learning environment each 
independently lowered women’s sense of belonging to math, Figure 3 shows that together they interacted to 
constitute a double threat.  Women who perceived both a fixed-ability learning environment and high gender 
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stereotyping, not only had to contend with messages of fixed ability implied by the stereotype, but also messages of 
fixed ability fostered by the environment.  It was precisely these students who were most susceptible to a lowered 
sense of belonging to math, regardless of their prior ability.  Environments that portrayed skills as acquirable and 
expandable, however, created resiliency to the negative stereotypes’ debilitating message.  Learning environments 
that communicate that math ability is acquirable helped women maintain a sense of belonging to math even when 
they perceived their environment as highly gender-stereotypical.  Thus, by the end of the semester, the effect of 
gender stereotyping on sense of belonging was moderated by the types of messages the environment communicated 
about math intelligence—fixed-ability environments aggravated the effect and malleable-ability environments 
muted it. 
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Importantly, these results were based on women’s perceptions of their environment and not on an objective 
measure of whether that environment actually promoted gender stereotypes or communicated that math intelligence 
FIG 3. Sense of belonging to math as a function of perceptions of environmental stereotyping and 
fixedness. Error bars represent standard error. 
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is fixed.  The point here is that regardless of their actual environments, women’s subjective appraisals of those 
environments influenced their vulnerability to a decreased sense of belonging.  The good news is that changing 
people’s perceptions of their environment can be an effective tool to counter the effects of stereotype threat.  For 
example, it may be possible to buffer the effects of stereotypes on sense of belonging by having people perceive 
their environment in a more benign way, say, by seeing that it promotes a malleable view of math intelligence.  We 
examine this and other possibilities later in the chapter.  
 
How Environments Send Threatening Messages 
 
Whether an environment portrays the view that ability is fixed or malleable can determine whether it is seen as 
threatening or benign.  But, how exactly do they convey such messages?  One way to tackle this question is to look 
at the people who are in positions of authority in a given environment to see what types of messages they send.  In a 
classroom, for example, we might examine what teachers say and think about intelligence to see how it affects 
students’ perceptions of the environment. If teachers send the message that intelligence is malleable as opposed to 
fixed, perhaps this can create a safe environment where students reap the rewards conferred by a malleable theory.  
This possibility is currently being investigated (Good & Dweck, 2003b).  Preliminary results suggest that when a 
novel math lesson includes a discussion about the hard work and effort that go into mathematical discovery, students 
perceive the instructor and the environment as holding malleable views of math intelligence.  Alternatively, when 
the same novel math lesson includes statements about the genius of mathematical discovery, students perceive the 
environment as communicating a fixed view of math intelligence.   
In a second study (Good & Dweck, 2003b), college students were primed with either a fixed or malleable view of 
intelligence and then asked to take the perspective of a math teacher who was returning math exams to their students.  
Participants read a scenario about either a female or male math student and were asked to indicate how likely they 
would be to implement a variety of pedagogical practices for the student in question.  Preliminary results suggest that 
participants primed with the fixed view of intelligence had pronounced gender stereotyping that was expressed 
through their pedagogical practices.  Participants primed with the malleable view, in contrast, showed less gender 
stereotyping.  Fixed-ability participants, for example, were more likely to recommend that a student enroll in a gifted 
Threatening Environments     18 
 
math program and join a math club when the hypothetical student was male as opposed to female.  Participants 
primed with the malleable view, however, were just as likely to make these recommendations to males and females.  
These results underscore the subtle ways in which a teacher’s implicit theory of intelligence can direct the 
degree to which stereotyping is conveyed and so affect whether a classroom environment is seen as threatening or 
not.  In combination, both studies show that teachers holding a fixed view of intelligence not only communicate that 
ability is fixed but also that they have different expectations for males and females.  And as discussed earlier, 
holding gender stereotypes and a fixed view of intelligence forms a deadly combination by creating an environment 
that can affect motivational states—such as a decreased sense of belonging—and perhaps even performance (Good 
& Dweck, 2003a).  There is, however, a silver lining to all of this: Given that malleable-intelligence environments 
can buffer people from threats posed by negative stereotypes, it follows that instructors who teach this malleable 
view can foster an accepting and inclusionary learning environment and thus, reduce students’ vulnerability to 
stereotype threat.  This possibility is currently being investigated (Good & Dweck, 2003b). 
  
 
OVERCOMING THREATENING ENVIRONMENTS 
 
In this chapter, we’ve spent most of our time—perhaps even too much time (Seligman, 2002)—discussing how 
environments can hurt, threaten, and impede.  For example, we have discussed how minority environments can 
evoke stereotype threat, how perceiving a fixed-ability learning environment can hurt feelings of belonging, and 
how being stereotype vulnerable—or possibly being in an environment that fosters stereotype vulnerability—can 
threaten self-knowledge.  But what can we do to help people overcome these threats?  How can we neutralize threats 
present in the environment? 
 
Learning about the Malleability of Intelligence 
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One possibility, which builds upon Carol Dweck’s work on implicit theories of intelligence (see Dweck, 1999), is to 
create environments where people are encouraged to view intelligence as a malleable quantity.  A number of studies 
have addressed this possibility.  In one study, for example, Aronson, Fried, and Good (2002) conducted an 
intervention in which college students were encouraged to adopt a malleable mindset about intelligence.  In this 
study, both African-American and White participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups. The first 
group received training in order to view intelligence as something that can grow and increase with effort—the 
malleable view.  To foster this view, they watched a film illustrating that the brain forms new connections and 
literally changes whenever you learn something new.  Furthermore, they participated in a pen-pal program in which 
they wrote a letter to a struggling junior high school student and emphasized in their letters the idea that intelligence 
is expandable and increases with mental work.  In the control groups, participants either received no treatment or a 
treatment about the many forms of ability.  At the end of the semester, the group receiving the malleable 
intervention reported greater enjoyment of their academic work and greater valuing of academics in general. In 
addition, this group showed a clear gain in grade point average over the other groups.  Although these gains were 
apparent for all students in the study (both Whites and African-Americans) the gains were largest for the African-
American students.  
In a second study, Good, Aronson, & Inzlicht (2003) designed a similar intervention to investigate whether 
teaching junior high students about the malleable nature of intelligence could be used to reduce their vulnerability 
to stereotype threat and increase their standardized test performance.  Specifically, boys and girls in the seventh 
grade of a low-income, predominantly Hispanic school participated in a year-long intervention where they were 
mentored by college students who taught them either that intelligence is expandable (experimental group) or about 
the perils of drug use (control group). At the year’s end, the two groups’ math and reading performance on a state-
wide standardized achievement test was compared. Results indicated that the students in the malleable group 
received higher standardized test scores in both math and reading than students in the control group. Although the 
malleable intelligence manipulation helped all students, it was particularly beneficial for the stigmatized 
students—the Hispanic students in reading and the females in math. For example, in the malleable condition, the 
gender gap in math, evident in the control group, disappeared. These two studies therefore provide good evidence 
that interventions directed at students’ key motivation-relevant beliefs could pay off by boosting intellectual 
performance. 
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Other Interventions 
 
There are, of course, other remedies to the effects of threatening environments.  Steele et al., (1997), for example, 
designed a “wise” schooling intervention for first-year students at the University of Michigan.  Using mixed-race 
groups, students were “honorifically” recruited to the program by emphasizing that they had survived a very 
competitive admission process at the school, and that the University recognized their strong potential and had high 
expectations for them—all things that signal the insignificance of negative group stereotypes.  Once in the 
program, students were reminded of these high expectations and challenged with weekly workshops on advanced 
material that went beyond material presented in most freshman classes.  Several years of the program demonstrate 
that such practices can substantially increase the school performance of African-Americans.  Uri Treisman's 
Emerging Scholars Program is another possible remedy.  In this program, underrepresented groups in 
mathematics, such as females, attend math workshops (in addition to their regular math lectures) that specifically 
redress some of the factors that make math threatening.  The Emerging Scholars Program fosters an environment 
where students feel safe to explore new and unfamiliar ideas in math, the results of which are increases in 
performance and retention for women and other underrepresented populations (see College Board, 2001, for a 
review).  Other things teachers can do include reducing the apparent diagnosticity of tests (Steele & Aronson, 
1995) and increasing the number of minority teachers and role models (Marx & Roman, 2002; see Aronson, 2002, 
for a review). 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Social psychological research shows us that our environments can be threatening.  They can remind us of our social 
identities, activate negative stereotypes, and otherwise communicate that our groups are marginalized, devalued, and 
not accepted.  When this happens people must cope with these pejorative messages, and the skill with which this is 
done can influence a number of important outcomes, including academic and intellectual performance, feelings of 
trust and belonging, and the accuracy and stability of self-knowledge.  The good news that we hope has come 
Threatening Environments     21 
 
through in this chapter is that the effects of threatening environments can be mitigated and that there is much that 
educators and policy makers can do to help.  Once this is done, “counting” one’s social identity—as Arthur Ashe 
did—will no longer have the same negative repercussions. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. Researchers have used the terms “token”, “solo-status, and “minority environment” somewhat 
interchangeably to denote being outnumbered in an environment.  Although similar, these terms have 
different meanings.  Kanter defined (1977) the term “token” to denote individuals who belong to sub-
groups that comprise less than 15% of the super-ordinate group.  Furthermore, this term implies that one is 
chosen out of some symbolic gesture.  “Solo-status” implies that one is the only member of one’s group.  
Finally, the term “minority” is often used to describe any non-dominant racial or ethnic group; in its 
strictest sense, however, the terms “minority” or “minority environment” denote numerical inferiority and 
are the terms we prefer. 
2. This chapter was written in part by the support of a SPSSI Grants-In-Aid Award to Michael Inzlicht and an 
NSF grant to Catherine Good. We thank Josh Aronson, Carol Dweck, Talia Ben-Zeev, Steve Fein, Linda 
McKay, and Naomi Sarah Ball for valuable insights.  We also acknowledge support from New York 
University’s Center for Research on Culture, Development and Education. Correspondence concerning this 
chapter should be addressed to Michael Inzlicht, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University, 
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3C5, Canada (E-mail: minzlicht@wlu.ca). 
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“Ask yourself,” Gordon Allport invited readers of his 1954 classic The Nature of Prejudice to consider, “what would 
happen to your personality if you heard it said over and over again that you were lazy… and had inferior blood (p. 
138).” Although the study of prejudice and discrimination has historically been dominated by research from the 
perspective of the perpetrator (Oyserman & Swim, 2001), the past fifteen years in particular have witnessed an 
explosion of research that yields initial answers to Allport’s question.  Collectively, this research suggests that the 
effects of stigma on adjustment and adaptation are varied, and depend on the stigmatized characteristic, the context 
surrounding the stigma, and the coping mechanisms marshaled in response to stigmatization (Puhl & Brownell, 
2003). Consistent with stress and coping frameworks for understanding sigma (see Major, this volume; Swim & 
Thomas, this volume), the chapters in this volume illustrate well the heterogeneity and contextual specificity of 
targets’ responses to stigma. Given that the experience of stigmatization can vary widely, any one coping 
mechanism is not a panacea for all groups—or all individuals within groups.   
In this chapter, we review a growing body of research documenting the development and consequences of 
status-based rejection expectations. Rejection plays a central role in the experience of stigmatization (Miller and 
Kaiser, 2001; Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Root, 1992) and characterizes an important aspect of threat-
related dynamics that include stereotype threat (Aronson, 2002; Steele, 1997), stigma consciousness (Pinel, 1999; 
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2002), and race-based rejection sensitivity (Mendoza-Denton, Downey, Purdie, Davis, and Pietrzak, 2002; Pietrzak, 
Mendoza-Denton, & Downey, 2004). First, we review the conditions surrounding, and consequences that follow 
from, expectations of status-based rejection. Although such expectations can arise from situational pressures alone 
(see Inzlicht & Good, this volume), evidence also suggests that in certain situations, some people are more likely 
than others to experience threat or apprehension on the basis of status characteristics (Brown & Pinel, 2003; 
Mendoza-Denton et al., 2002). Further, not everybody who fears and expects rejection experiences similar outcomes 
(Ayduk, Mendoza-Denton, Mischel, Downey, Peake, & Rodriguez, 2000; Freitas & Downey, 1998). We argue here 
that variability in outcomes related to status-based rejection expectations is dependent on individual cognitions and 
affects that constitute peoples’ coping mechanisms in the face of such rejection.  
The latter half of this chapter explores these coping mechanisms at three levels: the intrapersonal, the 
interpersonal, and the institutional or structural. At the intrapersonal level, we review burgeoning research on 
personal strengths that individuals can marshal to cope with rejection expectations. These include (among many 
others) beliefs about the malleability of intelligence (Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002), ethnic identity (Pietrzak et al., 
2004), and proactive social activism for positive social change (see Deaux & Ethier, 1998). At the interpersonal 
level, we focus on the effect of cross-race relationships (McLaughlin-Volpe, Mendoza-Denton, and Shelton, in 
press; see also McLaughlin-Volpe, this volume) and on the quality of mentoring relationships (Cohen, Steele, & 
Ross, 1999). Finally, we turn to mechanisms at the structural or institutional level; namely, those procedures and 
steps institutions can take to gain the trust of individuals historically marginalized by the institution.  
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE COGNITIVE-AFFECTIVE  
PROCESSING SYSTEM 
 
Although research on the effects of stigma on adjustment and well-being have traditionally focused on between-
group differences, more recently researchers have investigated within-group variability in outcomes as well (Major, 
this volume; Major, Quinton, McCoy, & Schmader, 2000). Consistent with this view, our own analysis is framed 
within Mischel & Shoda’s (1995; 1999) Cognitive-Affective Processing System (CAPS) framework. From the 
CAPS perspective, a person’s characteristic responses are mediated by his or her unique network of cognitive-
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affective units (CAUs) —construals, expectations/beliefs, affects, and goals—activated in particular situations. The 
organization of these CAUs (the network), which reflects the social-cognitive history of the individual (Shoda & 
Mischel, 1998), guides and constrains the activation of cognitions, affects, and potential behaviors while an 
individual processes situational features.  Our analysis of coping mechanisms is framed within this broad 
framework, such that a person’s behavioral responses are influenced not only by the activation of race-based 
rejection expectations, but also by a host of other mechanisms in the network. These mechanisms can reflect 
individual differences (e.g., ethnic identity) as well as environmental influences (e.g., outgroup friendships).   
Culturally specific CAPS dynamics. As the individual grows, learns, and gains life experience, an increasingly 
rich and complex network of CAUs develops.  Some CAUs are acquired through the unique experience of the 
individual, while others are shared among members of cultural groups (Mendoza-Denton, Shoda, Ayduk, & 
Mischel, 1999). Other CAU’s can come to be shared as a result of having similar experiences specific to one’s 
cultural group—as when, for example, a shared group characteristic (e.g, skin color) makes a group significantly 
more likely to experience negative treatment, discrimination, or stigmatization.  
A central emphasis of CAPS theory is that the effect of context and situations is mediated by the individual’s 
cognitions and affects, activated in specific situations. As such, we emphasize that people are not the passive 
recipients of contexts and situations, bur are active participants in the construction and management of their 
environment (Kelly, 1955). In sum, we frame our analysis of the effect of stigma on the individual within a 
constructivist, person X situation framework, rather than viewing the phenomenon as being caused by either 
situational causes or dispositional causes alone. In this view, the question posed at the beginning of this chapter is 
not an invitation to an analysis of immutable dispositions or characteristics, but rather to an understanding of the 
psychological process that represents a person’s coping repertoire in response to a particular challenge—the 
challenge of being a target of stereotypes and prejudice. 
 
 
EXPERIENCING STEREOTYPES AND PREJUDICE: A COPING CHALLENGE 
 
Returning to the question Allport posed half a century ago: what happens to a person when one is told over and over 
that one is lazy and is of inferior blood? Historically, psychologists have understandably been reluctant to answer 
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this question in characterological terms, preferring instead to analyze outcomes related to stigma in terms of 
situational pressures (Major et al., 2000). Research on stereotype threat (Aronson, 2002; Steele, 1997) is one such 
example. In the classic demonstration of the stereotype threat phenomenon, Steele & Aronson (1995) presented 
African American students with questions similar to those found in standardized achievement tests. A simple yet 
powerful experimental manipulation was introduced: in one condition, students were told that the researchers were 
interested in measuring their verbal ability, and were thus being tested with items diagnostic of their ability. In the 
other condition, the students were told that the (same) questions were being used to understand the psychological 
processes associated with problem solving, but that the researchers would not be evaluating the participants’ ability. 
The former condition framed the experimental test questions similarly to the achievement tests widely used in 
America’s educational system. The latter condition framed the test questions with the intention of lifting the 
students’ concerns that their ability was under suspicion or scrutiny as members of a negatively stereotyped group. 
As hypothesized, the White students performed comparably regardless of experimental condition. The African 
American students, however, underperformed relative to White students in the “ability-diagnostic” condition but 
performed just as well as the White students in the “non-diagnostic” condition. In other words, African American 
participants’ performance on the same set of questions was significantly affected by a small-- but psychologically 
critical-- framing of the test. Other studies have shown that stereotype-relevant intrusive ideation and concerns about 
fulfilling the stereotype (Steele & Aronson, 1995), and the cognitive busyness that results (Croizet & Despres, 
2003), help explain this underperformance effect. To the degree that schooling in general, and standardized testing 
in particular, emphasize the diagnosis of ability as a gateway for tracking, college admissions, and other future 
opportunities, the implications of stereotype threat in relation to minority student achievement are profound.  
Research on stereotype threat provides compelling evidence that even small changes in the framing of a testing 
situation can have significant effects on the performance of minority students in the classroom (see also Inzlicht & 
Good, this volume). This research has had wide impact, in part, because it provides a testable psychological account 
of the contextual and societal forces that can account for the Black-White academic achievement gap (College 
Board, 1999), and provides a powerful, experimentally-validated alternative to biological explanations for 
achievement differences between groups (e.g., Herrnstein & Murray, 1994).  
Race-based rejection expectations. Within social psychology, a distinction has been made between stereotypes, 
the cognitively-based belief systems associated with particular groups, and prejudice, the affectively-based attitudes 
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that people hold against other groups (e.g., Franzoi, 1996). Independent of negative stereotypes and their influence 
on their targets, another critical dimension of the experience of being stigmatized is the affectively charged, general 
dislike held and expressed towards members of one’s group by outgroup members—in other words, the problem of 
prejudice.  
But if not through stereotype threat, how can one quantify and psychologically assess the impact of prejudice on 
its targets? Recent research on African American students’ apprehensive anticipation of prejudice (Mendoza-Denton 
et al., 2002) yields some insight into this issue. According to Mendoza-Denton and colleagues, direct or vicarious 
experiences of exclusion, discrimination, and prejudice can lead people to anxiously anticipate that they will be 
similarly treated in new contexts where the possibility of such treatment exists. These expectations are activated in 
intergroup situations where race-base rejection is possible, leading people to perceive discrimination more readily 
and to react to such race-based rejection more intensely. Mendoza-Denton and colleagues refer to this processing 
dynamic (expectations, perceptions, intense reactions) as race-based rejection sensitivity (RS-race). This process has 
also been referred to as prejudice apprehension to reflect the notion that individuals can develop expectations about 
others’ prejudice and discrimination unmediated by their fears about confirming stereotypes (Mendoza-Denton & 
Aronson, in press).  
Evidence from other lines of research is consistent with the notion that anxious expectations of status-based 
rejection can have a detrimental effect on academic outcomes. Independent of psychiatric symptoms, expectations of 
status-based rejection among those labeled mentally ill have been found to undermine well-being and social 
functioning (Link, Cullen, Frank & Wozniak, 1987). Similarly, individual differences in stigma consciousness have 
been related to women’s avoidance of situations where gender stigmatization is possible (Pinel, 1999), and to 
disruptive social interactions with outgroup members (Pinel, 2002). Broader constructs such as intergroup anxiety 
(Stephan & Stephan, 2000) and cultural mistrust (Terrell & Terrell, 1981), which are also characterized by 
anticipatory anxiety in relation to intergroup contact, have been related to wariness in anticipation of interaction and 
avoidance of intergroup contexts. 
Testing the links of the RS-race dynamic. To operationalize the construct for African Americans, Mendoza-
Denton et al. (2002) first developed and validated the RS-race Questionnaire, a measure that assesses anxious 
expectations of rejection in situations where race-based rejection is both applicable and personally salient (Higgins, 
1996) for African Americans (e.g., a roadblock where police are randomly pulling people over). African Americans 
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scored higher overall on the measure than Asian Americans or Whites, although, as expected, there was substantial 
within-group variability among African Americans. Consistent with the model, individual differences in anxious 
expectations of race-based rejection were related to a higher frequency of perceiving racial discrimination and 
prejudice in a series of cross-sectional and longitudinal studies. Also consistent with the model, students high in RS-
race reported greater levels of rejection and alienation following a negative race-related experience than those who 
were low in RS-race. Together, these results lend empirical support to the conceptualization of RS-race as a 
cognitive-affective processing dynamic (Mischel & Shoda, 1995) to anxiously expect, readily perceive, and 
intensely react to race-based rejection. 
RS-race and the transition to college. Having established a valid and reliable measure of RS-race, the 
researchers then addressed the questions of central concern to their research program: Do individual differences in 
RS-race help explain why some African American students view their college experience as alienating and 
undermining whereas others do not? In particular, does RS-race influence African American students’ initial college 
experiences in ways that have long-lasting implications? The researchers reasoned that pre-existing fears about race-
based rejection might play a formative role in students’ overall college experience by influencing the quality of the 
relationships they form with professors and peers and the sense of belonging they feel during the first weeks of 
college.   
To examine these questions, RS-race was assessed prior to the beginning of classes in two cohorts of incoming 
African American students at the university. Participants then completed a structured daily diary for the first three 
weeks of classes. Controlling for interpersonal rejection sensitivity, African American students pre-identified as 
anxiously expectant of race-based rejection experienced a heightened sense of alienation on the typical day of the 
diary period. They also felt less welcome at their new university, had greater difficulties with their roommates, and 
formed a less positive view of their professors than their low RS-race counterparts.  
Consistent with the model’s predictions, students high in RS-race felt less trust and obligation towards the 
university at the end of their first year in college. As sophomores and juniors, they also reported decreased 
attendance at academic review sessions, as well as increased anxiety about approaching professors and TA’s with 
academic problems. RS-race was predictive of participants’ change in GPA over the first five semesters of college, 
such that students high in RS-race were particularly likely to experience a decrease in their grades over time. 
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Impact on intergroup relations. Mendoza-Denton et al. (2002) also tracked the development of participants’ 
social relationships during the transition to college in relation to RS-race. At the end of their first year of college, 
participants were asked to report on the number, age, and race of new friends they made in college. Students high on 
RS-race reported having fewer White friends at the end of their first year in college than their counterparts low in 
RS-race. These results also held when controlling for number of Black friends and sensitivity to rejection based on 
personal characteristics (Downey & Feldman, 1996). Demonstrating the specificity of the construct as a dynamic 
that motivates people to avoid those who are more likely to reject them on the basis of race, but not necessarily to 
approach other ethnic minority ingroup members, RS-race was unrelated to the number of ingroup friends that 
participants reported. This is important because it distinguishes RS-race from a more generalized social anxiety or 
tendency to avoid social contact (see also Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002).  
 
 
MECHANISMS FOR COPING 
 
As previously noted, not everyone who develops or has anxious expectations is necessarily doomed to negative 
adjustment or poor intergroup outcomes. As the CAPS model reminds us, anxious expectations are only one aspect 
of a person’s CAPS network, and interact with other CAUs in the system (Ayduk et al., 2000). We refer here to 
psychological mechanisms that facilitate coping by allowing people to flexibly encode, transform, and interpret 
stimuli and events as operating at the intrapersonal level. 
Below, we review in some detail recent research shedding light on the interactive effects of ethnic identity and 
race-based rejection sensitivity on institutional identity as one example of coping at the intrapersonal level. We also 
discuss social activism as an example of a proactive coping mechanism. Although its effects are interpersonal, we 
place social activism as an intrapersonal coping response to emphasize its cognitive and affective benefits for the 
individual. Another example of a coping mechanism at this level, reviewed in more detail by Inzlicht and Good (this 
volume), is holding a belief in the malleability of intelligence in the face of stereotype threat (Aronson et al., 2002; 
Good, Aronson, & Inzlicht, 2003). 
Given the inherently interactive nature of the CAPS system, whereby a person’s stable CAUs are not only 
activated by specific situations but also developed and maintained by one’s social cognitive learning past and 
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current history, mechanisms at two other levels (at least) are also possible, and explored here: the interpersonal and 
the institutional. At the interpersonal level, we describe how positive intergroup contact can have a significant 
impact on the outcomes associated with race-based rejection expectations (see also Tropp, this volume, and 
McLaughlin-Volpe, this volume). We describe an ongoing research program suggesting that cross-race friendships 
may foster positive academic outcomes, particularly among those who expect rejection the most. At the structural or 
institutional level, certain practices or structures set up by the institution are also reviewed.  
 
Intrapersonal level 
 
Ethnic identity. In recent work, Pietrzak et al. (2004) have examined the interactive effects of ethnic identity and RS-
race for institutional affiliation and well being within the college setting. Our interest in ethnic identity stemmed in 
part from our observation that research on the effects of ethnic identity on adjustment outcomes has yielded 
somewhat contradictory results, sometimes associated with positive outcomes and sometimes with negative 
outcomes. As such, we proposed status-based rejection expectations might help account for some of the variation in 
these findings.  
Several researchers (e.g., Ogbu, 1991, 1994; Parham, 1989) have argued that ethnic and institutional identities 
are associated with conflicting values for minority students. Whereas identifying with one’s ethnic group involves 
taking pride in and having respect for the customs and history of one’s ethnic group, identifying with the university 
may mean implicitly turning a blind eye towards a history of discrimination and exclusion of one’s ethnic group by 
the university and its representatives. Accordingly, ethnic identity within the context of a predominantly White 
institution has been linked to reduced identification with the institution (Ogbu, 1994; Phinney, Horenczyk, Liebkind, 
& Vedder, 2001), as well as with greater perceptions of discrimination within the institution (Operario & Fiske, 
2001). In a related vein, McCoy and Major (2003) found that individuals highly identified with a particular ingroup 
were more prone to negative emotions following events perceived as discriminatory. In sum, research from this 
avenue suggests that ethnic identity stands in opposition to the development of an institutional identity, and as such 
could contribute to negative intergroup relations and to a greater sense of alienation from the institution (see 
Sidanius & Petrocik, 2001, for a broader discussion of the negotiation of superordinate and ethnic identities).  
Coping with status-based rejection expectations     9 
At the same time, a number of studies have linked identification with an ethnic or minority group to positive 
outcomes, including high self-esteem (Phinney, 1992; Roberts, Phinney, Masse, Chen, Roberts, & Romero, 1999; 
Wright, 1985), academic persistence and efficacy (Bennett & Okinaka, 1990; Jo, 1999; Oyserman, Harrison, & 
Bybee, 2001), and general well-being (Contrada et al., 2001; Cross, Parham, & Helms, 1991; Roberts et al., 1999). 
This research, though not related to institutional identification specifically, nevertheless suggests that ethnic identity 
may not always be in conflict with institutional values and identity.  
Pietrzak and colleagues hypothesized that the effects of ethnic identity on institutional belonging should be 
different depending on whether a person expects to be rejected on the basis of their race. In other words, one’s 
ethnic identity should be in conflict with one’s institutional identity only when one expects that the institution and its 
members are likely to reject and devalue one’s ethnicity. In the absence of anxious rejection expectations, however, 
the researchers hypothesized that ethnic and institutional identity should be orthogonal: given that the outgroup is 
less likely to be seen as a devaluator, a person may be able feel a sense of pride and belonging both as a member of 
the institution and as a member of one’s ethnic group without experiencing dissonance.  
Three studies were conducted to test these hypotheses—one correlational, one longitudinal, and one 
experimental (in which participants’ ethnic identity was experimentally manipulated). Across all three studies, the 
hypothesized pattern emerged. Among individuals low on RS-race, no relationship (and in one study, even a positive 
relationship) was found between the two identities. Among participants high in RS-race, however, the greater one’s 
ethnic identity, the lower one’s institutional identity. This pattern of results suggests that when a person is concerned 
about being devalued on the basis of their race, identity may indeed become a salient feature of social interaction 
(Ethier and Deaux, 1994), and ethnic identity may be developed in oppositional terms to the university as a 
protective identity (Parham, 1989).  
Of note is the finding that among those individuals high in RS-race, there was also a negative relationship 
between ethnic identity and reports of somatic symptoms (headaches, stomachaches) following negative racial 
incidents. In other words, ethnic identity seemed to serve as a source of strength for individuals high in RS-race, 
taking some of the sting out of negative race-related incidents. Individuals high in RS-race but low in ethnic identity, 
on the other hand, reported greater institutional identity, but also greater vulnerability to somatic symptoms in the 
face of discrimination. In the face of RS-race, people who do not feel close to their ethnic group may in fact embrace 
their institutional identity even more, leaving them vulnerable to the pain of rejection. These findings illustrate well 
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the notion that coping mechanisms often function as a system of tradeoffs, rather than as purely beneficial (see also 
Miller, this volume). 
Participation in social activism. Another way of coping with RS-race in particular, and expectations of status-
based rejection more generally, may be to engage in collective social action to combat discrimination. Numerous 
researchers have posited a link between stigmatized social status and participation in social movements (Duncan, 
1999; Gamson, 1992; Luhtanen, 1996; Puhl & Brownell, 2003; Zurcher & Snow, 1981), particularly in the face of 
immutable stigmas (Deaux & Ethier, 1998). Participation in social action or movements provides a proactive coping 
mechanism for counteracting discriminatory attitudes (Siegal, Lune, & Meyer, 1998), increasing one’s social 
connections (Puhl & Brownell, 2003), validating one’s experiences of stigmatization (Gamson, 1992), and 
enhancing group consciousness (Duncan, 1999).  
There is some suggestive data to support the notion of a link between status-based rejection expectations and 
social action. Bowen & Bok (1998) found that African American students who attended historically White 
universities were much more likely to participate in social activism and be involved in their community years later 
than their White counterparts. Looking only at African Americans, advanced degree holders tended to be more 
involved in the community. This suggests that people exposed to decreasingly diverse institutions in the journey 
through higher education were increasingly motivated to take social action. In the words of one participant: 
 
“What we found when we got there—when we got all the way up the ladder—is that there isn’t a lot of 
difference. People still see you first of all as black. Because you get that rude awakening, I think you end up 
feeling that you better hold on to those things that you knew before. And some part of that is what leads us 
back, to make sure that we keep roots in the community and keep this thing going. Like the people who 
helped us (quoted in Bowen and Bok, 1998, p. 172).” 
 
In another study, Kaplan & Liu (2001) followed a group of over 4,000 adolescents through three decades, and 
found that those adolescents who reported feeling stigmatized or rejected were most likely to be involved in social 
movements in their thirties. Kaplan and Liu found this relationship to be moderated by both self-efficacy with regard 
to social change and by the presence of others also engaged in social action. Although the authors did not 
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differentiate between rejection based on personal vs. status characteristics, it nevertheless suggests a relationship 
between social action and the broader construct of rejection.  
In sum, expectations of race-based rejection may spur people towards social action by making the pervasiveness 
of discrimination – and thus the need for action—more salient. A promising avenue for new research is to draw a 
more explicit link between prior experiences of stigmatization, future expectations of stigma-based rejection, and 
social action. Coping through social action provides one example of how people are active participants in the 
construction and management of their social environment in the face of stigma (Kelly, 1955; see also Deaux and 
Ethier, 1998)—and how their coping strategies can have important positive ramifications.  
 
Interpersonal level 
 
One of the basic premises of the RS-race model, and of CAPS theory more generally, is that expectations of race-
based rejection develop out of prior experiences of discrimination (either direct or vicarious) with outgroup 
members. Therefore, it makes sense that positive intergroup contact may have a beneficial effect on race-based 
rejection expectations by providing disconfirming evidence with regard to such expectations. Positive intergroup 
contact may help prevent the generalization of rejection expectations to all outgroup members. In recent research, 
our lab has been focusing specifically on the impact of cross-race friendships on minority students’ academic 
adjustment and intergroup relations. Although even relatively superficial intergroup contact has been found to be 
generally beneficial for reducing prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000), the effects of this type of contact are 
substantially weaker for low-status relative to high-status groups (Tropp, this volume). We propose that clear, 
unambiguous signs of relational positivity may be necessary to witness the positive effects of intergroup contact for 
stigmatized group members, and in particular for those who have anxious expectations of rejection. Because 
ambiguous cues are more likely to confirm a person’s rejection schema, repeated gestures of closeness—such as 
those expressed in burgeoning friendships-- may help to attenuate expectations of stigma-based rejection.  
Cross-group friendships. Although establishing a cross-group friendship may be difficult and needs to 
overcome substantial barriers of anxiety and suspicion (Ickes, 1984; Frable, Blackstone and Scherbaum, 1990; 
Stephan & Stephan, 2000), research suggests that its benefits may be substantial. Notably, in Pettigrew and Tropp’s 
(2000) meta-analysis of intergroup contact, the relationship between contact and prejudice was clearly strongest in 
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studies examining intergroup friendship. Similarly, a recent study by McLaughlin-Volpe (this volume) concludes 
that the effect of intergroup contact on prejudice is not contingent on amount of interaction per se, but rather on how 
much those interactions lead to closeness between members of different groups, or inclusion of the outgroup other in 
the self (see Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). In a powerful demonstration of the strength of the effects of contact on 
prejudice, Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp (1997) found that the mere knowledge of an ingroup 
member’s cross-race friendship fostered positive intergroup affect—termed the extended contact effect. 
As Mary McPherson, president of Bryn Mawr college, noted in The Shape of the River (Bowen and Bok, 1998): 
“Since students have only a limited amount of time and emotional energy, those able to concentrate on their 
academic tasks, without constant concern about their place on the campus and their relationships to others, are most 
likely to do well academically” (p.82). While ingroup friends provide “safe havens” where low-status group 
members do not have to be “on guard” (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998), outgroup friendships may actively help 
change beliefs about one’s acceptance by the majority group and one’s belonging within the institution. Through 
repeated exposure to a non-discriminatory outgroup member, students high in RS-race may begin to see more 
heterogeneous possibilities for treatment by outgroup members, including professors and institutional policy makers. 
To test the above ideas, Mendoza-Denton & Page-Gould (2002) examined the moderating effect of White 
friends on the relationship between RS-race and adjustment outcomes among the participants of the same 
longitudinal study described in Mendoza-Denton et al. (2002). To increase our confidence in the causal nature of the 
effects being investigated, we took advantage of three different stages of data collection. Specifically, a number of 
longitudinal outcomes collected 3-4 years after the beginning of the study were analyzed as functions of RS-race and 
cross-race friendships, both measured at least one year earlier. The analyses controlled for participants’ scores on the 
outcome measures at the end of their freshman year of college, thus allowing us to look at the predictive power of 
our independent variables (RS-race, cross race friends) on change in our dependent variables. The dependent 
measures examined were anxiety about speaking with peers about academic problems and satisfaction with the 
university. The overall pattern of results suggests that having outgroup friends serves a positive, beneficial function 
for students high in RS-race. Controlling for RS-personal, self-esteem, and ethnic identity, we found that students 
high in RS-race who had few outgroup friends reported the highest anxiety about sharing academic problems, and 
the greatest dissatisfaction with the university. Given the longitudinal nature of the design, and the fact that we 
controlled for students’ initial scores on the dependent variables, these findings are supportive of the idea that there 
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may be a causal effect of number of outgroup friends on the relationship between RS-race and subsequent feelings 
of satisfaction within the institution. In current research, we are attempting to replicate these findings by 
manipulating friendship (see Aron, Melinat, Aron, & Vallone, 1997), responding in part to a call for experimental 
research to establish a causal link between cross-race friendship and positive outcomes (Pettigrew, 1997; Levin, Van 
Laar, & Sidanius, 2003). 
Mentoring relationships. In addition to cross-race friendships, a second type of interpersonal relationship that 
can help one cope with status-based rejection expectations on the college campus is the mentoring relationship. For 
example, Cohen et al. (1999) have shown the influence of different types of mentoring feedback on minority 
students’ motivation and impressions of bias. Although there is often a premium placed on emotion-free critical 
analysis in our culture (Cosmides, Tooby, & Barkow, 1992), Cohen and colleagues’ research suggests that when it 
comes to mentoring across the racial divide, minority students’ discomfort and apprehension must be actively 
addressed.  
In their study, Cohen and colleagues invited African American and White university students to write an essay 
for possible publication in a university magazine. All students were given feedback on their essay one week later, 
and were led to believe that a White university professor (the purported editor of the magazine) was the one who 
provided the feedback. Unbeknownst to the students, the experimenters manipulated the way in which the feedback 
was given. Participants received one of three different feedback types: 1) “criticism only” - students received critical 
feedback on their essay in the form of red markings along the margins (e.g., “unclear”, “awkward”), two 
checkmarks for good points, plus specific suggestions; 2) “criticism plus high standards” - students received critical 
feedback, but the professor also wrote “remember, I wouldn't go through the trouble of giving you this feedback if I 
weren't committed to the quality of this journal- I want to uphold the highest standards for what I consider a suitable 
entry;” and, 3) “criticism plus high standards plus assurance” - the professor provided similarly critical feedback but 
additionally wrote: “Remember, I wouldn't go through the trouble of giving you this feedback if I didn't think, based 
on what I've read in your letter, that you are capable of meeting the higher standard I mentioned." 
The results from this study clearly showed that African American students’ motivation to revise the essay, 
based on the professor’s feedback, was the greatest in the “wise” criticism condition—that is, criticism + high 
standards + assurance. By contrast, the “criticism only” condition led to the lowest task motivation, identification 
with the writing task, and the greatest ratings of perceived bias (for most of these dependent variables, “criticism 
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plus high standards” fell between the two other conditions). These results suggest that there may be negative 
motivational consequences, particularly for African American students, in the face of pointed, unmitigated criticism. 
Such negative effects were not observed among the White students, who were less sensitive to the experimental 
manipulations. Consistent with the arguments presented here, those students most likely to have doubts about their 
professors’ attitudes towards them benefited the most from the “wise” feedback, implying professors may be able to 
motivate students who are concerned about being treated negatively on the basis of race by framing critical feedback 
in a constructive and supportive manner. 
 
Institutional level 
 
Mechanisms at the institutional level can also have a significant impact on the outcomes associated with race-based 
rejection expectations. Academic abilities are nurtured and developed through pedagogical, social, and institutional 
supports—a type of developmental “scaffolding” around and within which students can grow and find support 
(Gordon & Bridglall, 2003). The above research suggests that beyond the achievement of numerical diversity, 
educators—and the institutions that they represent—must work towards the achievement of relational diversity 
(Fine, Weis, & Powell, 1997). By relational diversity, we mean a type of diversity where institutions are not merely 
filling numerical quotas, but are instead actively working to secure the trust and confidence of all students. As 
research on RS-race shows, concerns about one’s belonging can directly impact one’s achievement by leading 
people to avoid various resources that the institution may offer, such as a professor’s office hours and academic 
counseling. Although this self-protective strategy minimizes the possibility of rejection and future prejudice, it also 
reduces the number of resources and support systems one can count on when faced with the same difficulties that all 
students face.  
How do institutions build bridges allowing all of their members to succeed and to achieve the goals they arrived 
at the institution to realize? One suggestive finding comes from Mendoza-Denton et al. (2002), who found that 
students who anxiously expected rejection at the university felt an increased sense of belonging at the university 
following days in which they had had a positive race-related experience. Examples of positive race-related 
experiences included speaking with another student about the experience of being Black at the university, as well as 
having attended a meeting of the Black Student Organization at the university. This finding provides initial evidence 
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for the beneficial effect of having institutionally-sanctioned events and organizations that foster positive race-related 
experiences. When universities explicitly value and support such organizations and events, they may disconfirm 
negative expectations about the institution’s lack of support, and foster a sense that the institution is attentive to the 
needs of all its members. Thus, in contrast to the perception that student groups organized around ethnicity lead to 
balkanization, these findings suggest that such organizations may lead to greater institutional belonging. These 
findings await replication and expansion; however, a task for future research remains to identify institutional 
arrangements that can aid—or hinder—the realization of true relational diversity (Fine et al., 1997).  
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Despite the removal of legal and institutional barriers to achieving diversity, clear disparities remain in educational 
achievement outcomes between minority and White students (Bowen & Bok, 1998). In this chapter, we have argued 
that expectations of race-based rejection are an important factor in understanding these disparities, noting that status-
based rejection describes well the phenomenology captured by the constructs of stereotype threat, stigma 
consciousness, cultural mistrust, and RS-race.  Although expectations of race-based rejection can arise solely out of 
situational pressures, not everyone responds similarly to such rejection. The CAPS framework emphasizes that 
expectations of rejection interact with other dynamics to determine behavior, which is consistent with a stress and 
coping framework. We have reviewed examples of coping mechanisms at three levels-- intrapersonal, interpersonal, 
and institutional—to illustrate the within-group diversity that characterizes stigmatized groups. This view adds one 
layer of complexity to analyses of stigma focused on between-group differences, and allows us to emphasize the 
cognitive and affective processes involved in answering Allport’s (1954) observation that “one’s reputation, whether 
true or false, cannot be hammered, hammered, hammered into one’s head without doing something to one’s 
character (p. 138-9)”. We have reviewed recent research relevant to this question to better understand the experience 
of being stigmatized. With such an understanding, we are better prepared to develop effective interventions at 
various levels.  
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For decades, researchers in the social sciences have sought to identify strategies that would be effective in reducing 
prejudice and promoting positive intergroup relations.  In his monograph on The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions, 
Williams (1947) suggested that the “mere giving of objective general information” about an outgroup would likely 
do little to reduce intergroup hostility (p. 64).  Instead, he proposed that certain kinds of contact between groups 
could facilitate the development of positive intergroup attitudes.  Allport (1954) concurred with this view, stating 
that contact under optimal conditions could reduce intergroup prejudice and improve relations between groups.  
 Guiding these authors’ views was an understanding that intergroup relationships are often marked by some 
degree of hostility or conflict, and contact therefore holds the potential to either enhance or diminish prejudice 
between groups (Allport & Kramer, 1946; Williams, 1947).  Hence, they focused their attention on positive 
conditions of the contact situation designed to ensure that intergroup contact would lead to reductions in prejudice.  
In particular, Williams emphasized that intergroup contact would maximally reduce prejudice when the groups share 
similar status, interests, and tasks, and the contact situation fosters intimate relations between the groups.  Extending 
the work of Williams, Allport (1954) specified four optimal conditions that would be effective in reducing prejudice 
when implemented within the contact situation.  First, Allport stressed the importance of establishing equal status 
between the groups within the contact situation.  Thus, even though the groups may be accorded different statuses in 
the larger society, they should be regarded as equal in status within the contact situation.  Allport also noted the 
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importance of authority sanction, such that the contact – and the equal status nature of that contact – would be 
supported by institutional authorities, laws, or customs.  Additionally, Allport emphasized that the groups should 
work toward common goals, and that they should do so in cooperation and not in competition, such that the groups 
would work together and rely on each other in order to achieve their shared goals. 
 Since Allport’s time, investigations of contact effects have flourished, with hundreds of studies being conducted 
across a wide range of social groups, contexts, and societies (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000; 2004).  Early field studies 
showed that equal status contact between racial groups can contribute to more positive intergroup attitudes (Deutsch 
& Collins, 1951; Wilner, Walkley, & Cook, 1955; Works, 1961).   And a half century later, we now have substantial 
evidence from longitudinal (Levin, van Laar, & Sidanius, 2003), experimental (Wright et al., 2004), and meta-
analytic studies (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2004) suggesting that intergroup contact can lead to significant reductions in 
intergroup prejudice. 
 Still, intergroup contact theory has persisted as a fairly general conceptualization of what occurs when members 
of different groups interact.  Indeed, only recently have researchers begun to consider the distinct ways in which 
members of minority and majority status groups are likely to respond to intergroup contact, given their differing 
histories of experiences within the broader society (see Devine & Vasquez, 1998).  It is the goal of this chapter to 
link intergroup contact theory to recent perspectives on group differences in status, to evaluate the likely 
effectiveness of contact for improving relations between members of minority and majority status groups. 
 
 
A SHIFTING FOCUS FOR CONTACT RESEARCH: OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS TO 
SUBJECTIVE RESPONSES 
 
In line with Allport’s original approach, intergroup contact research has traditionally focused on establishing optimal 
conditions within the contact situation, toward the ultimate goal of achieving broad-scale reductions in intergroup 
prejudice (see Cook, 1984; Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Pettigrew, 1998).  As such, contact research has highlighted 
the importance of objective conditions of the contact situation, with relatively little attention to group members’ 
subjective responses to those contact situations.  Moreover, with its traditional focus on prejudice reduction, studies 
of intergroup contact have overemphasized the perspectives and attitudes of members of majority status groups, to 
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the relative neglect of the perspectives of members of minority status groups (Devine & Vasquez, 1998; Shelton, 
2000). 
 Emerging contact research has begun to address these shortcomings by assessing minority and majority group 
members’ experiences during intergroup contact, along with the beliefs and expectations they bring to the contact 
situation.  This work suggests that members of both minority and majority status groups have challenges with which 
they must contend as they approach cross-group interactions (see Devine & Vasquez, 1998).  Generally, members of 
minority and majority status groups both have concerns about how they are likely to be perceived by the other group 
(Sigelman & Tuch, 1997; Vorauer, Main, & O’Connell, 1998), and they are both likely to feel anxious about 
engaging in cross-group interactions (Plant & Devine, 2003; Stephan & Stephan, 1985; Tropp, 2003).  Nonetheless, 
research suggests that their anxieties may be based in largely different sets of concerns.  In particular, members of 
majority status groups are likely to experience anxiety about being perceived as prejudiced, whereas members of 
minority status groups tend to be anxious about potentially becoming the target of prejudice (Devine & Vasquez, 
1998; Stephan & Stephan, 1985). 
 
 
EXAMINING CONTACT EFFECTS IN TERMS OF STATUS RELATIONS BETWEEN 
THE GROUPS 
 
These perspectives offer important advances for our understanding of group members’ subjective experiences in 
intergroup contexts, and the dimensions that are likely to be of concern to minority and majority group members 
during contact.  But beyond these concerns in the immediate contact situation, we must also consider whether there 
are broader differences in minority and majority group members’ views regarding the role that group status plays in 
defining relations between their groups (see Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999).  Other work has shown contrasting bases of 
intergroup prejudice among members of minority and majority status groups, such that majority attitudes are linked 
to support for their privileged status, while minority attitudes are often based in the anticipation of prejudice from 
the majority group (see Livingston, Brewer, & Alexander, 2004; Monteith & Spicer, 2000).  Additionally, due to 
their privileged position, members of majority status groups are generally less inclined to reflect on their group’s 
status (Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002), or to think of themselves in terms of their group membership (Kim-Ju & Liem, 
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2003; Pinel, 1999), unless it is required by demands of the immediate social context (McGuire, McGuire, Child, & 
Fujioka, 1978).  By contrast, members of minority status groups are often acutely aware of their group’s devalued 
status (Jones et al., 1984) and that they are likely to be seen and evaluated in terms of their devalued  evap 
membership (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Goffman, 1963; Mendoza-Denton, Downey, Purdie, Davis, & 
Pietrzak, 2002; Pinel, 1999).  Consequently, they live with a constant threat of becoming targets of prejudice and 
discrimination (Crocker et al., 1998), and worse still, they are often confronted with prejudice and discrimination 
due to their devalued group membership (Feagin & Sikes, 1994; Swim, Cohen, & Hyers, 1998; Swim, Hyers, 
Cohen, Fitzgerald, & Bylsma, 2003).  As such, these regular reminders of their group’s devalued status may become 
concrete features of the intergroup relationship from the perspective of members of minority status groups, while 
these features may be less likely to be perceived as intrinsic to the intergroup relationship among members of 
majority status groups. 
 Recent polls reveal trends that are consistent with this analysis.  Overall, Black Americans perceive 
significantly more racial discrimination against their group than do White Americans (National Conference for 
Community and Justice, 2000), at the same time as most White Americans believe Blacks in their communities are 
treated as well as Whites (Gallup Organization, 2001).  Correspondingly, relative to White Americans, Black 
Americans tend to see racial tensions as a bigger problem in our society, and they tend to be more pessimistic about 
the potential for American race relations to improve in the future (Gallup Organization, 2001; National Conference 
for Community and Justice, 2000).  Thus, concerns about group status and discrimination against one’s group may 
play a more significant role in defining the intergroup relationship among members of minority status groups, 
relative to the role they play among members of majority status groups. 
 Given these trends, it is perhaps not surprising that American race relations are typically characterized in terms 
of racial distrust (Dovidio, Gaertner, Kawakami, & Hodson, 2002), particularly so when viewed from the 
perspective of members of minority status groups.  Stigmatization understandably impedes the development of trust 
(Cohen & Steele, 2002; Kramer & Wei, 1999; Pinel, 2002; see also Inzlicht & Good, McLaughlin-Volpe, and 
Mendoza-Denton, Page-Gould, & Pietrzak, in this volume).  Thus, members of minority status groups may be 
especially vigilant in their relations with the majority outgroup until they feel outgroup members are worthy of their 
trust (Brown & Dobbins, 2004; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002).  Cohen, Walton, & Garcia (2004) recently 
examined these issues among ethnic minority and majority students in a high school context.  These authors found 
Stigma and Intergroup Contact 5 
that ethnic minority and majority students reported similar levels of concern about their academic abilities, as well 
as comparable levels of social anxiety.  Still, ethnic minority students reported substantially greater racial mistrust 
and perceptions of bias against their ethnic group relative to ethnic majority students.   
 Cohen et al.’s (2004) findings reveal that members of both minority and majority status groups are likely to 
have multiple concerns about how they will be perceived and evaluated in intergroup contexts.  Moreover, their 
findings suggest that a continual recognition of devalued group status and discrimination against one’s group may 
constitute an added negative factor with which minority group members must contend in intergroup contexts, while 
such a factor may not be operating for members of majority status groups.  On the one hand, a constant awareness of 
devaluation could make minority group members especially motivated to avoid intergroup contact, to keep from 
exposing themselves to prejudice and discrimination from the majority group (see Crocker et al., 1998; Goffman, 
1963; Mendoza-Denton et al., 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 1985).  But we can also consider the broader implications 
of this tendency for achieving positive relations between members of minority and majority status groups.  It is 
likely that long-standing histories of devaluation and discrimination against one’s group would seriously inhibit the 
potential for enhancing positive feelings about intergroup relationships among members of minority status groups, 
relative to the effects that might be observed among members of majority status groups.  This possibility is 
considered throughout the remainder of this chapter, in reference to samples of data gathered from meta-analytic, 
survey, and experimental studies on intergroup contact. 
 
 
CONTACT EFFECTS FOR MINORITY AND MAJORITY STATUS GROUPS: META-
ANALYTIC COMPARISONS 
 
These issues are first examined using data from a recent meta-analysis of intergroup contact effects (see Pettigrew & 
Tropp, 2004; Pettigrew & Tropp, in press; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2004a).  For this analysis, we retrieved hundreds of 
papers on intergroup contact through intensive searches of multiple research literatures.  As we located these papers, 
we then checked to see whether each met the four criteria we determined for inclusion in the meta-analysis. 
 First, since our analysis focused on the effects of intergroup contact, we considered only those cases in which 
intergroup contact could act as an independent variable for predicting intergroup prejudice. These studies included 
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both experimental studies testing for the effects of contact on prejudice, and correlational studies in which contact 
was used as a correlate or predictor for intergroup prejudice.  Second, we included only studies that involved contact 
between members of clearly defined groups, to ensure that we examined intergroup – rather than interpersonal – 
outcomes.  Third, the studies had to involve some degree of direct contact between members of the different groups, 
which could either be observed by others or reported by the participants themselves.  This criterion excludes studies 
that attempted to gauge contact using indirect measures such as information about an outgroup, as well as studies in 
which participants were categorized into groups without opportunities for actual cross-group interactions.  Finally, 
to be included, the outcome measures had to be collected on individuals rather than assessed on an aggregate level, 
and some type of comparative data had to be available to evaluate variability in prejudice in relation to the contact 
(see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2004 for an extended discussion). 
 From a five-year search, we uncovered 516 studies (including 715 independent samples) examining 
relationships between contact and prejudice that met these inclusion criteria.  The studies were conducted between 
the early 1940s through the year 2000, spanning many disciplines and involving contact between members of a wide 
range of groups.  Together, the studies include responses from 250,555 individuals in 38 countries. 
 In conducting our analysis, we used two indicators of effect size (Cohen’s d and Pearson’s r), with larger effect 
sizes signifying stronger relationships between intergroup contact and prejudice.  We also examined contact-
prejudice effects at distinct levels of analysis.  Analyses conducted at the level of studies represent the overall effects 
for all data reported in each paper.  Analyses at the level of samples represent the overall effects for each 
independent sample reported in each paper.  Since studies often include multiple samples, analyzing data at the level 
of samples offers larger numbers of cases for conducting more detailed comparisons of effects (see Pettigrew & 
Tropp, 2004).   
 Overall, results from the meta-analysis reveal that greater levels of intergroup contact are typically associated 
with lower levels of intergroup prejudice.  These patterns of effects are consistent across analyses by studies and 
samples (in each case, mean d = -.43, mean r = -.21).  Moreover, additional analyses suggest that these results are 
unlikely to be due to participant selection or publication biases, and the more rigorous research studies also reveal 
stronger contact-prejudice effects (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2004). 
 We then examined patterns of contact-prejudice effects among members of minority and majority status groups.  
Here, we coded samples as to whether participants in the contact situation belonged to a devalued, lower status 
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group (i.e., minority status), or a dominant, higher status group (i.e., majority status).  As a first step in our analysis, 
we tallied the number of samples that examined relationships between contact and prejudice among members of 
minority and majority status groups.  This comparison clearly reveals the relative scarcity of research on intergroup 
contact from the perspectives of members of minority status groups (see Devine & Vasquez, 1998; Shelton, 2000).  
Indeed, of the 715 samples included in our full analysis, only 142 samples examined contact outcomes among 
members of minority status groups, while an overwhelming 505 samples examined contact outcomes among 
members of majority status groups. 
 We then proceeded to compare the magnitudes of the contact-prejudice relationships among members of 
minority and majority status groups (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2004; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2004a).  Overall, we find 
that the relationship between contact and prejudice is significantly weaker among members of minority status groups 
(mean d = -.38, mean r = -.19) relative to the effects obtained for members of majority status groups (mean d = -.44, 
mean r = -.22, p < .001).  Thus, while significant contact-prejudice relationships were observed in both cases, the 
magnitudes of these relationships still appear to vary among members of minority and majority status groups. 
 As we interpret these findings, we must recognize that there are several possible reasons for this pattern of 
results.  For example, it could be that because minorities are fewer in number, and are regularly exposed to the 
majority group, any single contact experience would have less of an impact on their attitudes, thereby producing less 
change in their feelings toward the majority group as a whole.  Additionally, it might be that members of minority 
status groups generally report lower levels of prejudice than members of majority status groups, which could limit 
the degree to which their prejudices could be reduced further through intergroup contact.   
 Alternatively, it could be that these patterns of effects are associated with the different perceptions that group 
members have about intergroup contact, based on the broader relationships between their groups in the larger society 
(Bobo, 1999; Livingston et al., 2004; Monteith & Spicer, 2000).  Indeed, members of minority status groups are well 
aware of the devaluation that surrounds their group membership (Pinel, 1999), along with the possibility that they 
might become the targets of prejudice (Crocker et al., 1998).  Thus, with good reason, minority group members’ 
responses to intergroup contact may be colored by a persisting recognition of their group’s devaluation, which could 
inhibit the potential for achieving positive contact outcomes. 
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SURVEY OF CONTACT-PREJUDICE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG MINORITY AND 
MAJORITY STATUS GROUPS 
 
To examine these possibilities, we conducted a secondary analysis of survey responses gathered by the National 
Conference for Community and Justice (2000; see Tropp & Pettigrew, 2004a).  These survey responses resulted 
from telephone interviews conducted between January, 2000 and March, 2000, with a nationally representative 
sample of approximately 2,500 adults in the continental United States.  Oversamples of racial and ethnic minority 
respondents were drawn, such that the sample included responses from 995 White Americans and 709 Black 
Americans.   
 Responses from these participants have been re-analyzed in an attempt to replicate findings from the meta-
analysis, and to provide more insights regarding  possible interpretations of its results.  Testing for replication in a 
single study that uses identical procedures across all participants offers an important extension of our meta-analytic 
research, since meta-analyses are often criticized for including comparisons across studies where variables, samples, 
and testing procedures are not uniform (see Rosenthal, 1991 for an extended discussion). 
 In this survey, participants were asked to indicate their contact experiences and feelings of intergroup closeness 
with respect to a wide variety of groups.  For the present analysis, reported experiences with and closeness to Blacks 
were used as measures of intergroup contact and prejudice among White respondents.  Similarly, reported 
experiences with and closeness to Whites were used as measures of intergroup contact and prejudice among Black 
respondents. 
 First, respondents provided “yes” or “no” responses to a general contact measure, in which they indicated 
whether they “now have contact or not with a person who is (White/Black).”  Respondents also responded to a 
general measure of intergroup closeness, by reporting “how close they feel to (Whites/Blacks)” on a 5-point scale, 
with recoded responses ranging from 1 (very far) to 5 (very close).  Reported feelings of intergroup closeness can be 
an especially useful indicator of intergroup prejudice, since affective responses to the outgroup typically show 
stronger relationships with intergroup contact than other sorts of prejudice indicators (see Tropp & Pettigrew, 
2004b). 
 As a first step in our analysis, we examined the overall relationships between intergroup contact and prejudice, 
to see whether we would obtain the same results as what we observed in the meta-analysis (see Tropp & Pettigrew, 
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2004a).  Here, we conducted bivariate correlations between contact and prejudice, as well as partial correlations 
controlling for demographic variables such as level of education, socio-economic status, political ideology, age, and 
gender.  As in the meta-analysis, we found significant overall relationships between contact and prejudice both with 
and without controlling for the demographic variables, r = .17, partial r = .17, p < .001.  Moreover, we also found 
that the relationships between contact and prejudice were substantially weaker among Black participants, r = .08, 
partial r = .06, p < .05, relative to the effects obtained for White participants, r = .22, partial r = .24, p < .001, z = -
2.90, p < .01. 
 Subsequent analyses examined the obtained patterns of effects in relation to three possible interpretations 
growing from our meta-analytic results.  First, we considered whether the patterns of effects might be due to a 
tendency for White and Black respondents to differ in their levels of intergroup contact.  Specifically, a chi-square 
analysis tested whether White and Black respondents were more or less likely to have contact with the outgroup.  
The chi-square analysis was not significant, X2(1) = 2.01, p > .10, suggesting that White and Black respondents did 
not meaningfully differ in the extent to which they had contact with the outgroup.  Thus, it seems unlikely that initial 
differences in the amount of contact with the outgroup would account for the weaker contact-prejudice effects 
observed among Black respondents in this sample, or among minority status groups in the meta-analysis.   
 Additional analyses then examined whether White and Black respondents generally differed in the extent to 
which they reported feeling close to members of the outgroup.  Results indicate that White and Black respondents 
did not significantly differ in their overall feelings of intergroup closeness (M = 3.63 and 3.68, respectively), F(1, 
1654) = 1.54, p > .10.  Thus, initial differences in levels of intergroup closeness as a measure of prejudice cannot 
explain the divergent contact-prejudice relationships observed between White and Black respondents in the present 
sample, and are therefore unlikely to explain the differing contact-prejudice relationships observed between minority 
and majority status groups in the meta-analysis. 
 We then sought to test whether the differences in patterns of effects among White and Black participants might 
be associated with distinct views of the intergroup relationship.  Since members of minority groups anticipate being 
targeted by prejudice and discrimination to a greater extent than members of majority groups (e.g., Cohen et al., 
2004), we focused our analysis on group members’ perceptions of diusramination against their group.  Specifically, 
we used respondents’ answers to a separate item concerning “how much discrimination there is against 
(Whites/Blacks) in our society today,” with reverse-coded responses ranging from 1 (none at all) to 4 (a great deal).   
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 As might be expected, preliminary analyses showed that Black respondents perceived significantly more 
discrimination against their group (M = 3.43) relative to the discrimination perceived by White respondents against 
their group (M = 2.37), F(1,1691) = 619.60, p < .001.  More importantly, however, we find that perceiving 
discrimination bears different relationships with reports of intergroup closeness among White and Black 
respondents.  Specifically, greater perceived discrimination against one’s group relates significantly to lower 
feelings of intergroup closeness among Black respondents, r = -.12, partial r = -.12, p < .01, while the relationship 
between perceived discrimination and intergroup closeness is not significant among White respondents, r = .03, 
partial r = .03, p > .30.   
 We also find some evidence that perceived discrimination moderates the relationship between intergroup 
contact and closeness among Black respondents, while such moderation does not occur for White respondents.  
Table 1 presents bivariate and partial correlations between contact and closeness for Black and White respondents 
who perceive varying degrees of discrimination against their group1.  These analyses indicate that the relationship 
between intergroup contact and closeness is consistently strong for White respondents, regardless of the degree to 
which they perceive discrimination against their group.   
 
TABLE 1  
Perceived Discrimination as Moderator for Relationship Between 
Contact and Intergroup Closeness Among Black and White Respondents 
                         
         Black Respondents             White Respondents 
                        
Perceived Discrimination           r        partial r          n           r         partial r           n 
                         
A Great Deal          .06          .02               387        .34**           .29*               72 
Some / Only A Little         .18**          .18**          272        .17***         .19***         664 
None At All           .06            -.08                25        .29***         .32***         227 
                         
Note.  r = Pearson correlation coefficient; partial r = Pearson correlation coefficient controlling for level of education, 
socio-economic status, political ideology, age, and gender; n = number of respondents.  * p < .05   ** p < .01   *** p < .001 
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However, among Black respondents, the relationship between contact and closeness differs substantially depending 
on the degree to which they perceive discrimination against their group.  Specifically, the relationship between 
contact and closeness is significant among Black respondents who perceive only a moderate amount of 
discrimination against their group, yet contact and closeness are not significantly related among Black respondents 
who perceive a great deal of discrimination against their group.  It is also important to note that over half of the 
Black respondents reported that they perceived a great deal of discrimination against their group (n = 387, 56.6%), 
while most of the remaining Black respondents perceived a moderate amount of discrimination against their group 
(n = 272, 39.8%).  Together, these findings suggest that the more members of minority status groups perceive 
discrimination against their groups, the weaker their contact-prejudice relationships will tend to be. The one 
exception to this trend involved the small number of Black respondents who reported absolutely no discrimination 
against their group (n = 25, 3.6%).  These respondents reported high feelings of intergroup closeness whether they 
did (M = 4.12) or did not (M = 4.00) have contact with the outgroup.  Moreover, taken together, their mean reports 
of intergroup closeness were significantly higher (M = 4.08) than those reported by all other Black respondents in 
this sample (M = 3.66), t(682) = 2.52, p = .01.  Thus, it could be that since they already have quite positive 
orientations toward the outgroup, there are limits on the degree to which intergroup contact could further enhance 
their feelings of intergroup closeness. 
 Overall, however, these patterns of findings provide important insights into the nature of contact-prejudice 
relationships among members of minority and majority status groups, which can aid in our interpretation of results 
from the meta-analysis.  For members of minority status groups, perceiving discrimination against one’s group 
exists as a powerful, negative force that permeates the intergroup relationship, while this force appears to be largely 
irrelevant to the intergroup relationship from the perspective of members of majority status groups.  As such, 
contact-prejudice relationships are likely to vary depending on the degree to which minority group members 
perceive discrimination against their groups, while such effects are less likely to be observed among members of 
majority groups.  Thus, while positive intergroup outcomes can often be achieved through intergroup contact 
(Pettigrew & Tropp, 2004), the negative presence of discrimination as a feature of the intergroup relationship is 
likely to restrain the potentially positive effects of contact for members of minority status groups.  
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EXPERIMENTAL EFFECTS OF PREJUDICE ON FEELINGS TOWARD CROSS-
GROUP INTERACTIONS 
 
In sum, findings from the survey indicate that perceiving discrimination against one’s group will likely inhibit 
feelings of intergroup closeness among members of minority status groups.  Thus far, these relationships have been 
examined using survey data, showing that greater perceptions of discrimination correspond with reduced feelings of 
closeness toward the majority outgroup as a whole.  But some experimental evidence also suggests that exposure to 
prejudice can lead members of minority status groups to feel less positively about relations with the majority group. 
 Specifically, studies involving both laboratory and real groups have examined how an expression of prejudice 
from an outgroup member would affect minority group members’ expectations for cross-group interactions (see 
Tropp, 2003).  In one of these studies (Tropp, Study 2), participants from two ethnic minority groups (Latinos and 
Asian Americans) were initially informed that the study concerned “communication styles” among members of 
different ethnic groups.  After completing a filler task and a personal information form, participants then learned that 
they were randomly assigned to interact with a White person, and they were given a photograph and personal 
information form for a White partner.  In actuality, the person believed to be the White partner was a confederate 
working with the research team. 
 To manipulate participants’ exposure to an expression of prejudice, participants then overheard one of two 
scripted dialogues between the confederate and the experimenter while seated on the other side of a partition.  In the 
prejudice condition, participants overheard the confederate ask if he could switch partners, since he would rather not 
be matched with a (Latino/Asian) person.  Instead, in the neutral condition, participants overheard the confederate 
ask a benign question, concerning whether the study would take over an hour to complete.  It should also be noted 
that the confederate actually making these comments was a native English-speaking Asian American, rather than the 
White person who participants believed was their partner.  This procedure was used to ensure that, through the 
debriefing process, participants would be confident that the White person they saw in the photograph did not 
actually express or endorse prejudice against their ethnic group. 
 Following these procedures, participants completed a brief questionnaire packet as they anticipated an 
interaction with their partner.  To assess their orientations toward the outgroup, this packet asked participants to 
report the extent to which they expected to (a) get along with, (b) trust, (c) feel comfortable with, (d) enjoy 
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interacting with, and (e) have a lot in common with their outgroup partner, and with outgroup members in general 
(s ranging from .89 to .97).  Results from this study revealed that participants exposed to prejudice from an 
outgroup member had significantly less positive orientations toward the outgroup partner, and they also tended to 
have less positive orientations toward outgroup members in general.   
 These findings offer important insights regarding the roles that prejudice and discrimination may play in 
shaping understandings of intergroup relationships among members of minority status groups.  In particular, 
exposure to even a single instance of prejudice from an outgroup member may lead members of minority status 
groups to anticipate less trust and closeness in their relations with the outgroup.  Given that members of minority 
status groups are regularly confronted with prejudice in their everyday lives (Swim, Cohen, & Hyers, 1998; Swim et 
al., 2003), we must consider the broader detrimental effects that repeated exposure to prejudice is likely to have on 
minority group members’ feelings toward relations with the majority outgroup.   
 The varied research findings presented thus far indicate that devalued group status and discrimination against 
one’s group play important roles in defining the nature of intergroup relationships among members of minority 
status groups.  We have observed that the positive effects of intergroup contact tend to be diminished among 
members of minority status groups, relative to the effects observed for members of majority status groups (Pettigrew 
& Tropp, 2000).  We also find significant relationships between perceiving discrimination and reduced feelings of 
intergroup closeness among members of minority status groups, while these relationships are not significant among 
members of majority status groups; moreover, contact-prejudice relationships tend to be weak among members of 
minority status groups who perceive a great deal of discrimination against their groups (Tropp & Pettigrew, 2004a).  
Experimental findings also suggest that exposure to even a single instance of prejudice can lead minority group 
members to feel less positively about interacting with members of the majority outgroup (Tropp, 2003).  In sum, 
these collected findings suggest that intergroup contact may generally be a less effective means for promoting 
positive intergroup outcomes among members of minority status groups, to the extent that prejudice and 
discrimination act as negative forces curbing contact’s positive effects. 
 
 
EFFECTS OF OPTIMAL CONTACT CONDITIONS AMONG MINORITY AND 
MAJORITY STATUS GROUPS 
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Relating these findings to the broader framework of intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954; Hewstone & Brown, 
1986; Pettigrew, 1998), we must therefore question whether establishing Allport’s optimal conditions within the 
contact situation can sufficiently alleviate these negative forces, to allow positive contact outcomes to emerge 
among members of both minority and majority status groups.  Indeed, many researchers have noted that conditions 
of equal status may be defined and interpreted in a number of ways (Cohen, 1982; Foster & Finchilescu, 1986; 
Riordan, 1978), and members of different status groups may not always agree about the extent to which equal status 
has been achieved within the contact situation (Robinson & Preston, 1976).  Thus, even when objective attempts are 
made to establish such conditions as equal status, group members’ subjective responses to intergroup contact may 
still vary depending on the perceptions and experiences that inform their understanding of the intergroup 
relationship (see Cohen, 1982; Livingston et al., 2004).  As such, implementing optimal conditions within the 
contact situation may not necessarily be enough to ensure positive contact outcomes among members of both 
minority and majority status groups. 
 We returned to our meta-analytic data to pursue a preliminary test of these ideas (see Tropp & Pettigrew, 
2004a).  Specifically, we sought to examine whether samples from minority and majority status groups would still 
show different patterns of contact-prejudice relationships even in those cases where the contact situation was 
purposely designed to maximize positive intergroup outcomes.  To guide this investigation, we focused heavily on 
Allport’s proposed conditions for optimal intergroup contact, since they have played such a pivotal role in prior 
contact research.  We began by attempting to rate each of Allport’s conditions individually for each sample, but this 
approach proved impossible due to the limited information available in most of the research reports.  We therefore 
shifted our approach and rated each sample as to whether the contact situation was explicitly structured to 
approximate Allport’s conditions for optimal intergroup contact.  These global ratings actually offer a more direct 
test of Allport’s contentions than our original approach, since Allport held that his four conditions should be 
implemented together to maximize positive intergroup outcomes. 
 As a general test of the effectiveness of Allport’s conditions, we then compared samples that corresponded with 
our ratings, such that the contact situation either was or was not explicitly structured in line with Allport’s conditions 
(see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2004; Pettigrew & Tropp, in press).  Overall, we found that samples with contact structured 
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in line with Allport’s conditions yielded significantly stronger contact-prejudice effects (mean d = -.58, mean r = -
.28) relative to the effects obtained for the remaining samples (mean d = -.42, mean r = -.21, p < .0001).   
 We then turned to focus our analysis on whether Allport’s conditions would be comparably effective in 
promoting strong contact-prejudice relationships among members of minority and majority status groups.  We 
examined this issue by comparing the effect sizes for minority and majority samples that either were or were not 
structured to meet Allport’s conditions.  Among majority status groups, the 98 samples with contact structured in 
line with Allport’s conditions showed significantly stronger contact-prejudice effects (mean d = -.67, mean r = -.32), 
relative to the remaining majority samples (mean d = -.43, mean r = -.21, p < .0001).  However, among minority 
status groups, the 13 samples with contact situations structured in line with Allport’s conditions did not show 
substantially stronger contact-prejudice effects (mean d = -.46, mean r = -.22), relative to the other minority samples 
(mean d = -.38, mean r = -.19, p > .30).  In part, the lack of statistical significance in the minority context could 
reflect the relative small number of studies included in this comparison.  Nonetheless, given the difference in 
magnitude of the effects in the minority and majority contexts, these patterns suggest that members of minority and 
majority status groups may still show different responses to intergroup contact, even when the contact situation is 
explicitly structured to maximize positive intergroup outcomes.  Specifically, it may be that establishing Allport’s 
conditions within the contact situation can enhance the positive effects of contact among members of majority status 
groups, while these conditions may not significantly enhance the positive effects of contact among members of 
minority status groups.   
 As suggested previously, we believe these findings may grow from general differences in perspective regarding 
the nature of relationships between the groups (see Bobo, 1999; Livingston et al., 2004).  Members of minority 
status groups are likely to perceive prejudice and discrimination as integral to the intergroup relationship, while 
these may be less prominent features of the intergroup relationship in the minds of members of majority status 
groups.  As such, the effects of positive conditions within the intergroup context may be diluted for members of 
minority status groups, as their feelings about relations with the majority group are constructed in conjunction with 
long-standing histories of devaluation.  Thus, even when attempts are made to establish positive norms of tolerance 
and mutual acceptance, these efforts may not be sufficient to fully counter the negative effects of discrimination on 
minority group members’ feelings about relations with the majority group. 
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 Related to this point, we have recently gathered responses to a survey in which we assess ethnic minority and 
majority group members’ perceptions of societal norms, perceptions of discrimination, and orientations toward 
outgroup members (see Tropp, 2004).  To date, our sample includes responses from 154 undergraduate participants 
(84 ethnic minority, 69 ethnic majority), with ages ranging from 17 to 32 years (mean age = 19.20 years). With these 
data, we compare how group members’ feelings toward relations with outgroup members correspond with perceived 
norms of tolerance in the broader society and perceived discrimination against their ethnic groups. 
 To prepare for this analysis, we averaged responses to two items concerning norms of tolerance, in which 
participants indicated the extent to which they believe “efforts (are) made to establish norms of tolerance and 
acceptance among different ethnic groups” and “people acknowledge and promote ethnic diversity” in American 
society ( = .74 and .84 among ethnic minority and majority participants, respectively).  Using a single item, 
participants also reported the extent to which they perceive discrimination against their ethnic group as a whole.  
These items were scored on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all/strongly disagree) to 7 (very much/strongly 
agree). 
 As a first step in our analysis, we correlated scores on these measures with an indicator of perceived inclusion 
of one’s ethnic group.  Specifically, participants reported the degree to which they perceive their ethnic group as 
being “included” in American society, with scores ranging from 1 (not included at all) to 7 (completely included).  
Among ethnic minority participants, perceiving norms of tolerance was positively associated with the sense that 
one’s group is included in American society, r = .28, p = .01, while perceiving discrimination was negatively 
associated with perceived ingroup inclusion, r = -.26, p < .05.  At the same time, neither perceiving norms of 
tolerance nor perceiving discrimination were significantly related to perceptions of ingroup inclusion among ethnic 
majority participants, r = .10 and -.11, respectively, p > .30. 
 We then examined how perceiving norms of tolerance and discrimination related to feelings about relations 
with the outgroup across a number of indicators.  Participants reported their general orientations toward interacting 
with outgroup members (Tropp, 2003), along with feelings of warmth toward outgroup members and their 
proportions of outgroup friends.  Table 2 provides correlations between these indicators and the norm and 
discrimination measures for ethnic minority and majority participants.   
Thus far, responses from ethnic minority participants show that perceiving norms of tolerance typically 
correspond with more positive orientations toward outgroup members, greater warmth, and greater proportions of 
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outgroup friends.  At the same time, perceived discrimination corresponds with significantly less positive 
orientations toward outgroup members, less warmth, and smaller proportions of outgroup friends among ethnic 
minority participants.   
 
TABLE 2 
Correlating Perceived Norms of Tolerance and Discrimination with Feelings 
Toward Intergroup Relationships among Members of Ethnic Minority and Majority Groups 
                        
 
                          Norms of Tolerance                         Discrimination 
                                                              
 
                Minority          Majority          Minority           Majority 
                        
 
Orientations toward Outgroup Members        .23*           .14                -.24*                .24*   
 
Warmth toward Outgroup Members        .24*                  .15               -.32**               .11 
  
Proportions of Outgroup Friends               .28**           .11               -.35**               .17 
                        
* p < .05  ** p < .01  
 
Additionally, when entered simultaneously as predictors, both norms of tolerance and discrimination emerged as 
significant predictors for each indicator, yet perceived discrimination tends to be a stronger predictor than perceived 
norms of tolerance2.  By contrast, among ethnic majority participants, there are no significant relationships between 
perceiving norms of tolerance and these indicators, and only one indicator reveals a significant relationship with 
perceived discrimination: greater perceptions of discrimination correspond with more positive orientations toward 
outgroup members, r = .24, p < .05.  
 Taken together, these findings suggest that members of minority and majority status groups generally differ in 
the extent to which they see norms of tolerance and discrimination as relevant to their intergroup relationships.  
Perceiving norms of tolerance can encourage greater feelings of inclusion and more positive orientations toward 
cross-group interactions among members of minority status groups.  At the same time, however, perceiving 
discrimination acts as a persisting negative force in the intergroup relationship from the perspective of members of 
minority status groups, while neither norms of tolerance nor perceived discrimination contribute substantially to 
majority group members’ feelings about their intergroup relationships.   
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 It may be that members of majority status groups enjoy the privilege of not having to think about their group’s 
status as they reflect on the broader intergroup relationship (see Leach et al., 2002), unless such reflection is induced 
by demands of the immediate social context (see Devine & Vasquez, 1998).  By contrast, considerations of group 
status and discrimination appear to be of great importance to members of minority status groups, such that these 
considerations permeate their feelings about relations with the majority status group.  Moreover, given that members 
of minority status groups are often met with prejudice and discrimination against their groups (Swim et al., 1998), 
perceived discrimination is likely to operate as a perpetual negative force in their views of the intergroup 
relationship, while such a consistent negative force may not be operating among members of the majority status 
group. 
 These patterns of findings appear to diverge somewhat from the traditional emphasis of intergroup contact 
theory, which suggests that positive intergroup attitudes can be enhanced by emphasizing equal status between 
groups within the contact situation (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998).  As such, the results may reflect distinctions 
between what people report in relatively abstract contexts, as compared to what they would likely experience in 
actual contact situations (see Levy, Freitas, & Salovey, 2002 for a related discussion).  But these findings also point 
to broader issues we must consider regarding the approaches we use to achieve positive intergroup relations in the 
larger society. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Together, these combined findings suggest that our traditional focus on establishing optimal conditions within the 
intergroup context may not be enough to promote positive intergroup relations among members of both minority and 
majority status groups.  Beyond emphasizing conditions of the contact situation, we must also recognize that group 
members have histories of perceptions and experiences that are likely to inform their understanding of the intergroup 
relationship (Cohen et al., 2004; Livingston et al., 2004), and their responses to cross-group interactions (Devine & 
Vasquez, 1998; Plant & Devine, 2003; Tropp, 2003).  Indeed, even when objective attempts are made to establish 
optimal conditions within the contact situation, group members’ subjective responses to contact may still be guided 
by their long-standing views of the intergroup relationship (see Cohen, 1982; Robinson & Preston, 1976). 
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 Consistent with this view, the research presented in this chapter indicates that members of minority status 
groups not only contend with prejudice and discrimination (Crocker et al., 1998; Swim et al., 1998), but these 
factors can also contribute negatively to their feelings about intergroup relations (Tropp, 2003), in ways beyond 
those that are likely to be detected among members of the majority group (Tropp & Pettigrew, 2004a).  As such, we 
must extend our understanding of intergroup contact theory to acknowledge how differing histories of experiences 
may lead members of minority and majority status groups to show different responses to intergroup contact, and to 
recognize the important role that prejudice and discrimination can play in shaping minority group members’ feelings 
toward intergroup relationships. 
 Thus, as we look to future research on intergroup contact, we must look beyond establishing a set of objective 
conditions within the contact situation to promote positive intergroup outcomes, corresponding to the approach that 
has commonly been used in the past (see Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Williams, 1947).  Rather, we must also 
take into account the subjective perspectives of the different groups involved and attempt to address concerns that 
are particularly relevant to their conceptions of the intergroup relationship.  Since prejudice and discrimination can 
curb the potentially positive effects of contact, we must work to create environments that members of minority 
status groups feel they can trust (Cohen & Steele, 2002; Steele et al., 2002), and in which they can feel confident 
that prejudice and discrimination will not affect how they will be perceived and treated (Crocker et al., 1998).  At 
the same time, we must not only curb the endorsement of prejudice among members of majority status groups, but 
we must also encourage them to recognize the significance of prejudice and discrimination in minority group 
members’ views of the intergroup relationship.  Perhaps through such a sharing of perspectives we can achieve more 
common understandings of intergroup relationships among group members on both sides, along with promoting the 
kinds of mutual trust and openness that can facilitate positive relations between members of minority and majority 
status groups.  
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. Altogether, 684 Black respondents and 963 White respondents provided responses to all items relevant to 
these analyses. 
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2. Standardized regression coefficients () for perceived discrimination were -.22 when predicting 
orientations toward outgroup members, p = .05; -.30 when predicting warmth, p = .005; and -.32 when 
predicting proportions of outgroup friends, p = .002.  Standardized regression coefficients for perceived 
norms of tolerance were .20 when predicting orientations toward outgroup members, p = .06; .21 when 
predicting warmth, p = .05; and .25 when predicting proportions of outgroup friends, p = .02.   
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What are the affective, cognitive, and behavioral implications of being stigmatized – of being socially devalued and 
targeted by negative stereotypes, prejudicial attitudes, and discrimination? This question is central to understanding 
the phenomenology and effects of stigmatization. Stigma is the possession of, or belief that one possesses, some 
attribute or characteristic that conveys a social identity that is devalued in a particular social context (Crocker, 
Major, & Steele, 1998).  Although psychologists have long been interested in studying stereotyping, prejudice, and 
discrimination, only recently have they  begun to examine in earnest the psychological effects of these processes on 
those who are their targets.  As reflected in the chapters in this volume, researchers have begun to investigate a 
variety of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral consequences of stigmatization, including self-stereotyping, group 
identification, collective self-esteem, outgroup-directed hostility, task performance, social interactions, and personal 
self-esteem, among other outcomes. 
The prevailing view among psychologists has been that stigmatization cannot help but have negative effects on 
the psychological well-being of its victims. As Miller (this volume) points out, “big” problems (such as prejudice) 
are assumed to have “big” effects. There is substantial evidence that negative stereotypes, prejudicial attitudes, and 
discriminatory treatment do have direct, harmful effects on the stigmatized (see Crocker & Major, 1989; Miller, this 
volume). Prejudice and discrimination limit access to resources such as employment, occupational advancement, 
income, housing, education, and medical care. Inability to obtain these resources compromises the physical well 
being of the stigmatized, especially if structural discrimination is repeated, pervasive, and severe (Allison, 1998; 
Clark, Anderson, Clark, & Williams, 1999). The stigmatized are also ignored, excluded, patronized, and targeted by 
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physical violence. These interpersonal threats also have negative implications for psychological and physical well-
being (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995).  Stigmatization may also lead directly to stress responses such as 
increased anxiety (Clark et al., 1999) and cardiovascular reactivity (Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey & Leitten, 1993). 
Many classic theories of the effects of stigmatization further assumed that for many of its victims, stigma 
becomes internalized into chronic feelings of inferiority. Exposure to prejudice and discrimination is assumed to 
leave a “mark of oppression” on the personalities and self-esteem of the stigmatized (see Crocker & Major, 1989, 
for a discussion).  Dorwin Cartwright proposed, for example, “To a considerable extent, personal feelings of worth 
depend on the social evaluation of the group with which a person is identified. Self-hatred and feelings of 
worthlessness tend to arise from membership in underprivileged or outcast groups” (1950; p. 440). Likewise, in 
commenting on their observation that a large percentage of African American children in their study seemed to 
prefer White skin coloring to Black skin coloring, Clark and Clark (1950) wrote, “They [their data] would seem to 
point strongly to the need for a definite mental hygiene and educational program that would relieve children of the 
tremendous burden of feelings of inadequacy and inferiority which seem to become integrated into the very structure 
of the personality as it is developing.” (p. 350). Even Allport (1954/1979) observed, “One’s reputation, whether 
false or true, cannot be hammered, hammered, hammered into one’s head without doing something to one’s 
character” (p. 142). 
Starting in the 1980’s a number of papers began to appear that challenged the view that stigma is internalized 
into the self-concepts of its targets and uniformly and inevitably has negative consequences for them. For example, 
reviews of the literature on group differences in self-esteem concluded that members of many chronically 
stigmatized groups, such as African-Americans, have levels of self-esteem as high if not higher than nonstigmatized 
groups (Crocker & Major, 1989; Simpson & Yinger, 1985).  Reviews of the literature on subjective well-being 
observed that members of many chronically stigmatized groups, such as those who are blind, quadriplegic, or 
developmentally disabled, report positive levels of well-being (Diener, 1984). In addition, research on ability-
stigmatized groups demonstrated that test performance is remarkably sensitive to situations -- although they 
sometimes perform more poorly on intellectual tasks than those not so stigmatized, at other times they perform just 
as well (e.g., Steele & Aronson, 1995). On the basis of these accumulating findings, new theoretical perspectives on 
stigma emerged which challenged traditional understandings of the effects of stigma (e.g., Crocker et al., 1998; 
Steele, 1997). The chapters in this volume reflect and advance this new perspective on stigma.  In this chapter, I 
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summarize the core themes of this “New Look” in stigma research, and provide examples of research that reflects 
these themes. 
 
 
THE “NEW LOOK” OF STIGMA RESEARCH 
 
The Assumption of Variability 
 
As reflected in much of the research discussed by the authors of this book, stigma can have a variety of negative 
effects for the stigmatized individual. When stigma is relevant to and activated in the situation, it can negatively 
affect their intellectual performance, trust in outgroup members and institutions, attachment to domains in which 
they are negatively stereotyped, accuracy and stability of self-knowledge, and psychological well-being, among 
other things. Nonetheless, in contrast to traditional perspectives, contemporary perspectives on stigma assert that the 
effects of stigma are not uniformly and inevitably negative. Contemporary perspectives emphasize variability in 
targets’ responses to prejudice and discrimination – variability across situations, persons, and groups (e.g., Crocker, 
1999; Friedman & Brownell, 1995; Major & Schmader, 2001; see Miller, this volume). Research illustrates that 
differential responses to stigma are observed between stigmatized groups, within stigmatized groups, and even 
within the same individual across contexts. For example, meta-analyses reveal that African-Americans, on average, 
have higher self-esteem than European-Americans (Twenge & Crocker, 2002). But on average, overweight women 
have lower self-esteem than nonoverweight women (Miller & Downey, 1999), and European-American women 
have lower self-esteem than European-American men (Major, Barr, Zubek, & Babey, 1999). Within the same 
stigmatized groups, some individuals appear resilient to prejudice and display positive well-being, whereas other 
members of the same group do not (Friedman & Brownell). In addition, the same individual may show different 
responses to prejudice as the context changes, as research on stereotype threat demonstrates (Steele & Aronson, 
1995). Thus, contemporary scholars acknowledge both vulnerability and resilience as common responses to negative 
stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination, and seek to identify factors that differentiate these responses.  As chapters 
by Miller (this volume) and Swim and Thomas (this volume) discuss, the effects of stigma depend upon how stigma-
relevant situations are appraised, and on how stigmatized individuals cope with stigma-related threat. These 
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appraisals and coping strategies, in turn, are shaped by characteristics of the situation (e.g., Inzlicht & Good, this 
volume), the person (e.g., Mendoza-Denton, Page-Gould, & Pietrzak, this volume), and the type of stigma (e.g., 
Quinn, this volume). 
 
The Importance of Construals 
 
A central assumption of contemporary views of stigma is that the effects of stigmatization are mediated through the 
stigmatized person’s understanding of how others view them and their interpretations of social contexts and social 
events (e.g., Crocker et al., 1998; Crocker, 1999; Major, Quinton & McCoy, 2002; Major, McCoy, Kaiser & 
Quinton, 2003; Major & O’Brien, in press; Steele, 1997; Steele, Spencer & Aronson, 2002). Although not ignoring 
the direct, negative effects of prejudice and discrimination, the new view of stigma is  “top-down” in that it 
emphasizes the importance of people’s construals of their environment in shaping their emotions, behavior, 
intergroup attitudes, and intellectual performance. 
Based on their prior experiences (direct or vicarious) with being the target of negative stereotypes, prejudice, 
and discrimination, and on their exposure to representations of their stigma in the dominant culture, members of 
stigmatized groups are assumed to develop shared feelings, beliefs and expectations about their stigma and its 
potential effects. These “collective representations” include: 1) awareness of the negative value that is placed on 
their social identity, 2) knowledge of the dominant cultural stereotypes of their stigmatized identity, and 3) 
uncertainty and apprehension about whether they will be a target of prejudice (Crocker et al., 1998). These 
collective representations may also include shared understandings of why one’s group occupies the position it does 
in the social hierarchy. Mendoza-Denton and colleagues (this volume) refer to these “states of mind” as culturally 
specific cognitive-affective units (CAUs) – i.e., construals, expectations/beliefs, affects, and goals that are shared as 
a result of having similar experiences specific to one’s cultural (or stigmatized) group. 
Importantly, even if they themselves do not endorse the dominant cultural representation of their stigma, it is 
assumed that members of stigmatized groups are aware of the dominant cultural stereotypes and evaluations of their 
group. These dominant stereotypes and attitudes thus constitute what Steele (1997) called a “threat in the air.” Once 
the dominant cultural stereotypes and attitudes of their stigma are known to the stigmatized, this knowledge 
influences how they approach and interpret situations in which their stigma is relevant. These collective 
New Perspectives on Stigma     5  
representations have the potential to affect their behavior in ways that do not involve obvious forms of 
discriminatory behavior on the part of others. In addition, they can affect the behavior of the stigmatized even when 
no other person is present in the immediate situation. 
 
 
A TRANSACTIONAL MODEL OF RESPONSES TO STIGMA 
 
Contemporary scholars increasingly draw upon transactional stress and coping models to understand responses of 
the stigmatized to their predicament (e.g., Allison, 1998; Clark et al., 1999; Kaiser, Major, & McCoy, 2004; Major 
et al., 2002; Major, McCoy et al., 2003; Major & O’Brien, in press; Miller & Kaiser, 2001; Miller & Major, 2000). 
From this perspective, possessing a consensually devalued social identity is a stressor similar to other types of 
chronic and acute stressors. Thus, theoretical and empirical insights gained from research on adjustment to stressful 
events in general can be usefully applied to advance understanding of how people respond to social devaluation and 
stigma. 
Transactional models of stress and coping were designed to explain significant variability across individuals in 
adaptation and response to stressful events (Bandura, 1982; Lazarus, 1999; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). A core 
premise of transactional models is that organisms do not respond in the same way to stressors; rather, responses to 
stressful life events vary across individuals. Responses to stressful events are assumed to be a function of two key 
processes: how individuals cognitively appraise the event and the coping strategies they use to deal with events that 
are appraised as stressful.  Appraisals and coping are assumed to be shaped by characteristics of the situation and 
characteristics of the person. Consistent with this view, a growing amount of research demonstrates that situational 
and personal factors moderate how the stigmatized appraise and cope with stigma-related stressors. 
 
Appraisal Processes 
 
Cognitive appraisals are judgments about the relationship between an individual and his or her environment and the 
implications of this relationship for psychological well-being (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). In primary appraisal, a 
person assesses whether an event has the potential to threaten important, self-relevant goals or values. In secondary 
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appraisal, an individual considers whether he or she has the resources to remedy a stressful person-environment 
relationship. Events are appraised as threatening when internal or external demands are seen as taxing or exceeding 
the adaptive resources of the individual, and as challenging when resources are appraised to exceed demands. 
Although primary and secondary appraisals can be conceptually distinguished, they are interdependent, and often 
empirically indistinguishable (Lazarus, 1999).   
Lazarus’ model of appraisal processes has been criticized as being overly cognitive and overly conscious. 
Contemporary models of responses to stressful events observe that appraisals are not necessarily cognitive; nor are 
they necessarily conscious. For example, Blascovich and Mendes (2000) theorize that a person may make 
nonconscious demand and resource appraisals. Furthermore, appraisals may involve affective (i.e., feeling) 
processes as well as cognitive (i.e., semantic) processes. This view is consistent with a growing body of research 
demonstrating that affective processing can occur independently of cognitive processing (e.g., LeDoux, 1996; 
Zajonc, 2000). Affective cues are objects in the situation that elicit affective responses or meaning; they can be 
either innate (e.g., a snake) or learned (e.g., a swastika). Affective cues can influence demand as well as resource 
appraisals via affective processing, and thereby lead to threat or challenge appraisals.  Furthermore, just as cognitive 
processing can be unconscious (occurring below awareness) so too can affective processing.  Stimuli presented 
below levels of awareness can elicit emotional reactions strong enough to drive judgment and behavior in the 
absence of any conscious feelings accompanying these reactions (Winkielman & Berridge, 2004). 
Contemporary perspectives on stigma assume that when cues in a situation make stigma relevant (i.e., lead 
them to suspect that they could be devalued, stereotyped, or discriminated against because of a particular social 
identity), that situation is often appraised (consciously or nonconsciously) as containing threats to the self (Crocker 
et al., 1998; Major & O’Brien, in press; Steele et al., 2002; Swim & Thomas, this volume). Crocker et al. (1998), for 
example, stated that stigma threatens one’s sense that one has a “safe, valued, and valuable self” (p. 543). Swim and 
Thomas (this volume) posit that stigma threatens core social motives, such as the need to belong, to have control, 
and to feel good about the self. Steele (1997) theorized that awareness of negative stereotypes and the accusations 
contained in them creates “stereotype threat,” defined as a situational threat consisting of fear that one may be 
judged and treated stereotypically, and that one’s behavior might confirm the stereotype in one’s own or others’ eyes 
(Steele & Aronson, 1995).  More recently, Steele et al. (2002) speculated that people with a stigmatized identity 
experience social identity threat (see also Major & O’Brien, in press). This leads them to become alert to situational 
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cues that signify they may be devalued on the basis of their social identity. Being on guard for such cues and trying 
to repudiate them if necessary is an extra burden that may impair their performance. Mendoza-Denton and 
colleagues (this volume) observe that direct or vicarious experiences of exclusion, discrimination and prejudice can 
also lead to prejudice threat – anxious anticipation that one will be a target of prejudice in new contexts where the 
possibility of such treatment exists. Likewise, attributional ambiguity is presumed to be identity threatening (Major 
et al., 2002). The uncertainty inherent in attributionally ambiguous circumstances can make it difficult to trust others 
and can make it hard for the stigmatized to make accurate assessments of key aspects of self-worth (Aronson & 
Inzlicht, in press; Inzlicht & Good, this volume). 
Most contemporary models of the experience of stigma emphasize the extent to which situations in which 
stigma is salient are appraised as threatening. It is important to note, however, that because the experience of threat 
occurs when demands are perceived as taxing or exceeding resources, it is theoretically possible for people to 
perceive themselves as victims of negative stereotypes, prejudice and/or discrimination and yet not experience this 
as a threat. This would occur if a person feels that he or she has the resources necessary to cope with the threat of 
being a target of prejudice. Such resources might include perceived control over important resources or the ability to 
limit exposure to others who are prejudiced. Such individuals might exhibit challenge, rather than threat, in the face 
of prejudice. More research on situational and personal factors that lead to challenge rather than threat appraisals is 
needed. 
 
Situational Determinants of Threat Appraisals 
 
Contemporary models of stigma posit that rather than being a stable feature of individuals, the effects of stigma 
emerge “in the situation.” Specifically, whether or not a stigma-related event is appraised as threatening is assumed 
to be a function of affective or semantic cues in the immediate situation that make stigma relevant to that situation, 
and of the cultural representations of their stigma that the stigmatized bring to that situation. As a consequence, 
members of stigmatized groups may show threat related responses (e.g., impaired performance) in some situations 
(e.g., when a test is described as diagnostic of ability) but not others (e.g., when a test is described as nondiagnostic 
of ability). Because the meaning of immediate situations is shaped by the collective representations that the 
individual brings to that situation, the same situation may also mean very different things to different individuals. 
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Nonstigmatized and stigmatized groups in particular may react very differently to the same local situation because 
of their differing understandings of how their social identity is viewed in the dominant culture. For example, 
research by Inzlicht and Good (this volume) shows that being in the numerical minority activates stereotypes, 
increases anxiety, and decreases performance among members of stigmatized groups. However, being in the 
numerical minority does not have these effects on members of nonstigmatized groups. These findings suggest that 
stigmatized individuals appraise this situation as threatening, whereas nonstigmatized individuals do not. These 
differences as a function of group status illustrate how the meaning of the local situation is shaped by collective 
representations that individuals bring to that situation.  They also illustrate the dangers of drawing conclusions about 
the phenomenology of stigmatization from research based on nonstigmatized populations. 
A variety of cues in the environment may activate stigma-related thoughts and lead situations to be appraised as 
threatening to the self (see Inzlicht & Good, this volume for a review). As noted above, the original work on 
stereotype threat demonstrated that simply describing intellectual tests as diagnostic of ability was sufficient to 
create stereotype threat and accompanying poorer test performance among members of ability stigmatized groups 
(e.g., Steele & Aronson, 1995; Spencer, Steele & Quinn, 1999). Heterogeneous settings, i.e., situations in which 
members of more than one social group are present also are appraised as more threatening by members of 
stigmatized groups. As Inzlicht and Good (this volume) discuss, environments in which they are outnumbered by 
members of nonstigmatized groups increase distinctiveness and feelings of self-consciousness, activate stereotypes, 
and cause anxiety that is experienced as heightened physiological arousal among members of stigmatized groups. 
Other cues that lead environments to be appraised (consciously or nonconsciously) as threatening and impair 
performance include being taught by an instructor who is a member of a dominant outgroup (Marx & Roman, 2002), 
being exposed to media images that reinforce negative stereotypes of one’s group (Davies, Spencer, Quinn & 
Gerhardstein, 2002), hearing messages that ability or intelligence is fixed rather than malleable (Good & Dweck, 
2003, cited in Inzlicht & Good, this volume), and being asked to reveal a concealable stigma (see Quinn, this 
volume).  Although the threat appraisal process may at times be deliberate and conscious, self-related threat often 
emerges from nonconscious affective or cognitive processing of cues in the environment.   
Situational cues also affect the likelihood that people will perceive themselves as a potential victim of 
discrimination. Research illustrates that discrimination is more likely to be perceived in intergroup rather than 
ingroup situations (Major, Gramzow et al., 2002), when prejudice cues in the immediate situation are clear rather 
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than ambiguous (Major, Quinton & Schmader, 2003), and when information on discrimination is presented 
aggregated over several individuals rather than on a case-by-case basis (Crosby, Pufall, Snyder, O’Connell & 
Whalen, 1989). In general, perceiving oneself (or one’s group) as a victim of prejudice is associated with threat 
appraisals and negative affect (Major et al., 2002). 
 
Individual Determinants of Threat Appraisals 
 
The extent to which environments are appraised as threatening also is affected by characteristics of the person (see 
Mendoza-Denton et al., this volume). Personal characteristics may influence either demand or resource appraisals or 
both. Several measures assess individual differences in the tendency to be vigilant for stigma-related threats. The 
Stigma-Consciousness Questionnaire (SCQ) measures a tendency to expect to be stigmatized and stereotyped on the 
basis of one's stigma (Pinel, 1999). Scores on the stigma consciousness scale correlate positively with perceptions of 
discrimination against the self and ingroup, with expectations that one will be treated negatively by outgroup 
members, with distrust of others, and with nonconscious attention towards social identity threatening cues (Kaiser, 
Vick & Major, 2004). These relationships have been observed among ethnic minorities, women, gays, and lesbians 
(Pinel, 1999; 2002). The Race Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire (RS-race) measures the tendency to anxiously 
expect, readily perceive, and intensely react to rejection based on race (Mendoza-Denton, Purdie, Downey, Davis & 
Pietrzak, 2002). Individual differences on the RS-race among African American students prior to entering college 
prospectively predicted the extent to which they reported experiencing negative race-related events during their first 
three weeks of college, the extent to which they felt negatively toward their peers and professors, and their sense of 
belonging at the university. Students high in RS-race also had less diverse friendships, decreased attendance at 
academic review sessions, and were especially likely to experience a decrease in their grades over time (see 
Mendoza-Denton et al., this volume). Individuals who are high in stigma consciousness or expectations of status-
based rejection are more likely to be vigilant to prejudice cues in their environment and sensitive to identity-related 
threats in their environment. Hence, threat appraisals are likely to be exacerbated for these individuals. 
Several other individual characteristics moderate the extent to which people appraise situations as relevant to 
their stigma.  One is the extent to which an individual is identified with his or her stigmatized identity. The more 
identified one is with a group, the greater likelihood that negative group-related events will be appraised as self-
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relevant. Negative events that are more self-relevant are appraised as more threatening (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; 
Patterson & Neufeld, 1987). Accordingly, the more central and important a stigmatized identity is to an individual, 
the more threatening it should be for that individual to perceive discrimination against that social identity, or to have 
negative stereotypes activated about that identity. Several experiments provide support for this hypothesis.  
Several experiments have demonstrated that being able to attribute a negative outcome to discrimination based 
on one’s social identity instead of to internal, stable aspects of one’s personal identity protects against depressed 
emotion and loss of self-esteem (e.g., Crocker, Voelkl, Testa & Major, 1991; Major, Kaiser & McCoy, 2003; Major, 
Quinton & Schmader, 2003). McCoy and Major (2003) hypothesized that this would be truer for individuals who 
not highly identified with the targeted group than for individuals who are highly identified with the group.  To test 
this hypothesis, women, all of whom had previously completed a measure of gender identification, received negative 
feedback on a speech from a male evaluator. They then subsequently learned that the evaluator had sexist or 
nonsexist attitudes.  Women low in gender identification reported less depressed emotion and higher self-esteem in 
the sexist than nonsexist condition, consistent with the idea that being able to attribute negative personal feedback to 
discrimination based on one’s social identity can protect self-esteem. Among highly gender-identified women, in 
contrast, self-esteem and depressed emotions did not differ between the sexist and nonsexist conditions. This 
interaction suggests that when social identity is a core aspect of the self, perceiving prejudice against that social 
identity is more more personally threatening, and less likely to buffer personal  self-esteem from negative feedback, 
than when social identity is is not a core aspect of the self.  
In a second experiment, Latino/a American students, all of whom had previously completed a measure of ethnic 
group identification, read either an article describing the existence of pervasive prejudice against Latino/as or a 
control article (McCoy & Major, 2003). They then completed measures of threat and self-directed emotions. As 
expected, group identification moderated the effects of prejudice condition on emotions. In the control condition, 
group identification was negatively associated with depressed emotions, such that participants who were highly 
identified with their ethnic group were less depressed than those low in ethnic group identification. Among 
participants in the prejudice condition, however, group identification was positively associated with depressed affect, 
such that participants high in ethnic group identification were more depressed after reading about prejudice against 
their group than were participants low in ethnic group identification. Furthermore, group identification also 
interacted with experimental condition to predict threat appraisals. The more Latino/a-American students in the 
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prejudice condition identified with their ethnic group, the more they reported being personally threatened by racism. 
These primary appraisals of threat, in turn, fully mediated the positive relationship between group identification and 
depressed emotion. Thus, consistent with the transactional model, group identification moderated the relationship 
between perceived prejudice against the group and depressed emotion via its impact on cognitive appraisals of 
personal threat. 
Other personal characteristics also moderate emotional responses to stressors through their impact on threat 
appraisals. Research in the health domain, for example, indicates that people with an optimistic outlook tend to 
appraise potentially stressful events as less harmful and taxing than people with a pessimistic outlook on life. The 
former’s more benign appraisals, in turn, are associated with greater psychological resilience in the face of stressful 
life events (Major et al., 1998). Kaiser et al. (2004) examined whether dispositional optimism influences the extent 
to which people appraise prejudice against their group as personally threatening, and through this mediator, their 
affect and self-esteem. In their first study, men and women who had previously completed a measure of 
dispositional optimism were randomly assigned to read an article about prejudice against their own gender group or 
one of two control articles (an article about prejudice against the elderly or a neutral article unrelated to prejudice). 
Participants then completed measures of self-esteem and depressed emotions.  Among men and women who read 
about pervasive sexism directed towards their own gender group, an optimistic outlook on life was associated with 
significantly higher self-esteem and less depression. Among participants who read control information, optimism 
was unrelated to depressed emotions and still significantly, but more weakly, positively related to self-esteem. There 
was no main effect of the prejudice manipulation on self-esteem or depressed emotions, even though participants in 
the sexism condition perceived greater prejudice against their gender group than participants in the control 
conditions. 
A follow-up study examined whether cognitive appraisals of personal threat mediated the relationship between 
optimism and self-evaluative emotions (Kaiser et al., Study 3). Women who were dispositional optimists or 
pessimists were recruited and asked to read an article documenting pervasive sexism against women. They then 
completed measures of primary and secondary appraisals, personal self-esteem, and depressed emotions. Again, 
optimism was positively related to self-esteem and negatively related to depressed emotions. Furthermore, as 
predicted, this relationship was mediated by cognitive appraisals. Compared to pessimists, optimists appraised 
prejudice against their group as less personally threatening and believed they were better prepared to cope with 
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prejudice. These more benign primary and secondary appraisals, in turn, were related to higher self-esteem and less 
depression. In sum, individual differences in personal resources such as dispositional optimism can affect the extent 
to which perceived prejudice against the group is cognitively appraised as threatening to the self. 
The extent to which individuals endorse or reject beliefs that legitimize status differences in society is another 
personal factor that may influence threat appraisals in intergroup situations (see Kaiser, this volume). Status 
legitimizing beliefs include the belief that status systems are permeable, that hard work is rewarded, and that one’s 
outcomes and status are under one’s own control, among others (Major & Schmader, 2001). In three studies, Major, 
Gramzow et al. (2002) found that the more strongly stigmatized participants (Latino/a-Americans; women) endorsed 
the ideology of individual mobility (e.g., agreed with items such as “Advancement in American society is possible 
for individuals of all ethnic groups”), the less likely they were to report in general that they personally (or members 
of their group) were a target of ethnic discrimination and the less likely they were to blame discrimination when a 
higher status confederate (European-American; man) rejected them for a desirable role. In contrast, among members 
of high status groups, the more they endorsed the ideology of individual mobility, the more likely they were to 
blame discrimination when a member of a lower status group rejected them for a desirable role. These differences as 
a function of group status further demonstrate how the meaning of the local situation is shaped by collective 
representations, and are another illustration of the dangers of drawing conclusions about the phenomenology of 
stigmatization from research based on nonstigmatized populations. 
 
Coping 
 
The second process central to transactional models of stress is coping. Coping is defined as a goal-directed process 
aimed at regulating emotion, cognition, behavior, physiology, and the environment in response to stressful events or 
circumstances (Compas, Conner-Smith, Saltzman, Thomsen, & Wadsworth, 2001). Coping efforts are process-
oriented, context-specific, and can be distinguished from the outcomes of coping efforts (i.e., whether or not they are 
successful). Coping processes, like appraisals, are theorized to differ as a function of characteristics of both the 
person and the situation (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Situational factors that affect coping include, for example, 
whether supportive others are present in the situation (Lazarus, 1999). Person factors include dispositional optimism, 
locus of control, and self-esteem, among other things (e.g., Major et al, 1998; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 2001; 
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Taylor, 1989). Structural factors, such as membership in a group with high social status and ample resources, may 
also moderate coping processes (e.g., Adler & Ostrove, 1999).  
The concept of coping is central to contemporary perspectives on stigma. In contrast to traditional perspectives, 
these perspectives portray the stigmatized not as passive victims, but as active agents attempting to make sense of 
their world, preserve their self-esteem, and achieve their goals (see Miller, this volume; Swim & Thomas, this 
volume). Conceptualizing the stigmatized in this way has led to a number of new insights (see Miller, this volume).  
A number of strategies of coping with prejudice have been identified (e.g., Allport, 1954/1979; Crocker & 
Major, 1989; Goffman, 1963; Jones et al., 1984). For example, Allport described fourteen different “ego-defenses” 
that targets of prejudice may employ in response to their situation, including: obsessive concern, denial of 
membership, withdrawal and passivity, clowning, strengthening in-group ties, slyness and cunning, identification 
with the dominant group (self-hate), aggression against own group, prejudice against out-groups, sympathy with 
other oppressed out-groups, fighting back (militancy), enhanced striving, and symbolic status-striving. 
Crocker and Major (1989) addressed three strategies by which members of stigmatized groups may cope with 
threats to their self-esteem posed by being a target of prejudice: devaluing the importance of domains in which they 
or their group are disadvantaged (Major & Schmader, 1998), comparing with members of their  ingroup rather than 
with advantaged outgroup members (Major, Schiacchitano, & Crocker, 1993), and attributing negative events to 
discrimination, instead of to internal, stable qualities of themselves (Crocker & Major, 1989; Major & Crocker, 
1993). Their suggestion that attributing negative outcomes to discrimination is a coping strategy proved highly 
controversial. How can attributing negative events to discrimination be a coping strategy if the perception of 
discrimination is also a perceived demand that leads to a threat appraisal? As I discussed extensively elsewhere 
(Major et al., 2002) , a key distinction is whether or not the person has experienced a specific negative outcome 
(e.g., a rejection) that threatens their personal self. If they have, attributing the negative event to discrimination (a 
more external cause) may be an effective coping strategy for protecting self-esteem because it shifts blame from 
stable, unique aspects of the personal self to the prejudice of others. For example, Major, Kaiser and McCoy (2003) 
found that women blamed themselves less, and experienced less depressed affect, if they imagined being rejected 
from a course by a sexist professor than if they imagined being rejected by a professor who thought they were 
unintelligent. Furthermore, self-blame mediated the effects of the attribution condition on depressed affect. When 
people perceive discrimination in the absence of an immediate personal threat, however, this perception serves no 
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such defensive purpose. Under these conditions, reports of discrimination may reflect the frequency or severity of 
discrimination, rather than attributional processes. 
Identifying more closely with one’s stigmatized group also has been identified as an effective coping strategy in 
response to prejudice and devaluation (Allport, 1954/1979; Branscombe, Schmitt & Harvey, 1999). Groups can 
provide emotional, informational, and instrumental support, social validation for one’s perceptions, and social 
consensus for one’s attributions. Turning to the group can facilitate attempts to directly solve the problems of 
prejudice and discrimination (e.g. collective action) as well as facilitate attempts to deal with the emotions resulting 
from perceiving prejudice. Branscombe and her colleagues propose that group identification increases in response to 
perceived prejudice against the group, and that this increased group identification enhances psychological well-
being. They further propose that this increase in identification with the group partially offsets the negative effects of 
perceiving pervasive prejudice against the group on personal self-esteem and psychological well-being. Consistent 
with this model, several studies have shown that perceptions of prejudice and group identification are positively 
associated (Branscombe et al., 1999; Major, Quinton & Schmader, 2003; Operario & Fiske, 2001). Further, Jetten, 
Branscombe, Schmitt, and Spears (2001) showed experimentally that customers in a piercing salon who read that 
prejudice existed against body piercers subsequently identified more strongly with that group than customers who 
read that prejudice against body piercers was decreasing. A number of studies also report a positive association 
between group identification and self-esteem among stigmatized groups (e.g., Bat-Chava, 1994; Branscombe et al., 
1999; Phinney, 1990; Rowley, Sellers, Chavous, & Smith, 1998). These findings are consistent with the idea that 
group identification can be an effective coping strategy in response to perceptions of prejudice against the group. 
As Allport (1954/1979) speculated, however, not all members of stigmatized groups may cope with prejudice 
by increasing their identification with the group. Some individuals and groups may cope with prejudice by 
decreasing their affiliation and identification with a group. Research by Ellemers and colleagues suggests that highly 
identified members of a group respond to threats to the group by increasing their identification with the group, 
whereas those members who are low in identification decrease their identification even more in response to threats 
to the group (see Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002 for a review). McCoy and Major (2003) observed this pattern in 
the second of their experiments described above. Specifically, after reading about pervasive discrimination toward 
their ethnic group, Latino/a-American students who had previously reported low levels of ethnic group identification 
identified even less with their ethnic group, whereas previously highly group identified Latino/a-American students 
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identified even more strongly with their ethnic group. Further research is needed to determine when group 
identification is a buffer against vs. a source of vulnerability to prejudice against the group. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Research on coping strategies in response to stigmatization is burgeoning (see Miller, this volume). One important 
lesson of this research is that different types of prejudice may require different types of coping (see Miller, this 
volume). Another important lesson emerging from this research is that coping often involves trade-offs. That is, 
strategies that are engaged in to achieve one goal (such as protection of self-esteem) may inhibit attainment of other 
goals (such as achievement) (see Swim & Thomas, this volume).  Protecting self-esteem by disengaging from the 
academic domain can potentially impair performance in that domain (Crocker & Major, 1989); attributing negative 
outcomes to discrimination to protect self-esteem can interfere with accurate knowledge of one’s strengths and 
weaknesses (Aronson & Inzlicht in press), complaining about prejudice might lead one to be socially derogated 
(Kaiser, this volume), and being vigilant for prejudice can spur one to act in ways that lead one to be treated more 
negatively by unsuspecting others (Pinel, 2002), and impair intergroup relations (Tropp, this volume). 
These trade-offs point to the importance of looking at multiple effects of stigma. Looking at only one outcome, 
such as self-esteem, or intergroup attitudes, or intellectual performance, cannot provide a full picture of the 
phenomenology of stigma. Further, these trade-offs point to the various ways in which  psychological well-being 
can be conceptualized: Is it feeling good about the self?. Doing well in school?  Feeling identified with one’s 
ingroup?  Getting along well with members of outgroups?  Engaging in efforts to combat prejudice? Maintaining a 
sense of control over one’s outcomes? All of these have been discussed as valid measures of good outcomes (see 
Swim & Thomas, this volume).  Obtaining any one of these outcomes may be achievable for those who are 
stigmatized, but achieving all in the face of stigma may be difficult. Researchers need to think broadly about the 
effects of stigma, and examine multiple outcomes simultaneously in order to fully understand the phenomenology of 
stigmatization.  
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Members of stereotyped groups live in a social world in which cultural stereotypes often influence the way others 
see them and behave toward them (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998).  One consequence of this state of affairs is that 
stereotype targets are regularly in the position of interacting with other social actors who hold, or are perceived to 
hold, stereotypical attitudes about their group.  Classic perspectives on the social basis of self-understanding such as 
symbolic interactionism suggest that self-stereotyping (i.e., application of cultural stereotypes to the self) is an 
unavoidable consequence of these stereotype-tinged social interactions (e.g., Allport, 1954; Cartwright, 1950; 
Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934).  According to these approaches, the self is derived from internalization of the way 
peoples’ social interaction partners view them.  In this analysis, stereotype targets simply absorb cultural beliefs 
about their group into their own self-concepts whenever they interact with individuals who subscribe to these 
stereotypic beliefs.  Because stereotypes pervade society, this analysis suggests that self-stereotyping is a highly 
prevalent, perhaps ubiquitous, phenomenon.  Our research takes a decidedly different approach to understanding the 
social basis of self-stereotyping.  Although we agree that self-stereotyping can be a product of one’s social 
relationships, our research suggests that it is far from unavoidable.  Rather, self-stereotyping is situation specific and 
contingent on the perceived views of salient social interaction partners and the desire to get along with them. 
 
 
THE SOCIAL BASIS OF THE SELF  
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Psychologists recognized long ago that the individuals people interact with shape self-understanding.  Specifically, 
symbolic interactionists argued that intersubjectivity with those around us was a critical element in the development 
and maintenance of self-understanding (see Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979; Stryker & Statham 1985 for reviews).  
For example, Mead (1934) proposed that self-concepts are formed and continually regulated by adopting the 
perspectives others have about the self.   Similarly, Cooley (1902) contended that self-understanding is predicated 
on the way individuals think others understand them.  In essence, these theorists argued that self-evaluations were 
situationally constructed such that they corresponded with the evaluations of others.   
Recent research on relational schemas (Baldwin, 1992; Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996) and transference (Andersen 
& Chen, 2002; Chen & Andersen, 1999) renewed focus on the interpersonal basis of self-understanding.  According 
to these approaches, self-evaluations are shaped by the perceived views of individuals with whom one has developed 
a long-term significant relationship.  Influenced by research on social cognition, they posit that aspects of the self 
become associated with significant others.  When reminded of a given significant other, self-evaluations 
corresponding to the way one typically behaves with that person come to the forefront of working memory, thus 
dictating how people see themselves at that moment. 
Our research is motivated by shared reality theory (Hardin & Conley, 2001; Hardin & Higgins, 1996), which 
unites classic perspectives’ focus on intersubjectivity, modern research on communication (e.g., Higgins, 1992; 
Krauss & Fussell, 1996), and social cognitive underpinnings.  Shared reality theory suggests that all social beliefs, 
including beliefs about the self, are situationally derived via intersubjectivity with other social actors.  Specifically, 
this perspective contends that social bonds and social beliefs are maintained through perceived consensus or “shared 
reality.” The establishment of specific shared realities in particular social interactions both creates social bonds and 
structures understanding of the world.  In other words, social beliefs are established and maintained to the degree 
that social interaction partners are thought to share them.  In addition, social bonds are established and maintained to 
the degree that participants in social interactions believe they have achieved mutually shared understanding of 
relevant beliefs and experiences (Hardin & Conley; Hardin & Higgins).   
 
Affiliative social tuning hypothesis 
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These basic assertions yield two hypotheses that guide the research discussed in this chapter.  First, because 
achieving shared reality is thought to create social bonds, it follows that people should experience a heightened need 
to develop shared reality with another social actor to the extent that they are motivated to get along with this person.  
One way for individuals to achieve this is to “tune” their social beliefs, including beliefs about the self, toward the 
views of the other person when affiliative motivation is high. We refer to this as the affiliative social tuning 
hypothesis.   
Although our research on self-stereotyping is the first to expressly test the affiliative social tuning hypothesis 
with respect to self-evaluations, there is evidence of affiliative social tuning of other social beliefs (e.g., Chen, 
Shechter, & Chaiken, 1996; Davis & Rusbult, 2001; McCann & Hancock, 1983; McCann & Higgins, 1992).  For 
example, Higgins & McCann (1984) found that the descriptions of an individual provided by people who valued 
positive interactions with superiors (i.e., "high authoritarians") corresponded with the ostensible views of a high 
status audience, but not a low status audience.  In other words, these individuals experienced attitude convergence 
with superiors, whom they care about, but not inferiors, whom they do not care about.  Sinclair and colleagues 
(2004b) also found that even automatic attitudes about others were subject to affiliative social tuning.  We showed 
that people who interacted with a likable experimenter shifted their automatic ethnic attitudes toward the 
experimenter’s ostensible attitudes, but people who interacted with a rude experimenter did not experience 
commensurate attitude shift (see also Lowery, Hardin & Sinclair, 2001). 
 
Domain relevance hypothesis 
 
In every day social interaction, individuals that engender high affiliative motivation may espouse many social 
beliefs.  Drawing on the communication literature (Higgins, 1992; Krauss & Fussell, 1996), shared reality theory 
also provides some guidance as to which of these beliefs is most likely to form the basis of one’s attempts to create 
shared reality via social tuning.  One source of this guidance is the domain relevance hypothesis.  It states that a 
social belief that is under negotiation will respond to the other social actor’s view that is most local or specific to it.  
For example, one could know another person’s views of people in general, people from your town and you as an 
individual.  Although each of these views is potentially relevant to the self, attempts to achieve shared reality 
Self-stereotyping  4 
regarding the self with that person should entail adjusting to her views about you as an individual, as doing so yields 
the best chance of creating mutual understanding.  The less precise match between the self and what this person 
thinks of people in general or people from your town has greater potential for slippage.  If this person thinks you are 
different from the aforementioned groups, adjusting the self to conform to her beliefs about these groups will 
actually violate her expectations, decrease mutual understanding, and likely make the social interaction less pleasant 
(Krauss & Fussell; Orive, 1988). 
One can see the critical role of intersubjectivity with others that characterized classic perspectives on the social 
basis of the self, such as symbolic interactionism, in the notion of social tuning presented in these hypotheses.  
Individuals are thought to adjust beliefs that are relevant to important social interactions (including beliefs about the 
self) to the ostensible beliefs of other people involved in these interactions to achieve shared reality, the state of 
perceived mutual understanding (i.e., intersubjectivity).  However, unlike recent perspectives on the social basis of 
the self that focus on the role of significant others in constructing one’s self-understanding, our perspective suggests 
that both significant others and novel social actors who are the object of situationally derived affiliative motivation 
can elicit social tuning.  From this perspective, the phenomenological sense of a stable self that most individuals 
enjoy is a product of two things: stable environmental and motivational input.  People experience the self as stable 
because they tend to interact with similar types of people (Andersen, Reznik & Manzella, 1996), frequent similar 
types of environments, and hold long-term social roles (e.g. occupational, familial) that structure their interpersonal 
interactions. 
The potential for dramatic flexibility of implicit and explicit attitudes as a function of the perceived views in 
one’s interpersonal context and affiliative motives proposed by shared reality theory is predicated on connectionist 
models of mental representation (Smith, 1996).  Connectionist models suggest that information is not contained in 
inert nodes; but rather, distributed across an array of processing units connected by unidirectional links.  A given 
mental state is a pattern of activation across these units and links that best fit the amalgam of current input.  As such, 
all mental representation is highly flexible and dependent on immediate experiences, motives, etc.  Thus, classic 
notions of intersubjectivity dynamically structuring social beliefs feasibly combine with modern notions of cognitive 
representation. 
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THE INTERPERSONAL BASIS OF SELF-STEREOTYPING 
 
Given that stereotypes are widely shared cultural beliefs that influence how stereotype targets are evaluated (Devine 
& Elliot, 1995; Stangor & Lange, 1994), and stereotype targets are well aware of that fact that stereotypes may 
influence how they are perceived (Crocker, et al., 1998), it is likely that stereotypes targets face a great many 
situations in which they must interact with individuals who hold, or are presumed to hold, stereotypes of their group.  
How does being subject to this predicament affect the way in which stereotype targets see themselves?  The 
affiliative social tuning hypothesis and the domain relevance hypothesis make clear predictions regarding the impact 
of this predicament.  According to the affiliative social tuning hypothesis, the stereotype-relevant evaluations of 
others will translate into self-evaluations and corresponding behavior when affiliative motivation is high as opposed 
to low.  In other words, stereotype targets’ self-evaluations will become more stereotype consistent when they 
possess high as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward another social actor perceived to hold stereotype 
consistent attitudes about their social group.  In contrast, stereotype targets’ self-evaluations will become less 
stereotype consistent when they possess high as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward another social actor 
believed to hold stereotype inconsistent attitudes.  The domain relevance hypothesis suggests that once individuals’ 
stereotype-relevant self-evaluations are under negotiation, they will tune to the beliefs that are most closely related 
to them.  In other words, if someone is privy to another social actors’ stereotype-relevant views of members of their 
social group and of them as individuals, that person’s self-evaluations should tune to the social actor’s views of 
themselves as individuals because these beliefs are more relevant to the self than are beliefs about members of the 
group to which one belongs, and are therefore more likely to create mutual understanding.   In the remainder of this 
chapter we will discuss several experiments that examine the veracity of these predictions. 
 
Affiliative social tuning experiments 
 
To examine the affiliative social tuning hypothesis we manipulated whether participants believed their interaction 
partner held stereotype consistent or inconsistent attitudes of their social group in three experiments.  We also 
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manipulated (Experiments 1 & 3) or measured (Experiment 2) participants’ affiliative motivation toward that 
person.  In each of these experiments, we found clear and consistent support for our predictions (see Sinclair, 
Huntsinger, Skorinko, & Hardin, 2004a for a more detailed presentation of these results). 
In Experiment 1, we tested the affiliative social tuning hypothesis with respect to self-stereotyping on gender-
relevant traits.  Eighty-three participants (50 women and 33 men) participated in the experiment.  Participants were 
greeted by a female experimenter and informed that the experiment concerned the transmission of rumors.  
Participants then completed a brief demographics questionnaire; among the questions was an item asking when their 
birthday was.  At this point, participants were assigned to one of two affiliative motivation conditions.  We 
employed a two-fold manipulation of affiliative motivation based on previous work (Griffitt, 1968; Kelley & 
Thibaut, 1978; Miller, Downs, & Prentice, 1998).  Participants were told that they were going to have a relatively 
long interaction with someone who happened to share their birthday (high affiliative motivation) or a short 
interaction with someone whose birthday differed from theirs (low affiliative motivation).   
After this, participants were told they would read some information allegedly completed by the other participant 
in order to give participants some information about this person.  This information constituted the manipulation of 
the ostensible group attitudes of the interaction partner (always female).  Embedded within this packet of 
information was a questionnaire entitled "Attitudes about women" that was designed to convey to participants that 
their imminent social interaction partner had stereoonme consistent or inconsistent attitudes about women.  For 
example, in the stereotype consistent condition, the questionnaire indicated that her social interaction partner 
strongly agreed with the statement “Women should be cherished and protected by men.” In contrast, in the 
stereotype inconsistent condition, her partner purportedly agreed with the statement “Women often miss out on good 
jobs due to sexual discrimination.”  
After being given time to peruse the questionnaire, participants were informed that they would complete several 
questions about themselves that their partner would also have the opportunity to view.  The dependent measure in 
this experiment was the degree to which participants rated ten traits stereotypically associated with women (calm, 
caring, compassionate, faithful, attractive, sensitive, sweet, sad, shy, weak) and nine traits stereotypically associated 
with men (athletic, competitive, confident, outspoken, intelligent, strong, aggressive, arrogant, insensitive) as 
indicative of the self on this questionnaire.  To create an index of stereotypicality of self-evaluation, we transformed 
each item into a z-score within gender, separately averaged the female and male traits, and created a difference score 
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by subtracting the stereotypically male traits from the stereotypically female traits.  Higher numbers indicated self-
evaluations that were more consistent with the cultural stereotype of females. 
If the affiliative social tuning hypothesis is correct, we should have found that female participants’ self-
evaluations were more stereotype-consistent when they had high as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward an 
interaction partner who was believed to hold stereotype-consistent attitudes about their group.  The opposite pattern 
of self-evaluations should have emerged when the interaction partner was believed to hold stereotype inconsistent 
attitudes; such that, female participants’ self-evaluations were less stereotype-consistent when they had high versus 
low affiliative motivation toward their interaction partner.  Furthermore, we did not expect male participants to 
evidence similar shifts in self-evaluation because their interaction partner’s attitudes about women were less 
germane or relevant to their self-views. 
To test these predictions, we ran a 2 (partner attitudes) X 2 (affiliative motivation) X 2 (gender) between 
participants ANOVA on participants’ responses to the self-evaluation measure.  As expected, the only reliable effect 
was a three-way interaction between partner attitudes, affiliative motivation, and participant gender, F (1, 75) = 
6.11, p = .02, ŋ2 = .08.  To more fully explore this three-way interaction, we conducted separate ANOVAs on female 
and male participants’ responses to the measure of self-evaluation. 
First, as predicted and consistent with the affiliative social tuning hypothesis, the only effect to emerge for 
female participants was a two-way interaction between partner attitudes and affiliative motivation, F (1, 46) = 6.97, 
p = .01, ŋ2 = .13 (see Figure 1).     
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FIG. 1.  Female participants' stereotypicality of self-evaluations as a function of affiliative motivation and the ostensible attitudes 
of an interaction partner in Experiment 1.  Note:  Higher numbers indicate more stereotype consistent self-evaluations. 
 
As hypothesized, when the ostensible attitudes of the interaction partner were stereotype consistent, women’s 
self-evaluations were more stereotype consistent when they possessed high affiliative motivation than low affiliative 
motivation toward that partner (p = .04, one-tailed).  The opposite pattern of self-evaluations was found when the 
ostensible attitudes of the interaction partner were stereotype inconsistent; women’s self-evaluations were more 
stereotype inconsistent when they possessed high affiliative motivation than low affiliative motivation (p = .03, one-
tailed).  Furthermore, investigation of male participants’ responses yielded no reliable main effects (both p’s > .13) 
and the interaction between partner attitudes and affiliative motivation did not reach significance, p = .291.   
In a second experiment, we sought to provide further support for shared reality theory’s affiliative social tuning 
hypothesis and to gain leverage against a self-presentation explanation of these results (e.g., Jones & Pittman, 1982; 
Zanna & Pack, 1975).  In an attempt to decrease any self-presentational concerns, participants were told that the 
measure of self-evaluation would not be viewed by their interaction partner and was simply for "our records."  
Furthermore, in Experiment 2 we had female participants (n = 75) actually interact with a confederate.  We expected 
that participants' behavior would also be subject to affiliative social tuning, with their behavior mimicking self-
evaluations.  Rather than experimentally manipulating affiliative motivation in Experiment 2, we took advantage of 
naturally occurring differences in the extent to which one wishes to form (or avoid) interpersonal relationships.  To 
accomplish this, we measured participants’ sense of loneliness or sense of being socially overburdened via two 
questionnaires.  Participants were assigned to either a loneliness or social overburdened scale.  From scores on these 
two scales, we created high (either lonely or not socially overburdened) and low (either not lonely or socially 
overburdened) affiliative motivation groups.  Similar to Experiment 1, participants were informed that the 
experiment dealt with first impressions and they would get a chance to view some information about their 
interaction partner (always male) and would then get a chance to interact with this person.  First, participants were 
given the opportunity to view their interaction partner's answers to a series of questions.  This constituted the 
ostensible group attitudes of the interaction partner and was the same as that in the first experiment.  Next, 
participants were given the measure of affiliative motivation discussed above.  After participants completed this 
measure, the experimenter claimed that she forgot to have them complete a background questionnaire earlier in the 
experiment.  This background questionnaire was for the experimenter's files and their partner would not view their 
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answers to these items.  The measure of self-evaluation was contained within this questionnaire.  By making the 
measure of self-evaluation not tied to the interaction with their partner in any way (i.e., this person would never 
view their answers), we sought to minimize participants' self-presentational concerns when completing this measure. 
The items that comprised this measure were similar to the series of stereotypically female and stereotypically male 
traits as those used in the first experiment. After completing these items, participants commenced with an 
unstructured interaction with their interaction partner, actually a male confederate blind to experimental condition.  
Following the interaction, the confederate rated the stereotypicality of participants’ behavior, with higher numbers 
indicating greater stereotype-consistent behaviors than stereotype inconsistent behavior enacted during the course of 
the interaction.   Predictions for both participants' behavior and self-evaluation were the same as those in Experiment 
1.  
To test these predictions, we conducted a 2 (partner attitudes) X 2 (affiliative motivation) between participants 
ANOVA on participants’ behavior as rated by the confederate.  The only reliable effect to emerge from this analysis 
was the predicted interaction between partner attitudes and affiliative motivation, F (1, 64) = 6.15, p = .02, ŋ2 = .09 
(see Figure 2).  Consistent with the affiliative social tuning hypothesis, when the interaction partner’s ostensible 
attitudes about women were stereotype consistent, participants’ behavior was more stereotype consistent when they 
possessed high affiliative motivation than low affiliative motivation toward that partner (p = .04, one-tailed).  This 
pattern was reversed when the ostensible attitudes of the interaction partner were stereotype inconsistent, with 
participants’ behavior being more stereotype inconsistent in the high affiliative motivation condition than the low 
affiliative motivation condition (p = .05, one-tailed).  In addition, we replicated the same pattern of self-evaluation 
as that found in Experiment 1 (Interaction, F (1, 71) = 5.88, p = .02, ŋ2 = .08).  Consistent with the affiliative social 
tuning hypothesis, when the interaction partner’s ostensible attitudes about women were stereotype consistent, 
participants’ self-evaluations were more stereotype consistent when they possessed high affiliative motivation (M = 
.165) than low affiliative motivation (M = -.244) toward that partner (p = .05, one-tailed). This pattern was reversed 
when the ostensible attitudes of the interaction partner were stereotype inconsistent, with participants’ self-
evaluations being more stereotype inconsistent in the high affiliative motivation condition (M = -.266) than the low 
affiliative motivation condition (M = .172) (p = .04, one-tailed).  
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FIG. 2.  Stereotypicality of participants' behavior as a function of affiliative motivation and the ostensible attitudes of an 
interaction partner in Experiment 2.  Note:  Higher numbers indicate more stereotype consistent behaviors. 
 
In Experiment 3, we wanted to generalize these findings to another stereotyped group (e.g., African Americans, 
n = 29), another type of stereotype relevant self-view (i.e., academic self-evaluation), and gain further leverage 
against a self-presentation explanation of previous results.  Because the predominant stereotype about  
African Americans is that they are intellectually inferior (Devine & Elliot, 1995), this allowed us to set up a situation 
in which we could pit two motives against one another.  To do this, we created a situation in which participants 
competed to gain entrance into a prestigious academic team and earn a monetary prize.  If strategic self-presentation 
is guiding participants’ responses, then we should find inflated academic self-evaluations in all conditions since this 
situation calls out for a maximization of academic self-evaluation to make the team and get the money.  In contrast, 
if participants are guided by affiliative social tuning, we should find academic self-evaluations varying as a function 
of affiliative motivation and perceived stereotypicality of partner attitudes regardless of whether this would thwart 
entrance into the team and lessen chances to win the monetary prize.  More specifically, we predicted participants' 
academic self-evaluations would be lower (i.e., consistent with stereotypes of African Americans) when they had 
high versus low affiliative motivation toward a person who was perceived to hold stereotype consistent attitudes 
about their group.  In contrast, we expected participants' academic self-evaluations to be higher when they had high 
as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward someone believed to have stereotype inconsistent attitudes about 
their group.  Some broad conceptions of self-presentation do not limit themselves to postulating that self-
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presentation only occurs to make one appear positive (e.g., Schlenker, 2003); however, these perspectives are unable 
to predict which of the aforementioned self-evaluative responses would occur.   
The general procedure was as follows.  Participants were led to believe that they were competing for a slot on a 
prestigious academic team and a monetary prize.  We manipulated level of affiliative motivation by telling 
participants that the person who selected team members (high affiliative motivation) or another prospective member 
of the team (low affiliative motivation) was next door, would view their materials, and they would later interact with 
this person.  After being told this information, participants were informed that prior to interacting with this person, 
they would be given some information about him.  This constituted the manipulation of ostensible group attitudes.  
In one case, this person was described as an economics major who liked classic rock, played golf, and wanted to be 
a corporate lawyer (stereotype consistent attitudes condition).  In the other condition, this person was described as a 
sociology major that liked hip-hop music, volunteered at a local charity, and wanted to be a civil rights attorney 
(stereotype inconsistent attitudes condition).    The same picture of a European American male accompanied both 
descriptions.  Other generic information common to both descriptions was used to lessen suspicion and to flesh out 
the descriptions.   Pre-testing determined that African Americans would indeed assume the former person to have 
more stereotype-consistent views than the latter person.  After hearing the descriptions, participants were handed a 
questionnaire containing the main dependent measure and informed that their answers to this questionnaire would be 
used to determine entrance onto the academic team.  The dependent measure was Steele and Aronson's (1995) 3-
item measure of academic investment.  The items were:  “How would you rate your overall academic ability?” (1 = 
not good at all to 7 = very good), “How much do you value academics?” (1 = not very much to 7 = very much), and 
“How important are academics to you?” (1 = not very important to 7 = very important), α = .77.  To be consistent 
with the two previous experiments, we reverse-scored participants responses to each item, transformed participants' 
responses to each item into z-scores, averaging all three to create an index of self-evaluation, with higher numbers 
representing more negative, academic self-evaluations than lower numbers.  
To test these predictions, we submitted the measure of academic self-evaluation to a 2 (partner attitudes) X 2 
(affiliative motivation) between participants ANOVA.  As can be seen in Figure 3, the predicted interaction was 
obtained, F (1, 23) = 7.25, p = .01, ŋ2 = .24, controlling for participants math and verbal SAT.  In support of shared 
reality theory's affiliative social tuning hypothesis, we found that when participants believed their interaction partner 
held stereotype consistent attitudes of African Americans, their academic self-evaluations were more negative (i.e., 
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more stereotype consistent) when they had high as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward him (p = .06, one-
tailed).  This pattern of academic self-evaluations Vol.triking given that participants actually rated themselves as less 
academically talented to the very person who would be choosing members of the academic team.  In addition, the 
opposite pattern of academic self-evaluations emerged when the ostensible attitudes of this person were stereotype 
inconsistent.   In this case, African Americans' academic self-evaluations were higher (i.e., less stereotype 
consistent) when participants had high as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward him (p = .02, one-tailed).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIG. 3.  African Americans' academic self-evaluations as a function of affiliative motivation and the ostensible attitudes of an 
interaction partner in Experiment 3.  Note:  Higher numbers indicate more stereotype consistent self-evaluations. 
 
Across all three experiments, two stereotype targets, two manipulations of ostensible group attitudes of another 
social actor, and various manipulations (and measures) of affiliative motivation we found strong and consistent 
evidence for the veracity of the affiliative social tuning hypothesis.  In sum, we found that stereotype targets' self-
evaluations and behavior varied as a function of affiliative motivation and the perceived stereotype relevant attitudes 
of their interaction partner.  What these experiments demonstrate is that the self-stereotyping is neither unavoidable 
nor simply the direct result of stereotype targets internalizing the beliefs of those people with whom they interact.  
Social interactions can act to promote self-stereotyping or to attenuate self-stereotyping.    
Furthermore, it seems that participants’ self-views were genuinely changing as opposed to simply being 
strategically presented to make a positive impression.  First, in Experiment 2, participants' responses on the self-
evaluation measure were completely confidential and would not be viewed by their interaction partner, minimizing 
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the extent to which participants would be motivated to engage in strategic self-presentation.  Second, Experiment 3 
directly pitted strategic self-presentational goals against affiliative social tuning goals.  In this experiment we created 
a situation in which participants, if guided by self-presentation, should have presented themselves in a positive light 
across all conditions to accomplish the goal of attaining entrance onto the academic team and the monetary reward 
associated with entrance on the team.  However, this was not the case; participants’ self-evaluations reflected 
processes of affiliative social tuning.  
 
Domain relevance experiments:  Self-stereotyping and exceptions to the rule    
 
As discussed earlier (see also Huntsinger & Sinclair, 2004), an additional unique prediction derived from shared 
reality theory is the domain relevance hypothesis (Hardin & Conley, 2001).  This hypothesis suggests that when 
confronted with multiple applicable views upon which to construct a shared understanding with another person an 
individual will choose to social tune toward only those views that will lead to the development of the most precise 
shared understanding with this person.  That is, they will choose the other social actor’s belief that is most closely 
related to the belief under negotiation.  This hypothesis can help us understand how stereotype targets contend with 
conflicts between how a person sees his or her group and how this person sees him or her as an individual.  For 
example, stereotype targets may not always encounter a person who sees him or her through the lens of a group 
stereotype; rather, this person may see him or her as an exception to the rule, as being different from the rest of the 
members of a particular group (i.e., women, African Americans, etc.).   
Perceivers are relatively adept at categorizing apparently stereotype disconfirming individuals as exceptions to 
the rule (e.g., Allport, 1954; Hewstone, 1994).  What this suggests is that stereotype targets may encounter 
individuals in their social environment who, for whatever reason, see them as different from other members of the 
group.  This mismatch between group-individual attitudes could take many forms, with a person being seen as an 
exception to a more or less stereotypical image of the group, e.g., someone with traditional attitudes about women 
thinks a woman he is interacting with is agentic, or someone with non-traditional attitudes about women thinks a 
woman he is interacting with is quite communal.  These individual level perceptions need not be data-driven in any 
fashion or correspond to how a person actually sees him or herself.  For example, a person may erroneously 
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conclude that Jane is quite a good leader based on company rumor or some random first encounter he has with her at 
the company softball game last weekend.   
How will a stereotype target (i.e., a woman) respond to this discrepancy?  One possibility is that the attitudes 
about the group will exert more influence on a woman's self-evaluation than attitudes about her as an individual.  
For example, to the extent that being seen as different from her gender group makes a woman feel distinct from this 
valued social identity, this feeling of distinctiveness may then motivate a need to re-affirm that identity.  One means 
of accomplishing this goal would be to see oneself as highly similar to the group (i.e., self-stereotype; Pickett, et al., 
2002).  In addition, self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987) implies that simply making a particular social identity 
and the stereotypes associated with this identity salient may induce stereotype consistent self-evaluation (Hogg & 
Turner, 1987).   
Although either of these alternatives is possible, shared reality theory proposes a decidedly different resolution 
to these group-individual mismatches.  Based on the domain relevance hypothesis, it is expected that a person will 
seek to develop shared reality about the self based on the attitudes most closely related to the self available within a 
particular social interaction.  In this case, although both this person’s individual and group attitudes are potentially 
applicable to the self, the individual level attitudes about the self represent the most local or domain specific views 
upon which to construct her self-evaluation with this person.  Social tuning to the group level attitudes would not 
serve her goal to develop shared reality about the self with this person, given that these are inconsistent with how 
this person specifically views her.  Such mismatch would not facilitate the development of shared reality or social 
bonds with this person (see Huntsinger & Sinclair, 2004 for a detailed discussion of the domain relevance 
hypothesis).   
In Experiments 4 and 5, we (Huntsinger & Sinclair, 2004) tested the domain relevance hypothesis by examining 
the affiliative social tuning of women’s self-evaluations in response to being confronted with group-individual 
mismatches of another social actor's attitudes and the level of affiliative motivation present within the interaction.  
Affiliative motivation was manipulated by varying whether the participant was in a position of low power (high 
affiliative motivation: they were being chosen, or not chosen, by a male confederate to become members of an 
interesting discussion group), or equal power (low affiliative motivation:  the male confederate was simply a 
research assistant of no consequence to participants) in relation to another person. To manipulate the group attitudes 
of another social actor, we created a situation in which participants ostensibly overheard a conversation between a 
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male confederate and a female experimenter, in which the confederate made a series of comments about women in 
general and a series of comments about participants in particular that either matched or mismatched his attitudes 
about women in general.    
In Experiment 4 (n = 65), the confederate's attitudes toward women were stereotype-consistent across all 
conditions and we varied whether his attitudes about participants matched or mismatched these group attitudes.  In 
Experiment 5 (n = 47), the confederate's attitudes toward women were generally stereotype-inconsistent and he then 
expressed attitudes about participants that matched or mismatched these attitudes.  In both experiments, we 
predicted that participants' self-evaluations would social tune toward their social interaction partner’s attitudes about 
them in particular, regardless of whether these conflicted (i.e., group-individual mismatch conditions) or 
corresponded (i.e., group-individual match conditions) to this person's attitudes about their gender group, when 
affiliative motivation was high as opposed to low toward this person.    
The basic procedure across Experiments 4 & 5 was as follows.  Participants were recruited under the guise that 
they were participating in a group discussion screening process.  The discussions were described as fun, with free 
food and drink, and a monetary prize raffled off to those who made it into the discussions.  A female experimenter 
who informed participants that they would be completing two questionnaires greeted them.  She told them that first 
questionnaire would be used to determine entrance into the discussions and the second would be used to give the 
researchers more information about participants and would only be viewed if participants became members of the 
discussion.   
As this was being said, participants could hear typing through a slightly ajar door directly to the right of where 
they were seated.  Participants could hear but not see what was occurring in this adjacent room.  After informing 
participants about what they would be doing during the experiment, the experimenter said one of two things to 
participants in an offhand manner.  This was our manipulation of affiliative motivation.  In the high affiliative 
motivation condition, the female experimenter informed participants that Matt, the discussion leader, was entering 
previous participants’ responses to the first questionnaire into a computer and would be making his decisions as to 
who would get into the discussions later in that day.  In the low affiliative motivation condition, participants were 
told that Matt was a research assistant entering previous participants’ responses to the first questionnaire into a 
computer for the discussion leader.  The discussion leader would be in later that day to make his decisions.   
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After this exchange, the experimenter handed participants the first questionnaire and went into the room with 
the male confederate who participants thought was named “Matt.”  In reality, this first questionnaire was bogus and 
the confederate’s statements about participants in particular, to be discussed shortly, were supposedly based on 
participants’ answers to this questionnaire.  We were not concerned with how participants completed any of these 
items.  After participants completed this questionnaire, the experimenter said she forgot to put together the second 
questionnaire and would be right back.  The experimenter then went into the adjacent room with the male 
confederate, leaving the door ajar so participants could hear what was occurring in the room.  Participants then 
overheard a conversation between the confederate and the experimenter in which the male confederate expressed 
stereotype consistent attitudes (Experiment 4) or stereotype inconsistent attitudes (Experiment 5) about women in 
general and then expressed attitudes about participants in particular that either matched or were in opposition to 
these group attitudes.  For example, in Experiment 4 the confederate conveyed stereotype consistent attitudes about 
women in general by saying that the women in the previous discussion have been great because they don’t take the 
lead, are sensitive to other's opinions, and don’t state their own opinions.  He then said that, based on the bogus 
questionnaire the participant just completed, he expected the participant to be just like the previous female 
participants or just the opposite. 
After participants overheard this exchange, the experimenter returned with the second questionnaire, informed 
participants once again that their answers to these questions would not be viewed until after the discussions had 
occurred and only if they were chosen for the discussions.  It should be noted that the conversation in no way 
suggested to participants that they were likely or unlikely to be chosen.  This second questionnaire contained the 
measure of self-evaluation.  Similar to Experiments 1 and 2, participants rated the degree to which a series of eight 
traits stereotypically associated with women (sympathetic, calm, caring, compassionate, feminine, verbally skilled, 
dependent, supportive) were indicative of the self, Experiment 4 α = .67 and Experiment 5 α = .71.  As before, these 
items were individually z-scored and averaged to form the measure of self-evaluation with higher numbers 
indicating more stereotype-consistent self-evaluations than lower numbers. 
In both experiments, the design was a 2 (affiliative motivation:  high, low) X 2 (partner attitudes:  group-
individual match, group-individual mismatch) between participants factorial.  In Experiment 4, when the 
confederate’s attitudes about both women in general and individual participants were consistent with prevailing 
stereotypes, we predicted that participants' self-evaluations would be more stereotype-consistent when they had high 
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versus low affiliative motivation toward this person, consistent with Experiments 1-3. In contrast, when the 
confederate’s attitudes about women in general were consistent with prevailing stereotypes but his attitudes about 
individual participants were inconsistent with prevailing stereotypes, we predicted that participants' self-evaluation 
would be less stereotype-consistent when they had high as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward this person.  
This finding would provide support for the domain relevance hypothesis.   
In Experiment 4, the expected interaction between affiliative motivation and confederate attitudes was obtained, 
F (1, 61) = 10.37, p = .002, ŋ2 = .15 (see Figure 4).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIG. 4. Self-evaluation as a function of confederate attitudes (group-individual match, group-individual mismatch) and affiliative 
motivation (Experiment 4).  Note:  Higher numbers indicate more stereotype consistent self-evaluations. 
 
Consistent with predictions, and Experiments 1-3, when the confederate expressed attitudes consistent with 
prevailing stereotypes about women in general and individual participants, participants’ self-evaluations were more 
stereotype consistent when they had high affiliative motivation as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward him 
(p = .03, one-tailed).  Providing evidence for the domain relevance hypothesis, the opposite pattern emerged when 
the confederate's attitudes about individual participants conflicted with his attitudes about their group.  Specifically, 
when participants were seen as exceptions to the rule (i.e., the confederate had stereotype inconsistent views of 
individual participants but stereotype consistent views of women in general), we found that participants social tuned 
their self-evaluations toward the individual level attitudes of the confederate.  Participants’ self-evaluations were 
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more stereotype inconsistent when they possessed high affiliative motivation than when they had low affiliative 
motivation toward the confederate (p = .01, one-tailed).  Consistent with predictions, participants social tuned 
toward the most local or specific set of self-relevant attitudes of the confederate, his attitudes about them as 
individuals. 
In Experiment 5, we predicted that when the confederate expressed stereotype inconsistent attitudes about 
women in general and individual participants, participants’ self-evaluations would be less stereotype consistent 
when they had high as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward him, consistent with Experiments 1- 3.  In 
contrast, based on the domain relevance hypothesis, we predicted the opposite pattern of self-evaluations when 
participants were seen as exceptions to the rule.  Specifically, when the confederate was believed to have stereotype 
inconsistent attitudes about women in general, but have stereotype consistent attitudes about individual participants, 
we predicted that participants’ self-evaluations would be more stereotype consistent when they had high as opposed 
to low affiliative motivation toward the confederate.  This is precisely what we found.  In Experiment 5, as in 
Experiment 4, the only reliable effect was the predicted interaction, F (1, 43) = 5.38, p = .03, ŋ2 = .11.  As can be 
seen in Figure 5, domain relevance hypothesis was again supported.  Consistent with predictions, when the 
confederate expressed attitudes inconsistent with prevailing stereotypes about women in general and individual 
participants, participants’ self-evaluations were less stereotype consistent when they had high as opposed to low 
affiliative motivation toward this person (p = .04, one-tailed).  Providing further evidence for the veracity of the 
domain relevance hypothesis, the opposite pattern of self-evaluation was found when the confederate expressed 
stereotype inconsistent attitudes about women in general but stereotype consistent attitudes about individual 
participants (i.e., he saw them as exceptions to the rule).  In this case, participants’ self-evaluations were more 
stereotype consistent when they had high as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward the confederate (p = .07, 
one-tailed).   As in Experiment 4, participants social tuned toward those beliefs that would lead to the most local or 
specific shared reality, this person’s attitudes about them as individuals, disregarding this person’s attitudes about 
their group. 
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FIG. 5. Self-evaluation as a function of confederate attitudes (group-individual match, group-individual mismatch) and affiliative 
motivation (Experiment 5). Note:  Higher numbers indicate more stereotype consistent self-evaluations. 
 
Across both experiments, we found clear support for shared reality theory’s domain relevance hypothesis.  In 
each experiment, regardless of whether another social actor’s ostensible attitudes about participants conflicted or 
coincided with this person’s ostensible attitudes about their group, participants social tuned toward what they 
believed his attitudes about them were under conditions of high but not low affiliative motivation.  Being seen as an 
exception to the rule does not motivate participants to see themselves in a manner consistent with how the group is 
perceived.  Rather, participants’ self-evaluations incorporate or social tune toward the most local or domain specific 
attitudes of another social actor, the person’s attitudes about them as an individual; which in turn leads to the most 
accurate representation of the self as seen through this other person's eyes.  While being seen as an exception to the 
(stereotypic) rule may act to insulate one’s self-evaluation from the negative effects of broader stereotypes it could 
also have detrimental effects.  For example, seeing certain women as exceptions to the rule may be used as a form of 
social control (Jackman, 1994) and allow men to maintain their stereotypic beliefs of women generally.  
Furthermore, being seen as an exception to the rule could also thwart women’s attempts at social action by 
decreasing their sense of group identity and shared fate (Wright, 2001). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Our research uses shared reality theory as a framework to examine how the fundamental need to get along with 
others and the ostensible views of others intersect to lead members of stereotyped groups to view themselves, and 
behave, in line with cultural stereotypes.  This research found support for the affiliative social tuning hypothesis 
which argues that the stereotype-relevant evaluations of others will translate into self-evaluations and corresponding 
behavior when affiliative motivation is high as opposed to low.  It also found support for the domain relevance 
hypothesis that contends that a social belief under negotiation will respond to the other social actor’s view that is 
most local or specific to it.  These findings occurred across a number of operationalizations of affiliative motivation 
and perceived attitudes; in within-group and cross-group interactions; and for two types of stereotype targets, 
women and African Americans.   As such, unlike perspectives highlighting the social basis of the self to suggest that 
the prevalence of cultural stereotypes makes self-stereotyping virtually ubiquitous and unavoidable, our research 
robustly demonstrates that self-stereotyping depends critically on the perceived views of one’s social interaction 
partners and one’s relationship to them.   
Although research on self-presentation also finds fluctuations in self-evaluation as a function of affiliative 
motives (e.g., Schlenker, 2003; Zanna & Pack, 1975), we do not believe that these results can be simply attributed to 
self-presentation for several reasons.  First, in Experiment 2 participants did not think that the other social actor 
would see their self-descriptions.  Thus, if strategic self-presentation were driving the results, self-evaluative shift 
would not be warranted and should not have been found.   Second, in Experiments 3 – 5 participants actually 
behaved in ways that likely reduced their chances of receiving social and financial rewards in order to enhance the 
likelihood sharing reality with the other social actor.  In Experiment 3, participants actually described themselves as 
less intelligent when expecting to interact with someone who seemed to have stereotypic views of African 
Americans when that person had the power to select them for an academic team versus did not have power over 
them.  In Experiments 4 & 5, women tuned their self-evaluations to a high powered person’s views of them as 
individuals, consistent with the domain relevance hypothesis, even though this entailed saying that they were very 
different from women already doing well in the discussion group they were trying to gain entrance to.  Theory and 
research on self-presentation cannot account for the pull of affiliative motivation over the rewards; if anything, most 
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of the self-presentation literature implies that the rewards should have dictated the manner of self-evaluative shift 
(Jones & Pittman, 1982).  
We also believe that behavioral confirmation cannot account for our findings.  According to behavioral 
confirmation theorists, expectancy-confirming behavior is brought about by the biased behaviors of biased 
perceivers (for a review Snyder & Stukas, 1999).  For example, perceivers may act less friendly towards a social 
actor they believe to be unattractive as opposed to attractive.  The purportedly unattractive person then responds to 
this relatively sullen behavior in a commensurate way and, thus, fulfills the stereotype that unattractive people are 
not socially skilled (Snyder, Tanke & Berschied, 1977).  However, participants only engaged in an actual social 
interaction in Experiment 2, and it is unlikely that the confederates in that experiment had systematic expectations 
because they were blind to condition.  Given that participants were not subject to the biased behaviors of perceivers 
in the reported experiments, behavioral confirmation is unable account for our findings.   
Other research from our lab has lead us to suspect that the affiliative social tuning effects occur, at least in part, 
because people are not labeling the beliefs of other social actors stereotyping and, therefore, are not bringing coping 
mechanisms discussed throughout this volume to bear (see Miller, in this volume; Swim & Thomas, in this volume).  
Participants do not predict that they will tune their self-evaluations to the stereotypic beliefs of another social actor 
when affiliative motivation is high; rather, they predict that they will become angry and their self-views will be 
immobile (Huntsinger & Sinclair, 2004).  We have also found tuning effects as a function of a subliminal prime 
(Sinclair, et al, 2004a) and on implicit attitudes (Sinclair, et al, 2004b).  Future research should discern whether 
noting that the beliefs of others are the product of stereotypes would reduce affiliative social tuning, as well as the 
mechanisms by which this reduction occurs. 
The interpersonal basis of self-stereotyping described in this research poses a challenge for individuals who do 
not want to foster self-stereotyping among stereotype targets.  It suggests that individuals need not hold, or overtly 
express, stereotypes to elicit self-stereotyping among stereotype targets.  Stereotypes may influence the self-
evaluations of a stereotyped person if he or she merely believes that the other social actor holds stereotype consistent 
views of their group, or of himself or herself as an individual, and high affiliative motivation toward this social actor 
is warranted.  For this reason, it is not sufficient for individuals who wish to avoid influencing their social 
interaction partners in potentially detrimental ways to simply avoid endorsing stereotypes.  They must also actively 
seek to convey that they do not harbor stereotypical views.  This task is especially difficult given that stereotyped 
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individuals can often detect implicit stereotypes and prejudices that their social interaction partners are unaware of 
holding and can not consciously ameliorate (e.g. Dovidio, Kawakami, and Gaertner, 2002).   
Our findings also pose a challenge for stereotype targets.  It is imperative for them to be interpersonally distant 
from individuals that seem to hold stereotypic views of them in order to avoid self-stereotyping.  This is an arduous 
task for several reasons.  First, it is difficult to discern the views of others.  This is particularly the case with respect 
to stereotype-relevant views because people are often motivated to appear as if they do not endorse stereotypes (or 
may genuinely experience themselves as not endorsing stereotypes) despite stereotypic attitudes that leak out via 
non-verbal channels and when the appropriate behavior is not clear (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998).  Thus, 
stereotype targets are faced with social interaction partners who say and believe one thing about themselves but 
subtly behave in a biased way.  Second, although being vigilant to stereotyping is necessary to protect the self from 
the views of others, such vigilance has negative emotional and pragmatic costs as well (e.g. Branscombe, Schmitt & 
Harvey, 1999; Pinel, 1999; see Kaiser, in this volume).  For example, Mendoza-Denton and colleagues (2002; this 
volume) found that African American students who are sensitive to race-based rejection were less comfortable 
during the transition from high school to college and experienced lower university grades.  Third, many important 
life circumstances require successful interpersonal connections with individuals who are thought to hold stereotypic 
views.  For example, it is hard to imagine that stereotype targets can be successful in work or educational settings 
without succumbing to the affiliative motivation inherent in interactions with supervisors, teachers, roommates or 
teammates – some of whom may be perceived as having stereotypic views.  Moreover, the fundamental human need 
for social connection (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) may drive stereotype targets who are solos in their environment to 
experience affiliative motivation toward the people around them, regardless of their apparent stereotype-relevant 
views. 
Although this research illuminates challenges for stereotype targets and their interaction partners, it also 
identifies situations in which stereotype targets may be protected from self-stereotyping.  For example, this research 
suggests that minority group members should flourish in environments in which teachers, mentors, and important 
others clearly express counter-stereotypic beliefs at both the group and individual level (see also Inzlicht & Good, in 
this volume; Mendoza-Denton, Page-Gould, & Pietrzak, in this volume).  It also suggests a psychological 
mechanism by which interactions with ingroup members bolster the self-esteem, self-evaluations and performance 
outcomes of stereotype targets (e.g., Allen, Epps, & Haniff, 1991; Allen, 1992; Davis, 1995; Frable, Platt, & Hoey, 
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1998; Jackman, 1994).  Because individuals are likely to experience affiliative motivation toward proximal others 
(Festinger, Schacter & Back, 1950) and ingroup members are likely to have (or at least be presumed to have) less 
stereotypic views of their group than outgroup members (Hamilton, 1981; Linville, 1982), benefits of ingroup 
contact may stem from social tuning toward the presumably counter-stereotypic views on ingroup members.  It is 
interesting to note, however, that the social tuning mechanism can account for negative effects of ingroup contact as 
well (Fordham & Ogbu, 1986; Ogbu, 1986).  This perspective suggests that contact with ingroup members should 
yield stereotypic self-evaluations and behavior when ingroup members are perceived as buying into stereotypes of 
their own group (Fordham & Ogbu; Jackman; Ogbu).   
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. All simple effects tests were one-tailed due to strong directional hypotheses (Abelson, 1995). 
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Classic theorists of stigma and prejudice make the assertion that under certain conditions, those who are socially 
stigmatized might come to feel a sense of shame for aspects of their stigmatized identity. Gordon Allport (1954) 
went so far as to suggest that if victims of prejudice come to identify with the dominant group, they will develop a 
sense of self-hate.  For example, Allport stated that “…the immigrant grows ashamed of his faulty accent, his lack 
of ease and social grace, his defective education” (p. 151). In fact, it is so common to assume that stigma is 
associated with shame that the word processing program being used to write this chapter lists “shame” as the first 
suggested synonym of the word “stigma.”   
In this chapter, we focus on one particular way in which stigmatization and shame are connected, namely how 
members of a stigmatized group are emotionally affected by acts of fellow group members that confirm the negative 
stereotype about the group. Whereas other chapters in this section have discussed how stigmatized individuals’ self-
perceptions are shaped by their interactions and associations with members of the outgroup, we turn our focus 
toward how those who are socially stigmatized are affected by the actions of other ingroup members. As we will 
discuss, members of stigmatized groups are often conscious of how their own behavior could be seen as confirming 
negative stereotypes about their group (e.g., Pinel, 1999).  However, what is less clear is the nature of their 
emotional response to seeing another member of their ingroup commit an act that confirms a negative stereotype 
about their group.  Building from Allport’s example, the question that we pose is whether the immigrant who has 
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made great efforts to minimize his or her own accent and obtain an education still feels a sense of shame for the 
faulty accent or lack of social graces exhibited by other ingroup members? 
In the first half of our chapter, we review evidence that personal confirmation of negative stereotypes is 
threatening to stigmatized individuals and draw on recent work on group-based emotion to articulate why a person 
might feel a threat to identity when someone other than the self confirms negative stereotypes about one’s ingroup. 
In the second half, we describe work we have done examining different predictors of group-based shame (as 
opposed to group-based guilt) as a precursor to presenting two studies that specifically examine the degree to which 
Hispanic individuals feel a sense of shame when a member of their ethnic ingroup behaves in a stereotypic way. Our 
primary focus in this chapter is on feelings of vicarious shame for the stereotypic actions of ingroup members, but 
the studies we report also include measures of guilt, anger, sadness, and anxiety. By analyzing a range of negative 
emotional responses that individuals might have to a stereotypic group member, we are able to isolate the unique 
way in which feelings of shame are linked to the sense of identity threat that these situations pose.  
 
Theoretical Background – The Threat of Stereotype Confirmation 
 
Sinclair and Huntsinger (in this volume) show that members of stigmatized groups sometimes behave in stereotypic 
ways when they are motivated to form a relationship with a prejudiced outgroup member. Although these social 
tuning processes are likely to happen unconsciously, we might wonder how these individuals would feel if they were 
aware that their behavior confirmed negative stereotypes about their group. Many theories would lead us to predict 
that they should feel threatened by this possibility.  For example, stereotype threat theory (Steele and Aronson, 
1995) states it is the fear of doing something that would confirm the stereotype that leads members of negatively 
stereotyped groups to perform more poorly in situations where the stereotype is made salient. Not only is there 
evidence that stereotype threat can entail increased anxiety (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999) and threat arousal 
(Blascovich, Spencer, Quinn, & Steele, 2001), but research also shows that individuals are motivated to behave in a 
way that will disconfirm the stereotype if at all possible (e.g., Ben-Zeev, Fein, & Inzlicht, in press; Kray, Thompson, 
& Galinsky., 2001; O’Brien & Crandall, 2003).   
Other work suggests that members of stigmatized groups are often conscious of how others perceive them in 
terms of their group membership (Pinel, 1999). Pinel’s work also shows that women who are particularly conscious 
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of their stigmatized gender identity are more likely to avoid situations where they are at risk of confirming a 
negative stereotype about women. Similarly, research by Miller and colleagues (Miller, Rothblum, Felicio, & Brand, 
1995) suggests that those who are socially stigmatized (overweight women in their studies) might personally cope 
with threat of negative stereotypes through compensatory behaviors designed to create a more positive impression of 
themselves as individuals.  
Finally, at more of a group level, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) states that individuals derive a 
sense of self-esteem from the social groups with whom they identify. Thus, one’s positive sense of self will be 
threatened to the extent that those groups are thought to possess negative characteristics. Tajfel and Turner discuss 
several options that individuals might employ to manage their tarnished group identity.  One strategy is to engage in 
social competition where the group tries to behave in ways that increase the positive value associated with the 
identity.  A second strategy is to physically or psychologically disassociate oneself from the negative social identity. 
A third strategy is to embrace the characteristics of the group that have been labeled negative by the dominant 
culture and to reframe them in a more positive light.  Nonetheless, even given these strategies for reframing the 
meaning of the stereotype, it is likely that negative stereotypes will remain threatening to many members of 
stigmatized groups. 
 
Emotional Reactions to Stereotype Confirmation 
 
This past theory and research confirms our intuitions that individuals are often loathe to do anything themselves that 
would confirm negative stereotypes that others hold about their racial or ethnic group. When people do see 
themselves as behaving in a stereotypic way, we propose that stigmatized individuals would feel a sense of shame as 
a result. Shame and other related emotions such as guilt and embarrassment are often labeled self-conscious or 
moral emotions because they are thought to regulate people’s behavior with regard to moral standards and serve to 
maintain social relationships between individuals and in groups (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1995; 
Eisenberg, 2000; Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; Keltner, 1995; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). People are thought to feel 
ashamed when they attribute a negative event to an uncontrollable and internal aspect of themselves (Weiner, 1995; 
Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983). Shame is often characterized by feelings of self-consciousness and a fear of 
rejection (Lewis, 1971; Wicker et al., 1983) and is accompanied by the counterfactual thought, “If only I were a 
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different type of person” (Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994). Although shame is greater when the potential 
for public exposure is high (R. Smith, Webster, & Parrott, 2002), shame is not only experienced in truly public 
situations and can involve a private concern fy: That others would think (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). 
In other words, we feel shame when we perceive that a flaw in our character has been revealed to others and/or to 
ourselves.  
The unique aspects of shame can be better appreciated when contrasted against the profile of a related self-
conscious emotion such as guilt. Guilt is often accompanied by feeling that one had control in the situation and 
should have behaved in a different manner (Wicker, et al., 1983). Weiner (1995) argues that people feel guilt when 
they attribute a negative event to a cause that is internal and controllable. Indeed, individuals who are asked to recall 
a guilt experience are more likely than those who recall a shame experience to have the counterfactual thought, “If 
only I had acted differently” (Niedenthal et al., 1994). But the primary reason we might care about distinguishing 
shame from guilt is that these two emotions have been shown to predict very different behavioral responses.  
Feelings of shame seem to evoke a desire to hide from others or distance oneself from the shame-provoking 
situation (Tangney, 1995; Wicker et al., 1983), whereas feelings of guilt are associated with empathy for the 
wronged party and a desire to confess, apologize, or in some way repair or atone for what happened (Tangney, 
1995). In other words, shame elicits a very passive or withdrawing response aimed at reducing feelings of self-
consciousness, whereas guilt elicits a more active or approach response aimed at repairing damage that has been 
done to important social relationships.  
Because stereotypes are characterizations of the defining attributes associated with members of a particular 
group, the awareness that one has done something that confirms negative stereotypes about one’s stigmatized group 
could be appraised as evidence that there is a flaw in one’s identity. In this situation, people might think, “I’m one of 
those types of people?” In other words, it is particularly because people are motivated to see negative social 
stereotypes about their group as being inaccurate that any indication that they might possess those stereotypic traits 
could elicit feelings of shame. Under most circumstances, those with a desire to advance the interests of themselves 
and their group are likely to choose situations and behaviors that will disconfirm negative stereotypes about their 
social group and avoid these feelings of shame.  However, it is important to realize that not all members of a racial 
or ethnic group will necessarily hold this same goal.  For example, individuals who believe that the status hierarchy 
is illegitimate and their advancement is impossible might come to reject that which is valued by the dominant 
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culture (Major & Schmader, 2001; Ogbu, 1991; Schmader, Major, Eccleston, & McCoy, 2001). To regain a sense of 
positive identity, these individuals might even come to value traits that are deemed part of the negative stereotype of 
the group and to engage in behaviors that are consistent with these stereotypes while feeling little or no threat to 
identity. What are the emotional consequences of witnessing other group members mismanage your identity by 
engaging in stereotypic behaviors that you yourself are motivated to avoid?  This question is the focus of the 
remainder of this chapter. 
 
Affective Consequences of Stigmatization and the Link to Vicarious Shame  
 
Researchers interested in the effects of stigmatization have always had an interest in the affective consequences of 
being targeted by negative stereotypes. In fact, there is now a large literature examining how perceptions of 
stigmatization affect global feelings of self-worth and esteem (Crocker & Major, 1989; see also Major, Quinton, & 
McCoy, 2002, for a review). The question that we are posing is distinct from that which has been studied in past 
work on the affective consequences of stigma. Whereas past research has focused on emotional reactions to being a 
target of prejudicial behavior enacted by the outgroup, we are interested in examining emotional reactions to 
stereotypic behaviors enacted by members of the ingroup. Furthermore, rather than focus on consequences for global 
self-worth or self-esteem, our interest is in identifying distinct emotional reactions, such as shame, that these 
stereotypic behaviors elicit within a given situation and linking these emotional reactions to distinct action 
tendencies.   
Our proposition that individuals sometimes experience a sense of shame for the negative actions carried out by 
group members is also related to, but somewhat distinct from, work on the black sheep effect.  The black sheep 
effect, first studied by Marques and colleagues (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988) represents a polarization of 
people’s judgments of ingroup members compared to outgroup members. Although people generally rate ingroup 
members more favorably than outgroup members, research on the black sheep effect has shown that people will 
sometimes derogate an ingroup member more than an outgroup member when that person engages in a negative 
behavior, or does not have positive traits. This research has indicated a particular mechanism for this effect, namely 
that people hold particularly positive expectancies or stereotypes about their ingroups and also that people expect 
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that ingroup members will uphold positive norms of expected behavior. When ingroup members do not conform to 
these norms or expectancies, other members of the group derogate them.  
Although research on the black sheep effect has not examined specific emotional reactions to norm violation on 
the part of ingroup members (but see Biernat, Vescio, & Billings, 1999, for one study that measured negative mood), 
we speculate that violating positive expectancies of one’s group might evoke shame, and that the resulting 
derogation of the ingroup member is an indication of the motivation to distance oneself from shame-inducing 
situations. The approach that we have taken in the research we will describe below extends work on the black sheep 
effect. Rather than examining reactions to ingroup members who fail to live up to positive norms established by the 
ingroup, we explore reactions to ingroup members who specifically behave in ways that are seen as a confirmation 
of an existing negative stereotype applied to the identity.  
We start with the question of why one should have any emotional reaction to the stereotypic behaviors of 
members of his or her ingroup?  Categorizing oneself as belonging to the same group as the person in question is an 
important element in determining one’s emotional reactions to that person’s behavior. We know from past research 
that individuals tend to view their social groups as part of their self-concept (Smith & Henry, 1996; Tajfel & Turner, 
1986) and work described by McLaughlin-Volpe (in this volume) shows that the inclusion of others into the self can 
enable individuals to expand their self-definition. Perhaps because of these self-expansion processes, individuals 
take pride in their membership in positive groups and seem ready to “cut themselves off” from the failure of 
negative groups (Snyder, Lassegard, & Ford, 1986). Thus, our perspective is similar to that proposed by Smith 
(1993) who argued for the role of emotions in intergroup and intragroup behaviors. If we categorize ourselves as 
part of a given group and that group identity is an integral part of how we define ourselves, then it is reasonable to 
assume that the behaviors of other group members have the potential to affect us.  
But just as this assertion seems sure to be true, it seems just as sure that the story is more complicated.  Is it the 
case that those who belong to a stigmatized group are always affected by the behaviors of their ingroup?  Are 
different types of groups likely to provoke different degrees and/or types of emotions?  And finally, what emotions 
in particular should we expect to see and is there variation in the types of behaviors that these emotions provoke?  
We will approach answering these questions in two steps.  First, we will discuss a general framework that we have 
developed to predict when people feel a sense of shame for a fellow ingroup member. Once we have placed feelings 
of vicarious shame in a context that is broader than the experience of stigmatized groups, we will move to 
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addressing feelings of shame for the actions of ethnic ingroup members and the particular role that confirmation of 
negative stereotypes may play in evoking vicarious shame. 
 
 
VICARIOUS SHAME 
 
Earlier we reviewed evidence that people tend to feel shame in response to a perceived flaw in their identity and 
these feelings of shame elicit attempts to hide or to distance oneself from the shame-evoking event. Although this 
earlier work relates to how shame can be evoked by one’s own actions or attributes, we argue that these same 
appraisal and motivational correlates that characterize personal shame are maintained when we consider shame as a 
group-based emotion (Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004; Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Ames, & Barquissau, 
2004). Specifically, we assert that, like personal shame, vicarious shame is likely to be evoked by appraisals of the 
threat to one’s personal and group identity that are caused by a group member’s actions, and that vicarious shame is 
linked to a motivation to distance oneself from the event and the perpetrator (Johns, Schmader, & Lickel, 2004). 
This profile of vicarious shame can be distinguished from that of other self-conscious emotions such as vicarious 
guilt, which is predicted by an appraisal that one should have had more control over the group member’s behavior 
(Lickel at al., 2004) and is associated with a motivation to apologize for or repair whatever damage those actions 
might have caused (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Lickel at al., 2004). 
Categorizing oneself as sharing a group identity with another person is one key element in experiencing shame 
for their actions. However, beyond categorizing oneself as sharing an ingroup membership, it is possible to 
characterize what it is about that shared association that leads to feelings of vicarious shame. In developing our 
model of vicarious shame, we draw on the concept of the depth or meaningfulness of shared identity.  One’s sense 
of shared identity with a group can be distinguished from other elements that can define social groups such as 
perceptions of interpersonal interdependence with other group members (e.g., Brewer, 2000; Hamilton, Sherman & 
Lickel, 1998; Krech & Crutchfield, 1948; Lewin, 1948; Prentice, Miller, & Lightdale, 1994; Rabbie & Horwitz, 
1988). We sometimes feel a sense of social connectedness with others whom we have never met and with whom we 
have no interpersonal contact if we simply feel that we share a core identity in common.   
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Moreover, we intuitively have a sense that some social identities are “shallow” whereas others are “deep.” This 
intuition about the “depth” or meaningfulness of different kinds of identities was captured by Rothbart and Taylor’s 
(1992) discussion of essentiality.  According to Rothbart and Taylor, certain kinds of groups such as racial 
categories are viewed by perceivers as being inalterable and deeply informative aspects of identity. Likewise, 
Allport (1954) noted that people have an intuitive idea of race in which, “a belief in essence develops.  There is an 
inherent ‘Jewishness’ in every Jew.  The ‘soul of the Oriental,’ ‘Negro blood,’ ‘Hiltler’s Aryanism,’ …. – all 
represent a belief in essence.  A mysterious mana (for good or ill) resides in a group, all of its members partaking 
thereof.”  More recently, Haslam, Rothschild, and Ernst (2000) assessed the specific qualities of groups that underlie 
people’s perceptions of essentiality.  Examples of groups that perceivers are particularly likely to treat as highly 
essentialized include kinship, but also gender, racial, ethnic, and national identities (Gil-White, 2001; Haslam et al., 
2000; Hirschfeld, 1995; Lickel et al., 2000). Still, even groups based on nominal characteristics can sometimes 
instill in members a sense of shared identity (Tajfel, 1970). 
This feature of social association (i.e., one’s feeling of shared identity with another person) is important for 
predicting people’s shame responses to the negative actions of that individual; we might expect people to feel more 
ashamed for the wrongful actions of those with whom they feel a sense of shared, and even essentialized, identity. In 
contrast, it is one’s level of interdependence (i.e., interpersonal interaction and shared communication) with the 
group member that seems to predict feeling guilty for his or her wrongdoing (Lickel et al., 2004).  
 
What Types of Behavior Elicit Vicarious Shame Reactions? 
 
When addressing when and why people are emotionally affected by the actions of members of their stigmatized 
ingroup, one important question concerns whether all negative acts committed by a fellow group member have equal 
potential for producing vicarious shame. From our point of view, the sense of shared identity is important, but 
negative actions of ingroup members should be most shame provoking when they are seen as relevant to the group 
identity. There are two general circumstances when this might happen.  First, if the context makes group 
membership salient, then any negative actions carried out by group members might be taken as a reflection of the 
group. For example, membership in a group that is a numerical minority can lead to increased identity salience and 
group identification (e.g., Brewer, 1991; Ellemers, Doosje, & van Knippenberg, 1992; see also Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 
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2000; McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978). If such minority status is chronic, as is the case with most ethnic 
minority groups in the United States, group identity is likely to be more highly accessible across situations. 
However, a given context can create minority status and increase the likelihood that behaviors of ingroup members 
will seem to be relevant to the group. For example, if there are only a few women in a largely male corporation, the 
female employees are more likely to have their gender identity salient on the job, thereby increasing the degree to 
which any negative act committed by a fellow woman in the corporation may be likely to evoke shame in other 
female coworkers.  
In addition to situational cues that prime group identity, high levels of group identification might make group 
identity chronically salient for some individuals. Moreover, those who are highly identified with their group are also 
likely to be more invested in maintaining a positive image of their group and thus more threatened by the negative 
actions of other group members.  Thus, individuals who are more inclined to define themselves in terms of their 
group membership are likely to be more sensitive to the negative actions of other ingroup members. For example, 
past research shows that individuals who are highly group identified show a stronger black sheep effect to disloyal 
group members (Branscombe, Wann, & Noel, 1993). We have also found evidence for this prediction in a study of 
Americans’ reactions to Anti-Arab prejudice following the September 11th terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon (Johns et al, 2004). Importantly, the more highly identified Americans were with their 
national identity, the more ashamed they felt for very extreme acts of prejudice carried out by fellow Americans (but 
not for more mild forms of prejudice) and the stronger their desire to distance the offending group member from 
their group identity. Group identification did not significantly predict any other emotional response to these events. 
Thus, one’s level of identification with a shared social identity can predict the intensity with which one experiences 
shame when a fellow ingroup member is seen as mismanaging that identity.  
Beyond contextually driven salience and chronic group identification, existing social stereotypes provide an 
important mechanism for sorting and tagging the myriad events that occur in people’s lives.  Other scholars have 
noted how stereotypes serve as hypotheses for interpreting behavior (e.g., Darley & Gross, 1983) as well as being 
explanations for the outcomes that individuals receive (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu,  2002; Kay & Jost, 2003). 
People may also have better memory for acts that confirm stereotypes (Rothbart, Evans, & Fulero, 1978).  Thus, acts 
that appear to confirm negative stereotypes are likely to be noticed, interpreted, and categorized as being relevant to 
the group regardless of whether or not group identity was salient to begin with. Events that are not readily 
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interpreted in light of the stereotype or social reputation of the group will be attributed to the particular 
characteristics of the person committing the act, unless the group membership is contextually or chronically salient. 
We found initial support for the link between the relevance of the event and feelings of vicarious shame in a 
study in which participants were directed to recall and make ratings of three instances in which they felt ashamed or 
guilty for the actions of a family member, a friend, and a member of their ethnic or racial group (Lickel et al., 2004). 
As predicted, the perception that the person’s behavior was relevant to the reputation or social stereotype of the 
group (i.e., friendship group, family group, or ethnic group) was associated with greater appraisals that the event 
was a threat to personal identity, greater feelings of shame, and a greater desire to distance oneself from the 
situation. Notably, this profile for vicarious shame was quite distinct from the profile of responses associated with 
vicarious guilt. In contrast to the relevance of the event for a shared identity, it was the perception that one shared an 
interdependent association with the offending group member that predicted greater appraisals of control over that 
person’s behavior, stronger feelings of guilt, and a greater desire to apologize or make amends for his or her actions.  
Thus, the relevance of the event to the shared identity of the group was significantly linked to feelings of shame 
and to motivations to distance oneself from the event.  Although this study does not pertain directly to stigma, recall 
that participants in the above study were specifically instructed to recall one event that involved an ethnic ingroup 
member. In comparison to events involving a family member or a friend, events concerning an ethnic ingroup 
member received the highest ratings of relevance to a sense of shared identity. Although most participants in this 
study were Caucasian, these data provided us with an initial indication that members of ethnic groups might feel 
vicarious shame for ingroup behaviors that seem to confirm negative stereotypes about their ethnic group. We next 
sought to examine this possibility more directly. 
 
 
AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF STIGMATIZED INDIVIDUALS’ EMOTIONAL REACTIONS 
TO INGROUP STEREOTYPIC BEHAVIORS 
 
In the previous sections of this chapter, we have outlined our general hypothesis that members of stigmatized groups 
might often feel a sense of shame for the negative stereotypic behavior of other ingroup members. In the remainder 
of the chapter, we present the results of two studies that test this hypothesis and also examine how emotional 
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responses to these situations of stereotype confirmation are related to group identification and certain action 
tendencies like distancing from the negative event.  
In Study 1, we asked Hispanic college students to recall a time when a member of their ethnic group did 
something that seemed to be consistent with negative stereotypes that people hold about their ethnic group. As in our 
previous work (Lickel et al., 2004), participants wrote about the event and made ratings of their emotional reactions 
and action tendencies associated with the event. In addition, we assessed their perceptions of the stereotypicality of 
the event and their collective self-esteem (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). Based on the ideas review above, we tested 
three core hypotheses. First, we predicted that variation in the stereotypicality of the events that Hispanic students 
recalled would predict the intensity of their shame response to those behaviors, even after controlling for the overall 
severity of the event and how well they knew the group member. Second, we predicted that Hispanic students who 
were highly identified with their ethnic group would express higher levels of shame for the stereotypic actions of 
their ingroup. Finally, we predicted that shame would be the specific emotional response that would relate to a 
desire to distance oneself not just from the offending group member but perhaps even from the group identity more 
generally. We also tested whether shame would relate to a desire to repair the tarnished group image by engaging in 
behaviors that disconfirm the group stereotype.     
 
 
STUDY 1 
 
Participants and Procedures 
 
Participants were 136 Hispanic college students who received credit in their introductory psychology course in 
exchange for their participation. Because we wanted to focus on events where participants themselves were not 
directly involved, seventeen participants were excluded because they agreed (i.e., they had a score greater than 5 on 
a 9 point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree) with the statement I was the cause of the event (n = 
2), with the statement The event was directed at me (n = 11), or with both statements (n = 4). Thus, our final sample 
included 119 participants (35 men, 84 women). 
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Participants were run in small groups ranging from one to seven people. They were first given an initial 
questionnaire to complete that included measures of collective self-esteem. After completing this measure, they 
were given the main survey packet. In this packet, they were asked to think about a time when they observed 
someone else in their ethnic group do something that seemed to them to be consistent with negative stereotypes that 
people have about their ethnic group. They were told that they could write about someone they know or a complete 
stranger and it was emphasized that we were not looking for a time when they themselves had done something 
stereotypic. Participants were given five minutes to write about the experience. After completing their narrative, 
participants completed a survey about the event. Upon completing the survey, all participants were thanked for their 
participation and were debriefed. 
 
Measures 
 
Unless otherwise mentioned, all of the following items were rated on 9 point scales ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Examples of items used in composites are given. A complete set of items can be 
obtained from the first author. 
Collective self-esteem.  Items from Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) collective self-esteem scale were modified 
to assess participants’ collective self-esteem for their ethnic group. This scale includes four subscales measuring 
public collective self-esteem (α = .80), private collective self-esteem (α = .83), identity importance (α = .79), and 
membership self-esteem (α = .82).  
Stereotypicality.  The stereotypicality of the event was assessed with three items (α = .65, e.g., Regardless of 
what others might have thought, how stereotypical did you think the event was?: 1 = I didn’t think the event was very 
stereotypical, 9 = I thought the event was extremely stereotypical). 
Interdependence. Participants’ level of interdependence with the person who they wrote about was also assessed 
with three items (α = .88, e.g., How well did you know the person who caused the event?: 1 = I didn’t know the 
person at all, 9 = I know the person very well).  
Event severity.  Severity of the event was assessed with two items (r = .74, p < .001; e.g., How severe did this 
event seem to you?: 1 = Not very severe at all, 9 = Extremely severe).  
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Emotion composites.  Participants were asked to rate the degree to which the event made them feel each of 
several emotions. Shame was assessed as the average score to four items (α = .83, ashamed, disgraced, humiliated, 
and embarrassed), guilt as the average of four items (α = .64, guilty, regret, sorry, and remorseful), anger as the 
average of four items (α = .83, angry at the other person, offended, disgusted, and upset), sadness as the average of 
three items (α = .74, sad, depressed, and hurt), and anxiety as the average of two items (r = .55, p < .001: anxious 
and nervous). Five positive emotions were added as filler items. A maximum likelihood factor analysis with oblique 
rotation confirmed these groupings. 
Action tendencies. Distancing from the perpetrator was assessed with five items (α = .81, e.g., At the time, I 
remember thinking that I didn’t want to be associated in any way with the person who caused the event).  Distancing 
from one’s group was assessed with three items (α = .77, e.g., I wanted to hide my ethnicity from others).  Image 
repair was assessed with two items (r =  .69, p < .001; I felt like I should do something after the event that would 
show that people in my ethnic group are not really like that). Finally, event repair was assessed with four items (α = 
.67, I felt like I should do something after the event to make it better). A maximum likelihood factor analysis with 
oblique rotation confirmed these groupings.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Narratives that people wrote tapped into many negative stereotypes, including those related to crime and drugs, 
poverty, alcoholism, sexism, lack of education or ambition, being a drain on society, illegal immigration, and 
general uncivilized or rude behavior. The events that people described had occurred in the past year on average, and 
participants witnessed the event they described first hand 82% of the time (n = 97). In addition, there was someone 
else who was harmed or victimized by the event in 47% of the stories (n = 55) and others present to witness the 
event in 83% of the stories (n = 99). The person(s) who engaged in the stereotypic behavior were almost equally 
likely be someone who the participant knew well (n = 57, e.g., a close friend, significant other, coworker, or 
relative) or someone who they did not know well (n = 62, an acquaintance or a stranger). The perpetrators were male 
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67% of the time (n = 80), female 29% of the time (n = 35), and included both sexes in 3% of the stories (n = 4). 
Finally, a frequency analysis of perceived stereotypicality ratings revealed that, although there was considerable 
variance in people’s ratings, 86.6% of the participants rated the event they recalled at or above the midpoint on 
stereotypicality (M = 6.67, SD = 1.50), suggesting that a clear majority of the participants recalled very stereotypic 
events.  
 
Mean Levels of Emotion 
 
A within-subjects analysis of the negative emotions revealed significant differences among the emotion clusters, 
F(4, 115) = 30.00, p < .001. Participants were more likely to feel angry (M = 4.79) and ashamed (M = 3.82) than 
they were to feel any of the other emotions (sadness, M = 2.92; anxiety M = 2.75; and guilt M = 2.41), all p’s < .001. 
Mean levels of anger and shame were significantly different from another, p < .001. People also felt more sadness 
than guilt, p < .01. These data highlight that anger and shame clearly stood out as the dominant emotional responses 
that Hispanic students had to the stereotypic actions of their ethnic ingroup.  
 
Predicting Emotions from Group Variables 
 
To assess our primary hypothesis that the stereotypicality of ingroup member’s actions is predictive of feeling 
shame, we conducted a series of simultaneous regression analyses in which stereotypicality and interdependence 
were entered as predictors of each of the emotion clusters, controlling for the perceived severity of the event. Results 
are summarized in Table 1. Consistent with our first hypothesis, the stereotypicality of the event significantly 
predicted shame but interdependence did not. Anger was also significantly related to perceptions of stereotypicality. 
In contrast, interdependence and not stereotypicality was uniquely predictive of feeling guilt and sadness. Clearly, 
these two different aspects of the event (i.e., relevance to group stereotypes and interpersonal interdependence), 
predicted very distinct profiles of emotions. 
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TABLE 1 
Standardized Coefficients from Simultaneous Regression Analyses Predicting Emotional Response from Event Severity, 
Stereotypicality, and Interdependence. 
 Outcome Variables 
 Shame Anger Guilt Sadness Anxiety 
Predictors      
   Severity      .31***   .54*** .43***   .56***    .18* 
   Stereotypicality    .26**  21**       -.10         .09 -.10 
   Interdependence          .09        -.06        .19* .22**  .10 
** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
Predicting Emotions from Collective Self-Esteem 
 
To test our second hypothesis concerning the relationship between group identification and vicarious shame, we 
next examined the different facets of collective self-esteem as predictors of participants’ emotional responses. 
Because collective self-esteem has to do with one’s attitudes toward one’s social identity, our specific prediction 
was that those who are more highly identified with their ethnic group (i.e., higher in importance collective self-
esteem) would be most likely to feel ashamed when another group member does something to tarnish that group 
identity. We also thought that public and private collective self-esteem might be associated with feeling ashamed but 
we were less sure of the direction. On the one hand, those who have a somewhat negative private or public 
perception of their group to begin with might be more sensitive to actions that confirm that negative perception. On 
the other hand, those with a positive private or public image of their group might be more shocked and appalled by 
behavior that is at odds with those positive perceptions. We did not have specific predictions concerning the 
membership subscale of the collective self-esteem scale. To assess the unique relationship of each of these four 
subscales in predicting emotional responses to the event, we conducted a series of simultaneous regression analyses 
with importance, private, public, and membership collective self-esteem entered as predictors of a given emotional 
response controlling for the perceived severity of the event. Results are summarized in Table 2.  
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TABLE 2 
Standardized Coefficients from Simultaneous Regression Analyses Predicting Emotional Response from Event 
Severity and Collective Self-Esteem (CSE). 
 Outcome Variables 
 Shame Anger Guilt Sadness Anxiety 
Predictors      
   Severity   .21*   .50***  .39***   .55***    .17# 
   Importance CSE   .21*       .02       .17       .12  .12 
   Private CSE -.27*      -.05      -.04      -.05  .12 
   Public CSE -.20*      -.15#      -.01       .08   .01 
   Membership CSE .17       .23*      -.01       .07 -.16 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, # p < .10. 
 
Consistent with our hypothesis, participants were more likely to feel ashamed for the stereotypic actions of their 
ingroup to the degree that they placed a great deal of importance on ethnicity as part of their self concept (β = .21, p 
< .05). In addition, those with who had a more negative private attitude toward their ethnic group (β = -.27, p < .05) 
or who assumed that others had a negative perception of their ethnic group (β = -.20, p < .05) were also more likely 
to feel ashamed in response to their stereotypic ingroup member. These three variables (importance, private, and 
public collective self-esteem) were not significantly related to any of the other emotions (although public collective 
self-esteem was marginally related to anger, β = -.15, p < .10). The only other significant relationship for collective 
self-esteem in these analyses was that Hispanic participants who felt that they were good and worthy members of 
their ethnic group (i.e. high in membership collective self-esteem) were more likely to feel angry in response to 
another group member who confirms negative stereotypes about the group. Thus, even though the stereotypic 
actions of a group member elicited both feelings of shame and anger, these two emotions were differentiated by how 
they were related to aspects of collective self-esteem. As we might expect, concerns about a negative group image 
and the importance of ethnicity to identity was what uniquely predicted feeling ashamed. The comparison of one’s 
own good behavior as a group member to that of the perpetrator was what uniquely predicted anger. 
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TABLE 3 
Standardized Coefficients from Simultaneous Regression Analyses Predicting Action Tendencies from Emotional 
Responses. 
 Outcome Variables 
 Distance from 
 Group Member 
Distance from 
Group Identity 
Repair Group 
Image 
Repair 
Event 
Predictors     
   Shame      .28***          .49***          .42*** .11 
   Guilt .16# -.02   .08    .24* 
   Angry      .54*** -.07  -.03 .06 
   Sadness             -.15#   .11   .10      .33** 
   Anxiety             -.04   .13    00 .04 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, # p < .10. 
 
Emotions Predicting Action Tendencies 
 
In our final set of analyses, we examined what emotional reactions predict behavioral motivations. In each of these 
analyses, the five negative emotions were entered simultaneously as predictors of a given action tendency (i.e., 
distancing from the group member, distancing from the group identity, repairing the image of the group, and 
repairing harm caused by the event). We did not control for event severity in these analyses because initial results 
revealed that it was not a significant predictor of action tendencies. Results are summarized in Table 3. These 
analyses revealed that shame and anger were uniquely predictive of wanting to distance oneself from the group 
member. But shame was the only emotion that was uniquely predictive of wanting to distance oneself from one’s 
ethnic group or do something to repair the tarnished image of one’s group. These strategies seem to be adopted to 
reestablish a more positive group identity by, 1) “re-fencing” individuals who were confirming negative stereotypes 
about the group (i.e., distancing from the group member), and 2) personally engaging in behaviors that communicate 
to oneself and to others that “we are not all like that” (i.e., repair the group image) or 3) disidentifying with the 
group that has now been tarnished (i.e., distancing from the group identity).  Finally, as we saw in our prior research 
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(Lickel et al., 2004), direct efforts to repair whatever damage the ingroup member had caused was predicted not by 
shame, but by guilt as well as by sadness. Importantly, all of these relationships remained even when controlling for 
initial levels of collective self-esteem. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
To summarize, data from this study provide evidence that shame plays a unique role in how individuals who are 
ethnically stigmatized react to the stereotypic behaviors of their ingroup. Although these actions elicit high levels of 
both shame and anger, it is shame that is predicted by the importance one places on his or her ethnic identity and it is 
shame that is distinctly predictive of distancing from the group or doing something to repair the image of the group 
in response. Although the offending actions of our ingroup might also make us very angry, shame is the reaction we 
seem to have in response to the feeling that an ingroup member is mismanaging the identity of our group.  
This study relied on a methodology where participants recalled events from their own experiences. This event 
sampling technique has the advantage of allowing us to assess participants’ reactions to real and sometimes fairly 
extreme events that would be difficult to recreate in more a more controlled context. However, one limitation of this 
technique is that there is a great deal of variability in the type of event that participants recall. A second limitation to 
this first study is that there is no control group with which to make comparisons. Perhaps the events that participants 
recalled in the first study were the sorts of behaviors that would make anyone feel ashamed if a member of their 
ethnic group engaged in that behavior. We thought this was unlikely. Specifically, we predicted that given the same 
behavior (assuming that behavior is consistent with negative stereotypes about Hispanics), Hispanics would feel 
more ashamed of an ethnic ingroup member engaging in that behavior than would Whites if a member of their racial 
ingroup engaged in the same behavior.  
To test this hypothesis, we conducted a second study in which we created scenarios describing a person (or 
persons) engaging in behaviors that were pretested to be consistent with negative stereotypes that people have about 
Hispanics (and modeled after some of the stories provided by participants in Study 1). Both White and Hispanic 
participants were instructed to imagine that a member of their own ethnic group had carried out the behavior that 
was described. Even though the events were identical, we expected that Hispanic participants would report more 
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shame when imagining another Hispanic engaging in the behavior as compared to White participants imagining 
another White engaging in the same act. 
 
 
STUDY 2 
 
Participants and Procedure 
 
Participants were 51 Hispanic and 66 Caucasian college students who participated in the study as part of a class 
assignment.  They were given a survey that included all instructions and measures. Participants were asked to 
identify their racial/ethnic group and then proceeded to read and make ratings of their reactions to 12 different 
scenarios. For each scenario, participants were asked to imagine that the person carrying out the behavior in the 
scenario was of the same race or ethnicity as themselves. Each of the 12 scenarios described a situation in which an 
individual (or individuals) of the same racial / ethnic group as the participant engaged in either a negative (6 
scenarios) or positive (6 scenarios) behavior. Their responses to three of the negative scenarios were of primary 
interest. The remaining scenarios were included as filler stimuli to distract participants from our focus on negative 
behaviors stereotypic of Hispanics.  
The scenarios were developed and pretested on a different sample of Hispanic and Caucasian participants to 
select negative scenarios that were rated by members of both groups as being significantly more stereotypic of 
Hispanics than of Whites. Specifically, these scenarios described three young men being arrested for drug charges, a 
teenage mother who intentionally failed her last year in high school so that she could continue to receive state 
childcare benefits, and a group of men who yell obscene sexual remarks to a passing woman. After reading each 
scenario, participants made ratings of the emotional reactions they would have if they observed this event and what 
behaviors they would be motivated to do in response. Participants were debriefed at the conclusion of the study and 
thanked for their participation. 
 
Measures 
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All items were rated on 9 point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Additional filler 
items were included that pertained to the positive scenarios. 
Group identification. Prior to reading the scenarios, participants completed the identity importance subscale of 
the collective self-esteem scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) as a measure of group identification. 
Emotions. After reading each scenario, participants made ratings of how much that scenario made them feel 
sad, ashamed, angry, anxious, and guilty on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very intensely). 
Action tendencies. Distancing from the perpetrator was assessed with one item (I would wish that this person or 
persons was not of my same race or ethnic group). Distancing from one’s group was assessed with one item (I 
would wish that there was someway that I could change my ethnicity). Image repair was assessed with the item (I 
would want to do something to show that people in my ethnic group are not really like that). Finally, event repair 
was assessed with one item (I would feel like I should do something after the event to make it better).  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Participants’ shame ratings to each of the target scenarios were averaged together to form a composite rating of 
shame. This procedure was used to create indices for each variable that was measured. Responses of Hispanic and 
White participants were compared using a series of independent t-tests. 
Emotion. Consistent with our hypothesis, Hispanic participants reported feeling significantly more shame (M = 
5.49) than did Whites (M = 4.40), t (115) = 2.84, p < .01, when imagining an ingroup member engaging in these 
negative behaviors. Importantly, the two groups did not differ in their ratings of any of the other emotions, all t’s < 
1. 
Action tendencies. Analysis of the action tendency variables revealed group differences only on the measure of 
image repair, t (115) = 4.20, p < .001; Hispanic participants reported that they would feel more motivated to do 
something to repair the image of their ethnic group (M = 6.53) than did White participants (M = 4.71). Contrary to 
predictions, there were no significant group differences in the tendency to distance from the perpetrator or from 
one’s ethnic group, both t’s < 1. There was also no difference in the desire to repair the event directly, t < 1.30. 
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Correlations with group identification. In our last set of analyses, we examined the degree to which the 
importance of ethnic identity was associated with Hispanic and White participants’ responses to the scenarios. 
Within-group correlations revealed that, among Hispanic students, the more importance they placed on their 
ethnicity, the more they responded to an ingroup member engaging in stereotypic behaviors by feeling ashamed, r = 
.39, p < .01, and by wanting to repair the image of their group, r = .39, p < .01, and repair the event directly, r = .48, 
p < .001. Identification was not significantly related to any other emotion or action tendency among Hispanics 
participants, all p’s > .05. Among White participants, identification was not significantly related to any of the 
emotion or action tendency variables, all p’s > .05.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Results of the second study extend those of the first by providing additional evidence that individuals feel a sense of 
shame for the stereotypic actions of their ethnic group. The same negative behaviors carried out by an ingroup 
member elicited equivalent levels anger, sadness, guilt, and anxiety among Hispanic and White participants. 
However, Hispanic participants reported feeling significantly more ashamed for these behaviors than did Whites and 
reported being more motivated to do something to repair the image of their ethnic group. These results highlight that 
shame is a unique emotional response that individuals might have when they witness another member of their group 
engage in negative stereotypic behaviors. The relatively low levels of shame reported by White participants suggest 
that the same behaviors might not have the same implication for identity if they are not consistent with stereotypes 
about one’s group.  Likewise, group identification only predicted greater shame and a strong motive to repair the 
group image among Hispanic students, and not among Whites, further supporting our assertion that these behaviors 
should be particularly threatening to those most likely to include the stereotyped group identity as part of their self-
concept.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
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Our goal in this chapter has been to develop a framework for understanding the emotional reactions that people may 
have when they witness another member of their ethnic group confirm negative social stereotypes about the group. 
Our evidence indicates that these events can have strong emotional consequences, particularly evoking feelings of 
shame, but also anger, for the event. These reactions of group-based shame are linked to how strongly identified 
individuals are with their stigmatized ingroup and shame uniquely predicts engaging in a variety of behaviors 
including repairing the tarnished group identity or distancing oneself from the group member or the group as a 
whole. In sum, these feelings of vicarious shame are so powerful, even in response to the actions of a complete 
stranger, because they signal to people that a core aspect of identity has been tainted and that steps must be taken to 
repair the group image or disidentify from the group.  
The results of this research are important for both theoretical and practical reasons. By integrating elements of 
intergroup relations (e.g., the concept of social identity) with work on emotion (e.g., the unique aspects of shame), 
both of these literatures are extended in novel ways. While previous research has highlighted that individuals 
construct a sense of identity around the social groups they belong to, the present work highlights that those social 
identities can sometimes come at an emotional cost. By including group members into our self-concept we can 
expand our sense of who we are (McLaughlin-Volpe, in this volume), but this also means that when those 
individuals engage in behaviors that are at odds with our own standards and values we can experience the same 
sense of shame that we might feel in response to our own questionable acts. This is not only a novel finding for 
intergroup research, but it also extends past work on shame which has traditionally only examined this emotion in 
response to one’s own actions or moral failures. It is interesting to learn that emotions like shame are so frequently 
experienced in response to the behavior of other people with whom one has a fairly minimal association. 
At a more practical level, the present work highlights that an understanding of the distinct emotional response 
that people have in given situations can help us to identify who will feel the strongest negative reaction and to 
predict how they will be likely to behave. Results of research presented here suggest a person who feels especially 
guilty for an ingroup member’s behavior will be motivated to be proactive and step in to repair whatever damage the 
ingroup member might have caused. In sharp contrast, someone whose dominant emotional response is to feel 
ashamed will be primarily motivated to take action designed to erase the blight on their identity. This might include 
disowning the perpetrator as a member of one’s group, reducing one’s own sense of group attachment, or 
counteracting the stereotypic behavior with actions designed to disconfirm the validity of the stereotype.  In 
Stigma and Shame    23 
situations where an ingroup member has done real harm, the extent to which shame prompts behaviors in the service 
of identity management might preclude other actions of a more prosocial nature. For example, a Mexican American 
man who feels shamed by other Hispanic men who yell sexist remarks to a woman might feel more motivated to 
physically leave the situation that is eliciting this emotional response, than to step in and apologize or assist the 
woman who is being harassed. Such a response should be strongest for those individuals for whom group identity is 
particularly important and those behaviors that are especially relevant to one’s group identity.  
 
Future Research 
 
We believe that further research that examines specific emotional reactions to threats to people’s social identities 
and the way in which people cope with those threats will be valuable. For example, we have found that there are a 
variety of responses that people may make to cope with the threat of a group member who has done something that 
appears to confirm the negative stereotype of the group.  However, additional research is needed to understand when 
individuals choose one of these action tendencies over others.  When does one respond to a stereotypic ingroup 
member by acting to repair the threatened group identity versus oust the offending individual from the group or by 
disidentifying from the group themselves?   At present, we do not yet know all of the moderating variables that 
determine when each of these responses is selected. Uncovering these moderators will be essential to understanding 
the role that shame plays in intragroup dynamics. 
In addition, although we have examined these feelings of vicarious shame in response to discrete events, one 
might wonder whether some stigmatized individuals feel a chronic sense of shame for the actions of other group 
members and, if so, what psychological impact might this response have for people. Although group identification 
often provides a resource that helps stigmatized individuals cope with stigma-related threat (Branscombe, Schmitt, 
& Harvey, 1999), this resource might not be available in circumstances where a group member behaves 
stereotypically and elicits in others a knee-jerk response to disidentify from the ingroup rather than turn to it for a 
sense of solidarity. Future research into the prevalence of chronic feelings of vicarious shame among stigmatized 
individuals could shed light on these questions. 
Another issue that we believe is important is to understand how vicarious shame may operate within identities 
that are not classically considered “stigmatized.”  Thus, for example, European-Americans are not typically 
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considered a stigmatized group.  However, there is a negative stereotype of Whites as racist and many Whites are 
concerned about appearing racist. For example, Whites spontaneously attempt to control the use of social 
stereotypes in situations in which racist responses would be noticeable (Wyer, Sherman, & Stroessner; 1998) and 
demonstrate an activation of executive control processes in an attempt to control prejudicial responding (Richeson & 
Shelton, 2003).  Interestingly, there is also evidence that Caucasians feel emotionally threatened by the suggestion 
that they personally are racist. For example, work by Zuwerink, Devine, Monteith, and Cook (1996) and Son Hing, 
Li, and Zanna (2002) shows that Whites who consider themselves to be nonprejudiced feel a combined sense of guilt 
and shame when they are reminded of ways in which they might stereotype members of ethnic minority groups.  
Thus, although in many respects Whites in North America have privileged status and a correspondingly positive 
stereotype that justifies their position in the status hierarchy, racism is one stigmatizing mark to which they are 
vulnerable.  Correspondingly, Whites make efforts to not confirm the negative stereotype of their ethnic group as 
racist and may experience shame when they do so. By extension, we expect that at least some Whites may feel a 
sense of shame if they observe or learn of another White person who commits a racist act or statement.  Thus, 
whereas members of traditionally stigmatized groups might have an increased vulnerability to feeling a sense of 
vicarious shame simply because negative stereotypes are more commonly associated with their group, almost every 
social category has some negative stereotype associated with it that leaves its members susceptible to feelings of 
shame when individuals act in ways that confirm that unwanted characterization.  
In closing, we return again to our opening statements linking stigma and shame.  Certainly the association 
between stigma and shame is intuitive and has been noted by others such as Allport.  However, beyond being merely 
an intuitive link, we believe that efforts to link specific emotional reactions such as shame, anger, and guilt is crucial 
to understanding the specific behavioral responses that people may have in social situations involving other ingroup 
members.  Although past work on stigma has focused on global affective reactions to stigma (such as a sense of self-
esteem), we advocate more work that also examines how specific emotional responses may play a role in 
determining people’s responses to bearing a stigmatized identity. 
 
 
NOTES 
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Intergroup relations are notoriously problematic.  When individuals or groups of individuals with different social 
identities interact, tension and negative emotion often abound (Stephan & Stephan, 1985).  People sometimes cope 
with these tensions by simply withdrawing from intergroup contact (Tatum, 1997).  Too often, however, tension 
escalates into seemingly intractable conflict, with destructive consequences (Prentice & Miller, 1999).   
 The chapters in this volume illustrate a dramatic shift in research and theory on intergroup relations over the 
past 30 years.  In 1963, sociologist Erving Goffman published a monograph titled, “Stigma: Notes on the 
management of spoiled identity,” an exploration of how people cope with identities that are devalued, stigmatized, 
or stereotyped.  Goffman’s analysis inspired researchers to investigate the experiences of people with stigmatized 
identities.  Unfortunately, it was published just as the cognitive revolution transformed psychology.  Since the 
1960’s, social psychological research on intergroup relations has been dominated by the cognitive perspective, 
examining the role that stereotypes and categorization processes play in creating and exacerbating intergroup 
tensions.  Although much was learned about those processes, this research largely neglected the experiences of 
people who are targets of those stereotypes.  Furthermore, research emphasized the cooler side of intergroup 
relations, focusing on beliefs and cognitions while neglecting emotional experiences and motivations.    
 Eventually, a strictly cognitive perspective on intergroup relations seemed too limited, and in the 1990’s, a few 
researchers began to revive the interest in the experiences of people who are the targets of stereotypes and prejudice. 
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Research began to shift from a focus on categorization of people into ingroup and outgroup members and the beliefs 
and stereotypes held by ingroup members toward outgroups members, to a focus on the emotions, motivations, and 
coping strategies of people who are stigmatized.  The chapters in this volume illustrate just how much this 
perspective has blossomed in the past 15 years.   
 One of the main difficulties of people with stigmatized identities concerns how to respond to prejudice and 
discrimination they perceive.  When the stigmatized confront others about their prejudiced attitudes or 
discriminatory behavior, other people may derogate the stigmatized person, as Kaiser’s chapter documents. On the 
other hand, to ignore or overlook prejudice and discrimination is, in a sense, to collude in it, leading to guilt, regret, 
and disappointment for the stigmatized person (Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, and Hill (this volume).  In sum, the 
stigmatized often feel caught between two alternatives—confront or overlook prejudice—each of which has 
undesirable consequences.  It is no wonder, then, that people who can conceal their stigmatized identity often choose 
to do so, as Quinn (this volume) notes.  The predicaments the stigmatized experience, regarding disclosing or 
concealing a stigma, and confronting or overlooking prejudice, can be conceptualized in the framework of the 
coping literature, as Miller’s chapter (this volume) notes, or alternatively it can be conceptualized as a self-
regulation process, in which the stigmatized regulate their behavior in the face of obstacles to their goals, as Swim 
and Thomas (this volume) points out.  Bringing the existing literatures on coping and self-regulation to bear on the 
experienced of stigmatized people provides new insights and raises a number of intriguing hypotheses regarding the 
experience of stigmatized people.   
 As Goffman suggested, and other researchers have reiterated, the predicaments of the stigmatized are mainly 
situational or context-dependent.  In other words, stigmatized people feel devalued or threatened in some contexts 
more than others.  For example, subtle features of the situation may raise the specter of being devalued or 
stereotyped, affecting performance on intellectual tasks, a phenomenon explored by Inzlicht and Good (this 
volume).  Mendoza-Denton, Page-Gould, and Pietrzak (this volume) in their research on prejudice apprehension, 
show that some stigmatized individuals are particularly vigilant for prejudice and discrimination, with potentially 
negative consequences.  Perceptions of prejudice and discrimination adversely affect the intergroup contact 
experience for members of minority ethnic groups (Tropp, this volume).  Yet, reactions to the experience of stigma 
are by no means uniform; as Major (this volume) notes, responses to stigma differ variability in responses across 
individuals, situations, and dependent variables, and are transactional in nature.  
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 At its core, the experience of stigma is fundamentally a threat to the self.  Although all of the chapters in this 
volume implicate the self indirectly, in this third section of the volume the self becomes the focus of research and 
theory.  Sinclair and Huntsinger examine build on shared reality theory to understand how the self-concepts of the 
stigmatized are subtly shaped in their interactions with nonstigmatized individuals.  Specifically, shared reality 
theory contends that “social relationships and social beliefs are developed and maintained through perceived 
consensus or ‘shared reality’ established in particular social relationships.”  Shared reality theory describes a subtle 
but profound aspect of social relationships; smooth social interactions require that people share common 
assumptions and beliefs about the nature of reality, including assumptions about who each of the interaction partners 
is as a person.  People are particularly likely to tune their beliefs to those of relationship partners when their 
motivation to establish and maintain relationships is high, and when the belief is relevant to the relationship.  By 
incorporating the views that relationship partners hold of the self, shared realities are established and relationships 
are maintained.  This process is problematic for people who are stigmatized, because establishing a shared reality 
may require incorporating negative stereotypes that the other holds of the self into one’s own self-views, especially 
if the relationship is important and the stereotype is relevant to the relationship.  Thus, whereas developing a shared 
reality can be self-expanding when others hold positive views of the self, it can be self-limiting when it involves 
incorporating negative stereotypes held by interaction partners into self-views.   
 From a very different theoretical perspective, McLaughlin-Volpe takes as her starting point research on the 
inclusion of others in the self by Aron and his colleagues. According to Aron, people have the motive to grow and 
expand the self, acquiring new interests, skills, and knowledge.  Close relationships can be self-expanding, because 
when the other is seen as part of the self, the interests, skills, and knowledge of the relationship partner become a 
part of the self.   Thus, close relationships are an important source of personal growth and self-expansion.  This can 
be particularly true for close relationships between stigmatized and nonstigmatized people, whose interests, skills, 
and knowledge may differ because of their different life experiences.  That’s the good news.  The bad news is that 
because of stereotypes and prejudice, nonstigmatized people may be reluctant to form close relationships with 
stigmatized people, who in turn may have limited opportunities to form close relationships with nonstigmatized 
people.  Thus, stigma can limit opportunities for personal growth and self-expansion for stigmatized and 
nonstigmatized people alike.   
 In their chapter, Schmader and Lickel explore another version of including others into the self.  As noted by 
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Tesser (1988) and others, when people feel close to others, they may bask in the reflected glory of the others’ 
success. For example, parents bask in their children’s athletic accomplishments, professors bask in their students’ 
professional success, and many of us bask in the fame or fortune of our friends and relatives.  In yet another way, 
then, inclusion of others in the self can be self-expanding.  However, as Schmader and Lickel note, the same process 
of including others in the self can lead to a sense of shame or guilt for people who are stigmatized.  Because of a 
shared identity, stigmatized people may include others who share their identity in the self, and consequently may 
experience a sense of shame or guilt when members of their group act in ways that confirm negative stereotypes.     
 We applaud these authors for focusing on how the experience of social stigma can be problematic for the self 
and for the self-relevant emotions that are elicited in intergroup contexts.  In the remainder of this chapter, we 
propose a framework that places the self at the center of the dynamics of intergroup relations, linking our own 
perspective to the research and theory presented in the rest of this volume.   
 
 
THE PURSUIT OF SELF-ESTEEM 
 
We begin with the observation people are motivated by the desire to sustain a view of the self as valuable and 
worthy (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004; Steele, 1988).  The pursuit of self-esteem is so 
pervasive that many psychologists have assumed it is a universal and fundamental human need (Allport, 1955; 
Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1993; Maslow, 1968; Rogers, 1961; Rosenberg, 1979; Solomon, Greenberg, & 
Pyszczynski, 1991; Taylor & Brown, 1988); some have even argued that humans evolved as a species to pursue self-
esteem (Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary & Downs, 1995).  Although we question whether people truly need self-
esteem (Crocker & Nuer, 2004), it seems clear that at least in Western societies, people want self-esteem (Heine, 
Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). 
 People have beliefs about what they need to be or do to have worth and value as a person (Crocker & Wolfe, 
2001).  These beliefs, or contingencies of self-worth, are shaped by individual and collective experiences across the 
life-span, from early attachment relationships with caregivers, to interactions within the family, neighborhood, 
school, community, and culture, that convey what makes a person valuable and worthwhile (Crocker & Park, 2004).  
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In addition, the immediate context may suggest what one needs to be or do to have value and worth in that context 
(Garcia & Crocker, 2003).  In the classroom, intelligence is valued, in the ballroom, physical grace is valued, and in 
the boardroom business acumen is valued.   
 Regardless of their source, contingencies of self-worth shape people’s goals.  In these domains, people have 
self-validation goals, i.e., they want to prove that they satisfy their contingencies of self-worth, and therefore 
demonstrate that they are valuable and worthy (Crocker & Park, 2004; Wolfe & Crocker, 2003).  For example, 
students who base their self-esteem on doing well in school have the goal of demonstrating their intelligence through 
their schoolwork (Crocker, 2003).  Because it is difficult, if not impossible, to sustain a view of the self if others 
with whom one interacts do not share that view, people want others to see themselves as succeeding in the domains 
in which their self-esteem is based.  A person could simply decide that he is brilliant, beautiful, or has a lovely 
voice, but if at least some other people do not concur with this opinion, self-doubts will quickly develop, and  
interactions will be strained because the interactants are operating from different views of reality.  Reaching 
agreement on a shared reality regarding the qualities and attributes of the self is particularly urgent when a 
relationship is important, and when self-attributes are relevant to the interaction (Sinclair & Huntsinger, this 
volume).   
 One way to achieve shared reality in interactions is by adapting or adjusting one’s self-views in the direction of 
one’s interaction partner’s beliefs about the self (Sinclair & Huntsinger, this volume).  This adjustment of the self to 
others’ views eases and smoothes interactions, because both parties are operating on the same assumptions.  Yet, 
when people need others to recognize and validate particular qualities in the self in order to sustain self-esteem, 
adjusting the self to others’ views that threaten self-esteem creates difficulties for the self while it smoothes 
interactions.  Consequently, when self-attributes are relevant to their contingencies of self-worth, people act in ways 
that ensure that others will adjust their views of the self to be consistent with these desired, ego-relevant self-views.  
In other words, people act in ways that create and sustain what we call a “corporate image.”  The corporate image 
goes beyond simply being what one’s self-esteem depends upon, to acting in ways that ensure that others will see 
and acknowledge that one has that quality, with the goal of creating a shared reality that sustains one’s self-esteem.  
For example, a student with the corporate image of “intelligent” may deliberately try to say something clever in each 
class meeting, while avoiding asking questions that could reveal confusion or failure to understand a point.  As this 
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example illustrates, some of the things people do to sustain their corporate image are self-defeating; a student who 
will not ask questions when she doesn’t understand undermines accomplishment of her long-term goals. 
 Success at achieving self-validation and sustaining the corporate image leads to positive self-relevant emotions 
such as pride; threats or obstacles to these self-validation goals trigger negative self-relevant emotions such as 
shame, guilt, or humiliation.  Although success at any goal elicits positive emotions and failure elicits negative 
emotion (Carver & Scheier, 1998), the emotions connected to self-validation goals include self-relevant emotions 
such as shame and guilt, which have particularly potency (Tangney, 1999). When people are driven by self-
validation goals, they are prone to act and think in ways that maintain, protect, and enhance self-esteem, and engage 
in “defensive routines” (Argyris, 1990) that can be destructive, costly, and even self-defeating (Crocker & Park, 
2004).  For example, when people are uncertain of success, they will often self-handicap, or act in ways that create a 
good excuse or explanation for failure, such as procrastinating (Tice, 1991).  These self-handicapping strategies are 
clearly defensive because, although they protect one’s corporate image and self-esteem by providing an explanation 
for failure, they undermine the likelihood of success.   
 Although our perspective is different in focus from shared reality theory as described by Sinclair and 
Huntsinger (this volume), our view is not contradictory to theirs.  Whereas, Sinclair and Huntsinger emphasize how 
people adjust their self-views toward the views that their interaction partners hold of them, we suggest that for some 
self-views, people will be highly motivated to create a shared reality by getting others to see them in ways that 
sustain self-esteem.  Thus, it is not necessarily the case that stigmatized people will adjust their self views to those of 
their interaction partners by evaluating themselves and behaving in stereotype-consistent ways.  On the other hand, a 
shared reality can be developed by stigmatized people striving to get their interaction partners to see them in positive 
ways that counter negative stereotypes. The latter alternative ensures that self-esteem is maintained for the 
stigmatized person, while the non-stigmatized person’s self-esteem is likely to be diminished.  The desire to create a 
shared reality will be greatest when relationship motivation is high and when the self-view in question is relevant to 
contingencies of self-worth.   
 
 
STIGMA AND THE PURSUIT OF SELF-ESTEEM 
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In our view, sustaining the belief that the self is worthy and valuable is fundamentally difficult in interactions 
between the stigmatized and the nonstigmatized, and goes to the heart of why these interactions are often 
problematic.  In intergroup interactions, people bring with them their usual corporate images that they are likely to 
have in any interaction (e.g., competent, virtuous, kind), but most salient to them will be those aspects that are 
specifically relevant to their identity or identities as a member of a valued or devalued group (e.g., fair, 
unprejudiced, deserving of respect, intelligent).  For the stigmatized, interactions with nonstigmatized people raise 
the specters of devaluation, negative stereotypes, and discrimination, which threaten corporate images that the 
stigmatized person needs to sustain to maintain self-esteem.  Likewise, contexts in which one’s identity is valued or 
idealized may activate the goal to demonstrate that one possesses in sufficient measure the positive traits the identity 
is supposed to bestow; that one is fair and unprejudiced, or that one has not benefited unfairly from one’s privileged 
status.  Thus, whether stigmatized or idealized, social identities can trigger self-validation goals linked to corporate 
images in intergroup interactions. 
 
Stigma: The Target’s Perspective  
 
Goffman used the term “stigma” to refer to an attribute of a person that is deeply discrediting, and reduces the 
person "in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one" (Goffman, 1963, p. 3).  People 
who are stigmatized have some characteristic that raises doubts about their full humanity—the person is devalued, 
spoiled or flawed in the eyes of others (Jones et al., 1984). The experience of having a stigmatized attribute, 
condition, or diagnosis raises the possibility that in social interactions one will be devalued, stereotyped, 
discriminated against, rejected, or dehumanized by others (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998).  Consequently, stigma 
fundamentally poses a threat to the corporate image and, hence, self-esteem of the stigmatized person (Crocker et 
al., 1998).   
 When other people are included in the self, because they share a social identity with the self, people may have 
identity validation goals, in addition to self-validation goals.  In particular, as Schmader and Lickel (this volume) 
note, members of stereotyped groups may be highly motivated to prove wrong negative stereotypes of their groups.  
For example, a woman might want to validate that women are competent and tough-minded, or an African-
American student might want to validate that African-Americans are intelligent.  When people believe that they or 
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members of their group have been or could be perceived stereotypically, they may adopt goals to validate the 
positive qualities of the self or the group (Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002).  Avoiding confirming negative 
stereotypes allows the stigmatized person to protect the group’s corporate image. 
When social interactions require negotiating a shared reality, how does the stigmatized person respond to this 
devaluation?  As Sinclair and Huntsinger (this volume) show, if the relationship is important and the perceiver’s 
beliefs about the self are relevant to the interaction, the stigmatized person may adjust his or her self-concept to be 
aligned with the perceiver’s stereotypic beliefs.   However, achieving shared reality in this way may come at a price 
to the stigmatized person’s corporate image and self-esteem, because it may require agreeing that one has negative 
qualities stereotypically associated with one’s stigmatized identity.   Alternatively, the stigmatized person can 
actively assert a corporate image and contest the stereotypic belief, attempting to demonstrate that the negative 
stereotype does not apply to the self.  As Schmader and Lickel (this volume) note, contexts in which one’s identity is 
stigmatized or devalued may activate the goal to prove that negative stereotypes about one’s identity group do not 
apply to the self.  For example, African-American students about to take a test of their intellectual ability describe 
themselves in counter-stereotypic ways (Steele & Aronson, 1995).  One interpretation of this finding is that African-
American students who feel at risk of being judged in the context of negative stereotypes are motivated to distance 
themselves in the eyes of others from the stereotypic characterizations of their group.  
   In addition to the corporate image threat inherent in others holding negative beliefs or stereotypes about the 
stigmatized person, the corporate image of a stigmatized person can also come from how other group members are 
perceived.  As Schmader and Lickel (this volume) note, sharing a social identity with other stigmatized people 
means that their behavior in some ways reflects on the self.  Similarly, how other group members are viewed by 
others reflects on the corporate image of the group, and therefore on the self.  Consequently, when ingroup members 
act in ways that confirm negative stereotypes, stigmatized individuals feel many of the same negative emotions—
shame and anger—that they feel when their own corporate image is threatened (Schmader & Lickel, this volume). 
How do stigmatized people deal with this threat to their personal or collective corporate image?  The usual 
responses involve either creating conflict or avoiding conflict.  As the chapters by Shelton and Richeson (this 
volume) and Kaiser (this volume) note, the stigmatized person may actively cope with this situation by complaining 
about being stereotyped or discriminated against, a choice that is likely to create a conflict with the other.  The costs 
associated with complaining about prejudice and discrimination can be great.  Such complaints bring into sharp 
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relief the fact that there is no shared reality, making interactions difficult.  Furthermore, complaining about prejudice 
and discrimination can threaten other cherished corporate images, such as the image of being nice, easy-going, 
cooperative, non-defensive, and so on, and can threaten the motive to be accepted and included by others (Swim, 
this volume).  Complaints about prejudice can lead to arguments about who is right and who is wrong that can 
damage relationships.  Alternatively, the stigmatized person can avoid conflict by concealing the stigma, being 
vigilant for cues of stigma-based rejection, stifling complaints, or withdrawing. 
Concealment.  Stigmatized people whose stigmas are concealable might avoid conflict by choosing to “pass” as 
nonstigmatized (see Quinn, this volume). In their analysis of social stigma, Jones et al (1984) suggest that 
“individuals who can conceal their affliction will do just that,” (Jones et al., 1984).  When cultural stereotypes are 
inconsistent with the corporate image the stigmatized person wishes to project, concealing the stigma may seem like 
a good idea. However, concealing a stigma does not decrease psychological distress (Link, Mirotznik, & Cullen, 
1991), and  “passing” as non-stigmatized can actually create distress for the concealer (Goffman, 1963).  From the 
perspective of shared reality theory, concealing a stigma creates difficulties for interactions when the stigma is 
relevant and the relationship is important, because the concealer knows that interaction partners do not share crucial 
knowledge about the self.  People who conceal a stigma constantly worry about revealing information about the 
stigma; if they do, their corporate image is challenged both because the stigma becomes known, and because the 
concealer may be considered deceitful for having concealed it, potentially threatening the corporate image of  
“honest” or “trustworthy.” Thus, concealing a stigma is a risky strategy both because of the danger to one’s 
corporate image if the stigma becomes known, and because of the psychological distress and other health 
consequences concealment creates in the long-term (Cole, Kemeny, & Taylor, 1997; Cole, Kemeny, Taylor, & 
Visscher, 1996). 
Vigilance.  Vigilance for early cues of prejudice and devaluation might help the stigmatized person avoid 
conflict by taking defensive measures to avoid experiences with prejudice. However, when people are vigilant for 
signs of devaluation, they tend to see it everywhere, because they interpret the intentions of their interaction partner 
as hostile (Kramer, 1988)..  African Americans who are high in prejudice apprehension, or the anxious expectation 
of race-based rejection, perceive rejection more often and react to it more strongly (Mendoza-Denton, Downey, 
Purdie, Davis, & Pietrzak, 2002). People who anxiously expect rejection actually can behave in ways that increase 
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their likelihood of experiencing rejection (Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, & Khouri, 1998), again creating a downward 
spiral.   
 Stifling complaints.  Another strategy for avoiding conflict about prejudice is stifling one’s complaints.   
However, as Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, and Hill (this volume) note, the cost of not confronting another person 
about prejudice may be negative feelings about the self.  In addition, stifling complaints builds obstacles to creating 
a shared reality with the other. Exiting from the situation or relationship eliminates the need to negotiate a shared 
reality with the potential to threaten self-esteem, but has its own costs.   
 Withdrawal.  Withdrawal is another strategy to avoid conflict about prejudice and discrimination.  However, 
withdrawal can result in greater experiences of rejection, which can, in turn, result in increased withdrawal, creating 
a downward spiral (Wright, Gronfien, & Owens, 2000).  Moreover, withdrawing limits opportunities to form 
relationships with outgroup members, with costs for self-expansion and self-efficacy (McLaughlin-Volpe, this 
volume).   
In sum, from the perspective of the stigmatized person, stigma poses a threat to cherished corporate images, and 
hence self-esteem, and raises questions about one’s worth and value as a person.  Stigmatized people may adjust 
their self-images to be consistent with stereotypes others hold of them, fostering a sense of shared reality.  However, 
this strategy for creating shared reality is costly, in that it may diminish self-esteem. Alternatively, the stigmatized 
person can try to induce the interaction partner to shift his or her beliefs in line with the self-concept of the 
stigmatized person.  Specifically, the stigmatized person may confront the other, pointing out evidence of prejudice 
and discrimination.  Although this may bolster the corporate image by refuting negative stereotypes and devaluation, 
it can threaten corporate images of being good-natured, easy-going, or likeable.  In addition, confronting has costs 
for relationships (Kaiser, this volume). Alternatively, the stigmatized person may conceal the stigma from others, 
become especially vigilant for signs of devaluation, stifle complaints about prejudice, or withdraw from the 
relationship.  Each of these solutions has potential long-term costs. Thus, as Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, and Hill 
suggest, the stigmatized person may be caught between “a rock and a hard place,” with the choice of confronting the 
other and creating conflict, or withdrawing, concealing, being vigilant, or stifling, and avoiding conflict.  As the 
authors of Difficult Conversations note, delivering a difficult message, such as confronting someone about their 
prejudice, is like throwing a hand grenade; choosing not to deliver a difficult message, for example by avoiding 
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confronting someone about their prejudice, is “like hanging onto a hand grenade once you’ve pulled the pin,” 
(Stone, Patton, & Heen, 1999, p. xviii).  There are costs associated with either option.  
 
Stigma: The Perceiver’s Perspective 
 
Stigma can pose a threat to the corporate image of the non-stigmatized, as well.  Although having the valued identity 
in an interaction with a stigmatized person might seem to bolster the corporate image and self-esteem of the 
nonstigmatized person, in actuality there are perils for the nonstigmatized person’s corporate image in this situation.  
First, just as having a devalued identity is linked to stereotypes about negative qualities that presumably go with that 
identity, having a valued identity is linked to stereotypes about positive qualities that presumably go with that 
identity.  Men are supposed to be masculine, strong, and tough; professors are supposed to be intellectual and well-
read, and so on.  Thus, having a valued social identity raises the possibility that one will be judged as not measuring 
up to the positive qualities that are presumed to go with the identity.  In addition, even valued identities often have 
negative stereotypes associated with them; Boston Brahmins are presumed to be well-educated but cold; men are 
strong but emotionally distant; professors are intellectual but out of touch with real life.   Second, people with valued 
identities run the risk of being accused of benefiting from their privileged identity, and lacking the merit other 
people must have to achieve the same status.  For example, many white students feel very uncomfortable with 
exercises designed to help them see how they benefit from whiteness.  Such exercises threaten the corporate image 
that their accomplishments are based on merit, rather than favoritism or privilege.  Third, most people include in 
their corporate image attributes like, fair, thoughtful, just, unbiased, nice, likable, etc. Interacting with a stigmatized 
person can threaten these corporate images by raising the possibility that one will be “caught” expressing prejudice.  
Being caught in prejudice threatens the corporate image and the self-esteem of people who cling to the idea that they 
are unprejudiced (Monteith, 1996; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993).  Fourth, just as being stigmatized broadly 
threatens corporate image and self-esteem because one is devalued, being nonstigmatized puts one at risk of being 
seen by others as the oppressor or the beneficiary of prejudice and discrimination.  Whereas the stigmatized are 
easily seen as the victims of prejudice, the nonstigmatized are easily seen as the perpetrators of prejudice.  Simply 
having a valued identity can place one at risk of being seen as the perpetrator of injustice in certain situations.   
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When social interactions require negotiating a shared reality, how does the nonstigmatized person respond to 
this corporate image threat?  One strategy is to adjust one’s self-image in a negative direction, to bring it into 
alignment with the stigmatized person’s (real or imagined) views of the self, acknowledging that one is the 
beneficiary of privilege and a perpetrator of prejudice and discrimination. Although little studied, we think this 
strategy is used, albeit rarely, when interactions are important and the attribute is relevant.  For example, in our 
experience, white men who work in social justice programs linked to race and gender often freely acknowledge their 
privileged status, and their role as oppressors.  Although adjusting one’s self-concept to the stereotype that one is the 
oppressor threatens corporate images of fairness, etc., we suspect that this strategy can also bolster cherished 
corporate images that are most closely linked to self-esteem, such as the image of being a “good guy” who 
acknowledges his advantaged status and is on the side of creating social justice.  And for white men who work in 
social justice programs, reaching shared reality regarding whether one is the oppressor or not is both important and 
relevant.    
 For the vast majority of nonstigmatized individuals, however, social norms against being prejudiced mean that 
being nonprejudiced is an important part of their corporate image, and they try to behave in ways that ensure that 
others will see them as nonprejudiced. When students were asked to rate a variety of groups both in terms of how 
acceptable it would be to have negative feelings toward the group and their own feelings toward the group, 
participants reported their own prejudices only when they perceived prejudice against a group to be socially 
acceptable (Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002).  Furthermore, when a social norm against prejudice is salient, 
people are less inclined to display prejudicial responses (Monteith, Deneen, & Tooman, 1996).  Thus, egalitarian 
social norms lead people to suppress expressions of prejudice, which may then “leak” out in covert or subtle 
prejudice (Beal, O'Neal, Ong, & Ruscher, 2000; McConahay, 1981, 1986). 
Some people act in a discriminatory manner despite egalitarian norms, suggesting that being nonprejudiced is 
not part of their corporate image. Discrepancies between how people believe they should act (i.e., their corporate 
image) and how they would act with stigmatized others have emotional consequences (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, 
& Elliot, 1991; Zuwerink, Devine, Monteith, & Cook, 1996).  Specifically, when low prejudiced people act more 
prejudiced than their personal values dictate, they feel guilty and criticize themselves. 
To summarize, for nonstigmatized people, interacting with stigmatized others can threaten cherished corporate 
images, and hence self-esteem. Most non-stigmatized people believe that good, fair, likable people are not 
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prejudiced.  When confronted with evidence of their prejudice, their nonprejudiced corporate image is threatened, 
and they feel guilt and discomfort.   
 Thus, interactions can pose a predicament for both stigmatized and non-stigmatized individuals; the stigmatized 
person faces potential devaluation because of his or her stigmatizing attribute, whereas the non-stigmatized person 
faces the possibility of being judged as prejudiced, bigoted, or a perpetrator of injustice.  In the context of social 
interactions, these potential self-threats can lead to mistrust, discomfort, anxiety, and even avoidance and 
withdrawal (Monteith et al., 1993; Stephan & Stephan, 1985).  Social interactions between the stigmatized and non-
stigmatized can be more than uncomfortable; they can reinforce the negative views that each person in the 
interaction holds of the other. It is in these mixed interactions that “the causes and effects of stigma must be directly 
confronted by both sides,” (Goffman, 1963, p13).  For a variety of reasons, interactions between stigmatized and 
non-stigmatized others can be uncomfortable for both parties and even positive conditions of contact may not be 
sufficient to lead to positive effects of contact for members of non-stigmatized groups (Tropp, this volume). 
 
 
THE STIGMA CYCLE 
 
In interactions, two (or more) people’s efforts to sustain their corporate images can become intertwined and 
mutually reinforcing, creating a downward spiral that is difficult to break.  In interactions between stigmatized and 
nonstigmatized people, the ego issues at stake loom large, including who is the “good guy” and who is the “bad 
guy,” who is the victim and who is the perpetrator in the interaction.  Both people in the interaction tend to view 
their behavior as a reaction to the other’s behavior, and do not see their behavior as the cause of the other’s response.  
Thus, each party tends to see themselves as the victim, and the other person as the perpetrator, regardless of whether 
they have a stigmatized or valued social identity.  Admitting that one has made a mistake, apologizing for harm 
caused to another, or acknowledging that one is in some respects a perpetrator, can de-escalate conflict, but threaten 
one’s corporate image of being competent, right, or morally just.  For ego-defensive reasons, then, people resist 
taking actions that could reduce the level of tension in interactions between stigmatized and nonstigmatized people. 
 The resulting dynamic can be painful for both parties. Each person in the interaction, driven by his or her own 
corporate image, tends to behave in ways that trigger the corporate image concerns of the other person.  Of course, 
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there are many versions of this, depending on whether the stigmatized person withdraws, conceals, or accuses, and 
on whether the non-stigmatized person reacts to this behavior with guilt or anger.  The general rule, in our 
experience, is that each person acts in ways that make it more, rather than less, likely that his or her worst fears will 
come true. 
 Consider the dynamic depicted in Figure 1, a typical dynamic between the stigmatized and non-stigmatized, in 
our experience.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIG. 1.  Diagram of the cycle that might occur when the stigmatized and the stigmatizer blame each other. 
 
To help the discussion, we refer to the stigmatized person as “she” and the non-stigmatized person as “he.”  The 
stigmatized person in this dynamic begins with anxiety about being devalued, related to the belief or concern that the 
other may be prejudiced.  Her belief might be accurate, based in past experience or knowledge gleaned from others’ 
experiences.  She is likely to be vigilant for signs of prejudice in him, whether it is justified by past experience or 
not.  And that vigilance will result in a level of scrutiny that few could pass. Sensing that he is under scrutiny, the 
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non-stigmatized person might become nervous, distracted, or focused on suppressing inappropriate thoughts, which 
paradoxically can lead to a slip of the tongue (or a slip of the mind), and the unwanted expression of prejudice.  The 
stigmatized person may respond with complicated emotions—on the one hand, her worst fears have come true.  On 
the other hand, she knows that she was right to be vigilant and mistrusting, and there is something satisfying in 
being right.  She may confront him about his behavior.  He, thinking of himself as a good, fair, and nonprejudiced 
person, may react to this accusation either with rage, or with shame and humiliation, or both.  He may become 
angry, defensive, and feel that his good intentions are unappreciated.  He may conclude that she always sees herself 
as a victim, is critical and judgmental, and never gives him the benefit of the doubt.  He may respond with greater 
anxiety about being accused of prejudice, defending himself, counterattacking, withdrawing, or resisting.  She, in 
turn, will feel misunderstood, judged, and disrespected, and this will reinforce her conclusion that he is prejudiced.   
 We began describing the cycle with her, the stigmatized person’s, belief that she might be devalued, because the 
authors have both observed how we can begin our interactions with this belief.  But the starting point of the cycle 
could just as easily have been the nonstigmatized person, and his anxiety about being accused of prejudice.  We 
have both been in this situation, too.  There is no single person who started this cycle—both people in this dynamic 
bring with them their beliefs and assumptions about the other, corporate images and ego dynamics, and both 
contribute to the cycle.   
 In this cycle, the worst fears of both the stigmatized and the non-stigmatized person are confirmed. He was right 
to be worried about being accused of prejudice, and she was right to worry that he is prejudiced.  What is difficult 
for either of them to see is how they are each responsible for this reality.  In fact, having a conversation about who is 
right and who is wrong in this dynamic is not a way out of the cycle; instead, it is counterproductive.  Both are right, 
and both are wrongly accused.  Both are innocent victims in their own minds, and both are perpetrators in the other 
person’s mind.  In reality, each person in this interaction is both a victim and a perpetrator. After this interaction, 
each will approach the next interaction with more negative beliefs about the other, anxiety, mistrust, and suspicion, 
and create a new destructive cycle. 
 
What Initiates the Cycle? 
 
How does a destructive cycle like this get started?  In our experience, the precursor to this cycle is a threat to 
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corporate image or a “pinch” to the ego, which may be quite subtle.  For example, momentary feelings of 
incompetence, powerlessness, or guilt can subtly threaten self-esteem, creating the context for a destructive cycle.  
Alternatively, realizing that another person’s views of the self are inconsistent with one’s corporate image can set 
the stage for the cycle. At these moments, the person feels a deep, if unidentified, discomfort with the self.  
Reflecting on the reasons for the discomfort may require facing unpleasant realities about the self—I’m sometimes 
selfish, or I’m not as smart as I’d like to think, or my students see me as someone who isn’t open-minded, for 
example.  Unconsciously, to avoid facing unpleasant realities about the self, the person focuses on the weaknesses or 
shortcomings of others.  Negative beliefs about others become salient, triggering negative interaction cycles.  In our 
experience, for example, there are times when the foibles of others do not faze us as all, and times when the same 
foibles drive us to distraction.  The main difference in these situations, we suspect, is that when our egos have been 
pinched by something perhaps completely unrelated (an e-mail message that is unsettling, feeling stuck on a writing 
project), we focus on and cannot bear the foibles of the other.  We communicate our dissatisfaction, creating a 
conflict that confirms our worst views of the other.  Similarly, we suspect that moments when negative beliefs about 
outgroup members are salient have been preceded by some type of pinch to the ego, which leads us to focus on what 
is wrong with the other.   
 
What Sustains the Cycle?   
 
In light of how painful it is, and how inevitable the downward spiral, we might expect that people would quickly 
learn that they need more effective methods to deal with the downward spiral of intergroup relations.  But there are 
at least four powerful forces sustaining the cycle.  First, and most obviously, the desire to maintain and protect self-
esteem sustains the downward spiral.  The behaviors that can stop the cycle are things like admitting mistakes, 
acknowledging one’s responsibility, apologizing, and making reparations.  Yet, each of these behaviors threaten the 
corporate image, because they require acknowledging that one is not always good, right, competent, fair, and just.   
 Second, the cycle is difficult to break because there are some subtle additional advantages that people get from 
being in the cycle.  For example, both participants in these cycles tend to see themselves as the victim, which in their 
view absolves them of responsibility for any damage that is done to the other, and excuses them from responsibility 
for change.     
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 Third, these cycles can consume time, energy, and emotional resources, making it possible to avoid thinking 
about or addressing other, real difficulties facing the participants, such as unpleasant realities about the self.  Being 
caught in an argument about who is the victim and who is the perpetrator in these interactions can provide a great 
excuse not to look at one’s weaknesses and areas for improvement, such as whether one has a difficulty with trust or 
with considering the needs of the other.  For the stigmatized person, focusing on how one is (or might be) a victim 
of discrimination can be a welcome distraction from addressing the areas where one needs to improve.  For the 
nonstigmatized person, focusing on how others are untrusting and unfairly accusing can be a welcome distraction 
from really addressing the real issues in one’s behavior and relationships, and examining one’s beliefs and 
assumptions about outgroup members.  For both, the cycle can provide a distraction from the possibility that I have 
issues to address with the other and I do not know how to address them constructively, without either creating or 
avoiding conflict. 
 Fourth, these cycles can be difficult to break because they are self-reinforcing.  The stigmatized person who 
assumes that others will devalue or reject him may act in ways that increase the likelihood of those events, 
increasing the stigmatized person’s conviction that others cannot be trusted and vigilance is required. The 
nonstigmatized person’s belief that she will be unfairly accused of prejudice increases the likelihood that she will 
behave in cool or distant ways that others interpret as prejudice, reinforcing her concern that she will be unfairly 
accused. Each pass through the cycle reinforces the conception of reality that creates the cycle.   
 
 
THE WAY OUT 
 
How can we break this cycle of suspicion, mistrust, and anxiety between stigmatized and non-stigmatized people?  
Trying to sort out misconceptions from accurate perceptions of reality is not an effective way to break the cycle, 
because both people are convinced that their beliefs and assumptions about the other are right, and behave in ways 
that induce the other to confirm the belief, so both participants’ are right, based on their own experience.   
 The cycle can be broken if each person identifies and takes responsibility for his or her part of the cycle. The 
typical view in these situations is that one person is to blame and the other is the innocent victim—of course, we all 
tend to think that we’re the innocent victim.  Yet, it is very rare that difficult interactions are completely due to the 
Stigma and the Social Basis of the Self      18 
actions of one person, with the other person making no contribution at all.  Breaking the cycle requires shifting from 
blame and judgment to understanding joint responsibility (Stone et al., 1999).  Only when people begin to see that 
they are not only a victim in this cycle, but also a perpetrator, do they see where they have the possibility of altering 
the cycle.  It is precisely where one has responsibility for what went wrong that one has the possibility to create 
something different.  The motivation to take responsibility for breaking the cycle can come from a clear-eyed view 
of its costs and benefits.  Of course, that requires risking threat to one’s corporate image and self-esteem. 
 Framing the problematic nature of intergroup relations in terms of self-validation goals and defensive routines 
leads one to question what alternative goals people might have in intergroup contexts that could improve the 
dynamics of these interactions.   
 Learning goals. Social psychological research has shown that one way to reduce ego threat in difficult 
situations is to adopt a learning orientation (Dweck, 2000).  For example, students who failed a verbal test and 
whose self-esteem was staked on their academic competence showed a large drop in self-esteem; this loss of self-
esteem was entirely eliminated when students were given a learning orientation by priming the belief that 
intelligence can improve (Niiya, Crocker, & Bartmess, in press).  
 These insights dovetail nicely with organizational research on diversity, which suggests that when culturally 
diverse work groups treat their diversity as a resource for learning how best to do the group's core work, group 
members actively explore diverse views, deal more constructively with intergroup conflict, and feel more valued and 
respected, which enhances the group's performance (Ely & Thomas, 2001).  In groups that are motivated to learn 
from members’ cultural differences, discussions about cultural identity are legitimate and tend to be more 
constructive because they are seen as task- rather than ego-related.  In addition, openness to learning from cultural 
differences fosters a safe environment in which members of different cultural identity groups can provide and solicit 
feedback, air conflicts, and learn from their mistakes (Ely & Thomas, 2003). By identifying some of the individual 
and interpersonal dynamics that hinder—and enhance--people’s capacity to learn, we hope to identify and elaborate 
a framework for understanding how to reap the performance benefits of diversity while avoiding many of the costs.   
Learning goals can be a very powerful way to break many negative cycles.  Asking “What can I learn from this 
situation or experience?” can be helpful.   When a stigmatized person feels stuck between two bad options—
confronting another person about his prejudice and creating conflict, or stifling complaints and avoiding conflict, it 
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is possible to find a third alternative by having what Stone, et al. (1999) call a “learning conversation.”  Instead of 
assuming that one’s interpretation of the other’s behavior is right, one might try to learn what the other person’s 
interpretation is.  A non-stigmatized person who believes another person is being vigilant for prejudice, could check 
that out, again in a way that acknowledges that that the perception might be wrong.  A person accused of prejudice, 
or accused of being vigilant for prejudice, can ask, “What am I doing that might lead the other to see me as 
prejudiced?” This open-minded learning orientation can go a long way toward breaking destructive cycles in 
intergroup interactions, for both the stigmatized and the non-stigmatized person. 
Relationship goals.  Another helpful goal is a goal that includes the other person, such as a goal to create trust in 
the relationship, or to build effective communication.  This might be how self-expansion can be beneficial for 
interactions between stigmatized and nonstigmatized. To the degree that the other is included in the self, and one has 
a goal that is good for the other as well as the self, then there is a strong motivation to break the cycle, which is 
costly for both the self and the other (McLaughlin-Volpe, this volume).   
Goals that are larger than the self. Goals that are larger than the self can help break these cycles.  Asking, 
“What do I want to create, contribute, or build that is larger than me, about more than just me?” can take the focus 
off of what the interaction means about me.  
Entering interactions with any or all of these goals—learning goals, relationship goals that include the other, 
and goals to create something larger than the self—can break destructive cycles in several ways.  They reduce 
anxiety and fear, because mistakes, failures, and criticism are great learning opportunities.  With a learning goal, 
people should be less afraid of being accused or devalued, and more interested in understanding the other’s 
perspective and discovering what is useful for them in the exchange.  Relationship goals can serve as a compass for 
how to behave, no matter what the other person says or does.  For example, the goal of creating trust suggests that 
one should listen to what the other person says, try to understand, and not judge or criticize the other. The goal of 
creating something larger than the self can inspire the other person with that goal, leading to alignment rather than 
competition.  Each of these goals creates safety for the other person, which in turn creates safety for the self. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
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The great discomfort that stigmatized and non-stigmatized people feel when interacting is, in the final analysis, 
largely about ego.  Each is afraid of being devalued, being wrong, being accused, being the perpetrator, or being 
inferior. It is easy to see how these ego concerns can be costly in intergroup conflicts, when actions that could 
resolve a conflict such as making a concession or admitting past mistakes are resisted because of the desire to 
validate that one (or one’s group) is competent, right, virtuous, or just.   These experiences are painful for self-
esteem, but they do not represent real dangers to well-being.  People want to see themselves as the victim, and the 
other person as the perpetrator.  But everyone is both a victim and a perpetrator when they are driven by their egos.  
The solution, we have argued, lies in finding goals that are not driven by the ego.  Goals about what one can 
learn, what relationship one wants to create, or what one wants to build or contribute that is larger than the self can 
provide the way out of the destructive cycles of interaction between the stigmatized and stigmatizer.  They can help 
create trust, find common ground, and make a difference in the world. 
 As a final note, we want to be clear about what we are not arguing in this chapter.  We are not arguing that there 
is no reality to the prejudice, discrimination, and stereotyping that people with stigmatized identities experience.  
The evidence that prejudice, discrimination, and stereotyping are real is overwhelming.  In fact, having a spoiled 
identity, and hence being devalued, is a defining characteristic of stigma. Rather, we suggest that when people get 
ego-involved in that devaluation, when they focus on the threat to their self-esteem implicit in that devaluation, they 
act in ways that create the opposite of what they really want, which is to be treated fairly, with respect, and as fully 
human.  The feelings of shame and humiliation that accompany ego threats do not usually help people address the 
threat effectively, they are counterproductive (Tangney, 1999).   Similarly, we do not mean to suggest that concerns 
that others are vigilant for signs of prejudice, or that they could accuse one of being a perpetrator, are disconnected 
from reality.  Some stigmatized people are, indeed, very concerned about the possibilities of rejection, prejudice, 
discrimination, and being stereotyped, as the chapter by Mendoza-Denton (this volume) demonstrates.  We do 
suggest, however, that when nonstigmatized people take these concerns as a personal affront to their self-esteem, 
and respond with attempts to validate their corporate image, their responses are counterproductive. When people 
disconnect their own ego from the experience of being stigmatized and stigmatizer, and are guided instead by 
learning goals and goals that are larger than the self, they are more likely to create the experiences they want in their 
own lives and in others’ lives.  To be sure, there are real issues to address; being caught in maintaining the corporate 
image and pursuing self-esteem does not help people to address those issues.   
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